The War in Afghanistan (1979-1989) has been called "the Soviet
Union's Vietnam War," a conflict that pitted Soviet regulars
against a relentless, elusive, and ultimately unbeatable Afghan
guerrilla force (the mujahideen). The hit-and-run bloodletting
across the war's decade tallied more than 25,000 dead Soviet
soldiers plus a great many more casualties and further demoralized
a USSR on the verge of disintegration.
In "The Soviet-Afghan War" the Russian general staff takes a
close critical look at the Soviet military's disappointing
performance in that war in an effort to better understand what
happened and why and what lessons should be taken from it. Lester
Grau and Michael Gress's expert English translation of the general
staff's study offers the very first publication in any language of
this important and illuminating work.
Surprisingly, this was a study the general staff never intended
to write, initially viewing the war in Afghanistan as a dismal
aberration in Russian military history. The history of the 1990s
has, of course, completely demolished that belief, as evidenced by
the Russian Army's subsequent engagements with guerrilla forces in
Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, and elsewhere. As
a result, Russian officers decided to take a much closer look at
the Red Army's experiences in the Afghan War.
Their study presents the Russian view of how the war started,
how it progressed, and how it ended; shows how a modern mechanized
army organized and conducted a counter-guerrilla war; chronicles
the major battles and operations; and provides valuable insights
into Soviet tactics, strategy, doctrine, and organization across a
wide array of military branches. The editors' incisive preface and
commentary help contextualize the Russian view and alert the reader
to blind spots in the general staff's thinking about the war.
This one-of-a-kind document provides a powerful case study on
how yet another modern mechanized army imprudently relied upon the
false promise of technology to defeat a determined guerrilla foe.
Along the way, it vividly reveals the increasing disillusionment of
Soviet soldiers, how that disillusion seeped back into Soviet
society, and how it contributed to the collapse of the Soviet
Union. The Red Army had fought their war to a military draw but
that was not enough to stave off political defeat at home. The
Soviet-Afghan War helps clarify how such a surprising demise could
have materialized in the backyard of the Cold War's other great
superpower.
General
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