Although we tend to use the terms "representative democracy" and "democracy" as synonyms, Michael Mezey maintains that they are not. Democracy means that the people govern; representative democracy means that the people elect others to govern for them. This raises the question of the extent to which representative government approximates democracy-a question that turns on the relationship between representatives and those whom they represent. Mezey reviews the literature on the meaning of representation and its relationship to issues of citizen control. In the empirical sections that follow, he draws on data from the United States Congress and from legislatures outside the United States to discuss the extent to which the composition of a legislature reflects the demography of its nation. The author also examines a legislature's various political and economic interests and the extent to which representatives are responsive to specific requests for assistance from their constituents and to constituent opinions on public policy questions. He further looks at the effect that interest groups, political parties, and election systems have on the relationship between representatives and their constituents. Finally, Mezey addresses the criticisms that have been leveled against representative institutions: that they are slow to act, inefficient and uninformed when they do act, that they are too inclined to do what is popular rather than what is necessary and, conversely, that their members are too removed from the opinions of their constituents and therefore unfaithful to their democratic obligation to respond to the wishes of those whom they represent. Rich in thoughtful analysis, Representative Democracy incorporates normative, empirical and comparative perspectives on representation. It is perfectly suited for use in an upper-level course on the legislative process or Congress.

This book explores the increasing use of Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) in emerging democratic governments in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Oceania. CDFs dedicate public money to benefit parliamentary constituencies through allocations and/or spending decisions influenced by Members of Parliament (MPs). The contributors employ the term CDF as a generic term although such funds have a different names, such as Electoral Development funds (Papua New Guinea), Constituency Development Catalyst Funds (Tanzania), Member of Parliament Local Area Development Fund (India), and the like. In some ways, the funds resemble the ad hoc pork barrel policy making employed in the US Congress for the past 200 years. However, unlike earmarks, CDFs generally become institutionalized in the government s annual budget and are distributed according to different criteria in each country. They enable MPs to influence programs in their constituencies that finance education, and build bridges, roads, community centers, clinics and schools. In this sense, a CDF is a politicized form of spending that can help fill in the important gaps in government services in constituencies that have not been addressed in the government s larger, comprehensive policy programs. This first comprehensive treatment of CDFs in the academic and development literatures emerges from a project at the State University of New York Center for International Development (SUNY CID). This project has explored CDFs in 19 countries and has developed indicators on their emergence, operations and oversight. The contributors provide detailed case studies of the emergence and operations of CDFs in Kenya, Uganda, Jamaica, and India, as well as an analysis of earmarks in the U.S. Congress, and a broader analysis of the emergence of the funds in Africa. They cover the emergence, institutionalization, and accountability of these funds, analyze key issues in their operations, and offer provisional conclusions of what the emergence and operations of these funds say about the democratization of politics in developing countries and current approaches to international support for democratic governance in developing countries."

Although we tend to use the terms 'representative democracy' and 'democracy' as synonyms, Michael Mezey maintains that they are not. Democracy means that the people govern; representative democracy means that the people elect others to govern for them. This raises the question of the extent to which representative government approximates democracy-a question that turns on the relationship between representatives and those whom they represent. Mezey reviews the literature on the meaning of representation and its relationship to issues of citizen control. In the empirical sections that follow, he draws on data from the United States Congress and from legislatures outside the United States to discuss the extent to which the composition of a legislature reflects the demography of its nation. The author also examines a legislature's various political and economic interests and the extent to which representatives are responsive to specific requests for assistance from their constituents and to constituent opinions on public policy questions. He further looks at the effect that interest groups, political parties, and election systems have on the relationship between representatives and their constituents. Finally, Mezey addresses the criticisms that have been leveled against representative institutions: that they are slow to act, inefficient and uninformed when they do act, that they are too inclined to do what is popular rather than what is necessary and, conversely, that their members are too removed from the opinions of their constituents and therefore unfaithful to their democratic obligation to respond to the wishes of those whom they represent. Rich in thoughtful analysis, Representative Democracy incorporates normative, empirical and comparative perspectives on representation. It is perfectly suited for use in an upper-level course on the legislative process or Congress.

This book looks at the relationship between Congress and the president and how this interaction shapes public policy. The relationship between the president and the Congress has been under discussion as long as the U.S. Constitution has existed. It has been a discussion in which presidents, congressional leaders, Supreme Court justices, scholars

Selecting political leaders by popular election is an unquestioned hallmark of representative democracies-the institutional manifestation of Lincoln's promise of a government of the people and by the people. But in 2016, Lincoln's promise seems to have given way to Hamilton's nightmare-with his worries that popular elections would produce demagogues who paid an "obsequious court to the people," appealing to their passions and prejudices rather than to their reason. This book examines the commitment to the widest level of participation among the largest number of citizens in the selection of the president. It looks at two salient characteristics of our current presidential election environment that bring the wisdom of this commitment into question: the declining influence of political parties and the communication revolution in the form of the internet, social media, and cable television. Ultimately, Mezey asks whether our now fully democratized presidential selection process has in fact diminished the quality of our presidential candidates and the campaigns they run, whether the turn to demagoguery that the founders feared has materialized, what the consequences of our presidential selection process have been for American government, and whether or not it would be valuable to rethink our wholehearted commitment to popular election of the president. His answers do not topple our commitment to popular elections but rather point the way toward improving the quality of both participation and democracy.

Irina Khmelko, Frederick Stapenhurst, and Michael L. Mezey have assembled an authoritative guide to the declining institutional capacities of legislatures around the world. Case studies represent a diverse sample of countries, ranging from newer democracies emerging from the post-communist world to more established but at times fragile democracies in Asia. Although largely focused on newer democratic systems, readers will be able to identify key factors that explain the general global trend toward the empowerment of executives at the expense of national legislatures. The cases, although different from one another, identify several factors that have explained the erosion of legislative power, including historical legacies, institutional design, economic factors, external factors, political polarization, personalization of politics, and the rise of populism. Original data and the presentation of testable theoretical propositions about the growing imbalance between executives and national legislatures moves the field in a promising new direction. Legislative Decline in the 21st Century will be of interest to students and scholars of Legislative Studies and Comparative Politics. Lessons drawn from these case studies will allow policy makers to explore new solutions that can lead to the improved quality of democracy in countries around the world.

Selecting political leaders by popular election is an unquestioned hallmark of representative democracies-the institutional manifestation of Lincoln's promise of a government of the people and by the people. But in 2016, Lincoln's promise seems to have given way to Hamilton's nightmare-with his worries that popular elections would produce demagogues who paid an "obsequious court to the people," appealing to their passions and prejudices rather than to their reason. This book examines the commitment to the widest level of participation among the largest number of citizens in the selection of the president. It looks at two salient characteristics of our current presidential election environment that bring the wisdom of this commitment into question: the declining influence of political parties and the communication revolution in the form of the internet, social media, and cable television. Ultimately, Mezey asks whether our now fully democratized presidential selection process has in fact diminished the quality of our presidential candidates and the campaigns they run, whether the turn to demagoguery that the founders feared has materialized, what the consequences of our presidential selection process have been for American government, and whether or not it would be valuable to rethink our wholehearted commitment to popular election of the president. His answers do not topple our commitment to popular elections but rather point the way toward improving the quality of both participation and democracy.

The role legislatures play in the public policy-making process is of central concern to political scientists. Conventional wisdom claims that all legislatures except perhaps the US Congress are either marginal to the policy-making process or becoming increasingly so. In Legislatures in the Policy Process leading specialists in comparative government reassess this view and significantly advance research on the influence of legislatures. In the opening chapter, David Olson and Michael Mezey identify three categories of variables - external influences, internal influences and policy attributes - which can affect the policy-making role of legislatures. They specify sixteen hypotheses that describe the relationship between these variables and the policy participation of legislatures. In subsequent chapters, these hypotheses are examined through a series of individual and comparative country studies which focus upon the role of the legislatures in various aspects of economic policy making. These include the influence of the French, German, British and US legislatures on monetary policy; the role of the Brazilian Congress and Indian Parliament in computer and electronics policy and the part played by the Polish Sejm in labour policy.

The role legislatures play in the public policy-making process is of central concern to political scientists. Conventional wisdom claims that all legislatures except perhaps the US Congress are either marginal to the policy-making process or becoming increasingly so. In Legislatures in the Policy Process leading specialists in comparative government reassess this view and significantly advance research on the influence of legislatures. In the opening chapter, David Olson and Michael Mezey identify three categories of variables - external influences, internal influences and policy attributes - which can affect the policy-making role of legislatures. They specify sixteen hypotheses that describe the relationship between these variables and the policy participation of legislatures. In subsequent chapters, these hypotheses are examined through a series of individual and comparative country studies which focus upon the role of the legislatures in various aspects of economic policy making. These include the influence of the French, German, British and US legislatures on monetary policy; the role of the Brazilian Congress and Indian Parliament in computer and electronics policy and the part played by the Polish Sejm in labour policy.