Ending the U.S. war in Iraq required redeploying 100,000 military and civilian personnel; handing off responsibility for 431 activities to the Iraqi government, U.S. embassy, USCENTCOM, or other U.S. government entities; and moving or transferring ownership of over a million pieces of property in accordance with U.S. and Iraqi laws, national policy, and DoD requirements. This book examines the planning and execution of this transition.

U.S. Army Special Operations Command asked RAND Arroyo Center to determine whether its Tactical Human Optimization, Rapid Rehabilitation and Reconditioning (THOR3) program is effectively utilizing the resources provided and to identify opportunities for improvement in the program s planning and implementation, staffing, leader development and education, facility and equipment requirements, and ability to support participating personnel.

Security force assistance (SFA) is a central pillar of the counterinsurgency campaign being waged by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. This monograph analyzes SFA efforts in Afghanistan over time, documents U.S. and international approaches to building the Afghan force from 2001 to 2009, and provides observations and recommendations that emerged from extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan in 2009 and their implications for the U.S. Army. This title analyzes security force assistance efforts in Afghanistan, focusing on lessons and themes that emerged from extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan in 2009 and their implications for the U.S. Army.

This study considers the creation of a high-end police force for use in stability operations, examining its ideal size, how responsive it needs to be, where in the government to locate it, its needed capabilities, its proper staffing, and its cost. A 6,000-person force--created in the U.S. Marshals Service and whose officers are seconded to domestic police agencies when not deployed--would be the most effective of the options considered.

Looks at the Coalition Provisional Authority's efforts to rebuild Iraq's security sector and provides lessons learned. From May 2003 to June 28, 2004 (when it handed over authority to the Iraqi Interim Government), the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) worked to field Iraqi security forces and to develop security sector institutions. This book - all of whose authors were advisors to the CPA-breaks out the various elements of Iraq's security sector, including the defense, interior, and justice sectors, and assesses the CPA's successes and failures.

This monograph provides a practical definition of terrorism risk, presents a method of estimating it, and demonstrates a framework for evaluating this method. Results support conclusions on how to improve risk-based resource allocation. The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for protecting the United States from terrorism. It does so partly through the Urban Areas Security Initiative, though its distribution has been criticized for not reflecting risk. This monograph offers a practical definition of terrorism risk and a method for estimating it that addresses inherent uncertainties. It also demonstrates a framework for evaluating alternative risk estimates. Finally, it makes five recommendations for improving resource allocation.