This reference work is an ideal resource for anyone interested in better understanding the controversial Iraq War. It treats the war in its entirety, covering politics, religion, and history, as well as military issues. The Iraq War started in 2003 in a quest to rid the nation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that were never found. It lasted over 8 years, during which more than 30,000 U.S. service members were wounded and almost 4,500 American lives lost. Comprised of some 275 entries, this comprehensive encyclopedia examines the war from multiple points of view. Each article is written by an expert with specialized knowledge of the topic. The reference covers every aspect of the Iraq War, from the U.S. invasion (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM) through the rise of Al Qaeda in Iraq, the surge, and the U.S. withdrawal. Other significant aspects of the conflict are addressed as well, including Abu Ghraib, WMDs, the controversial use of private military contractors, and Britain's role in the war. The book also features an overview essay, a "causes and consequences" essay, maps, photos, a chronology, and a bibliography.

As shocking as the attacks of 9/11 were, we have been too quick to view the post-9/11 struggle against terrorism as entirely new and unprecedented. Without denying certain novel aspects of Al Qaeda and its affiliates, the "newness" of its purpose and methods has been overemphasized. Many aspects of contemporary terrorism bear a striking resemblance to past movements. Others represent the culmination of trends evolving over decades. Even seemingly novel characteristics of terrorist methods may be more the outcome of earlier developments than a truly new phenomenon. The increased lethality of terrorist attacks is a case in point. Usually attributed to lack of restraint brought on by religious extremism, the emphasis on body count may owe as much to a kind of threshold phenomenon. Numbed by decades of violence, people do not shock as easily as they once did. It now takes thousands of deaths to produce the same effect once caused by a relative handful. This book examines the nature of the contemporary threat within a historical context to discern continuities and change in terrorist behavior. It challenges the idea of a global war on terrorism and suggests that the United States, or any threatened country, would be better served by a policy aimed at reducing the risk of terrorist attack to an acceptable level at a reasonable cost. The book concludes by proposing a workable strategy for achieving this reasonable level of security.

Based upon consideration of United Nation missions to the Congo (1960-64), Somalia (1992-95), and the former Yugoslavia (1992-95) and examination of counterinsurgency campaigns, Mockaitis develops a new model for intervening in intrastate conflicts and commends the British approach to civil strife as the basis for a new approach to peace operations. Both contemporary and historic examples demonstrate that military intervention to end civil conflict differs radically from traditional peacekeeping. Ending a civil war requires the selective and limited use of force to stop the fighting, safeguard humanitarian aid work, and restore law and order. Since intrastate conflict resembles insurgency far more than it does any other type of war, counterinsurgency principles should form the basis of a new intervention model.

A comprehensive approach to resolve intrastate conflict requires that peace forces, NGOs, and local authorities cooperate in rebuilding a war-torn country. Only the British have enjoyed much success in counterinsurgency campaigns. Starting from the three broad principles of minimum force, civil-military cooperation, and flexibility, the British approach in responding to insurgency has combined the limited use of force with political and civil development. Carefully considered and correctly applied, these principles could produce a more effective model for peace operations to end intrastate conflict.

This volume offers a comprehensive history of warfare since 1648, covering conventional and unconventional operations and demonstrating how most modern wars have been hybrid affairs that involved both. The book uses a broad range of conflicts to explore the societal forces that have shaped wars. Written by noted military historian Thomas R. Mockaitis, this book explores conventional and unconventional conflicts and considers the relationships between them. It considers how epic struggles like the American Civil War, World Wars I and II, and the conflicts in the Middle East, among many others, shaped human history. The coverage serves to highlight four themes: the relationship between armed forces and the societies that create them; the impact of technology (not just armaments) on warfare; the role of ideas and attitudes towards violence in determining why and how wars are fought; and the relationship between conventional and unconventional operations. The book also covers the advent and evolution of unconventional warfare, including counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and current conflicts in the Middle East. It concludes with consideration of the forms armed conflict will take in the future. The book includes valuable excerpts from the writings of military thinkers such as Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, an extensive bibliography of primary and secondary sources, and supporting maps and diagrams.

Mockaitis begins by providing a working definition of counterinsurgency that distinguishes it from conventional war while discussing the insurgents' uses of terror as a method to support their broader strategy of gaining control of a country. Insurgent movements, he notes, use terror far more selectively than do terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda, which kills indiscriminately and is more than willing to produce mass casualties. Such methods stand in stark contrast to the American approach to armed conflict, which is more ideally suited to pragmatic culture leery of involvement in protracted foreign wars and demands immediate results. Within this context, Mocktaitis examines the conflict in Iraq, from post conflict troubles with Saddam in the early 1990s, to pre-invasion planning in 2003. He then moves into a discussion of the rise of insurgent movements and the challenges they posed in the aftermath of the fighting, tracing the ongoing efforts to shape a doctrine that allows US forces to successfully deal with the growing insurgency The U.S. military in Iraq faces the most complex counterinsurgency campaign in its history and perhaps the history of modern warfare. At the outset, it confronted as many as 22 different domestic insurgent and foreign terrorist groups in an environment made more difficult by thousands of criminals released by Saddam Hussein. Over the past three years, the conflict has evolved with growing ethnic violence complicating an already difficult security situation. Even the most optimistic assessments predict a continued deployment of significant U.S. forces for at least five years for the country to be stabilized. It remains to be seen whether public opinionwill support such a deployment. Mockaitis situates the Iraq War in its broad historical and cultural context. He argues that failure to prepare for counterinsurgency in the decades following the end of the Vietnam War left the U.S. military ill equipped to handle irregular warfare in the streets of Baghdad. Lack of preparation and inadequate troop strength led American forces to adopt a conventional approach to unconventional war. Over-reliance on firepower combined with cultural insensitivity to alienate many Iraqis. However, during the first frustrating year of occupation, U.S. forces revised their approach, relearning lessons from past counterinsurgency campaigns and adapting them to the new situation. By the end of 2004, they had developed an effective strategy and tactics but continued to be hampered by troop shortages, compounded by the unreliability of many Iraqi police and military units. The Army's new doctrine, embodied in FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, outlines the correct approach to winning Iraq. However, three years of desultory conflict amid ongoing revelations that the premises upon which the administration argued the need for invading Iraq may be false have eroded support for the war. The American armed forces may soon find themselves in the unfortunate situation of having found a formula for success at almost the same time the voters demand withdrawal.

Ideal for general readers as well as professionals conducting extensive research, this informative book offers a collection of documents on the origins and conduct of the Iraq War. The Iraq War: A Documentary and Reference Guide gives readers the opportunity to investigate this costly and controversial conflict as professional researchers do-by looking closely at key samples of historical evidence. As readers will see, that evidence proves to be extraordinarily revealing about the drive to war, the course of the initial invasion, the counterinsurgency, the "surge," and the continuing difficulties in unifying and stabilizing the country. From relevant exchanges in the 2000 Bush/Gore debates to interviews with Saddam Hussein to the latest reorganization of the Coalition Provisional Authority, The Iraq War gives readers an insider's view of the conflict's key decisions and events. Each chapter brings together primary and secondary sources on an important phase of the war, with the author providing context, analysis, and insight from a historian's perspective. The book also provides a solid framework for working with the documentary record-a particularly difficult task in this case, as so many vital sources will remain classified and inaccessible for years to come. More than 100 excerpts of government documents, military briefings, Congressional reports, media articles, and more, all related to specific phases of the Iraq War An introductory chapter on the processes and challenges of researching the historic record Commentary in each chapter showing what can be interpreted from the collected sources Sidebars offering biographical notes on key figures; explanations of key terms and concepts; accounts of international treaties, laws, and agreements, and background notes on historical events

This collection of essays examines the strategic dimensions of contemporary terrorist threats. It evaluates the changing nature of modern terrorism in the light of the events of September 11 2001. The collection argues that terrorism now promises to enter the terrain of global "grand strategy."

This collection of essays examines the strategic dimensions of contemporary terrorist threats. It evaluates the changing nature of modern terrorism in the light of the events of September 11 2001. The collection argues that terrorism now promises to enter the terrain of global "grand strategy."

Written for the general reader as well as the professional, this succinct but comprehensive work examines the hybrid nature of the two violent extremist movements threatening the United States: Islamist extremism and white nationalism. Scholarship as well as popular discourse on terrorism often focuses disproportionately on specific groups without paying sufficient attention to the ideology that motivates them. This book emphasizes understanding and countering the ideology that fuels extremism over preoccupation with specific organizations such as Al Qaeda or ISIS. It sets contemporary terrorist threats in perspective, avoiding fear-mongering and political rhetoric. The book examines the nature of violent extremism today in all its forms, including lone wolves and cyber threats. Focusing on the threats posed by both international and domestic terrorism, it analyzes each in depth as a multidimensional hybrid phenomenon: each threat exists as an ideology, as distinct groups espousing that ideology, and as a network of followers. Short, easy-to-read chapters take readers through the subject matter in a clear, methodical manner. Written in an accessible style by an author who has studied terrorism for more than 30 years and provided extensive media coverage on the subject, the work is a valuable addition to the literature on violent extremism. Provides concise but comprehensive analysis of violent extremism as a hybrid phenomenon Focuses on contemporary threats that are of great concern to the United States and other Western powers Combines scholarly rigor with an accessible writing style Debunks fear and counters myths while avoiding political hype

This concise biography of the world's most notorious terrorist tells the fascinating story of the evolution of a wealthy businesman's son to the 9/11 mastermind who declared war on America. Osama bin Laden: A Biography offers a concise, fact-based portrait of a man whose rise from obscurity to notoriety coincides with some of the most traumatic events of the 21st century. It follows bin Laden's story from his life in Saudi society in the 1960s and 1970s to his religious conversion, his emergence as a jihadist leader, his horrifying terrorist attacks, and his near-mythic status in parts of the Muslim world today. Drawing on a wide range of sources, Osama bin Laden finds the political and religious roots of a worldview that combines devout faith with a belief in violence and terrorism. The book pays particular attention to the spread of radical Islam from Egypt to Saudi Arabia and beyond, as well as the development of Al Qaeda and its current scope and capabilities.

As shocking as the attacks of 9/11 were, we have been too quick to view the post-9/11 struggle against terrorism as entirely new and unprecedented. Without denying certain novel aspects of Al Qaeda and its affiliates, the "newness" of its purpose and methods has been overemphasized. Many aspects of contemporary terrorism bear a striking resemblance to past movements. Others represent the culmination of trends evolving over decades. Even seemingly novel characteristics of terrorist methods may be more the outcome of earlier developments than a truly new phenomenon. The increased lethality of terrorist attacks is a case in point. Usually attributed to lack of restraint brought on by religious extremism, the emphasis on body count may owe as much to a kind of threshold phenomenon. Numbed by decades of violence, people do not shock as easily as they once did. It now takes thousands of deaths to produce the same effect once caused by a relative handful. This book examines the nature of the contemporary threat within a historical context to discern continuities and change in terrorist behavior. It challenges the idea of a global war on terrorism and suggests that the United States, or any threatened country, would be better served by a policy aimed at reducing the risk of terrorist attack to an acceptable level at a reasonable cost. The book concludes by proposing a workable strategy for achieving this reasonable level of security.

The U.S. missions to Bosnia and Kosovo and the current operation in Iraq make it clear that winning wars accomplishes little if we cannot also win the peace. The strategic goals for which the wars are fought can only be achieved if the follow-on mission leaves an occupied territory more stable and democratic than before. Civilmilitary cooperation (CIMIC) is the key to achieving such stability. Although such cooperation has occurred in the past, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization developed its own CIMIC doctrine in response to the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s. Humanitarian intervention requires the intervening military force to provide security and lend its considerable assets to relief operations and rebuilding. CIMIC provides the mechanism for such cooperation and support. Like any concept employed in coalition warfare, CIMIC application varies widely. Examining diverse national approaches to CIMIC in the field reveals best practices and common mistakes.

Taking full account of the factors beyond the control of the U.S. military and avoiding glib comparisons with Vietnam, the author examines how the American approach to the war in Iraq has affected operations there. He also draws on the experience of other nations, particularly the United Kingdom, to identify broad lessons that might inform the conduct of this and future campaigns. He documents the process by which soldiers and Marines in Iraq have adapted to the challenging situation and incorporated both historic and contemporary lessons into the new counterinsurgency doctrine contained in Field Manual 3-24.

Understanding how insurgencies may be brought to a successful conclusion is vital to military strategists and policymakers. This study examines how past insurgencies have ended and how current ones may be resolved. Four ways in which insurgencies have ended are identified. Clear-cut victories for either the government or the insurgents occurred during the era of decolonization, but they seldom happen today. Recent insurgencies have often degenerated into criminal organizations that become committed to making money rather than fighting a revolution, or they evolve into terrorist groups capable of nothing more than sporadic violence. In a few cases, the threatened government has resolved the conflict by co-opting the insurgents. After achieving a strategic stalemate and persuading the belligerents that they have nothing to gain from continued fighting, these governments have drawn the insurgents into the legitimate political process through reform and concessions. The author concludes that such a co-option strategy offers the best hope of U.S. success in Afghanistan and in future counterinsurgency campaigns.

Counterinsurgency remains the most challenging form of conflict conventional forces face. Embroiled in the longest period of sustained operations in its history, the U.S. Army maintains a fragile peace in Iraq and faces a chronic insurgency in Afghanistan. In much of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, active insurgent conflicts continue and potential ones abound. The United States may become involved in some of these conflicts, either directly or by providing aid to threatened governments. Understanding how insurgencies may be brought to a successful conclusion is, therefore, vital to military strategists and policymakers. The author, Dr. Thomas Mockaitis, examines in great detail how past insurgencies have ended and how current ones may be resolved. Drawing upon a dozen cases over half a century, the author identifies four ways in which insurgencies have ended. Clearcut victories for either the government or the insurgents occurred during the era of decolonization, but they seldom happen today. Recent insurgencies have often degenerated into criminal organizations committed to making money rather than fighting a revolution, or into terrorist groups capable of nothing more than sporadic violence. In a few cases, the threatened government has resolved the conflict by co-opting the insurgents. After achieving a strategic stalemate and persuading the belligerents that they have nothing to gain from continued fighting, these governments have drawn the insurgents into the legitimate political process through reform and concessions. This monograph concludes that such a co-option strategy offers the best hope of success in Afghanistan and in future counterinsurgency campaigns.