|
Books > Social sciences > Politics & government > Political activism > Armed conflict
|
Buy Now
Iraq and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency (Hardcover)
Loot Price: R1,481
Discovery Miles 14 810
|
|
|
Iraq and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency (Hardcover)
Series: Praeger Security International
Expected to ship within 10 - 15 working days
|
Mockaitis begins by providing a working definition of
counterinsurgency that distinguishes it from conventional war while
discussing the insurgents' uses of terror as a method to support
their broader strategy of gaining control of a country. Insurgent
movements, he notes, use terror far more selectively than do
terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda, which kills indiscriminately
and is more than willing to produce mass casualties. Such methods
stand in stark contrast to the American approach to armed conflict,
which is more ideally suited to pragmatic culture leery of
involvement in protracted foreign wars and demands immediate
results. Within this context, Mocktaitis examines the conflict in
Iraq, from post conflict troubles with Saddam in the early 1990s,
to pre-invasion planning in 2003. He then moves into a discussion
of the rise of insurgent movements and the challenges they posed in
the aftermath of the fighting, tracing the ongoing efforts to shape
a doctrine that allows US forces to successfully deal with the
growing insurgency The U.S. military in Iraq faces the most complex
counterinsurgency campaign in its history and perhaps the history
of modern warfare. At the outset, it confronted as many as 22
different domestic insurgent and foreign terrorist groups in an
environment made more difficult by thousands of criminals released
by Saddam Hussein. Over the past three years, the conflict has
evolved with growing ethnic violence complicating an already
difficult security situation. Even the most optimistic assessments
predict a continued deployment of significant U.S. forces for at
least five years for the country to be stabilized. It remains to be
seen whether public opinionwill support such a deployment.
Mockaitis situates the Iraq War in its broad historical and
cultural context. He argues that failure to prepare for
counterinsurgency in the decades following the end of the Vietnam
War left the U.S. military ill equipped to handle irregular warfare
in the streets of Baghdad. Lack of preparation and inadequate troop
strength led American forces to adopt a conventional approach to
unconventional war. Over-reliance on firepower combined with
cultural insensitivity to alienate many Iraqis. However, during the
first frustrating year of occupation, U.S. forces revised their
approach, relearning lessons from past counterinsurgency campaigns
and adapting them to the new situation. By the end of 2004, they
had developed an effective strategy and tactics but continued to be
hampered by troop shortages, compounded by the unreliability of
many Iraqi police and military units. The Army's new doctrine,
embodied in FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, outlines the correct
approach to winning Iraq. However, three years of desultory
conflict amid ongoing revelations that the premises upon which the
administration argued the need for invading Iraq may be false have
eroded support for the war. The American armed forces may soon find
themselves in the unfortunate situation of having found a formula
for success at almost the same time the voters demand withdrawal.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!
|
You might also like..
|
Email address subscribed successfully.
A activation email has been sent to you.
Please click the link in that email to activate your subscription.
Welcome to Loot.co.za!
Sign in / Register |Wishlists & Gift Vouchers |Help | Advanced search
(1)
(1)
