The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as "war of annihilations," "deep battle," and "deep operations" have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

An Austro-Hungarian with a dark streak, Victor Lustig was a man of athletic good looks, with a taste for larceny and foreign intrigue. He spoke six languages and went under nearly as many aliases in the course of a continent-hopping life that also saw him act as a double (or possibly triple) agent. Along the way, he found time to dupe an impressive variety of banks and hotels on both sides of the Atlantic; to escape from no fewer than three supposedly impregnable prisons; and to swindle Al Capone out of thousands of dollars, while living to tell the tale. Undoubtedly the greatest of his hoaxes was the sale, to a wealthy but gullible Parisian scrap-metal dealer, of the Eiffel Tower in 1925. In a narrative that thrills like a crime caper, best-selling biographer Christopher Sandford tells the whole story of the greatest conman of the twentieth century.

This prize-winning book, first published in 1991, provides a detailed legal account of the development of the UK Official Secrets Acts 1911-1989. In particular, the Espionage section (s.1) of this criminal law is analysed carefully, illustrated by leading cases of UK spies prosecuted under this section, particularly during the 1980's - including MI5 officer Michael Bettaney and Geoffrey Prime who worked at GCHQ. The author also examines problems of evidence in espionage prosecutions, and the consent of the Attorney-General in cases under the Official Secrets Acts. This book remains the definitive treatise on the UK Official Secrets Acts, especially concerning the espionage provisions.

This book traces the history of Australia's highly secret Intelligence Security Organisation. Established in the early days of the Cold War, like most intelligence organisations working under covert conditions, it exceeded the vague powers entrusted to it. It has been the subject of two Royal Commissions in Australia and in recent times several acts of Parliament have been passed in order to make it more accountable to Australia's government and its citizens.

A thin, balding, and reclusive middle-aged Russian by the name of Rudolf Ivanovich Abel was one of the Soviet Union's most renowned spies during the Cold War of the 1950s...until his cover was blown by an incompetent colleague who wanted to defect to the United States. This is the full account of Abel's espionage work, his dramatic apprehension, his eventual conviction and its affirmation by the United States Supreme Court, and finally, his surprising release back to Russia. Rudolf Ivanovich Abel ran KGB operations in the United States for nine years during the Cold War of the 1950s, until one day his true identity was revealed by a lazy, hard-drinking, womanizing colleague who decided to defect to the United States before he was sent back to Russia-and presumably his death-for incompetence in the field. As the authorities hunted down Abel, the FBI had in hand his tools of trade-hollowed-out bolts and coins used to send tiny coded messages and photographs back and forth to the Soviet Union-but little else in the way of hard leads. After Abel was located, his modest hotel in Manhattan was staked out by the FBI for over a month before he was eventually arrested and tried for espionage. After his conviction, Abel appealed his case to the Second Court of Appeals, where he argued that the search and seizure of his hotel room was unconstitutional because they were made without a warrant. His conviction was affirmed, and the case proceeded to the Supreme Court, which was sharply divided. The cliffhanger facing Abel for the next several years was whether he would face the electric chair, remain in prison for the rest of his life, or be exchanged for an American spy held by the Russians. His fate remained in the balance.

Numerous allegations of abuse of power have been made against the domestic security intelligence agencies in the UK - police special branches and MI5. These include the improper surveillance of trades unionists and peace activists, campaigns of disinformation against elected politicians and the summary shooting of people believed to be engaged in political violence. Although far-reaching enquiries have been conducted into similar agencies in other liberal democracies, and the end of the Cold War has brought dramatic change to security agencies in Eastern Europe, the UK agencies have remained aloof from anything more than marginal organizational change.

Numerous allegations of abuse of power have been made against the domestic security intelligence agencies in the United Kingdom - police special branches and MI5. These include the improper surveillance of trade unionists and peace activists, campaigns of disinformation against elected politicians and, most serious of all, the summary shooting of people believed to be engaged in political violence. Although in recent years far-reaching inquiries have been conducted into similar agencies in other liberal democracies, and the end of the Cold War has brought dramatic change to security agencies in Eastern Europe, the UK agencies have remained aloof from anything more than marginal organisational change. Drawing on extensive foreign material and making use of the social science concepts of information, power and law, this book develops a framework for the comparative analysis of these agencies. This provides, first, a systematic discussion of what is known about the operations of security intelligence agencies in liberal democracies and, second, an agenda for research into the UK agencies, including: the ambiguous nature of their mandate regarding 'national security', 'subversion' and 'terrorism'; the ways in which the agencies penetrate society and what they do with the information they gather; internal organisational questions such as recruitment and culture; the extent to which the agencies are controlled by ministers; and how the agencies' activities might be overseen by outside political bodies such as parliamentary committees, and by citizens in general. Concluding that not enough is known about how these agencies operate in the UK, the book argues the need for a thorough inquiry toinvestigate the disturbing allegations that have been made, and to make proposals for a more democratic system of security intelligence.

An in-depth analysis of why COVID-19 warnings failed and how to avert the next disaster Epidemiologists and national security agencies warned for years about the potential for a deadly pandemic, but in the end global surveillance and warning systems were not enough to avert the COVID-19 disaster. In The COVID-19 Intelligence Failure, Erik J. Dahl demonstrates that understanding how intelligence warnings work—and how they fail—shows why the years of predictions were not enough. In the first in-depth analysis of the topic, Dahl examines the roles that both traditional intelligence services and medical intelligence and surveillance systems play in providing advance warning against public health threats—and how these systems must be improved for the future. For intelligence to effectively mitigate threats, specific, tactical-level warnings must be collected and shared in real time with receptive decision makers who will take appropriate action. Dahl shows how a combination of late and insufficient warnings about COVID-19, the Trump administration’s political aversion to scientific advice, and decentralized public health systems all exacerbated the pandemic in the United States. Dahl’s analysis draws parallels to other warning failures that preceded major catastrophes from Pearl Harbor to 9/11, placing current events in context. The COVID-19 Intelligence Failure is a wake-up call for the United States and the international community to improve their national security, medical, and public health intelligence systems and capabilities.

This volume offers an account of some key activities of the Allied secret services and their German counterparts in Sweden during World War II. It also describes in some detail Swedish wartime legislation and Swedish organizations concerned with internal security and intelligence.

This collection of essays is an attempt to explore the history of spy fiction and spy films and investigate the significance of the ideas they contain. The volume offers insights into the development and symbolism of spy fiction. Collectively, the essays show how spy fiction and films have provided their own commentary on the history, politics and psychology of international relations. Spy fiction does not merely imitate espionage, it creates its own substitute for reality.

When A Don at War was published in 1966 it was hailed as the first book to be written from the point of view of the Intelligence staff officer in the field with critics remarking on Sir David Hunt's authoritative exposition of British as well as German strategies. Eight years later it was revealed that the British, through the Ultra' system, were able to decode even the most important German radio messages despite the fact they were sent in the supposedly unbreakable Enigma cipher'. Since 1974 the great secret has become common knowledge. As a result Sir David has specially written for this second edition a new foreword whose main purpose is to explain the use made of Ultra during four years campaigning in the Mediterranean.

An account of the traitorous trio who almost toppled the American nation at its birth. Benedict Arnold offered to sell his soldiers, with the key fortress of West Point, and to deliver to the enemy, dead or alive, George Washington. The plot promised to destroy the American battle of freedom.

Traditionally the military community held the intelligence profession in low esteem, spying was seen as dirty work and information was all to often ignored if it conflicted with a commander's own view. Handel examines the ways in which this situation has improved and argues that co-operation between the intelligence adviser and the military decision maker is vital.

In this compelling new study, Louise Edwards explores the lives of some of China's most famous women warriors and wartime spies through history. Focusing on key figures including Hua Mulan, Zheng Pingru and Liu Hulan, this book examines the ways in which these extraordinary women have been commemorated through a range of cultural mediums including film, theatre, museums and textbooks. Whether perceived as heroes or anti-heroes, Edwards shows that both the popular and official presentation of these women and their accomplishments has evolved in line with China's shifting political values and circumstances over the past one hundred years. Written in a lively and accessible style with illustrations throughout, this book sheds new light on the relationship between gender and militarisation and the ways that women have been exploited to glamorise war both historically in the past and in China today.

From a systematic point of view, all intelligence work can be studied on three levels: Acquisition, analysis, and acceptance. The author focuses on the third of these levels, studying the attitudes and behavioural patterns developed by leaders during their political careers, their willingness to consider information and ideas contrary to their own, their ability to admit mistakes and change course in the implementation of a failing policy and their capacity to cooperate.

Agents of Subversion reconstructs the remarkable story of a botched mission into Manchuria, showing how it fit into a wider CIA campaign against Communist China and highlighting the intensity-and futility-of clandestine operations to overthrow Mao. In the winter of 1952, at the height of the Korean War, the CIA flew a covert mission into China to pick up an agent. Trained on a remote Pacific island, the agent belonged to an obscure anti-communist group known as the Third Force based out of Hong Kong. The exfiltration would fail disastrously, and one of the Americans on the mission, a recent Yale graduate named John T. Downey, ended up a prisoner of Mao Zedong's government for the next twenty years. Unraveling the truth behind decades of Cold War intrigue, John Delury documents the damage that this hidden foreign policy did to American political life. The US government kept the public in the dark about decades of covert activity directed against China, while Downey languished in a Beijing prison and his mother lobbied desperately for his release. Mining little-known Chinese sources, Delury sheds new light on Mao's campaigns to eliminate counterrevolutionaries and how the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party used captive spies in diplomacy with the West. Agents of Subversion is an innovative work of transnational history, and it demonstrates both how the Chinese Communist regime used the fear of special agents to tighten its grip on society and why intellectuals in Cold War America presciently worried that subversion abroad could lead to repression at home.

Intelligence was a major part of the Cold War, waged by both sides with an almost warlike intensity. Yet the question 'What difference did it all make?' remains unanswered. Did it help to contain the Cold War, or fuel it and keep it going? Did it make it hotter or colder? Did these large intelligence bureaucracies tell truth to power, or give their governments what they expected to hear?

These questions have not previously been addressed systematically, and seven writers tackle them here on Cold War aspects that include intelligence as warning, threat assessment, assessing military balances, Third World activities, and providing reassurance. Their conclusions are as relevant to understanding what governments can expect from their big, secret organizations today as they are to those of historians analysing the Cold War motivations of East and West. This book is valuable not only for intelligence, international relations and Cold War specialists but also for all those concerned with intelligence's modern cost-effectiveness and accountability.

This book was published as a special issue of "Intelligence and National Security."

The story of Bletchley Park's codebreaking operations in the Second World War is now well known, but its counterparts in the First World War - Room 40 & MI1(b) - remain in the shadows, despite their involvement in and influence on most of the major events of that war. From the First Battle of the Marne, the shelling of Scarborough, the battles of Jutland and the Somme in 1916, to the battles on the Western Front in 1918, the German naval mutiny and the Zimmermann Telegram, this cast of characters - several of them as eccentric as anyone from Bletchley Park in the Second World War - secretly guided the outcome of the 'Great War' from the confines of a few smoke-filled rooms. Using hundreds of intercepted and decrypted German military, naval and diplomatic messages, bestselling author Paul Gannon reveals the fascinating story of British codebreaking operations. By drawing on many newly discovered archival documents that challenge misleading stories about Room 40 & MI1(b), he reveals a sophisticated machine in operation.

A history of Swedish interception of radio and telegraph messages during World Wars I and II providing a valuable background to Swedish military operations at this time. This should prove a valuable work for anyone interested in the intelligence systems at work during wartime.

In June 1952, a woman was murdered by an obsessive colleague in a hotel in South Kensington. Her name was Christine Granville. That she died young was perhaps unsurprising, but that she had survived the Second World War was remarkable. The daughter of a feckless Polish aristocratic and his wealthy Jewish wife, she would become one of Britain's most daring and highly decorated secret agents. Having fled Poland on the outbreak of war, she was recruited by the intelligence services long before the establishment of the SOE, and took on mission after mission. She skied over the hazardous High Tatras into Poland, served in Egypt and North Africa and was later parachuted into Occupied France, where an agent's life expectancy was only six weeks. Her courage, quick wit and determination won her release from arrest more than once, and saved the lives of several fellow officers, including one of her many lovers, just hours before their execution by the Gestapo. More importantly, perhaps, the intelligence she gathered was a significant contribution to the Allied war effort and her success was reflected in the fact that she was awarded the George Medal, the OBE and the Croix de Guerre.

States seldom resort to war to overthrow their adversaries. They are more likely to attempt to covertly change the opposing regime, by assassinating a foreign leader, sponsoring a coup d'etat, meddling in a democratic election, or secretly aiding foreign dissident groups. In Covert Regime Change, Lindsey A. O'Rourke shows us how states really act when trying to overthrow another state. She argues that conventional focus on overt cases misses the basic causes of regime change. O'Rourke provides substantive evidence of types of security interests that drive states to intervene. Offensive operations aim to overthrow a current military rival or break up a rival alliance. Preventive operations seek to stop a state from taking certain actions, such as joining a rival alliance, that may make them a future security threat. Hegemonic operations try to maintain a hierarchical relationship between the intervening state and the target government. Despite the prevalence of covert attempts at regime change, most operations fail to remain covert and spark blowback in unanticipated ways. Covert Regime Change assembles an original dataset of all American regime change operations during the Cold War. This fund of information shows the United States was ten times more likely to try covert rather than overt regime change during the Cold War. Her dataset allows O'Rourke to address three foundational questions: What motivates states to attempt foreign regime change? Why do states prefer to conduct these operations covertly rather than overtly? How successful are such missions in achieving their foreign policy goals? -- Cornell University Press

Spies, secret messages, and military intelligence have fascinated readers for centuries but never more than today, when terrorists threaten America and society depends so heavily on communications. Much of what was known about communications intelligence came first from David Kahn's pathbreaking book, The Codebreakers. Kahn, considered the dean of intelligence historians, is also the author of Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II and Seizing the Enigma: The Race to Break the German U-Boat Codes, 1939-1943, among other books and articles. Kahn's latest book, How I Discovered World War II's Greatest Spy and Other Stories of Intelligence and Code, provides insights into the dark realm of intelligence and code that will fascinate cryptologists, intelligence personnel, and the millions interested in military history, espionage, and global affairs. It opens with Kahn telling how he discovered the identity of the man who sold key information about Germany's Enigma machine during World War II that enabled Polish and then British codebreakers to read secret messages. Next Kahn addresses the question often asked about Pearl Harbor: since we were breaking Japan's codes, did President Roosevelt know that Japan was going to attack and let it happen to bring a reluctant nation into the war? Kahn looks into why Nazi Germany's totalitarian intelligence was so poor, offers a theory of intelligence, explicates what Clausewitz said about intelligence, tells-on the basis of an interview with a head of Soviet codebreaking-something about Soviet Comint in the Cold War, and reveals how the Allies suppressed the second greatest secret of WWII. Providing an inside look into the efforts to gather and exploit intelligence during the past century, this book presents powerful ideas that can help guide present and future intelligence efforts. Though stories of WWII spying and codebreaking may seem worlds apart from social media security, computer viruses, and Internet surveillance, this book offers timeless lessons that may help today's leaders avoid making the same mistakes that have helped bring at least one global power to its knees. The book includes a Foreword written by Bruce Schneier.

Whether using high-tech equipment or agents-provocateur (undercover agents), intelligence involves the use of processed data. This text is a collection of essential information based upon the author's training and experience over more than three decades as a law enforcement investigator and military officer. The result is an organized text of special skills and reference material essential to the professional investigator and intelligence operative. Supplemented with more than 140 illustrations and photos, the book provides an insider perspective on sensitive covert and overt operations and sources.