The 9/11 attacks and the war in Iraq sprang in no small part from massive intelligence failures, that much is well understood. How the CIA got to a point where it could fail so catastrophically is not.
According to John Diamond, this slippage results from the tendency to overlook the links between seemingly unrelated intelligence failures and to underestimate the impact of political pressure on the CIA: factors we need to examine to understand both the origin and magnitude of the 9/11 and Iraq intelligence failures.
To bring these links to light, Diamond analyzes the CIAs role in key events from the end of the Cold War (when the Soviet Union--and thus the CIAs main mission--came to an end) to the war in Iraq. His account explores both CIA successes and failures in the Soviet break-up, the Gulf War, the Ames spy case, the response to al-Qaedas initial attacks, and the US/UN effort to contain and disarm Iraq.
By putting into historical perspective the intelligence failures--both real and perceived--surrounding these events, Diamond illuminates the links between lower-profile intelligence controversies in the early post-Cold War period and the high-profile failures that continue to define the War on Terrorism.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as war of annihilations, deep battle, and deep operations have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

Edward Shils's The Torment of Secrecy is one of the few minor classics to emerge from the cold war years of anticommunism and McCarthyism in the United States. Mr. Shils's "torment" is not only that of the individual caught up in loyalty and security procedures; it is also the torment of the accuser and judge. This essay in sociological analysis and political philosophy considers the cold war preoccupation with espionage, sabotage, and subversion at home, assessing the magnitude of such threats and contrasting it to the agitation by lawmakers, investigators, and administrators so wildly directed against the "enemy." Mr. Shils's examination of a recurring American characteristic is as timely as ever. "Brief...lucid... brilliant." American Political Science Review. "A fine, sophisticated analysis of American social metabolism." New Republic. "An excitingly lucid and intelligent work on a subject of staggering importance...the social preconditions of political democracy." Social Forces."

Safeguarding Our Privacy and Our Values in an Age of Mass Surveillance America's mass surveillance programs, once secret, can no longer be ignored. While Edward Snowden began the process in 2013 with his leaks of top secret documents, the Obama administration's own reforms have also helped bring the National Security Agency and its programs of signals intelligence collection out of the shadows. The real question is: What should we do about mass surveillance? Timothy Edgar, a long-time civil liberties activist who worked inside the intelligence community for six years during the Bush and Obama administrations, believes that the NSA's programs are profound threat to the privacy of everyone in the world. At the same time, he argues that mass surveillance programs can be made consistent with democratic values, if we make the hard choices needed to bring transparency, accountability, privacy, and human rights protections into complex programs of intelligence collection. Although the NSA and other agencies already comply with rules intended to prevent them from spying on Americans, Edgar argues that the rules-most of which date from the 1970s-are inadequate for this century. Reforms adopted during the Obama administration are a good first step but, in his view, do not go nearly far enough. Edgar argues that our communications today-and the national security threats we face-are both global and digital. In the twenty first century, the only way to protect our privacy as Americans is to do a better job of protecting everyone's privacy. Beyond Surveillance: Privacy, Mass Surveillance, and the Struggle to Reform the NSA explains both why and how we can do this, without sacrificing the vital intelligence capabilities we need to keep ourselves and our allies safe. If we do, we set a positive example for other nations that must confront challenges like terrorism while preserving human rights. The United States already leads the world in mass surveillance. It can lead the world in mass surveillance reform.

Few countries can claim to have endured such a difficult and tortuous history as that of Iraq. Its varied peoples have had to contend with externally imposed state-building at the end of the First World War, through to the rise of authoritarian military regimes, to the all-encompassing power of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship. They have endured destructive wars, internationally-imposed sanctions, and a further bout of destabilizing regime change and subsequent state-building from 2003. The recent rise of the Islamic State, the consolidation of the Kurdistan Region, and the response of the Shi'i populace have brought the country to a de facto partition that may bring about Iraq's final demise. The second edition of Iraq: People, History, Politics provides a comprehensive analysis of the political, societal, and economic dynamics that have governed Iraq's modern development. Situating recent events within a longer historical timeframe, this book is a must-read for anyone wanting to understand the deep histories that underpin the contemporary politics of this war-torn and troubled state.

One of the hallmarks of the Soviet system was its heavy reliance on internal and foreign security and intelligence organizations. Not surprisingly, given the secrecy surrounding Soviet efforts in these areas, no biographical reference tools and few bibliographies have been published to date. In this context, Michael Parrish's work is a unique undertaking. In the first section to the volume, biographies are provided on some 4,000 officials in senior and mid-level positions who had served in Cheka, NKVD/RFSFR, GPU, KGB, and other organizations. Also included are officials of the Committee for State Control (formerly Ministry of State Control, and, before that, Commissariat of Workers and Peasants' Inspection). Prominent political personalities with earlier ties to security services, such as N.A. Bulganin, are listed even though such service formed only a brief part of their careers. Others listed include party officials, such as A.A. Kuznetsov, who at different times served as the Party's watchdog of security organs. Also included, because of their close association with repression and security organs, are members of Stalin's inner circle.

The second part of the volume is a survey of books in English published between 1917 and 1990 which related to Soviet security and intelligence organizations. This is followed by a biographical addendum, a glossary of terms, and material showing the development of Soviet security organizations. No one concerned with current intelligence issues and the role of security organizations in Soviet life can ignore this volume.

This book delves into the secret histories of the CIA, the FBI, and British and Italian intelligence to study how policymakers can control intelligence agencies and when these agencies will try to remove their own government. For every government they serve, intelligence agencies are both a threat and a necessity. They often provide vital information for national security, but the secrets they possess can also be used against their own masters. This book introduces subversion paradox theory to provide a social scientific explanation of the unequal power dynamic resulting from an often fraught relationship between agencies and their 'masters'. The author also makes a case for the existence of 'deep state' conspiracies, including in highly developed democracies, and cautions those who denounce their existence that trying to control intelligence by politicizing it is likely to backfire. An important intervention in the field of intelligence studies, this book will be indispensable for intelligence professionals and policymakers in understanding and bridging the cultural divide between these two groups. It will also make for a fascinating and informative read to scholars and researchers of diplomacy, foreign policy, international relations, strategic and defence studies, security studies, political studies, policymaking and comparative politics.

This book delves into the secret histories of the CIA, the FBI, and British and Italian intelligence to study how policymakers can control intelligence agencies and when these agencies will try to remove their own government. For every government they serve, intelligence agencies are both a threat and a necessity. They often provide vital information for national security, but the secrets they possess can also be used against their own masters. This book introduces subversion paradox theory to provide a social scientific explanation of the unequal power dynamic resulting from an often fraught relationship between agencies and their 'masters'. The author also makes a case for the existence of 'deep state' conspiracies, including in highly developed democracies, and cautions those who denounce their existence that trying to control intelligence by politicizing it is likely to backfire. An important intervention in the field of intelligence studies, this book will be indispensable for intelligence professionals and policymakers in understanding and bridging the cultural divide between these two groups. It will also make for a fascinating and informative read to scholars and researchers of diplomacy, foreign policy, international relations, strategic and defence studies, security studies, political studies, policymaking and comparative politics.

We have witnessed a digital revolution that affects the dynamics of existing traditional social, economic, political and legal systems. This revolution has transformed espionage and its features, such as its purpose and targets, methods and means, and actors and incidents, which paves the way for the emergence of the term cyberespionage. This book seeks to address domestic and international legal tools appropriate to adopt in cases of cyberespionage incidents. Cyberespionage operations of state or non-state actors are a kind of cyber attack, which violates certain principles of international law but also constitute wrongful acquisition and misappropriation of the data. Therefore, from the use of force to state responsibility, international law offers a wide array of solutions; likewise, domestic regulations through either specialized laws or general principles stipulate civil and criminal remedies against cyberespionage. Confronting Cyberespionage Under International Law examines how espionage and its applications have transformed since World War II and how domestic and international legal mechanisms can provide effective legal solutions to this change, hindering the economic development and well-being of individuals, companies and states to the detriment of others. It shows the latest state of knowledge on the topic and will be of interest to researchers, academics, legal practitioners, legal advisors and students in the fields of international law, information technology law and intellectual property law.

For almost half a century, the hottest front in the Cold War was right across Berlin. From summer 1945 until 1990, the secret services of NATO and the Warsaw Pact fought an ongoing duel in the dark. Throughout the Cold War, espionage was part of everyday life in both East and West Berlin, with German spies playing a crucial part of operations on both sides: Erich Mielke's Stasi and Reinhard Gehlen's Federal Intelligence Service, for example. The construction of the wall in 1961 changed the political situation and the environment for espionage - the invisible front was now concreted and unmistakable. but the fundamentals had not changed: Berlin was and would remain the capital of spies until the fall of the Berlin Wall, a fact which makes it all the more surprising that there are hardly any books about the work of the secret services in Berlin during the Cold War. Journalist Sven Felix Kellerhoff and historian Bernd von Kostka describe the spectacular successes and failures of the various secret services based in the city.

The history of secret intelligence, like secret intelligence itself, is fraught with difficulties surrounding both the reliability and completeness of the sources, and the motivations behind their release--which can be the product of ongoing propaganda efforts as well as competition among agencies. Indeed, these difficulties lead to the Scylla and Charybdis of overestimating the importance of secret intelligence for foreign policy and statecraft and also underestimating its importance in these same areas--problems that generally beset the actual use of secret intelligence in modern states. But in recent decades, traditional perspectives have given ground and judgments have been revised in light of new evidence.
This volume brings together a collection of essays avoiding the traditional pitfalls while carrying out the essential task of analyzing the recent evidence concerning the history of the European state system of the last century. The essays offer an array of insight across countries and across time. Together they highlight the critical importance of the prevailing domestic circumstances--technological, governmental, ideological, cultural, financial--in which intelligence operates. A keen interdisciplinary eye focused on these developments leaves us with a far more complete understanding of secret intelligence in Europe than we've had before.

In this gripping narrative, John Koehler details the widespread activities of East Germany's Ministry for State Security, or "Stasi." The Stasi, which infiltrated every walk of East German life, suppressed political opposition, and caused the imprisonment of hundreds of thousands of citizens, proved to be one of the most powerful secret police and espionage services in the world. Koehler methodically reviews the Stasi's activities within East Germany and overseas, including its programs for internal repression, international espionage, terrorism and terrorist training, art theft, and special operations in Latin America and Africa.Koehler was both Berlin bureau chief of the Associated Press during the height of the Cold War and a U.S. Army Intelligence officer. His insider's account is based on primary sources, such as U.S. intelligence files, Stasi documents made available only to the author, and extensive interviews with victims of political oppression, former Stasi officers, and West German government officials. Drawing from these sources, Koehler recounts tales that rival the most outlandish Hollywood spy thriller and, at the same time, offers the definitive contribution to our understanding of this still largely unwritten aspect of the history of the Cold War and modern Germany.

Why are we still at 'war' with terror 16 years after 9/11? This book will discuss what we have collectively done well, what we have done poorly, what we have yet to try and how we get to the point where terrorism does not dominate public discourse and cause disproportionate fear around the world. This book looks at a variety of approaches and responses to international Islamist extremism, ranging from military and security/law enforcement action to government policies, community measures and religious efforts, with a goal to determining what has worked and what has not. The examples are drawn largely from the West but the book's scope is global. Key features: Written in a clear, non-academic styleUses recent events to explain terrorismIs wide-ranging and 'ex-practitioner' based

Known as "the Great War," the world's first truly global conflict is remarkable in what might now be termed modern espionage. World War I was witness to plenty of "firsts." Apart from the contribution made by aerial reconnaissance and the interception of wireless telegraphy, telephone and cable traffic, there was the scientific aspect, with new machines of war, such as the submarine, sea-mine, torpedo, airship, barbed wire, armored tank and mechanized cavalry in a military environment that included mustard gas, static trench warfare, the indiscriminate bombardment of civilian population centers and air-raids. Large-scale sabotage and propaganda, the manipulation of news and of radio broadcasts, and censorship, were all features of a new method of engaging in combat, and some ingenious techniques were developed to exploit the movement of motor and rail transport, and the transmission of wireless signals. The hitherto unknown disciplines of train-watching, bridge-watching, airborne reconnaissance and radio interception would become established as routine collection methods, and their impact on the conflict would prove to be profound. The Historical Dictionary of World War I Intelligence relates this history through a chronology, an introductory essay, an appendix, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has over 400 hundred cross-referenced entries on intelligence organizations, the spies, and the major cases and events of World War I. This book is an excellent access point for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about the world of intelligence in World War I.

The United States' ignominious exit from Afghanistan in 2021 topped two decades of failure and devastation wrought by the war on terror. A long-running "fight against migration" has stoked chaos and rights abuses while pushing migrants onto more dangerous routes. For its part, the war on drugs has failed to dampen narcotics demand while fueling atrocities from Mexico to the Philippines. Why do such "failing" policies persist for so long? And why do politicians keep feeding the very crises they say they are combating? In Wreckonomics, Ruben Andersson and David Keen analyze why disastrous policies live on even when it has become apparent that they do not work. The perverse outcomes of the fights against terror, migration, and drugs are more than a blip or an anomaly. Rather, the proliferation of pseudo-wars has become a dangerous political habit and an endless source of political advantage and profit. From combating crime to the war on drugs, from civil wars to global wars and even "covid wars," chronic failure has been harnessed to the appearance of success. Over a wide variety of spheres, problems have persisted and worsened not so much despite the "wars" and "fights" waged against them as thanks to these floundering endeavors. Covering a range of cases around the world, Wreckonomics exposes and interrogates the incentive systems that allow destructive policies to flourish in the face of systemic failure - while offering strategies for dismantling the addiction to waging war on everything.

"Compulsively readable laugh out loud history." Mary Roach Bomb-carrying bats. Poisoned flower arrangements. Cigars laced with mind-altering drugs. Listening devices implanted into specially-trained cats. A torpedo-proof aircraft carrier made out of ice and sawdust. And a CIA plan to detonate a nuclear bomb on the moon ... just because. In Nuking the Moon, Vince Houghton, Historian and Curator at the International Spy Museum, collects the most inspired, implausible and downright bizarre military intelligence schemes that never quite made it off the drawing board. From the grandly ambitious to the truly devious, they illuminate a new side of warfare, revealing how a combination of desperation and innovation led not only to daring missions and brilliant technological advances, but to countless plans and experiments that failed spectacularly. Alternatively terrifying and hilarious, and combining archival research with newly-conducted interviews, these twenty-six chapters reveal not only what might have happened, but also what each one tells us about the history and people around it. If 'military intelligence' makes you think of James Bond and ingenious exploding gadgets ... get ready for the true story.

roduct Description (1000 characters, including spaces): *This is the remarkable biography of Noor Inayat Khan, code named"Madeleine." The first woman wireless transmitter in occupied France during WWII, she was trained by Britain's SOE and assumed the most dangerous resistance post in underground Paris. Betrayed into the hands of the Gestapo, Noor resisted intensive interrogation, severe deprivation and torture with courage and silence, revealing nothing to her captors, not even her own name. She was executed at Dachau in 1944."Spy Princess" details Noor's inspiring life from birth to death, incorporating information from her family, friends, witnesses, andofficial records including recently released personal files of SOEoperatives. It is the story of a young woman who lived with grace, beauty, courage and determination, and who bravely offering the ultimate sacrifice of her own life in service of her ideals. Her last word was "Liberte."

The methods developed by British intelligence in the early twentieth century continue to resonate today. Much like now, the intelligence activity of the British in the pre-Second World War era focused on immediate threats posed by subversive, clandestine networks against a backdrop of shifting great power politics. Even though the First World War had ended, the battle against Britain's enemies continued unabated during the period of the 1920s and 1930s. Buffeted by political interference and often fighting for their very survival, Britain's intelligence services turned to fight a new, clandestine war against rising powers Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. Using recently declassified files of the British Security Service (MI5), The Secret War Between the Wars details the operations and tradecraft of British intelligence to thwart Communist revolutionaries, Soviet agents, and Nazi sympathizers during the interwar period. This new study charts the development of British intelligence methods and policies in the early twentieth century and illuminates the fraught path of intelligence leading to the Second World War. An analysis of Britain's most riveting interwar espionage cases tells the story of Britain's transition between peace and war. The methods developed by British intelligence in the early twentieth century continue to resonate today. Much like now, the intelligence activity of the British in the pre-Second World War era focused on immediate threats posed by subversive, clandestine networks against a backdrop of shifting great power politics. As Western countries continue to face the challenge of terrorism, and in an era of geopolitical change heralded by the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia, a return to the past may provide context for a better understanding of the future. Kevin Quinlan received his PhD in History from the University of Cambridge. He works in Washington, DC.

American Spies presents the stunning histories of more than forty Americans who spied against their country during the past six decades, offering insight into America's vulnerability to espionage along the way. Now available in paperback, with a new preface that brings the conversation up to the present, American Spies is as relevant as ever.

Gwen Terasaki's Bridge to the Sun, an idealized memoir of her marriage in the 1930s and 1940s to a Japanese diplomat, Terasaki Hidenari, is still widely read as an inspiring tale of a 'bridge' between two cultures that waged savage war against each other from 1941 to 1945. However, neither this memoir nor charges that Terasaki was a master spy and a double agent are the whole historical truth. In Terasaki Hidenari, Pearl Harbor, and Occupied Japan, Roger B. Jeans reassesses Terasaki Hidenari's story, using the FBI's voluminous dossier on Terasaki, decoded Japanese Foreign Ministry cables (MAGIC), and the papers of an isolationist, a pacifist, and an FBI agent and chief investigator at the Tokyo war crimes trial. Jeans reveals that far from being simply a saint or villain, Terasaki, despite his opposition to an American-Japanese war, served as a Foreign Ministry intelligence officer, propaganda chief, and liaison with American isolationists and pacifists in 1941, while using all means to protect Hirohito during the postwar occupation.

The revised edition of Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practitioners, Managers, and Users is a primer for analysts involved in conducting strategic intelligence research. Author Don McDowell begins with an overview of what strategic intelligence and analysis is, the functions it performs, and outcomes it delivers. McDowell then outlines a proven methodological approach to planning and implementing a strategic research project useful in any setting whatsoever. Strategic Intelligence explains in detail the steps involved in doing strategic analysis and includes examples, guidelines, and standards to further illustrate the process. Each step in the process corresponds with a chapter in the book, describing the doctrine and/or theory appropriate, as well as applications of the theory and practical hints on its implementation. Additionally, holistic and creative thinking about the problem issues being tackled is stressed in order to avoid narrow, biased analysis.

This book examines the secret role of British and German Christians in the Cold War, both as non-governmental envoys and as members of covert intelligence operations. Based on archival sources, including those of the Stasi together with interviews with some of those involved, it demonstrates the way in which religion was used as a tool of psychological warfare. During the 1960s, the concept of Christian-Marxist dialogue was espoused by Church leaders and appropriated by politicians. In the GDR, Ulbricht used Christian-Marxist dialogue to quell opposition to his regime; in the West, politicians encouraged a policy of detente which led to the erosion of communist ideology. As the seeds of Ostpolitik were sown, Christians tunnelled their way beneath the ideological barriers of the Cold War in the name of reconciliation while secretly establishing subversive networks. At the same time, they provided political leaders with a hidden channel of communication across the Iron Curtain. This book examines the 1965 Coventry Cathedral project of reconciliation in Dresden, the work of Paul Oestricher, and the activities of the German Christian organisation Aktion Suhnezeichen. In doing so, it reveals the complexity of the Cold War world in which both sides appeared to hold out the hand of friendship while secretly working to eliminate the enemy.

A fresh perspective on statecraft in the cyber domain The idea of “cyber war” has played a dominant role in both academic and popular discourse concerning the nature of statecraft in the cyber domain. However, this lens of war and its expectations for death and destruction may distort rather than help clarify the nature of cyber competition and conflict. Are cyber activities actually more like an intelligence contest, where both states and nonstate actors grapple for information advantage below the threshold of war? In Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive, Robert Chesney and Max Smeets argue that reframing cyber competition as an intelligence contest will improve our ability to analyze and strategize about cyber events and policy. The contributors to this volume debate the logics and implications of this reframing. They examine this intelligence concept across several areas of cyber security policy and in different national contexts. Taken as a whole, the chapters give rise to a unique dialogue, illustrating areas of agreement and disagreement among leading experts and placing all of it in conversation with the larger fields of international relations and intelligence studies. Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive is a must read because it offers a new way for scholars, practitioners, and students to understand statecraft in the cyber domain.

This book describes and analyzes the history of the Mediterranean "Double-Cross System" of the Second World War, an intelligence operation run primarily by British officers which turned captured German spies into double agents. Through a complex system of coordination, they were utilized from 1941 to the end of the war in 1945 to secure Allied territory through security and counter-intelligence operations, and also to deceive the German military by passing false information about Allied military planning and operations. The primary questions addressed by the book are: how did the double-cross-system come into existence; what effects did it have on the intelligence war and the broader military conflict; and why did it have those effects? The book contains chapters assessing how the system came into being and how it was organized, and also chapters which analyze its performance in security and counter-intelligence operations, and in deception.