Facing the threats posed by dedicated suicide bombers who have access to modern technology for mass destruction and who intend to cause maximum human suffering and casualties, democratic governments have hard choices to make. On the one hand, they must uphold the basic values of democratic societies based on due process and human rights. On the other, they need to pre-empt the kind of destruction inflicted upon New York, Madrid, London, and Bali. The premise of this book is that for intelligence organizations to be able to face up to the challenges of global terrorism, they must think outside the box and utilize all of their resources effectively and creatively. To overcome the enemy, we must also secure the peace. Winning the hearts and minds of the terrorists' pool of potential recruits will be essential to cutting off the supply of suicide bombers. The support and cooperation of the people in countries where the terrorists strike must be sustained by ensuring they have confidence in the government and intelligence services. If a government and its intelligence services become so focused on pre-empting terrorist attacks that they infringe on the rights of their citizens and encroach on democratic norms, they unwittingly fall into a trap set by Al Qaeda and its kind. These organizations aim to destroy the democratic way of life so cherished in the West, and to incite the Muslim populations in democratic countries and their non-Muslim fellow citizens into a vicious circle of mutual hatred and violence. This book therefore addresses not only the question of how intelligence organizations can improve their efficacy in pre-empting terrorist outrages, but also the wider issue of removing the forces that sustain global terrorism as a scourge of the 21st century. The general public in the target countries and recruiting grounds must also be persuaded that—despite their rhetoric—the terrorists are not engaged in a holy war. Ultimately, the brand of global terrorism promoted by Osama bin Laden and his associates is meant to satisfy their own vanity and aspirations toward semi-divine status; the organization they have formed for this purpose is merely a global syndicate that commits serious crimes of a particularly heinous nature. Intelligence services of various countries need to find convincing evidence to prove this point. But it is up to governments, civil society, and the media in different parts of the world to work together if the evidence unearthed by national intelligence services is to be accepted by the general public. Unless the emotional or quasi-religious appeal of the global terrorists can be removed, the simple arrest of bin Laden and his close associates—or even the destruction of Al Qaeda as an organization—will not be sufficient to prevent others from rising to replace them.

Turkish Intelligence and the Cold War examines the hitherto unexplored history of secret intelligence cooperation between three asymmetric partners - specifically the UK, US and Turkey - from the end of the Second World War until the Turkey's first military coup d'etat on 27 May 1960. The book shows that our understanding of the Cold War as a binary rivalry between the two blocs is too simple an approach and obscures important characteristics of intelligence cooperation among allies. Egemen Bezci shows that a pragmatic approach offers states new opportunities to protect national interests, by conducting ''intelligence diplomacy' to influence crucial areas such as nuclear weapons and to exploit cooperation in support of their own strategic imperatives. This study not only reveals previously-unexplored origins of secret intelligence cooperation between Turkey and West, but also contributes to wider academic debates on the nature of the Cold War by highlighting the potential agency of weaker states in the Western Alliance.

This is a history of the secret activities of the British government in response to threats to the nation's well-being and stability during the twentieth century. It is based on intensive and widespread research in private and public archives and on documents many of which have only recently come to light or been made available.
The dangers perceived by the state have been manifold and various, coming from within and from abroad. Anarchists, fascists, socialists, communists, the IRA, trades-unionists and animal activists as well as spies, terrorists and saboteurs have been the subject of undercover investigation, along with almost every large-scale movement from suffragettes to campaigners for peace and nuclear disarmament. The author describes the methods and people employed, and the mixed nature of their results.
The British state has always seen itself as civil and liberal, but as Dr Thurlow shows it has sometimes been far from open. The government has had many weapons at its disposal, from public order acts, censorship, internment and proscription on the one hand, to covert operations, infiltration and manipulation on the other. Yet when examined in the light of new evidence, the activities of the state are fully comprehensible only in terms of those who comprised it. The author shows the tensions among the departments (between MI5, MI6, SIS and the Special Branch, for example), and the crucial part played by individuals whose motives were often far from what the government supposed them to be.
This is an at times disturbing, at others almost comical, but always fascinating account. It throws light on the inmost workings of the state, as well as on the movements and people subject to investigation and action.

Intelligence agencies spend huge sums of money to collect and analyze vast quantities of national security data for their political leaders. How well is this intelligence analyzed, how often is it acted on by policymakers, and does it have a positive or negative effect on decision making? Drawing on declassified documents, interviews with intelligence veterans and policymakers, and other sources, The Image of the Enemy breaks new ground as it examines how seven countries analyzed and used intelligence to shape their understanding of their main adversary. The cases in the book include the Soviet Union's analysis of the United States (and vice versa), East Germany's analysis of West Germany (and vice versa), British intelligence in the early years of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, Israeli intelligence about the Palestinians, Pakistani intelligence on India, and US intelligence about Islamist terrorists. These rivalries provide rich case studies for scholars and offer today's analysts and policymakers the opportunity to closely evaluate past successes and failures in intelligence analysis and the best ways to give information support to policymakers. Using these lessons from the past, they can move forward to improve analysis of current adversaries and future threats.

A fresh perspective on statecraft in the cyber domain The idea of “cyber war” has played a dominant role in both academic and popular discourse concerning the nature of statecraft in the cyber domain. However, this lens of war and its expectations for death and destruction may distort rather than help clarify the nature of cyber competition and conflict. Are cyber activities actually more like an intelligence contest, where both states and nonstate actors grapple for information advantage below the threshold of war? In Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive, Robert Chesney and Max Smeets argue that reframing cyber competition as an intelligence contest will improve our ability to analyze and strategize about cyber events and policy. The contributors to this volume debate the logics and implications of this reframing. They examine this intelligence concept across several areas of cyber security policy and in different national contexts. Taken as a whole, the chapters give rise to a unique dialogue, illustrating areas of agreement and disagreement among leading experts and placing all of it in conversation with the larger fields of international relations and intelligence studies. Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive is a must read because it offers a new way for scholars, practitioners, and students to understand statecraft in the cyber domain.

How can the United States guard against a clever unknown enemy while still preserving the freedoms it holds dear? Hulnick explains the need to revamp U.S. intelligence operations from a system focused on a single Cold War enemy to one offering more flexibility in combating non-state actors (including terrorists, spies, and criminals) like those responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001. Offering possible solutions not to be found in the federal commission's official report, Hulnick's groundbreaking work examines what is really necessary to make intelligence and homeland security more efficient and competent, both at within the United States and abroad. The U.S. government's progress in establishing a system for homeland security is considerable, yet, besides shifts in alert status, most U.S. residents are unaware of the work being done to keep them safe. Describing the system already in place, Hulnick adds further ideas about what more is needed to protect Americans in the ever-changing world of intelligence. To create a truly valuable program, it is suggested the the United States consider not only new strategies and tactics, but also the need to break down the barriers between intelligence agencies and law enforcement.

The episode of the opportunistic valet of Britain's ambassador to neutral Turkey during World War II--dubbed Cicero for the eloquence of the top-secret material he appropriated from his employer Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen and sold to the Nazis--is a staple of intelligence lore. Yet this remarkable and sometimes comical story has often been recounted with little regard for the facts, most prominently in the popular film "Five Fingers." Now, historian and former intelligence officer Richard Wires presents the first full and objective account of the Cicero spy episode, offering closure to past discrepancies and credible solutions to remaining mysteries. Copiously documented, "The Cicero Spy Affair" provides readers with the true chronology of events and places them in an international context. It is a story set in the hotbed of intrigue that was wartime Turkey, replete with a dramatic car chase, a series of colorful mistresses ever loyal to their lover the spy, and an old-school British ambassador whose documents are photographed at night as he plays the piano in the drawing room and/or slips into a sleeping pill-induced slumber.

Despite the affair's amusing aspects, it is also a sobering tale in which there are no winners and from which there are serious lessons to be learned. Germany never made use of the highly sensitive British documents it obtained during this crucial four-month period of the war because the handling of the information was caught up in a bitter and wasteful personal rivalry between Ribbentrop and Schellenberg. It was sheer luck for the British that their war effort did not sustain any significant damage. For, while the book states definitively that security regarding the Allied invasion of Normandy was not breached in the Cicero affair, Germany did gain a potential advantage concerning campaigns in the Aegean and the Balkans. This embarrassed the British greatly, especially since Cicero walked away a free man. However, the greedy valet--the most highly paid spy in history at that time--did not achieve his goals, either; he discovered some years later that the British banknotes he insisted on as payment were counterfeited by the Germans as part of a larger counterfeiting project. Cicero died a desperate man, deeply in debt--a fitting anticlimax for an espionage episode resulting in neither bodily injury nor strategic impact, but in humiliation on all sides.

John A. Walker Jr. was a Chief Warrant Officer and communications specialist for the US Navy. In 1985, he was arrested for selling classified secrets to the Soviet Union. Upon his arrest it was revealed that he had been acting as a spy from 1968 to 1985 and that his son, brother, ex-wife, and an acquaintance had also participated in the espionage ring. Altogether, their actions constituted one of the most serious security breaches in US history. In 1990, the New York Times stated, "Mr. Walker provided enough code-data information to alter significantly the balance of power between Russia and the United States." What motivated a career naval officer to become a spy during the height of the Cold War? Over the years, statements by Walker have been reported in various books, newspapers, and other media outlets, but Walker has never told his own story-till now. Walker has decided to make public a private document that he originally wrote for his children to explain his actions. Among the reasons he gives for publishing this work is the following statement: "As I grew older, I came to understand that the wars that had taken place during my entire life were just a symptom of a larger national policy. I watched my uncles and aunt go off to World War II, my brother to Korea, and myself to Vietnam, all of which were waged on foundations of lies. Voltaire said that history is a lie agreed upon by historians. How true. "I cannot classify myself as a visionary or idealist, but just a simple citizen who became angry by the government lies. I did conclude that the US system of government was broken, so I felt justified in breaking some rules in order to help save it.... Why did I feel responsible or qualified to end the pattern of perpetual war? I cannot answer my own questions. But then, my insane stunt seemed to have worked. By the admission of both the US and the USSR, I provided the most extensive intelligence ever to the Soviets. With my material in hand, the Soviet government eventually realized the US planned no attack upon them, so my actions have contributed greatly to the Soviet Union's decision to end the Cold War."

A unique exploration into the fascinating world of human and technological espionage, its contributions to national security, and its vital role in global politics. Espionage: A Reference Handbook illuminates the murky underworld of espionage and counterespionage efforts in the United States and around the world. Combining an academic treatment of the causes and forces that shape espionage with narrative accounts of how spying and spy catching are conducted, this is the only work of its kind to cover Benedict Arnold, J. Edgar Hoover, the CIA, the KGB, and Jay Pollard, all in one volume. Though special attention is focused on the American experience, British, Soviet, and Israeli cases are presented, along with recent world events of terrorism and ethnic conflict, providing a unique comparative perspective on the international forces behind spying.

Although China s intelligence activities may not have been well documented, they can be traced back to the ancient writings of Sun Tzu, and espionage has been a characteristic of Chinese domestic politics and international relations ever since. The People s Republic of China has long engaged in espionage, but relatively little is known about Chinese techniques, methodology, personnel, and organizations in comparison with what the West has learned about other more conventional intelligence agencies that conduct operations across the world. Whereas most intelligence services have suffered damaging defections, the number of Ministry of State Security professionals who have switched sides is relatively small, further limiting outside knowledge. The Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence covers the history of Chinese Intelligence from 400 B.C. to modern times. This is done through a chronology, an introductory essay, an extensive bibliography, and an index. The dictionary section has over 400 cross-referenced entries on the agencies and agents, the operations and equipment, the tradecraft and jargon, and many of the countries involved. This book is an excellent access point for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about Chinese Intelligence."

'A brilliant page-turner by one of Holland's finest investigative journalists' Rutger Bregman, author of Humankind 'Essential . . . What's revealed are networks of spies and criminals fighting an invisible war that involves us all' Eliot Higgins, bestselling author of We Are Bellingcat Summer 2017: computer screens go blank in 150 countries. The NHS is so affected that hospitals can only take in patients for A&E. Ambulances are grounded. Computer screens turn on spontaneously and warnings appear. Employees who desperately pull the plugs are too late. Restarting is pointless; the computers are locked. And now the attackers ask each victim for money. This is hijack software. It is just one example of how vulnerable the digital world has made us. Based on the cases he investigated over a period of six years, award-winning Dutch journalist Huib Modderkolk takes the reader on a tour of the corridors and back doors of the globalised digital world. He reconstructs British-American espionage operations and reveals how the power relationships between countries enable intelligence services to share and withhold data from each other. Looking at key players including Edward Snowden, Russian hackers Cozy Bear and Evgeniy Bogachev, 'the Pablo Escobar of the digital era', Modderkolk opens our eyes to the dark underbelly of the digital world with the narrative drive of a thriller.

On 7 March 2004, former SAS soldier and mercenary Simon Mann prepared to take off from Harare International Airport with a plane full of heavy weaponry and guns for hire. Their destination: Equatorial Guinea. Their intention: to remove one of the most brutal dictators in Africa in a privately organised coup d’etat. The plot had the tacit approval of Western intelligence agencies. It had the backing of a European government, and the endorsement of a former Prime Minister. Simon Mann had personally planned, overseen and won two wars in Angola and Sierra Leone. Everything should have gone right. Why, then, did it go so wrong?

When Simon Mann was released from five years’ incarceration in some of Africa’s toughest prisons, he made worldwide headlines. Since then, he has spoken to nobody about his experiences.

Now he is telling everything, including:

• The full involvement of Mark Thatcher in the coup d’etat.
• How a former Prime Minister personally endorsed the coup during face to face meetings with Simon Mann.
• The financial involvement of two controversial and internationally famous members of the House of Lords in the plot, backed up by banking records.
• How the British government approached Simon in the months preceding the Iraq war, to suggest ways in which a justified invasion of Iraq could be engineered.
• Simon will also tell of his pain when he had to tell his wife Amanda, who gave birth to their fourth child while he was incarcerated, that he believed he would never be freed.

With the end of the Cold War and the dawning of a new century, the U.S. intelligence system faces new challenges and threats. The system has suffered from penetration by foreign agents, cutbacks in resources, serious errors in judgment, and what appears to be bad management; nonetheless, it remains one of the key elements of America's strategic defense. Hulnick suggests that things are not as bad as they seem, that America's intelligence system is reasonably well prepared to deal with the many threats to national security. He examines the various functions of intelligence from intelligence gathering and espionage to the arcane fields of analysis, spy-catching, secret operations, and even the business of corporate espionage.

Hulnick offers a variety of ideas for making the system work better and for attracting the kinds of new intelligence professionals who will build a stronger intelligence system in the next century. "Fixing the Spy Machine" suggests that the role of the Director of Central Intelligence, the person who runs both the CIA and oversees the U.S. Intelligence Community, should be depoliticized and made stronger. It also concludes that people are responsible for making the system function, not its bureaucratic structure. Still, intelligence managers are going to have to become less risk-averse and more flexible if the system is to function at its best.

"Towne's narrative is a fascinating whodunit, with its vivid portrayal of Union commanders hiring questionable detectives in an effort to stymie the Knights of the Golden Circle, a loose collection of Confederate sympathizers in the Old Northwest. A valuable addition to any library seeking to upgrade its collection with a regional slant to the US Civil War. Summing Up: Highly recommended." -CHOICEA History Book Club Reading SelectionSurveillance and Spies in the Civil War represents pathbreaking research on the rise of U.S. Army intelligence operations in the Midwest during the American Civil War and counters long-standing assumptions about Northern politics and society. At the beginning of the rebellion, state governors in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois cooperated with federal law enforcement officials in various attempts-all failed-to investigate reports of secret groups and individuals who opposed the Union war effort. Starting in 1862, army commanders took it upon themselves to initiate investigations of antiwar sentiment in those states. By 1863, several of them had established intelligence operations staffed by hired civilian detectives and by soldiers detailed from their units to chase down deserters and draft dodgers, to maintain surveillance on suspected persons and groups, and to investigate organized resistance to the draft. By 1864, these spies had infiltrated secret organizations that, sometimes in collaboration with Confederate rebels, aimed to subvert the war effort. Stephen E. Towne is the first to thoroughly explore the role and impact of Union spies against Confederate plots in the North. This new analysis invites historians to delve more deeply into the fabric of the Northern wartime experience and reinterpret the period based on broader archival evidence.

The US intelligence community as it currently exists has been deeply influenced by the press. Although considered a vital overseer of intelligence activity, the press and its validity is often questioned, even by the current presidential administration. But dating back to its creation in 1947, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has benefited from relationships with members of the US press to garner public support for its activities, defend itself from its failures, and promote US interests around the world. Many reporters, editors, and publishers were willing and even eager to work with the agency, especially at the height of the Cold War. That relationship began to change by the 1960s when the press began to challenge the CIA and expose many of its questionable activities. Respected publications went from studiously ignoring the CIA's activities to reporting on the Bay of Pigs, CIA pacification programs in Vietnam, the CIA's war in Laos, and its efforts to use US student groups and a variety of other non-government organizations as Cold War tools. This reporting prompted the first major congressional investigation of the CIA in December 1974. In The Rising Clamor: The American Press, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Cold War, David P. Hadley explores the relationships that developed between the CIA and the press, its evolution over time, and its practical impact from the creation of the CIA to the first major congressional investigations of its activities in 1975--76 by the Church and Pike committees. Drawing on a combination of archival research, declassified documents, and more than 2,000 news articles, Hadley provides a balanced and considered account of the different actors in the press and CIA relationships, how their collaboration helped define public expectations of what role intelligence should play in the US government, and what an intelligence agency should be able to do.

How the US is losing the counterintelligence war and what the country should do to better protect our national security and trade secrets The United States is losing the counterintelligence war. Foreign intelligence services, particularly those of China, Russia, and Cuba, are recruiting spies in our midst and stealing our secrets and cutting-edge technologies. In To Catch a Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence, James M. Olson, former chief of CIA counterintelligence, offers a wake-up call for the American public and also a guide for how our country can do a better job of protecting its national security and trade secrets. Olson takes the reader into the arcane world of counterintelligence as he lived it during his thirty-year career in the CIA. After an overview of what the Chinese, Russian, and Cuban spy services are doing to the United States, Olson explains the nitty-gritty of the principles and methods of counterintelligence. Readers will learn about specific aspects of counterintelligence such as running double-agent operations and surveillance. The book also analyzes twelve real-world case studies to illustrate why people spy against their country, the tradecraft of counterintelligence, and where counterintelligence breaks down or succeeds. A “lessons learned” section follows each case study.

Identifying "lessons learned" is not new -- the military has been doing it for decades. However, members of the worldwide intelligence community have been slow to extract wider lessons gathered from the past and apply them to contemporary challenges. "Learning from the Secret Past" is a collection of ten carefully selected cases from post-World War II British intelligence history. Some of the cases include the Malayan Emergency, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Northern Ireland, and the lead up to the Iraq War. Each case acommpanied by authentic documents, illuminates important lessons that today's intelligence officers and policymakers -- in Britain and elsewhere -- should heed.

Written by former and current intelligence officers, high-ranking government officials, and scholars, the case studies in this book detail intelligence successes and failures, discuss effective structuring of the intelligence community, examine the effective use of intelligence in counterinsurgency, explore the ethical dilemmas and practical gains of interrogation, and highlight the value of human intelligence and the dangers of the politicization of intelligence. The lessons learned from this book stress the value of past experience and point the way toward running effective intelligence agencies in a democratic society.

Scholars and professionals worldwide who specialize in intelligence, defense and security studies, and international relations will find this book to be extremely valuable.

This is the first work to examine the phenomena of citizen espionage from the point of view of trust betrayal. Here is an effort to illuminate the social, political, and psychological conditions that influence trusted American citizens to spy against their country. The volume combines historical inquiry, sociological studies, psychological insights, and criminological analysis. It is especially timely when many nations, friend and foe alike, have instituted programs to obtain trade secrets and classified technology from American military and industrial sources.

Based in part on author Felix's personal experiences as a political agent in Hungary in the decades after World War II, this work explains what the rules are for secret operations, why the U. S. needs them, and how good a job our government and others are doing in practice. Chapters cover the political and social systems that a spy must rely on, the personal dilemmas an agent faces, and the tricks to keeping one's cover. A new afterword features revelations on Raoul Wallenberg's fate, British turncoat Kim Philby, and more.

Are IQ tests racially and culturally biased? That was the controversial question in two landmark lawsuits: the California case of Larry P. v. Riles (1979) and the Chicago case of PASE v. Hannon (1980). Litigating Intelligence is a detailed analysis and comparison of these complex cases--the background, evidence, testimony, arguments, and surprising outcomes. It is also an important case study of the role of social science testimony in the courtroom and the role of the courts in setting social policy.

In 1987, former naval intelligence officer Jonathan Jay Pollard was sentenced to life in prison for passing classified information to the Israelis-the only person ever to be so severely punished for spying on behalf of an American ally. Why was his sentence so harsh? This fascinating, intensively researched book, by investigative journalist Elliot Goldenberg, finally reveals the whole story. After numerous interviews with top intelligence operatives and government insiders, Goldenberg is able to make a strong case that Pollard's sentence was not due to the severity of the damage he inflicted on the security of the United States, contrary to assertions by the Justice Department and the Pentagon. His greatest crime, Goldenberg insists, was that Pollard inadvertently stumbled upon and threatened to expose secret dealings between President Reagan's most-trusted advisors and Saddam Hussein. Pollard, realizing how much of a threat this might mean to Israeli security, took it upon himself to pass on vital information regarding these U.S.-Iraqi dealings to Israeli security. Pollard's information eventually helped Israel target Iraqi military establishments for strikes during the Gulf War.
The Hunting Horse (the Israeli code name for Pollard) provides a rare glimpse into what may be the greatest cover-up in American history, a world of secret agendas and covert operations that is too often kept hidden from congressional oversight and public scrutiny.