The 9/11 attacks and the war in Iraq sprang in no small part from
massive intelligence failures, that much is well understood. How
the CIA got to a point where it could fail so catastrophically is
not.
According to John Diamond, this slippage results from the tendency
to overlook the links between seemingly unrelated intelligence
failures and to underestimate the impact of political pressure on
the CIA: factors we need to examine to understand both the origin
and magnitude of the 9/11 and Iraq intelligence failures.
To bring these links to light, Diamond analyzes the CIAs role in
key events from the end of the Cold War (when the Soviet Union--and
thus the CIAs main mission--came to an end) to the war in Iraq. His
account explores both CIA successes and failures in the Soviet
break-up, the Gulf War, the Ames spy case, the response to
al-Qaedas initial attacks, and the US/UN effort to contain and
disarm Iraq.
By putting into historical perspective the intelligence
failures--both real and perceived--surrounding these events,
Diamond illuminates the links between lower-profile intelligence
controversies in the early post-Cold War period and the
high-profile failures that continue to define the War on Terrorism.
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