How will the funds of hedge funds (FoHF) business have to change to survive in the wake of the 2008-2012 financial crisis? This new research provides valuable insight. "Reconsidering Funds of Hedge Funds" presents the first comprehensive views of UCITS as well as recent trends in due diligence, risk management, and hedge fund deaths and survivors. The book contains original chapters by 22 academics and 16 hedge fund professionals, and includes two sections on performance: one that looks at UCITS FoHF and one that deals with traditional FoHF performance. Most chapters examine aspects of the 2008-2012 financial crisis, and almost every chapter addresses fund of hedge funds' management process before, during, and after the crisis.
Covers recent advances in risk management, due diligence, tail risk, and allocationPresents an in-depth analysis of UCITs Balances academic and professional viewpoints

This volume takes up bankruptcy in early modern Europe, when its frequency made it not only an economic problem but a personal tragedy and a social evil. Using legal, business and personal records, the essays in this volume examine the impact of failure on business organizations and practices, capital formation and circulation, economic institutions and ethics, and human networks and relations in the so-called "transition" to modern society, from the early-sixteenth to the early-nineteenth century. One group of essays concentrates on the German-speaking world and shows a common concern for the microeconomics of bankruptcy, that is, for such issues as the structure of the firm, the nature of its capital, and the practices of its partners, especially their assessment of risk. Another group of essays shifts the focus from Central to Western and Northern Europe and away from the microeconomics of the early modern firm to an institutional consideration of bankruptcy. The final group of essays turns to Southern Europe, especially the Mediterranean basin, to assess bankruptcy not as an unfortunate result of crisis, but as an intentional response to crisis. All of the contributions are the result of original research; many of the scholars publish in English for the first time. All of the chapters are founded on close archival research, offering insights not only into business organization and practice but also into social and cultural aspects of economic life from the late sixteenth to the early nineteenth century.

This book provides analysis of the current financial/economic crisis from the Director of the Banking Sector at the FSA (Financial Services Authority). This new edition is updated to take into account the current changes in regulation and legislation in the US, EU and UK. Many of these changes were in line with the recommendations made in the original edition.

One striking weaknesses of our financial architecture, which helped bring on and perhaps deepen the Panic of 2008, is an inadequate appreciation of the past. Information about how the system functioned and the reliability of organizations and institutional controls were drawn from a relatively narrow group of recent examples. History and Financial Crisis: Lessons from the 20th Century is an attempt to broaden the range of historical sources used by policy makers to understand and treat financial crises. Many recent discussions of the 2008 panic and the economic turmoil have found the situation to either be unprecedented or greatly similar to that of 1931. However, the book's wide range of contributors suggest that the economic crisis of 2008 cannot be categorised in this way. This book was originally published as a special issue of Business History.

Euro Crash diagnoses the three fatal design flaws in EMU as constructed by the Maastricht Treaty and analyses future likely monetary scenarios for Europe, demonstrating how the best of these would be the creation of a new narrow monetary union between France and Germany founded on strict monetarist principle and without a European Central Bank.

The collapse of the Irish "Celtic Tiger" economy, in the wake of a banking disaster, provoked a joint EU/IMF rescue plan in late 2010. The election that followed saw Europe's most successful ever party lose more than half of its vote and almost three quarters of its seats. This book provides the definitive analysis of an electoral earthquake.

The early 21st century has not been kind to California's reputation for good government. But the Golden State's governance flaws reflect worrisome national trends with origins in the 1970s and 1980s. Growing voter distrust with government, a demand for services but not taxes to pay for them, a sharp decline in enlightened leadership and effective civic watchdogs, and dysfunctional political institutions have all contributed to the current governance malaise.
Until recently, San Diego, California--America's 8th largest city--seemed immune to such systematic governance disorders. This sunny beach town entered the 1990s proclaiming to be "America's Finest City," but in a few short years its reputation went from "Futureville" to "Enron-by-the-Sea." In this eye-opening and telling narrative, Steven P. Erie, Vladimir Kogan, and Scott A. MacKenzie mix policy analysis, political theory, and history to explore and explain the unintended but largely predictable failures of governance in San Diego.
Using untapped primary sources--interviews with key decision makers and public documents--and benchmarking San Diego with other leading California cities, "Paradise Plundered" examines critical dimensions of San Diego's governance failure: a multi-billion dollar pension deficit; a chronic budget deficit; inadequate city services and infrastructure; grandiose planning initiatives divorced from dire fiscal realities; an insulated downtown redevelopment program plagued by poorly-crafted public-private partnerships; and, for the metropolitan region, inadequate airport and port facilities, a severe underinvestment in firefighting capacity despite destructive wildfires, and heightened Mexican border security concerns.
Far from a sunny story of paradise and prosperity, this account takes stock of an important but understudied city, its failed civic leadership, and poorly performing institutions, policymaking, and planning. Though the extent of these failures may place San Diego in a league of its own, other cities are experiencing similar challenges and political changes. As such, this tale of civic woe offers valuable lessons for urban scholars, practitioners, and general readers concerned about the future of their own cities.

When the global financial system crashed, governments in America and Britain perfomed the greatest bailout in history. The legacy is record government debt, low growth and a new era of austerity. A stellar cast of contributors, including Tim Bale, Wyn Grant and Graham Wilson provide a sophisticated account of how the administrations are faring.

Financial market reform has focused chiefly on the threats to stability arising from the risky, uncontrolled activity of the leaders of financial institutions. Nevertheless, organized crime, white-collar crime, and corruption have a huge impact on financial systems worldwide and must also be confronted if true reform is to be achieved. A collection of articles written by experts in their fields of study, Financial Crimes: A Threat to Global Security spotlights the importance of addressing the problem of illegal financial activity as part of a greater comprehensive plan for reforming the financial sector.

Drawn from the 23rd Annual Meeting of the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) held in Vienna, the book explores the major themes discussed at this elite symposium. In the first section, the contributors examine changing concepts in security over the course of history and across nations. They discuss how an event in Austria led to the implementation of a new security philosophy that is now followed by the majority of the European Union. The book examines the diverse models of preventing security threats that have grown from that idea as well as the gradual expansion of the role of the security council of the United Nations.

The next section analyzes the present state of security worldwide and examines the wide array of criminal activity that plagues the financial sector. Expert contributors reveal methods to identify certain types of behavior and criminals as well as efforts to combat illegal activity including the role of the media.

The final section investigates alternative approaches to preventing another worldwide financial disaster through investigative reporting, human factors analysis, legislative initiatives, and other methods.

Filled with insight from international experts, the book highlights both the warning signs to illegal activity as well as the most effective methods for combating the invidious corruption that, if unchecked, puts all nations at risk.

Maximilian Edelbacher will be appearing at three upcoming events:

• June 28, 2012: Roundtable in the House of the European Union in Vienna on the topic "Financial Crimes: A Threat to European Security?"
• October 8, 2012: Roundtable in Joannneum, Austria on the topic "Financial Crimes: A Threat to Global Security"
• October 9, 2012: Book presentation at the Hans Gross Museum in Graz, Austria

The early 21st century has not been kind to California's reputation for good government. But the Golden State's governance flaws reflect worrisome national trends with origins in the 1970s and 1980s. Growing voter distrust with government, a demand for services but not taxes to pay for them, a sharp decline in enlightened leadership and effective civic watchdogs, and dysfunctional political institutions have all contributed to the current governance malaise.
Until recently, San Diego, California--America's 8th largest city--seemed immune to such systematic governance disorders. This sunny beach town entered the 1990s proclaiming to be "America's Finest City," but in a few short years its reputation went from "Futureville" to "Enron-by-the-Sea." In this eye-opening and telling narrative, Steven P. Erie, Vladimir Kogan, and Scott A. MacKenzie mix policy analysis, political theory, and history to explore and explain the unintended but largely predictable failures of governance in San Diego.
Using untapped primary sources--interviews with key decision makers and public documents--and benchmarking San Diego with other leading California cities, "Paradise Plundered" examines critical dimensions of San Diego's governance failure: a multi-billion dollar pension deficit; a chronic budget deficit; inadequate city services and infrastructure; grandiose planning initiatives divorced from dire fiscal realities; an insulated downtown redevelopment program plagued by poorly-crafted public-private partnerships; and, for the metropolitan region, inadequate airport and port facilities, a severe underinvestment in firefighting capacity despite destructive wildfires, and heightened Mexican border security concerns.
Far from a sunny story of paradise and prosperity, this account takes stock of an important but understudied city, its failed civic leadership, and poorly performing institutions, policymaking, and planning. Though the extent of these failures may place San Diego in a league of its own, other cities are experiencing similar challenges and political changes. As such, this tale of civic woe offers valuable lessons for urban scholars, practitioners, and general readers concerned about the future of their own cities.

'This is a most useful book which nicely combines theory and practice. In it the authors provide a framework which helps us better understand the nature of modern financial crises and how monetary and regulatory policies interact in delivering price and financial stability. Certainly worth reading by academics, policymakers and all those interested in deepening their knowledge of how modern financial systems work in both good and bad times.' - Jose Vinals, Standard Chartered, UK 'This collection of papers is a remarkable tour de force. Goodhart and Tsomocos have made pioneering steps toward understanding the causes of financial crises and showing how the financial system can be regulated to reduce and mitigate them. A must-read for anyone interested in financial stability.' - Doyne Farmer, University of Oxford, UK 'Today almost everyone realizes the crucial importance of liquidity, a painful lesson taught by the global financial crisis. This collection records that Goodhart and Tsomocos were early and persistent voices, initially in the wilderness but now almost mainstream, showing the way forward by clothing old wisdom in new modelling.' - Perry G. Mehrling, Columbia University, US Charles Goodhart and Dimitrios P. Tsomocos examine the interaction of monetary and regulatory policy to achieve the important goals of price and financial stability. Their focus is on the relationship between liquidity and default in the post-crisis context, with special emphasis on macroprudential regulation. Exploring how financial stability can be continually assessed and measured, Financial Regulation and Stability discusses the interrelationships between liquidity and default. Without default there would be no concern about liquidity. But the financial crisis was not just a liquidity problem, it requires a general equilibrium model. The authors' model delineates all the potential interrelationships between the real and financial sectors of the economy, with special emphasis on the interaction between liquidity and default. Economists and central bankers will greatly benefit from the practical advice offered in this book to aid financial stability. Advanced students of financial economics will also find this a vital read to understand the consequences of the 2007-8 financial crisis in more depth and the lessons to be learnt.

Building on Green and Janmaat's previous work on education, equality and social cohesion, this book, now in paperback, analyses the various mechanisms that hold different societies together and how these are withstanding the strains of the current economic crisis. In an original, and highly interdisciplinary, mixed method approach, drawing on evidence from historical sociology, political science and political economy, Green and Janmaat identify four major traditions of social cohesion in developed western and east Asian societies, each with specific institutional and cultural foundations. An extensive statistical analysis of contemporary administrative and attitudinal data for over 30 countries demonstrates that there are still distinctive 'regimes of social cohesion' in 'liberal, ' 'social market' and 'social democratic' countries and that they achieve social bonding in quite different ways. As the crisis of globalization unfolds in the wake of the global financial crisis, social cohesion in each regime is vulnerable at different points.

The Global Financial Crisis is acknowledged to be the most severe economic downturn since the 1930s, and one that is unique in its underlying causes, its scope, and its wider social, political and economic implications. This volume explores some of the ethical issues that it has raised.

Review: Within its chosen frame of reference the authors have made a substantial contribution. - Economic & Political Weekly Dutt and Wilber provide a compact yet comprehensive introduction to economics and ethics that thoroughly engages neoclassical economics, distinguishes different approaches to ethics, and discusses such fundamental issues as justice and equality. This is an excellent book, and is highly recommended for teaching and as a resource for scholars. - John B. Davis, Marquette University and University of Amsterdam This is a good and helpful introduction to the normative dimensions of economic theory and policy. - Albino Barrera, Providence College 'Wilbur and Dutt bring a wealth of knowledge and humanity to the task of revitalizing the art of economics. This book provides a nuanced and timely account of the importance of ethics to our understanding of economics and public policies. The reader is in thoughtful and trustworthy hands.' - Jonathan B. Wight, Professor of Economics at the University of Richmond and author of the economic novel Saving Adam Smith: A Tale of Wealth, Transformation, and Virtue.

With the effects of the latest financial crisis still unfolding, this is a timely guide to the politics of international financial reform comparing the policies that the international community requested the IMF to follow in the aftermath of the Mexican, Asian, and subprime crisis.

US capitalism has long been ranked first among nations in production, jobs, wealth, power, and individual freedom. Is this level of preeminence likely to continue? In this candid, sobering assessment of our current fiscal maladies, economist Robert H. Parks explains why he predicts capitalism is now rushing to its demise.
A strong opponent of the supply-side, trickle-down economics that has been in vogue under conservative presidents, Parks argues that bottom-up stimulus and big government spending still have an important role to play in bringing greater prosperity to all US citizens. Citing the stellar examples of the financing of World War II, the use of fiscal and monetary tools to end the Great Depression, social security, and the G.I. Bill, Parks advocates public works programs to rebuild our crumbling infrastructure, improve our public school system, and other vital projects. To critics who object that deficit financing would be inflationary, he counters that the present inadequate system is already producing severe oil and food price inflation, even as house prices continue to plunge.
Among the other urgent problems that the federal government must tackle, Parks addresses the need to curb societal violence and the murder rate through gun control, the worldwide threat from nuclear proliferation through government's leadership in promoting disarmament measures, corruption of government by business through influence-peddling, environmental protection, and, most of all, "the military, industrial, and big oil complex." Parks identifies energy cartels and the armament industry as the "dangerous and secret links of major industries to government officials, corporate executives, and military commanders." He asserts that the loosely regulated manufacture of weapons together with the virtual monopoly over oil production and gas prices constitutes the greatest threat to the welfare, not only of capitalism, but also of global society in the future.
This stern jeremiad from an experienced economics forecaster, who correctly predicted the "mini-depression" of 1981-82, is a call for drastic change in our national agenda and policy making.

This book examines the role of financial globalization in economic growth and derives corresponding implications for economic policy. Although economists have debated the importance of openness to international trade, they generally agree that in the market for goods, international openness is more favorable to growth than a largely closed economy. In contrast, whether external financial openness boosts or curbs growth has long been a controversial issue, and it has become even more so with the outbreak of the global financial crisis of 2007-09.The East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s raised doubts on this issue, and helped spur a wave of empirical research on it. Supporters of financial globalization-such as Stanley Fischer and Lawrence Summers-maintained that, with the right policies, open capital markets continued to be a powerful means for enhancing growth. Critics, including Jagdish Bhagwati and Joseph Stiglitz, argued that the crisis demonstrated that, unlike free trade in goods, free mobility for capital is counterproductive for growth. In the past decade a large empirical literature has emerged examining this question. Overall it has tended to find that financial globalization has "positive marginal effects on growth." The US-led financial crisis of 2007-09 swept most of the developed and emerging-market economies into its vortex. The global crisis has set the stage for an intensification of the debate on financial openness. Some analysts and policymakers will be inclined to escalate calls for restrictions on capital flows. In the acute phase of the crisis that began in September 2008, major stock markets around the world plunged along with the US equity market, and many currencies fell sharply against the dollar (excluding the yen, which proved, like the dollar, to be a safe-haven currency). If countries had maintained closed capital markets, some may argue, they would not have been vulnerable to these shocks. Cline asserts that financial globalization represents a significant factor in economic growth of emerging-market economies. Further, he argues that a significant portion of current-day GDP can be attributed to the cumulative influence of financial openness, especially in industrial countries.This study surveys the extensive literature on this issue to arrive at a broad sense of the state of the evidence for and against the growth benefits of financial openness. The survey is critical in the sense that it seeks to evaluate strengths and weaknesses of the various studies in addition to summarizing their results. It then applies leading quantitative models from the literature to arrive at synthesis estimates of the contribution of financial openness to growth for major industrial and emerging-market economies over the past four decades. Finally, the book considers the preliminary evidence on whether the 2007-09 financial crisis constitutes grounds for a major change in the policy verdict on financial openness. As part of that reconsideration, the analysis reviews the causes of the global crisis, as well as its principal events and policy interventions.

THIS HAS HAPPENED BEFORE. The current financial crisis has only one parallel: the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and subsequent Great Depression of the 1930s, which crippled the future of an entire generation and set the stage for the horrors of the Second World War. Yet the economic meltdown could have been avoided, had it not been for the decisions taken by a small number of central bankers. In Lords of Finance, we meet these men, the four bankers who truly broke the world: the enigmatic Norman Montaguof the bank of England, Benjamin Strong of the NY Federal Reserve, the arrogant yet brilliant Hjalmar Schacht of the Reichsbanlk and the xenophobic Emile Moreau of the Banque de France. Their names were lost to history, their lives and actions forgotten, until now. Liaquat Ahamed tells their story in vivid and gripping detail, in a timely and arresting reminder that individuals - their ambitions, limitations and human nature - lie at the very heart of global catastrophe.

Our prosperity requires the enterprise of innumerable individuals and businesses who exercise their imagination and judgment-and bear responsibility for outcomes. And it is through dialogue and relationships that widespread enterprise is fostered, not merely prices in anonymous markets. Yet modern finance blatantly neglects these necessary elements for enterprise, and the dynamism of the real economy is stifled. For the last several decades finance has become increasingly centralized, distanced, and mechanistic. Instead of thousands of lending officers making judgments about borrowers who they know, credit decisions are the output of the models of a few Wall Street wizards and credit agencies whose mistakes have widespread, sometimes disastrous consequences. A Call for Judgment explains in a clear way how bad theories and mis-regulation have caused this dangerous divergence between the real economy and finance. Bhide accessibly lays out how so-called advances in modern finance helped mass-produce toxic products, based on backward-looking, top-down models that have no place in today's dynamic and decentralized world. Thanks to excessively tight securities laws and loose banking laws, anonymous transactions have displaced relationship-based finance. Returning to relationships and case-by-case judgment requires at a minimum tough rules that limit banks-and all deposit taking institutions-to basic lending and nothing else. Financing the Venturesome Economy is essential reading for anyone interested bringing the economy back to a point at which decisions can be made that foster organic economic growth without the potentially disastrous risks currently accepted by modern finance.

Since the first edition there have been fundamental changes in the Irish growth model. The sudden collapse of the Irish economy in 2008 raises questions such as: why the sudden and deep decline in economic growth? What are the prospects for a return to growth? Answering these questions and more, this book is the definitive work on the Celtic Tiger.

In his acclaimed book "American Theocracy," Kevin Phillips warned of the perilous interaction of debt, financial recklessness, and the spiking cost (and growing scarcity) of oil- warnings that are proving to be frighteningly accurate. Now, in his most significant and timely book yet, Phillips takes the full measure of this crisis. They are a part of what he calls "bad money"- not just the depreciated dollar, but also the dangerous attitudes and the flawed products of wayward mega-finance. His devastating conclusion: In its hubris, the financial sector has hijacked the American economy and put our very global future at risk-and it may be too late to stop it.

Rich in archival detail and offering a ground-breaking analysis, this book presents a radically new interpretation of British politics and policy failings during the Great Famine. The Irish famine of the 1840s is the biggest humanitarian crisis in the United Kingdom's history. Within six years of the arrival of the potato blight in Ireland in 1845, more than a quarter of its residents had unexpectedly died or emigrated. Its population has not yet fully recovered since. Historians have struggled to explain why the British government decided to shut down its centrally organised relief efforts in 1847, long before the famine ended. Some have blamed the laissez-faire attitudes of the time for an inadequate response by the British government; others have alleged purposeful neglect and genocide. In contrast, The Great Famine in Ireland and Britain's Financial Crisis uncovers a hidden narrative of the crisis, which links policy failure in Ireland to financial and political instability in Great Britain. More important than a laissez-faire ideology in hindering relief efforts for Ireland were the British government's lack of a Parliamentary majority from 1846, the financial crises of 1847, and a battle of ideas over monetary policy between proponents and opponents of financial orthodoxy. The high death toll in Ireland resulted from the British government's plans for intervention going awry, rather than being prematurely cancelled because of laissez-faire. This book is essential reading for scholars, students and anyone interested in Anglo-Irish relations, the history of financial crises and famines, and why humanitarian-relief efforts can go wrong even with good intentions.

The global credit crisis of 2008-2009 was the most serious shock to the world economy in fully 80 years. It was for the world as a whole what the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 was for emerging markets: a profoundly alarming wake-up call. By laying bare the fragility of global markets, it raised troubling questions about the operation of our deeply integrated world economy. It cast doubt on the efficacy of the dominant mode of light-touch financial regulation and more generally on the efficacy of the prevailing commitment to economic and financial liberalization. It challenged the managerial capacity of inherited institutions of global governance. And it augured a changing of the guard, pointing to the possibility that the economies that had been the leaders in the "global growth stakes" in the past might no longer be the leaders in the future. What the crisis means for reform, however, is still unclear. This book brings together leading scholars and policy analysts to describe and weigh the options. Successive chapters assess options for the global financial system, the global trading system, the international monetary system, and the Group of 20 and global governance. A final set of chapters contemplates the policy challenges for emerging markets and the advanced economies in the wake of the financial crisis.