Many of the assumptions that underpin mainstream macroeconomic models have been challenged as a result of the traumatic events of the recent financial crisis. Thus, until recently, it was widely agreed that although the stock of money had a role to play, in practice it could be ignored as long as we used short-term nominal interest rates as the instrument of policy because money and other credit markets would clear at the given policy rate. However, very early on in the financial crisis interest rates effectively hit zero percent and so central banks had to resort to a wholly new set of largely untested instruments to restore order, including quantitative easing and the purchase of toxic financial assets. This book brings together contributions from economists working in academia, financial markets and central banks to assess the effectiveness of these policy instruments and explore what lessons have so far been learned.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the business model of international banks is under pressure. Regulators across the world are retrenching to national lines by applying restrictions on cross-border banking. Applying game theory, this book develops a model of the financial trilemma to understand the co-ordination failure among regulators. It also provides governance solutions to overcome this co-ordination failure. The goal is to offer a long-term perspective on international banking for regulators and academics. The book combines academic insights and policy issues.

​This book explores some relevant distortions and market failures in financial and banking markets caused by the recent financial crisis and offers important insights to policymakers as well. After having introduced the reader to the economic background behind the origin of the present financial turmoil, the book proposes a distinct angle to look at some macro and microeconomic aspects. The volume discusses whether and to what extent policies, implemented by governments and monetary authorities to countervail bank defaults and avoid a disastrous financial instability, have in some way determined opportunistic conducts (moral hazard), changes in banks’ behaviour, distortive incentives and market failures. Furthermore, the book offers a viewpoint on the effects of the evolution of regulation for the banking sector. Finally, the book assesses how the increase in the cost of funding and the shrinking in credit supply (credit crunch) has modified the financial structure of small and medium firms. To illustrate this, some specific cases at Italian regional level are examined.

Since publication of Hetzel's The Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve (Cambridge University Press, 2008), the intellectual consensus that had characterized macroeconomics has disappeared. That consensus emphasized efficient markets, rational expectations and the efficacy of the price system in assuring macroeconomic stability. The 2008-9 recession not only destroyed the professional consensus about the kinds of models required to understand cyclical fluctuations but also revived the credit-cycle or asset-bubble explanations of recession that dominated thinking in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. These 'market-disorder' views emphasize excessive risk taking in financial markets and the need for government regulation. The present book argues for the alternative 'monetary-disorder' view of recessions. A review of cyclical instability over the last two centuries places the 2008-9 recession in the monetary-disorder tradition, which focuses on the monetary instability created by central banks rather than on a boom-bust cycle in financial markets.

This timely book utilizes the tools of politics, economics and public policy to explore the causes of the recent global financial crisis, which, the author argues, can be explained as the absence of a public interest perspective in policy making. Maurice Mullard points out that recessions are not collective shared experiences. Recessions create winners and losers. Furthermore, recessions are not an external event but reflect the outcomes of the policy process. The author looks beyond economic explanations for the economic crisis, and instead points towards a structural explanation. He explores the concept of social structures, the effects of the relationships between power and influence, and the role of ideology and income inequalities as contributory factors. The commitment to deregulated financial markets created an over the counter derivatives market worth some $640 trillion dollars compared to a global GDP worth $65 trillion dollars. The growth of derivatives markets, the role of credit rating agencies, major shifts in policy making and growing income inequalities are described as major factors explaining the present economic recession. The absence of a public interest perspective, the breakdown of trust in institutions, policy makers dependence on financial contributions, the housing bubble, and the increased concentration of income have distorted the democratic process. Thought provoking and stimulating, this book will provide a fascinating study for students and academics with an interest in politics, economics, political economy and public policy.

This title surveys contributions to the economics of bankruptcy. It offers a comprehensive compilation of work by both legal scholars and economists working in the fields of corporate and consumer finance beginning with Baird, Jackson and Rea before showcasing papers that extend, test and revise their theories.

The severity of the Great Recession and the subsequent stagnation caught many economists by surprise. But a group of Keynesian scholars warned for some years that strong forces were leading the U.S. toward a deep, persistent downturn. This book collects essays about these events from prominent macroeconomists who developed a perspective that predicted the broad outline and many specific aspects of the crisis. From this point of view, the recovery of employment and revival of strong growth requires more than short-term monetary easing and temporary fiscal stimulus. Economists and policy makers need to explore how the process of demand formation failed after 2007, and where demand will come from going forward. Successive chapters address the sources and dynamics of demand, the distribution and growth of wages, the structure of finance, and challenges from globalization, and inform recommendations for monetary and fiscal policies to achieve a more efficient and equitable society.

The IMF's response to the global crisis of 2008 2009 marked a significant change from its past policies. The Fund provided relatively large amounts of credit quickly with limited conditions, and accepted the use of capital controls. This book traces the evolution of the IMF's actions to promote international financial stability from the Bretton Woods era through the most recent crisis. The analysis includes an examination of the IMF's crisis management activities during the debt crisis of the 1980s, the upheavals in emerging markets in the 1990s and early 2000s, and the ongoing European crisis. The dominant influence of the United States and other advanced economies in the governance of the IMF is also described, as well as the replacement of the G7 nations by the more inclusive G20, which have promised to give the IMF a role in their mutual assessment of policies while undertaking reforms of the IMF's governance."

This provocative look at the global financial crisis argues that the United States, the European Union and Japan have intentionally and unwittingly adopted wrong-headed economic policies in a futile attempt to deal with sovereign debt resulting from the global financial crisis. It offers persuasive evidence of how the politics of austerity fail to encourage economic recovery, and proposes instead a number of alternative ideas and solutions. The book begins with a detailed breakdown of the financial crisis and the government response in the United States, with particular focus on the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The author then puts forth a basic three-part plan calling for (1) fundamental tax and entitlement reform; (2) massive economic stimulus in the form of public and private investment to modernize the country's aging infrastructures; and (3) mortgage relief to revitalize the nation's housing markets. The book concludes with specific policy proposals designed to achieve these goals and return the US economy to a state of full employment and robust economic growth. This timely and insightful volume will appeal to students and scholars of economics, public policy and finance, as well as anyone with an interest in the recent economic history of the United States.

The Republic of Ireland, which declared itself in 1949, allowed the Catholic Church to dominate its civil society and education system. Investment by American and European companies, and a welcoming tax regime, created the 'Celtic Tiger' of the 1990s. That brief burst of good fortune was destroyed by a corrupt political class which encouraged a wild property boom, leaving the country almost bankrupt. What Ireland needs now is a programme of real change. It needs to become a fully modern republic in fact as well as name. Politicians have been let get away with murder, and there is a fatalistic sense that nothing can change. The country needs to encourage participation in, and oversight and knowledge of politics, to make people feel that they have a right to challenge the old party machines and to make a difference. It is their country, after all.

The Financial Crisis and Developing Countries is an invaluable discussion and analysis of the regional and country specific impacts of the financial crisis in both emerging markets and developing countries. Using heterodox and mainstream methodologies, the book develops a multidisciplinary perspective on the crisis, showing empirical impacts on the poor and vulnerable. It examines how the crisis continues to change our concepts of development, critically discusses mainstream approaches, and analyses (global) governance responses including of the G20. The contributors critically assess the measures taken to deal with the crisis, and reveal that many elements that have led to crisis (inequality, inappropriate international financial architecture, structural imbalances) have not been dealt sufficiently, and as a result new crises will continue to emerge. Exploring a global and inter-disciplinary view, this timely book provides accessible information on the impact of the crisis that will prove relevant for students of development studies and international economics. Researchers and policymakers including in foreign and economic affairs, development cooperation, and international institutions interested in understanding the impact of the global economy will also find much to learn from this important book. Contributors: F. Cheru, H. Clemens, A. de Haan, A.M. Fischer, J. Ghosh, S. Gong, D. Green, K. Jansen, A. Kapoor, R. King, R. Marconi, M. Messkoub, S.M. Murshed, F.B. Schiphorst, K.A. Siegmann, M. Spoor, P.A.G. van Bergeijk, R. van der Hoeven, I. van Staveren, R. Vos, B. White

In The Financial Crisis Reconsidered, Aronoff challenges the conventional view that reckless credit produced the US housing boom and the financial crisis, explaining how the large current account deficit, and its mercantilist origin, was a more fundamental cause. He also demonstrates that the decision to provide relief for bank creditors rather than underwater homeowners was responsible for the prolonged recession that followed the crisis. Aronoff proposes a novel theory to account for the ultimate origins of secular stagnation and economic volatility. He shows how accumulation, which occurs when a person or country earns more than it ever plans to spend, generates both an excess of saving and a deficiency in demand. While savings provide the funds to promote booms, under-consumption ensures that these booms will turn bust and that the economy will fall short of its potential growth rate. Aronoff argues that mercantilists and top income earners engage in accumulation, and that the influence of both types has grown in recent decades. Combining economic theory and historical narrative, this book offers a new perspective of the housing boom and the financial crisis, concluding with innovative policy proposals to reduce accumulation without compromising the benefits of a market economy.

In 2008 Ireland experienced one of the most dramatic economic crises of any economy in the world. It remains at the heart of the international crisis, sitting uneasily between the US and European economies. Not long ago, however, Ireland was celebrated as an example of successful market-led globalisation and economic growth. How can we explain the Irish crisis? What does it tell us about the causes of the international crisis? How should we rethink our understanding of contemporary economies and the workings of economic liberalism based on the Irish experience? This book combines economic sociology and comparative political economy to analyse the causes, dynamics and implications of Ireland's economic 'boom to bust'. It examines the interplay between the financial system, European integration and Irish national politics to show how financial speculation overwhelmed the economic and social development of the 1990s 'Celtic Tiger'.

When States Go Broke collects insights and analysis from leading academics and practitioners that discuss the ongoing fiscal crisis among the American states. No one disagrees with the idea that the states face enormous political and fiscal challenges. There is, however, little consensus on how to fix the perennial problems associated with these challenges. This volume fills an important gap in the dialogue by offering an academic analysis of the many issues broached by these debates. Leading scholars in bankruptcy, constitutional law, labor law, history, political science, and economics have individually contributed their assessments of the origins, context, and potential solutions for the states in crisis. It presents readers academics, policy makers, and concerned citizens alike with the resources to begin and continue that important, solution-oriented conversation."

The financial crisis of 2007-10 has presented a number of key policy challenges for those concerned with the long-term stability of the euro area. It has shown that price stability as provided by the European Central Bank is not enough to guarantee financial stability, and exposed fault lines in governance and deficiencies in the architecture of the financial supervisory and regulatory framework. This book addresses these and other issues, including why the crisis affected some countries more than others, whether the euro is still attractive for new EU states, and what policy changes and structural reforms, both macro and micro, should be undertaken to ensure its future viability. Written by a team of leading academic and central bank economists, the book also includes chapters on the cross-country incidence of the crisis, the Irish crisis and ECB monetary policy during the crisis, and studies on Spain, the Baltics, Slovakia and Slovenia.

This timely book utilizes the tools of politics, economics and public policy to explore the causes of the recent global financial crisis, which, the author argues, can be explained as the absence of a public interest perspective in policy making. Maurice Mullard points out that recessions are not collective shared experiences. Recessions create winners and losers. Furthermore, recessions are not an external event but reflect the outcomes of the policy process. The author looks beyond economic explanations for the economic crisis, and instead points towards a structural explanation. He explores the concept of social structures, the effects of the relationships between power and influence, and the role of ideology and income inequalities as contributory factors. The commitment to deregulated financial markets created an over the counter derivatives market worth some $640 trillion dollars compared to a global GDP worth $65 trillion dollars. The growth of derivatives markets, the role of credit rating agencies, major shifts in policy making and growing income inequalities are described as major factors explaining the present economic recession. The absence of a public interest perspective, the breakdown of trust in institutions, policy makers dependence on financial contributions, the housing bubble, and the increased concentration of income have distorted the democratic process. Thought provoking and stimulating, this book will provide a fascinating study for students and academics with an interest in politics, economics, political economy and public policy.

When are policy makers willing to make costly adjustments to their macroeconomic policies to mitigate balance-of-payments problems? Which types of adjustment strategies do they choose? Under what circumstances do they delay reform, and when are such delays likely to result in financial crises? To answer these questions, this book examines how macroeconomic policy adjustments affect individual voters in financially open economies and argues that the anticipation of these distributional effects influences policy makers' decisions about the timing and the type of reform. Empirically, the book combines analyses of cross-national survey data of voters' and firms' policy evaluations with comparative case studies of national policy responses to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/8 and the recent Global Financial Crisis in Eastern Europe. The book shows that variation in policy makers' willingness to implement reform can be traced back to differences in the vulnerability profiles of their countries' electorates.

Offering an analytical perspective on the design and reform of the international financial architecture, this book stresses the important role played by creditor co-ordination problems in the origin and management of crises by relating the insights of the new literature on global games to earlier work on currency crises, bank runs, and sovereign debt default. It examines the design of sovereign bankruptcy procedures, the role of the IMF in influencing creditors and debtor countries, and the currency composition of sovereign debt, and draws on recent research and policy work. The book's first part provides a critical synthesis of the literature underpinning the architecture debate. It reviews the traditional distinction between "fundamentals-based" and "sunspot-based" crises before reconciling the two using global game methods. The role of co-ordination problems in sparking costly liquidation and influencing the debtor's incentives to repay is then examined in depth and shown to lie at the heart of crisis management policy. The empirical literature on leading indicators of crisis is also critically examined and related to the architecture debate. In its second part the book examines key issues in crisis management. Suggesting that optimal reforms must set the inefficiencies of crisis against the inefficiencies of debtor moral hazard, the authors consider the relative merits of statutory and contractual solutions to sovereign debt workouts. They go on to discuss the role of the IMF in influencing private lending and debtor moral hazard, theoretically and empirically. They argue that there is no simple relationship between ex post crisis management and ex ante moral hazard, implying that the handling of financial crises is a delicate affair warranting a cautious approach by would-be architects.

Against the backdrop of the financial crisis that unfolded in 2008, this book deals with policy challenges going forward, focusing in particular on the ongoing catching-up process in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European (CESEE) countries. While having emerged relatively unscathed from the crisis, the CESEE economies nonetheless need to adjust to the new external conditions they will encounter. In this respect, decision-makers are faced with multiple sources of uncertainty: will post-crisis growth be the same as pre-crisis growth? What will be the future role of financial integration, growth financing and exports? What are the particular challenges facing monetary policy-makers and the banking sector in the region? On these issues and related topics, the book provides a multi-disciplinary assessment, combining the views of high-ranking central bankers and other policy makers, commercial bankers and academics. Economists and students of economic policy and European integration from central, commercial and investment banks, governments, international organizations, universities and research institutes will find this book of great interest and importance, especially those working on Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.

Douglas Berry Copland (1894 1971) was a renowned economist and diplomat. Originally published in 1934, this book was based upon the Alfred Marshall lectures delivered by Copland at the University of Cambridge during October and November 1933. The text offers an account of the Great Depression as it happened in Australia, presenting an outline of the economic crisis and sketching the main lines of policy pursued in reaction to it. A diary of events is also provided, along with statistical tables and charts. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in Australian economic history, economic policy and the Great Depression.

This critical and thought-provoking book explores the causes and consequences of Europe's failed political and economic institutions. Europe's recession has created new challenges as market turmoil has shaken the foundations of the twin pillars of the new drive for European integration - political and monetary unions. This book critically assesses the patchwork solutions continually offered to hold the troubled unions together. Failed political policies, from the prodigious 'Common Agricultural Policy' to ever more common fiscal stimulus packages, are shown to have bred less than stellar results in the past, and to have devastating implications for future European growth. The contributors outline the manner through which European monetary union has subsidized and continues to exacerbate the burgeoning debt crisis. Most strikingly, the interplay between Europe's political and economic realms is exposed as the boondoggle it is, with increasingly bureaucratic institutions plaguing the continent and endangering future potential. Combining political and economic analysis, this comprehensive book will prove essential for researchers and students in international business and macroeconomics. Educated laymen wanting a keener perspective on Europe's recession will also find this book to be invaluable.

In the Eighth Edition of this classic text on the financial history of bubbles and crashes, Robert McCauley joins with Robert Aliber in building on Charles Kindleberger's renowned work. McCauley draws on his central banking experience to introduce new chapters on cryptocurrency and the United States as the 21st Century global lender of last resort. He also updates the book's coverage of the recent property bubble in China, as well as providing new perspectives on the US housing bubble of 2003-2006, and the Japanese bubble of the late 1980s. And he gives new attention to the social psychology that leads people to take the risk of investing in Ponzi schemes and asset price bubbles. For the first time in this revised and updated edition, figures highlight key points to ensure that today's generation of finance and economic researchers, students, practitioners and policy-makers-as well as investors looking to avoid crashes-have access to this panoramic history of financial crisis.

This book investigates cases in which national and international activities have gone massively wrong, entailing seriously negative consequences, and in which the sophisticated analytical models of social science have ceased to be helpful. Illustrations range from the global financial crisis to the failure to achieve speedy systemic change in the former Soviet Union and the failure to achieve development in the Third World. The analysis uses as a backdrop long-term Russian history and short-term Russian encounters with unrestrained capitalism to develop a framework that is based in the so-called new institutionalism. Understanding the causes of systemic failure is shown to require an approach that spans across the increasingly specialized subdisciplines of modern social science. Demonstrating that increasing theoretical sophistication has been bought at the price of a loss of perspective and the need for sensitivity to the role of cultural and historical specificity, the book pleads the case for a new departure in seeking to model the motives for human action.

This insightful book explores the economic conditions and policy response of four major East Asian economies in the wake of the 2008 global economic crisis. Written by a distinguished group of Asian social scientists, this study summarizes and synthesizes the economic impacts of the crisis on individual countries and their policy response over the past few years, and in particular carefully scrutinizes the immediate and remote causes of the crisis. It not only offers an assessment of the impacts of the crisis, and identifies specific country measures that can be undertaken to stabilize the situation, but also looks at the crisis from three important economic perspectives: that of a healthy fiscal system, international trade, and the energy market. This insightful research monograph will be gratefully received by academics in economics and development studies as well as public policy think tanks. Government economic planning agencies in emerging countries, as well as international economic organizations and institutions such as World Bank and United Nations will also find plenty of key insights and important information in this path-breaking book.

This unique and fascinating book illustrates that the 'credit crunch' and the ensuing financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009 did not only strike hard at the economy in the Western world, but also at its policymakers, at economics as a scientific discipline and, more specifically, at the process of European integration itself. In a series of theoretical and empirical papers, the expert contributors discuss the impact of the financial crisis on European integration in detail, considering issues including governance, sovereign debt crises, global economic imbalances, and post-crisis perspectives from Central and East European countries. The conclusion is that there is an urgent need for political integration in Europe as a necessary tool to facilitate economic integration. This book will prove invaluable to both academics and practitioners with a special interest in the economics of European integration, international financial markets, economics and international business. Contributors include: F.C. Bagliano, H. Berger, N.D. Coniglio, P. De Grauwe, S. Dumitrescu, M. Heipertz, A. Horobet, D. Ioannou, A.M. Lejour, J. Lewis, J. Lukkezen, K.-S. Lee, C. Morana, V. Nitsch, M. Pirovano, F. Prota, Z. Qian, S. Sarisoy Guerin, A. Van Poeck, J. Vanneste, P. Veenendaal