To fully comprehend the Vietnam War, it is essential to understand the central role that southerners played in the nation's commitment to the war, in the conflict's duration, and in the fighting itself. President Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas and Secretary of State Dean Rusk of Georgia oversaw the dramatic escalation of U.S. military involvement from 1965 through 1968. General William Westmoreland, born and raised in South Carolina, commanded U.S. forces during most of the Johnson presidency. Widely supported by their constituents, southern legislators collectively provided the most dependable support for war funding and unwavering opposition to measures designed to hasten U.S. withdrawal from the conflict. In addition, southerners served, died, and were awarded the Medal of Honor in numbers significantly disproportionate to their states' populations. In The American South and the Vietnam War, Joseph A. Fry demonstrates how Dixie's majority pro-war stance derived from a host of distinctly regional values, perspectives, and interests. He also considers the views of the dissenters, from student protesters to legislators such as J. William Fulbright, Albert Gore Sr., and John Sherman Cooper, who worked in the corridors of power to end the conflict, and civil rights activists such as Martin Luther King Jr., Muhammad Ali, and Julian Bond, who were among the nation's most outspoken critics of the war. Fry's innovative and masterful study draws on policy analysis and polling data as well as oral histories, transcripts, and letters to illuminate not only the South's influence on foreign relations, but also the personal costs of war on the home front.

"Joyful to heart-wrenching. Short non-fiction stories about moving to Los Angeles from Vietnam, and a dream-like childhood that's turned into a nightmare when the author's father returns to the family after spending years in a "re-education" camp. It's a well-written rollercoaster of beauty and terror." - Jason Koivu, 2003

First published in 1992. From the foreword: "Search and rescue has always been important to the United States Air Force, whose aircrews deserve nothing less than the fullest possible commitment to save them and return them home. The motto of Air Force search and rescue, "So Others May Live," is one of the most compelling of all military mottoes. It embodies this spirit of altruism and, as events have proven, also indicates the service's intention to furnish life-saving SAR for civilian as well as military purposes. Search and rescue flourished during World War II as lifeguard ships and submarines joined patrolling aircraft in saving lives and sustaining morale, especially in the Pacific Ocean Areas. The rotary-wing, turbojet, and avionics revolutions made modern SAR a reality. Foreshadowed by the Korean War, the helicopter became the principal form of air rescue vehicle in Vietnam. In three major conflicts, SAR forces gained a reputation for bravery, dedication, and self-sacrifice, as they ventured repeatedly into hostile territory to pluck fallen aircrews to safety. The USAF rightly continues to place a top priority on search and rescue, seeking better ways to perform this function through the use of advanced equipment and aircraft (such as the multipurpose MH-53J Pave Low helicopter) and improved training of personnel. This reprint of a classic work offers the reader an exciting and exacting history of the evolution of combat search and rescue in America's longest and most grueling war: the conflict in Southeast Asia."

Hal's Navy is an insightful personal memoir that brings home not only many technical aspects of naval service, but also the joys, sorrows, separations and heady feelings of a job well done. Hal Sacks tells his terrific and entertaining story beginning with Officer Candidate School and Korea in 1953, going on to Vietnam in 1968, and beyond. Lovers of great storytelling will relish this book, right alongside history buffs and military aficionados.

"Abandoned in Place" provides a snapshot of the Vietnam POW/MIA issue. From the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, in January 1973, ending American involvement in the war in Southeast Asia to the "dysfunctional" POW/MIA accounting effort of 2014. With the period 1980 -1981 a clear line in the sand. As the U.S. government refocused its efforts from the rescue of surviving POWs to the recovery of remains. "Abandoned in Place" painstakingly details the intelligence available in 1980 that led to the conclusion American POWs survived in Laos, six years after the end of the Vietnam War. Using never before seen documents, the author reconstructs events leading up to a CIA reconnaissance mission, doomed from the start, to confirm the presence of POWs held deep in the Laotian jungle. As the CIA team headed toward the camp, members of the Joint Special Operation Command trained for a strike of surgical precision. Its mission rescue the POWs held at the camp known as Nhom Marrott. A lack of political will, bureaucratic failures, and leaks forced a stand-down order, condemning any surviving POWs. The author highlights the post Nhom Marrott government accounting effort, focusing on several specific POW/MIA cases. Crippled by a "mindset to debunk" officials ignored evidence of capture and survival in captivity. They edited witness statements to support pre-conceived conclusion of death and dismissed Vietnamese admissions of capture. This despite overwhelming evidence POWs not only survived but also continued to lay down signals in hopes of eventual rescue. Early Reviews - Col. Don Gordon (USA-Ret) Special Operations Command, J2 Director of Intelligence 1980-1983 - "O'Shea leads readers to form their own reasoned conclusions. She writes the most comprehensive and thoroughly researched compendium, private or government, classified or unclassified, about this complicated and emotional subject. It is an event long needed to be told accurately and with respect for the missing in action and their families. O'Shea is fidelis to that cause. She carefully distinguishes fact from speculation. Abandoned in Place is a meticulously detailed, thoroughly verified, and reliable story, well told. It describes plans to rescue about 35 United States Military servicemen strongly believed held in a prison camp in Laos in 1980. Step-by-step, O'Shea builds a strong case that some US military likely remained under North Vietnamese and Lao control after the war." Former Senator and Vice-Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs Bob Smith - "Lynn O'Shea has provided the best in depth analysis ever written and brilliantly combined over 25 years of personal research, evidence and a chronological portrayal of the facts to prove, without any doubt, that America left men behind in Southeast Asia at the end of the Viet Nam War. When we were told that the North Vietnamese, Lao and Viet Cong had complied with the Paris Peace Accords in 1973 and returned all of our men, the evidence shows that was an outright lie and many of our government leaders and the intelligence community knew it." Dr. Jeffrey Donahue, Brother of Major Morgan Donahue - "Lynn masterfully connects a mind-boggling array of dots to not only affirm the truth of the Indochina POW-MIA issue but also to rigorously convey how and why the U.S. government knowingly left men behind and then covered it up. Lynn has woven together tens of thousands of documents and countless hours of interviews to produce a cogent and unassailable profile of one of the most tragic episodes of modern American history. The how and why have never been so brilliantly researched, documented and conveyed."

Every Marine who has served in Vietnam has been heavily involved in efforts to improve the situation of the Vietnamese people. The civil affairs actions of the III Marine Amphibious Force have been every bit as important as the combat actions. In this reference pamphlet, which follows an earlier history of the first year of Marine Corps civic action in Vietnam, the story of the second year of civilian aid policies, programs, and activities is related. The use of civic action by the Marine Corps to accomplish its assigned mission is nothing new. Examples of how the Marines have employed civic action in the past can be found by reading accounts of their exploits during the 1920s in Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. From these accomplishments and astute observations made by men such as Major Earl H. Ellis and others, accounts of "lessons learned" about civic action can be found recorded in the Small Wars Manual of 1940, which points out: "The motive in small wars is not material destruction. It is usually a project dealing with the social, economic, and political development of the people. It is of primary importance that the fullest benefit be derived from the psychological aspects of the situation. That implies a serious study of the people, their racial, political, religious, and mental development. By analysis and study the reasons for existing emergency may be deduced; the most practical method of solving the problem is to understand the possible approaches thereto and the repercussion to be expected from any action which may be contemplated. By this study and the ability to apply correct psychological doctrine, many pitfalls may be avoided and the success of the undertaking assured." With the basic concept of small wars in mind, the Manual of 1940 goes on to point out: "The purpose should always be to restore normal government or give the people a better government than they had before, and to estabJ.sh peace, order, and security on as permanent a basis as practicable. In so doing one should endeavor to make self-sufficient native agencies responsible for these matters. With all this accomplished, one should be able to leave the country with the lasting friendship and respect of the native population." The concept of civic action may be simply stated, but the organization and application of carrying out an effective program becomes a difficult matter. This difficulty in application can be seen through the scope and magnitude of the U. S. Marine Corps civic action effort in the I Corps area of South Vietnam. There the Marine Corps came face-to-face with the age old problem of guerrilla warfare; winning the confidence of the population which is vital in defeating the insurgent. It was in the field of winning the confidence of a large civilian population, while at the same time fighting a war, that the Marine Corps was least prepared when its troops landed in South Vietnam.