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Books > Social sciences > Warfare & defence > War & defence operations > General
Between 1946 and 1958, the U.S. conducted some 66 nuclear bomb tests in the Marshall Islands. In 1959, this scattering of coral atolls was again chosen as the testing site for a new generation of weapons-long-range missiles fired in the U.S. Then in 1984 a missile fired from California was intercepted by one from Kwajalein atoll: SDI, or Star Wars, was declared a realizable dream. As military researcher Owen Wilkes has noted: "If we could shut down the Pacific Missile Range, we could cut off half the momentum of the nuclear race." This is the story of the preparations for war which every day impinge on tire lives of Pacific Islanders caught on the cutting edge of the nuclear arms race. It is the story of a displaced people contaminated by nuclear fallout, forcibly resettled as their own islands become uninhabitable, and reduced to lives of poverty, ill-health, and dependence. It is also a stirring account of the Marshall Islanders themselves, of their resilience and protest, and of their attempts to seek redress in the courts. It is a shocking and timely study.
For many years historians of the Cuban missile crisis have concentrated on those thirteen days in October 1962 when the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war. Mark White s study adds an equally intense scrutiny of the causes and consequences of the crisis. "Missiles in Cuba" is based on up-to-date scholarship as well as Mr. White s own findings in National Security Archive materials, Kennedy Library tapes of ExComm meetings, and correspondence between Soviet officials in Washington and Havana all newly released. His more rounded picture gives us a much clearer understanding of the policy strategies pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union (and, to a lesser extent, Cuba) that brought on the crisis. His almost hour-by-hour account of the confrontation itself also destroys some venerable myths, such as the unique initiatives attributed to Robert Kennedy. And his assessment of the consequences of the crisis points to salutary effects on Soviet-American relation and on U.S. nuclear defense strategy, but questionable influences on Soviet defense spending and on Washington s perception of its talents for "crisis management," later tested in Vietnam.
This important study seeks to address the issues of state building and regime security as key variables affecting and determining a foreign policy-making process during a crisis and confrontation. Mohamedou proceeds from the notion that decision makers' dispositions matter their worldview, ideology, beliefs, and axioms play a role in state building as well as the historical operational environment (societal, regional, and international). The case this study is concerned with is the Second Gulf War, initiated on August 2, 1990, with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and which came to an end on February 28, 1991, after a military confrontation between Iraq and an international coalition of twenty-eight countries led by the United States of America.
In the aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Crawford F. Sams led the most unprecedented and unsurpassed reforms in public health history, as chief of the Public Health and Welfare Section of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers in East Asia. "Medic" is Sams's firsthand account of public health reforms in Japan during the occupation and their significance for the formation of a stable and democratic state in Asia after World War II. "Medic" also tells of the strenuous efforts to control disease among refugees and civilians during the Korean War, which had enormously high civilian casualties. Sams recounts the humanitarian, military, and ideological reasons for controlling disease during military operations in Korea, where he served, first, as a health and welfare adviser to the U.S. Military Command that occupied Korea south of the 38th parallel and, later, as the chief of Health and Welfare of the United Nations Command. In presenting a larger picture of the effects of disease on the course of military operations and in the aftermath of catastrophic bombings and depravation, Crawford Sams has left a written document that reveals the convictions and ideals that guided his generation of military leaders.
The impressive Second Edition of this standard study
incorporates important new evidence on the origins of the war from
Chinese and Russian archives. It reveals that Stalin encouraged the
attack on South Korea, but also confirms that the original
initiative came from North Korea. Peter Lowe has also written an
extended conclusion with a discussion of the Koreas in the late
1990s, and the challenges involved in securing their
reunification.
This book offers a scientific interpretation of the field of military knowledge situated between strategy and tactics, better known as operational art', and traces the evolution of operational awareness and its culmination in a full-fledged theory. The author, a Brigadier General (ret.) in the Israeli Defence Forces and Doctor of History, King's College, London, clarifies the substance of operational art' and constructs a cognitive framework for its critical analysis. He chronicles the stages in the evolution of operational theory from the emergence of 19th-century military thought to Blitzkrieg. For the first time the Soviet theories of Deep Operations' and Strike Manoeuvre' that emerged in the 1920s and 1930 are discussed. The author argues that it is these doctrines that eventually led to the crystallization of the American Airland Battle theory, successfully implemented in the Gulf War.
This book offers a scientific interpretation of the field of military knowledge situated between strategy and tactics, better known as operational art', and traces the evolution of operational awareness and its culmination in a full-fledged theory. The author, a Brigadier General (ret.) in the Israeli Defence Forces and Doctor of History, King's College, London, clarifies the substance of operational art' and constructs a cognitive framework for its critical analysis. He chronicles the stages in the evolution of operational theory from the emergence of 19th-century military thought to Blitzkrieg. For the first time the Soviet theories of Deep Operations' and Strike Manoeuvre' that emerged in the 1920s and 1930 are discussed. The author argues that it is these doctrines that eventually led to the crystallization of the American Airland Battle theory, successfully implemented in the Gulf War.
Throughout the world, countries are obliged to make great sacrifices in order to raise the vast sums of money needed to secure their defence. But both the sacrifice and the money will be wasted unless properly prepared and qualified commanders are available to direct military operations in the event of war breaking out. Many books have been written which attempt to deduce the qualities required of contemporary generals by studying the performance of the great captains of history. By contrast, in "Directing Operations," first published in 1989, Kitson works out the qualities needed by studying the tasks that would be likely to confront commanders of the day. He goes on to discuss how traditional methods of producing senior officers, which may have been suited to the needs of the massed armies of the first half of the twentieth century, should be adapted to fit the demands of the modern world. Kitson's writings continue to be widely read and provoke strong opinions, and the ideas contained in "Directing Operations" remain highly relevant to the armies of all developed countries.
Bosnia and Hercegovina emerged in the wake of the Second World War
as a melting pot for the cultures that had determined the history
of the South Slavs since the middle ages. Catholic, Orthodox, and
Muslim all shared in and contributed to the political and cultural
life of Yugoslavia's most diverse republic.
Perspectives on Strategy examines in depth five aspects of strategy. Strategic thought and behaviour are explored and explained from the perspectives of intellect, morality, culture, geography, and technology. Each perspective has attracted persisting controversy. Perspectives on Strategy is strongly complementary to the author's previous book, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (OUP, 2010). This new work takes a notably holistic view of strategic phenomena, which serves as a master framework within which detailed examination of strategic history and issues can usefully be pursued in the light of particular perspectives. Foundational for the argument in Perspectives on Strategy is the proposition that distinctive aspects of strategy (e.g. ethics, culture, inter alia) can only be appreciated properly when they are regarded in context. The author shares this view with T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia), who wrote of the 'whole house of war'. Perspectives on Strategy gratefully adapts Lawrence and writes about the 'whole house of strategy'. The book insists that the nature of strategy is best represented by a Venn diagram that shows overlapping perspectives. Thus, the subject of each chapter is shown as having meaning for, and in turn is influenced by, the subjects of the other chapters. For example, the book explores the importance of strategic ideas relative to the significance of the material weapons of war. The author poses the hardest of questions pertinent to each chosen perspective (e.g. do ideas matter more than muscle?-in practice how robust is the ethical code with which warfare is waged?-is geography destiny, as some theorists have claimed?-and do technically superior weapons win wars? Perspectives on Strategy demonstrates that it is possible to look closely at strategic matters from limited but arguably powerful perspectives, without being captured by them. This book asks and answers the most challenging and rewarding questions that can be posed in order to reveal the persisting universal nature, but ever changing character, of strategy.
In late 1945, American military planners began to develop strategies to deal with the frightening possibility of a war with the Soviet Union when it becaeme clear that the Soviet Union was an aggressive power that sought to exercise its power. This work examines those plans and describes both how the Soviet military threat was perceived and how the American Joint Chiefs of Staff intended to defeat the Russians. This account provides a view of what might have happened had the two superpowers attempted to settle their differences by force.
In late 1945, it became clear that the Soviet Union was an aggressive power. American military planners began to develop strategies to deal with the frightening possibility of a war with the Soviet Union. This work examines those plans.
This work reports on the Vietnam war as seen by the GI in the jungles. It discusses current attitudes, views from Saigon, Hanoi and Phnom Penh, and other locales in the countryside.
This work reports on the Vietnam war as seen by the GI in the jungles. It discusses current attitudes, views from Saigon, Hanoi and Phnom Penh, and other locales in the countryside.
In this riveting account, historian Stephen Ambrose continues where he left off in his #1 bestseller D-Day. Ambrose again follows the individual characters of this noble, brutal, and tragic war, from the high command down to the ordinary soldier, drawing on hundreds of interviews to re-create the war experience with startling clarity and immediacy. From the hedgerows of Normandy to the overrunning of Germany, Ambrose tells the real story of World War II from the perspective of the men and women who fought it.
This research guide consists of an annotated bibliography of selected published items concentrating on military logistics in America from the colonial era to the present. This unique comprehensive reference is designed for libraries and scholars interested in American military history and for the use of academics and professionals at military service schools, staff colleges, and senior service colleges, with an interest in logistical doctrine and the logistical support of military operations. A narrative introduction includes a concise discussion of the major themes, of American military logistics. A subsequent section notes the top 50 works in the field of military logistics history. Chapter 1 notes unpublished and published government documments dealing with military logistics, and manuscript collections of interest, The core bibliographical section consists of seven topical chapters (Science of Logistics, General, Quartermaster, Transportation, Subsistence, Ordnance, and Procurement-Mobilization) comprising 1996 entries representing the most significant books, dissertations, and articles in English on the topic of military logistics. The core chapters are organized chronologically with an introductory section comprising works covering more than one period.
V K Triandafillov was an outstanding young commander who shaped the military theory and doctrine of the Red Army as it came to grips with the problem of future war. A conscript soldier who rose through the ranks to become an officer in the Tsarist Army, he saw combat in both the First World War and the Russian Civil War. A student of some of the finest military specialists teaching the first generation of young Red commanders, he sought to link theory and practice by using past experience to comprehend future combat.
This volume derives from an unprecedented seminar held at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs in November 1990. At the seminar, leading Western diplomatic and military historians and Vietnam scholars met with prominent Vietnamese Communists to reflect on the Vietnam War. The book contains four parts: The Vietnamese Revolution and Political/Military strategy; the war from the American side; the war in the South and Cambodia; and retrospective and postwar issues. In addition to Jane Werner and Luu Doan Huynh, the contributors are Mark Bradley, William Duiker, David Elliott, Christine White, George Vickers, James Harrison, George Herring, Ronald Spector, Paul Joseph, Jeffrey Clarke, Ngo Vinh Long, Benedict Kiernan, Marilyn Young, Keith Taylor, and Tran Van Tra. General Tra was Commander of the People's Liberation Armed Forces of South Vietnam from 1963 to 1975. His eye-opening analysis of the Tet Offensive has never before been available in English.
Some of the most active debate about the Vietnam War today is prompted by those who believe that the United States could have won the war either through an improved military strategy or through more enlightened social policies. Eric Bergerud takes issue with both of these positions. Carefully analyzing the entire course of the war in a single key province, "The Dynamics of Defeat" shows that the Vietnam War was a tragedy in the true sense of the word: American policy could not have been much different than it was and could only have led to failure.Examining the war at the operational level, where political policy is translated into military action, "The Dynamics of Defeat "provides a case study of the efficacy on the ground of policies emanating from Washington. Many of the policy alternatives now proposed in hindsight were actually attempted in Hau Nghia to one degree or another. Bergerud is able on that basis to critique these policies and to offer his own conclusions in a thought-provoking but utterly unpolemical fashion.Based on extensive research in U.S. Army archives and many personal interviews with those who experienced the war in Hau Nghia, "The Dynamics of Defeat" is a story full of violence, frustration, and numbing despair, but also one rich with lessons for American foreign policy.
This book provides a comprehensive analysis and review of the major events and the leading actors of the Gulf War. Copies of key documents and essential factual information build up a picture of the realities of war in the Middle East but the material is set in a strong theoretical framework. This allows the author to see the conflict within the context of the international system and to relate it to the changes of the post-cold-war world. Matthews looks at the shifts in international order which dictated the nature of the international response to the war, but also at the new conditions created by the war itself. What scope is there for Arab socialism after the fall of European socialism? Has the conflict made Israel stronger or weaker? Can the UN be entrusted with the post of global peace-keeper?
In February 1979, China launched a full scale attack on Vietnam bringing to the surface the deep tension between the two socialist neighbours. The importance of the resultant war is often overlooked. Millions of people throughout the region were affected, and the frictions that remain in the wake of the war threaten the prospects for peace not only in Southeast Asia, but also the whole Asia-Pacific region as well. This is a full scale examination of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War - the events that led to it, the Cold War aftermath, and the implications for the region and beyond.
In February 1979, China launched a full scale attack on Vietnam bringing to the surface the deep tension between the two socialist neighbours. The importance of the resultant war is often overlooked. Millions of people throughout the region were affected, and the frictions that remain in the wake of the war threaten the prospects for peace not only in Southeast Asia, but also the whole Asia-Pacific region as well. This is a full scale examination of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War - the events that led to it, the Cold War aftermath, and the implications for the region and beyond.
This book provides a comprehensive guide to 19th and 20th century wars and their settlement. It examines the deeper origins of the conflict, the immediate reason for the outbreak of hostilities, the course of the fighting, and the terms of the settlement. The book is organized both geographically and topically, covering a range of wars including the Post-Napoleonic revolutionary wars, wars of German Unification, the Middle Eastern wars, Maghreb wars and South American wars.
'. . . an extraordinarily accurate and insightful account of the Cuban missile crisis. I remember well the fear of which he writes so persuasively.'--Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson |
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