Highlights "the range and richness of scholarship on medieval warfare, military institutions, and cultures of conflict that characterize the field". History 95 (2010) The latest collection of the most up-to-date research on matters of medieval military history contains a remarkable geographical range, extending from Spain and Britain to the southern steppe lands, by way of Scandinavia, Byzantium, and the Crusader States. At one end of the timescale is a study of population in the later Roman Empire and at the other the Hundred Years War, touching on every century in between. Topics include the hardware of war, the social origins of soldiers, considerations of individual battles, and words for weapons in Old Norse literature. Contributors: Bernard S. Bachrach, Gary Baker, Michael Ehrlich, Nicholas A. Gribit, Nicolaos S. Kanellopoulos,Mollie M. Madden, Kenneth J. McMullen, Craig M. Nakashian, Mamuka Tsurtsumia, Andrew L.J. Villalon

This book consists of extracts from key documents, along with commentary and further reading, on the 'Great Patriotic War' of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany, 1941-45. Despite the historical significance of the war, few Soviet documents have been published in English. This work provides translations of a range of extracts from Soviet documents relating to the titanic struggle on the Eastern Front during World War II, with commentary. This is the only single-volume work in English to use documentary evidence to look at the Soviet war effort from military, political, economic and diplomatic perspectives. The book should not only facilitate a deeper study of the Soviet war effort, but also allow more balanced study of what is widely known in the West as the 'Eastern Front'. This book will be of much interest to students and scholars of military history, Soviet history, and World War II history.

The Small Wars of the United States, 1899 2009 is the complete bibliography of works on US military intervention and irregular warfare around the world, as well as efforts to quell insurgencies on behalf of American allies. The text covers conflicts from 1898 to present, with detailed annotations of selected sources. In this second edition, Benjamin R. Beede revises his seminal work, bringing it completely up to date, including entries on the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. An invaluable research tool, The Small Wars of the United States, 1899 2009 is a critical resource for students and scholars studying US military history.

January 31, 1968. A cold, dense fog had settled over the city of Hue, South Vietnam. Guards posted at key points around the lightly defended American military advisors' compound stared out into blackness. Nothing could be seen or heard until the blinding flash and shocking concussion of an exploding rocket tore through the fog. A hail of rocket and mortar shells was followed by a ground attack. It was soon obvious to the heterogeneous group (Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force personnel) inside the compound that a large group of people outside the compound wanted to kill them. The Tet battle for Hue was on. The Americans battled for their lives. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Richard Brown had two jobs: leading Forward Air Controllers responsible for the area between the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and DaNang, plus advising General Truong, First ARVN Division Commander, on Air Force support. He lived in the Hue MACV compound and remained in the city during the first seventeen days of the battle. The author began his military career during World War II as a fighter pilot in the Fourteenth Air Force, China, under the command of General Claire Chennault. Called back to active duty during the Korean War, he remained in military service until the end of his duty tour in Vietnam. Curious as to how communism could "benefit" common man, he returned to China in 1980 and Vietnam in 1988.

This book deals with the processes and theories involved in managing military organisations in both peacetime and crisis conditions. Examining the challenges faced by policymakers and military commanders in conducting military operations, this book considers the benefits of conventional management and organisation theory for the military. At the same time, these essays recognise that the military should be considered as a highly individual organisation, operating in exceptional circumstances. This awareness of the differences between the military and other organisations generates important lessons not only for the military but also for general organisations as it teaches them how to cope in exceptional, 'hyper' conditions. These theoretical lessons are illustrated by case studies and experiences from recent military operations, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. This book will be of great interest to students of military studies, security studies and organizational studies. Joseph Soeters chairs the department of management and organization studies and defence economy at the Netherlands Defense Academy and he is a professor in organizational sociology at Tilburg University. Paul. C. van Fenema is an associate professor of organization studies at the Netherlands Defence Academy and Tilburg University. Robert Beeres is an associate professor in the field of defence accounting and control (business administration) at the Netherlands Defence Academy and at Nyenrode Business School.

The two attempts by Khubilai Khan, the Mongol Emperor of China, to invade Japan in 1274 and 1281 represent unique events in the history of both countries. It pitted the samurai of Japan against the fierce warriors of the steppes who had conquered half the known world.
The Mongol conquest of Korea left them with a considerable quantity of maritime resources, which enabled them to thin seriously for the first time about crossing the Tsushima strait between Korea and Japan with an army of invasion. The first invasion, which began with savage raiding on the islands of Tsushima and Iki, made a landfall at Hakata Bay and forced the samurai defenders back inland. Luckily for the Japanese defenders, a storm scattered the Mongol invasion fleet, leading them to abandon this attempt.
In the intervening years the Japanese made defensive preparation, and the Mongol increased their fleet and army, so that the second invasion involved one of the largest seaborne expeditions in world history up to that time. This attempt was aimed at the same landing site, Hakata Bay, and met stiffer opposition form the new defences and the aggressive Japanese defenders. Forced buy a series of major Japanese raids to stay in their ships at anchor, the Mongol fleet was obliterated by a typhoon - the kami kaze (divine wind) - for the loss of as many as 90 per cent of the invaders. Although further preparations were made for an assault by the Mongols at the end of the 13ht and beginning of the 14th centuries, this proved to be the last realistic threat of an invasion of the home islands till 1945.

This book deals with the processes and theories involved in managing military organisations in both peacetime and crisis conditions.

Examining the challenges faced by policymakers and military commanders in conducting military operations, this book considers the benefits of conventional management and organisation theory for the military. At the same time, these essays recognise that the military should be considered as a highly individual organisation, operating in exceptional circumstances. This awareness of the differences between the military and other organisations generates important lessons not only for the military but also for general organisations as it teaches them how to cope in exceptional, 'hyper' conditions. These theoretical lessons are illustrated by case studies and experiences from recent military operations, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This book will be of great interest to students of military studies, security studies and organizational studies.

Joseph Soeters chairs the department of management and organization studies and defence economy at the Netherlands Defense Academy and he is a professor in organizational sociology at Tilburg University.

Paul. C. van Fenema is an associate professor of organization studies at the Netherlands Defence Academy and Tilburg University.

Robert Beeres is an associate professor in the field of defence accounting and control (business administration) at the Netherlands Defence Academy and at Nyenrode Business School.

Today's protracted asymmetrical conflicts confuse efforts to measure progress, often inviting politics and wishful thinking to replace objective evaluation. In Assessing War, military historians, social scientists, and military officers explore how observers have analyzed the trajectory of war in American conflicts from the Seven Years' War through the war in Afghanistan. Drawing on decades of acquired expertise, the contributors examine wartime assessment in both theory and practice and, through alternative dimensions of assessment such as justice and proportionality, the war of ideas and economics. This group of distinguished authors grapples with both conventional and irregular wars and emerging aspects of conflict-such as cyberwar and nation building-that add to the complexities of the modern threat environment. The volume ends with recommendations for practitioners on best approaches while offering sobering conclusions about the challenges of assessing war without politicization or self-delusion. Covering conflicts from the eighteenth century to today, Assessing War blends focused advice and a uniquely broad set of case studies to ponder vital questions about warfare's past-and its future. The book includes a foreword by Gen. George W. Casey Jr. (USA, Ret.), former chief of staff of the US Army and former commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq.

Andrew Dorman introduces Sierra Leone as Blair's second great military adventure after Kosovo and the first he undertook on his own. It is tied to Blair's 1999 Chicago speech on the 'Doctrine of the International Community', his move towards humanitarianism and the impact of the Kosovo experience. The book links this move with the rise of cosmopolitan militaries and the increasing involvement of Western forces in humanitarian operations and their impact on the international system. Furthermore, it places it within the context of defence transformation and the emerging Western expeditionary capabilities, in particular the European Union's new battle group concept and developments in concepts such as Network Centric Warfare and Networked Enabled Capability. Examining the whole campaign and considering the impact on the Blair Government, this book will prove to be a key reader on the topic.

Today's protracted asymmetrical conflicts confuse efforts to measure progress, often inviting politics and wishful thinking to replace objective evaluation. In Assessing War, military historians, social scientists, and military officers explore how observers have analyzed the trajectory of war in American conflicts from the Seven Years' War through the war in Afghanistan. Drawing on decades of acquired expertise, the contributors examine wartime assessment in both theory and practice and, through alternative dimensions of assessment such as justice and proportionality, the war of ideas and economics. This group of distinguished authors grapples with both conventional and irregular wars and emerging aspects of conflict-such as cyberwar and nation building-that add to the complexities of the modern threat environment. The volume ends with recommendations for practitioners on best approaches while offering sobering conclusions about the challenges of assessing war without politicization or self-delusion. Covering conflicts from the eighteenth century to today, Assessing War blends focused advice and a uniquely broad set of case studies to ponder vital questions about warfare's past-and its future. The book includes a foreword by Gen. George W. Casey Jr. (USA, Ret.), former chief of staff of the US Army and former commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq.

This book provides the first comprehensive study of the evolution of the Iraqi military from the British mandate era to post-Baathist Iraq.

Ethnic and sectarian turmoil is endemic to Iraq, and its armed forces have been intertwined with its political affairs since their creation. This study illustrates how the relationship between the military and the political centre in Iraq has evolved, with the military bringing about three regime changes in Iraq's history before being brought under control by Saddam Hussein, up until the 2003 war. The instability that followed was partly due to the failure to create a new military that does not threaten the government, yet is still strong enough to deter rival factions from armed conflict. The reconstitution of the armed forces will be a prerequisite for an American withdrawal from Iraq, but this book argues that immense challenges lie ahead, despite the praise from the Bush administration for the progress of the new Iraqi army.

The changed strategic landscape of the 21st century has driven a shift to more flexible, adaptable capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the validity of team warfare between air and land forces during open hostilities with an enemy. The time has come for innovative counter-air and counter-land concepts focused on medium- to large-scale conventional combat operations that will merge air and ground forces even more effectively into a single potent fighting force. Such is the focus of AirLandBattle21. A basic assumption in this study is that, during major combat operations, a relevant number of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) will conduct distributed operations in a non-linear, non-contiguous and geographically separated fashion. The study introduces a flexible counter-air framework that allows for the most efficient use of limited air assets and advocates only the necessary levels of air control in different areas across the theatre. The study also offers alternative views of strategic attack and explores the critical role tactical airlift will play in employing and sustaining the brigade combat team.

During Desert Shield, the Air Force built a very complicated organizational architecture to control large numbers of air sorties. During the air campaign itself, officers at each level of the Central Command Air Forces believed they were managing the chaos of war. Yet, when the activities of the many significant participants are pieced together, it appears that neither the planners nor Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, the Joint Force Air Component Commander, knew the details of what was happening in the air campaign or how well the campaign was going. There was little appreciation of the implications of complex organizational architectures for military command and control. Against a smarter and more aggressive foe, the system may well have failed.

This is the first in-depth study to address the financing of the American-Mexican War of 1846-48. Floating the Mexican War loans was the greatest single endeavour of the American financial community during the 1840s. Under President Polk, the Treasury issued three loans totalling $49 000 000. Investment bankers enthusiastically marketed these treasury notes and bonds directly to the international investing public. Cummings argues that the successful financing of the American-Mexican War had a long-term beneficial effect on American financial institutions and markets. At home, the stability of the Independent Treasury was assured, and abroad, America's international credit standing was restored. Most importantly, the dealing of government issue by investment bankers was a decisive step towards modern public finance.

This unique gem of a personal story of a Japanese soldier in the Russo-Japanese War of the Meiji Era in Japan which broke out in 1904 is of more than historical interest and fascination. The writer paints a moving picture of the lives and deaths, joys and sorrows of the men who took Port Arthur in the bloodiest battle of this short war. The tale is told vividly and simply and is a rare revelation of the innermost feelings of a Japanese soldier of remarkable intelligence, spirituality and powers of expression

A prevalent view among historians is that both horsed cavalry and the cavalry charge became obviously obsolete in the second half of the nineteenth century in the face of increased infantry and artillery firepower, and that officers of the cavalry clung to both for reasons of prestige and stupidity. It is this view, commonly held but rarely supported by sustained research, that this book challenges. It shows that the achievements of British and Empire cavalry in the First World War, although controversial, are sufficient to contradict the argument that belief in the cavalry was evidence of military incompetence. It offers a case study of how in reality a practical military doctrine for the cavalry was developed and modified over several decades, influenced by wider defence plans and spending, by the experience of combat, by Army politics, and by the rivalries of senior officers. Debate as to how the cavalry was to adjust its tactics in the face of increased infantry and artillery firepower began in the mid nineteenth century, when the increasing size of armies meant a greater need for mobile troops. The cavalry problem was how to deal with a gap in the evolution of warfare between the mass armies of the later nineteenth century and the motorised firepower of the mid twentieth century, an issue that is closely connected with the origins of the deadlock on the Western Front. Tracing this debate, this book shows how, despite serious attempts to 'learn from history', both European-style wars and colonial wars produced ambiguous or disputed evidence as to the future of cavalry, and doctrine was largely a matter of what appeared practical at the time.

This book provides the first comprehensive study of the evolution of the Iraqi military from the British mandate era to post-Baathist Iraq.

Ethnic and sectarian turmoil is endemic to Iraq, and its armed forces have been intertwined with its political affairs since their creation. This study illustrates how the relationship between the military and the political centre in Iraq has evolved, with the military bringing about three regime changes in Iraqa (TM)s history before being brought under control by Saddam Hussein, up until the 2003 war. The instability that followed was partly due to the failure to create a new military that does not threaten the government, yet is still strong enough to deter rival factions from armed conflict. The reconstitution of the armed forces will be a prerequisite for an American withdrawal from Iraq, but this book argues that immense challenges lie ahead, despite the praise from the Bush administration for the progress of the new Iraqi army.

In The Costs of War: International Law, the UN, and World Order After Iraq, Richard Falk, brings together some of his recent essays, published and unpublished, examining the impact that the Iraq War has had and will have on international law, human rights, and democracy.

A new introduction provides an overview as well as a sense of the current context and reflects on the internal prospects for Iraq and on the logic of an early U.S. military and political withdrawal.

Having been revised and updated to take account of the march of events, the essays are organized into the following sections:

• Part 1 addresses the effects of the American invasion and occupation of Iraq on the current dimensions of world order
• Part 2 provides a normative inquiry into the larger intentions and consequences of the Iraq War
• Part 3 considers the more fundamental implications of the Iraq War, especially on our understanding of war as an instrument for the solution of conflict.

Falk demonstrates the dysfunctionality of war in relation to either anti-terrorism or the pursuit of a global security system based on military dominance; the historical potential of a realistic Gandhiism as a positive alternative in the setting of global policy in the twenty-first century.

The Costs of War will be of interest to students and scholars of political science, media studies, and politics and international relations in general.

This book investigates, and explains, the extent to which different liberal democracies have resorted to the use of force since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The responses of democratic states throughout the world to the September 2001 terrorist attacks have varied greatly. This book analyses the various factors that had an impact on decisions on the use of force by governments of liberal democratic states. It seeks to explain differences in the security policies and practices of Australia, Canada, France, Germany and the UK regarding the war in Afghanistan, domestic counterterrorism measures and the Iraq War. To this end, the book combines the concepts of strategic culture and securitisation into a theoretical model that disentangles the individual structural and agential causes of the use of force by the state and sequentially analyses the impact of each causal component on the other. It argues that the norms of a strategic culture shape securitisation processes of different expressions, which then bring about distinct modes of the use of force in individual security policy decisions. While governments can also deviate from the constraints of a strategic culture, this is likely to encounter a strong reaction from large parts of the population which in turn can lead to a long-term change in strategic culture. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic culture, securitisation, European politics, security studies and IR in general.

For many years historians of the Cuban missile crisis have concentrated on those thirteen days in October 1962 when the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war. Mark White s study adds an equally intense scrutiny of the causes and consequences of the crisis. "Missiles in Cuba" is based on up-to-date scholarship as well as Mr. White s own findings in National Security Archive materials, Kennedy Library tapes of ExComm meetings, and correspondence between Soviet officials in Washington and Havana all newly released. His more rounded picture gives us a much clearer understanding of the policy strategies pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union (and, to a lesser extent, Cuba) that brought on the crisis. His almost hour-by-hour account of the confrontation itself also destroys some venerable myths, such as the unique initiatives attributed to Robert Kennedy. And his assessment of the consequences of the crisis points to salutary effects on Soviet-American relation and on U.S. nuclear defense strategy, but questionable influences on Soviet defense spending and on Washington s perception of its talents for "crisis management," later tested in Vietnam.

The range and extent of the Peloponnesian War of the fifth century BC has led to it being described as a 'world war' in miniature. Within a narrative framework, this work concentrates on the fighting itself, and examining the way in which both strategy and tactics developed as the conflict spread.

The governance of post-conflict territories embodies a central contradiction: how does one help a population prepare for democratic governance and the rule of law by imposing a form of benevolent autocracy?
Transitional administrations represent the most complex operations attempted by the United Nations. The operations in East Timor and Kosovo are commonly seen as unique in the history of the UN--perhaps never to be repeated. But they may also be seen as the latest in a series of operations that have involved the United Nations in 'state-building' activities, where it has attempted to develop the institutions of government by assuming some or all of those sovereign powers on a temporary basis. The circumstances that have demanded such interventions certainly will be repeated.
Seen in the context of earlier UN operations, such as those in Namibia, Cambodia, and Eastern Slavonia, the view that these exceptional circumstances may not recur is somewhat disingenuous. Moreover, the need for such policy research has been brought into sharp focus by the weighty but ambiguous role assigned to the UN in Afghanistan and the possibility of a comparable role in Iraq.
This book fills that gap. Aimed at policy-makers, diplomats, and a wide academic audience (including international relations, political science, international law, and war studies), the book provides a concise history of UN state-building operations and a treatment of the five key issues confronting such an operation on the ground: peace and security, the role of the UN as government, judicial reconstruction, economic reconstruction, and exit strategies.

For General George S. Patton, Jr., the battle for Lorraine during the fall and winter of 1944 was a frustrating and grueling experience of static warfare. Plagued by supply shortages, critical interference from superiors, flooded rivers, fortified cities, and the highly-determined German army, Patton had little opportunity to wage a fast armored campaign. Rickard examines Patton's generalship during these bitter battles and suggests that Patton was unable to adapt to the new realities of the campaign, thereby failing to wage the most effective warfare possible.

By the beginning of the Ardennes offensive, Patton had crippled his worthy opponent, but had suffered the highest casualties of any campaign that he conducted during the war. Until now, his better known exploits in Sicily and Normandy have overshadowed this campaign. Relying on a broad range of sources, this treatment of Patton's operational performance in Lorraine goes beyond the official history. It describes Patton's philosophy of war and explains why it essentially failed in Lorraine. Supplemented by full orders of battle, casualty and equipment losses, and excellent maps, "Patton at Bay" is a penetrating study of America's best fighting general.

'American Mourning' is the story of the Johnsons and the Sheehans - two families that lost sons in the war against Terror. Their sons were best friends since they first met but the families have little else in common. The way they handled themselves after Casey and Justin's deaths stands in stark contrast.

How were the Crusades made possible? There have been studies of ancient, medieval and early modern warfare, as well as work on the finances and planning of Crusades, but this volume is the first specifically to address the logistics of Crusading. Building on previous work, it brings together experts from the fields of medieval Western, Byzantine and Middle Eastern studies to examine how the marches and voyages were actually made. Questions of manpower, types and means of transportation by land and sea, supplies, financial resources, roads and natural land routes, sea lanes and natural sailing routes - all these topics and more are covered here. Of particular importance is the attention given to the horses and other animals on which transport of supplies and the movement of armies depended.