Few studies of Middle East wars go beyond a narrative of events and most tend to impose on this subject the rigid scheme of superpower competition. The Gulf War of 1991, however, challenges this view of the Middle East as an extension of the global conflict. The failure of the accord of both superpowers to avoid war even once regional superpower competition in the Middle East had ceased must give rise to the question: Do regional conflicts have their own dynamic? Working from this assumption, the book examines local-regional constraints of Middle East conflict and how, through escalation and the involvement of extra-regional powers, such conflicts acquire an international dimension. The theory of a regional subsystem is employed as a framework for conceptualising this interplay between regional and international factors in Tibi's examination of the Middle East wars in the period 1967-91. Tibi also provides an outlook into the future of conflict in the Middle East in the aftermath of the most recent Gulf War.

When Major Michael Donnelly was instructing his U.S. Air Force student pilots, he used to tell them three things: Timing is everything; it's nice to be lucky; and there is no justice. Highly decorated fighter pilot, proud young patriot, loyal friend with a mischievous sense of humor, loving husband and father of two, he could not have imagined the tragic meaning those words would assume just a few years after his tour of duty in Desert Storm. In 1996 Major Donnelly was diagnosed with ALS, Lou Gehrig's Disease, at the unusually young age of 35; the onset of this illness marked the beginning of a kind of torture beyond the scope of even the most rigorous military survival training. Betrayed by his body, eventually paralyzed and confined to a wheelchair, he experienced another betrayal perhaps even more difficult to comprehend--betrayal by his country. For despite the fact that over 110,000 Desert Storm veterans are sick, many dying of mysterious cancers and neurological diseases, including more than ten times the normal incidence of ALS--and despite all evidence pointing to U.S. troops having been dosed by low levels of Iraqi nerve agents and exposed to chemical weapons' fallout--the Pentagon adamantly denies any connection between their illnesses and their service in the Gulf War. "Falcon's Cry: A Desert Storm Memoir," Michael Donnelly's unforgettable story, is his courageous attempt to unearth the truth and force an acknowledgment of that truth by the government he and his fellow veterans defended with their lives.

Flying 44 fighter jet combat missions in a war fought on an all-or-nothing scale was thrilling for Michael Donnelly. When the war was won, he and his country rejoiced in the knowledge that, unlike in Vietnam, America had gotten it right in the Persian Gulf. Less than a decade later, the world is learning what veterans and their families have known since Desert Storm--we did not get it right at all. Saddam Hussein is still terrorizing a large portion of the globe. Moreover, we did not learn the lesson of Agent Orange which the Department of Defense denied for decades was the cause of early deaths and birth defects among Vietnam veterans and their families. Yet, thanks largely to the testimony of the author before the House of Representatives in 1997, a first step has been taken toward justice for the tens of thousands of Desert Storm veterans who are suffering virtually in isolation, many without any medical or disability benefits. Major Donnelly believes the truth about Gulf War Illnesses will be uncovered by studies funded in the recently passed Omnibus Appropriations bill, as well as through stories like his own, and he fervently hopes that America can, at last, get it right.

On the morning of November 20, 1776, General Charles Cornwallis overran patriot positions at Fort Lee, on the New Jersey side of the Hudson River. The attack threw George Washington's army into turmoil. Thus began an American retreat across the state, which ended only after the battered rebels crossed the Delaware river at Trenton on December 7. It was a three-week campaign that marked the most dramatic and desperate period of the War for Independence. In The Long Retreat, Arthur Lefkowitz has written the first book-length study of this critical campaign. He adds compelling new detail to the narrative, and offers the most comprehensive account in the literature of the American retreat to the Delaware and of the British pursuit. What emerges is a history misconceptions about the movements of the armies, the intentions of their leaders, and the choices available to rebel commanders and their British counterparts. Lefkowitz presents a patriot military pounded into desperate straights by the forces of the Crown, but in the end more resilient and wily than most previous scholarship has allowed. If brought low over November and December of 1776, Washington's battalions were still a force to reckon with as they pulled away from the advancing British. Despite serious losses in material and personnel, Washington managed to keep his units operational; and even while making mistakes, he sought to consolidate patriot regiments and longed for a chance to counterattack. The Christmas night riposte at Trenton, a dramatic reversal of fortune in any case, stemmed from measures the rebel Commander-in-Chief had initiated even as he completed his retrogade across New Jersey. How all of this came about emerges and crisp narrative of The Long Retreat. It is the definitive book on a crucial chapter in the history of American Arms.

Dominated by the ambitions of France's King Louis XIV, Europe in the years 1650-1715 witnessed a series of wars from which emerged many of the theories, practices, and technologies that characterize modern warfare. During this period European armies evolved modern ideas of army organization and military leadership, as well as modern views of campaign strategy and battle tactics. As European soldiers and colonists moved into Asia, the Middle East, and the Americas, the practice or influence of their military techniques and ideas also affected wars fought in those places. In this volume, an award-winning author of reference works on international relations and war describes and defines important events, technologies, and individuals from this seminal period of global military history. Besides more than 1000 extensively cross-referenced entries, the encyclopedia also includes 14 maps of various wars and battles, as well as a detailed chronology of the period and a current, select bibliography of useful print and nonprint information resources. Among the entries are many, such as the following, which describe the course and consequences of various wars of the period: BLFirst Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654) BLFrench and Indian Wars (1689-1763) BLGreat Northern War (1700-1721) BLKing Philip's War (1675-1676) BLNine Years' War (1688-1697) BLQueen Anne's War (1702-1713) BLScanian War (1674-1679) BLWar of Devolution (1667-1668) BLWar of the Reunions (1683-1684) BLWar of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713) Other entries, such as the following, describe the course and explain the importance of various battles and sieges: BLAlmanza, Battle of (April 14/25, 1707) BLBeachy Head, Battle of (June 30/July10, 1690) BLBuda, Siege of (June 17-September 2, 1686) BLKockersberg, Battle of (October 7, 1677) BLLille, Siege of (August 14-December 10, 1708) BLMalplaquet, Battle of (August 31/September 11, 1709) BLRamillies, Battle of (May12/23, 1706) BLZenta, Battle of (September 1/11, 1697) Other entries, such as the following, describe national armies and navies of the period: BLBritish Army BLDutch Army BLFrench Army BLIrish Establishment BLRoyal Navy BLRussian Army BLSpanish Navy BLState's Navy Many entries, such as the following, describe the careers and influence of important military figures of the period: BLCadogan, William (1675-1726) BLEugene, Prince of Savoy (1663-1736) BLKarl XII, of Sweden (1682-1718) BLMarlborough, John Churchill, Duke of (1650-1722) BLSchomberg, Friedrich, Graf von (1615-1690) BLTurenne, Henri de la Tour d'Auvergne, vicomte de (1611-1675) BLVillars, Claude Louis, duc de (1653-1734) William III, of England and Scotland (1650-1702) Finally, many entries, such as the following, cover events and individuals from countries and wars outside Europe: BLAurangzeb (1618-1707) (India) BLBanner System (China) BLDeerfield Raid (February 29, 1704) (Massachusetts) BLHudson Bay Company (Canada) BLIndian Wars (Americas) BLJapan BLKara Mustafa Pasha (1634-1683) (Ottoman Turkey) BLManchus (China) BLMarathas (India) BLPeter (Pyotr) I (1672-1725) (Russia) Information in all entries can be accessed through a detailed subject index and through the use of cross-references found in the main entry listing and within the entries themselves.

The last place a German soldier wanted to be in 1944 was the Russian front. That summer, Stalin hurled into battle more than six million men and 9,000 tanks, supported by 16,000 fighters and bombers and more than 12,800 guns and rocket launchers. Despite this massive effort and the resulting decimation of German forces, events on the Eastern Front are largely neglected by historians who focus instead on German defeats in Normandy and the Ardennes. This account details the massive battles on the Eastern Front from the summer of 1944 until the fall of Budapest in early 1945, a period when Hitler lost the majority of his conquered Eastern territories and many of his best remaining divisions. To destroy the Third Reich, the Allies needed to defeat the German Wehrmacht militarily, and the decisive victories of this period occurred on the Russian Front. More German soldiers were lost in White Russia than at Stalingrad; more troops were lost in Rumania in a brief ten days than in the entire Normandy campaign; and German losses in Hungary were greater than the Battle of the Bulge. The most mobile army in the world in 1940, the German Army was the least mobile by 1944, and Hitler's stand fast and fortified place policies imposed a paralysis that neither senior German generals nor the High Command of the Army were able to overcome. Outnumbered 3 to 1 in men, 5 to 1 in tanks, and 20 to 1 in airplanes, the German Army was slaughtered, as casualties mounted and the empire crumbled.

This is the story of the early struggles of an ill-equipped ragtag French force, among the first to pledge its loyalty to General de Gaulle. It fought a lonely, almost secret war against the numerically superior Italian troops deep in the wildest parts of the Sahara, hundreds of miles from the main campaigns along the African coast. These daring Free French raids with their long thirsty treks and small-scale oasis battles have been nearly forgotten, although their path is marked by the graves of many hundreds of French, Italian, and native soldiers. Bimberg details the exotic units that participated in this struggle, including the "Tirailleurs Senegalaise du T'chad" (African Infantry), the "Compagnies Sahariennes" (Saharan Camel Companies), and "the Groupe Nomade du Tibesti" (a tribal militia recruited in the Tibesti Mountain region of the great desert).

Despite antiquated equipment and some of the world's worst terrain, the Free French were among the most dedicated soldiers in the Allied camp. The backdrop to their fierce fighting includes the barely surveyed Tibesti Mountains with their 10,000 foot volcanic peaks, interspersed with treacherous shifting sands--terrain which would prove to be an enormous challenge to the worn out, patched-together motor vehicles of the Free French. Much of the action takes place in the most remote areas of Italian Libya, the desert province of Fezzan with its fortified oases of Mourzouk and Koufra, each strongly defended by the Italians. While these skirmishes were a sideshow to the epic battles of North Africa, they were immortalized by heroic acts by the French and African troops alike, efforts that ultimately led to success in this far corner of the world.

Fear and ignorance have colored the perception of chemical and biological (CB) warfare both in the public and military spheres. Media coverage following the alleged gassing of sheep at Dugway Proving Ground in 1968 has led most people to believe that CB warfare is an unstoppable doomsday weapon of mass destruction. Yet, in 1972, General Creighton Abrams, the Army Chief of Staff, attempted to disestablish the Chemical Corps because he saw no need for it. Had that decision not been reversed in 1976, there would not have been any chemical defense specialists or equipment available for Operation Desert Storm in 1990.

This study tracks events relating to the Department of Defense's CB warfare program between 1968 and 1990, as it evolved up to the Gulf War. It also details how the military develops and procures CB defense equipment to protect today's soldiers. Mauroni draws parallels between the development of binary chemical weapons, the chemical demilitarization program, and the DoD CB terrorism response efforts, as each has very similar issues and solutions. He seeks to educate leading officials and the general public about the facts behind CB warfare and the options for coping with it in the future. With proper training and equipment, the challenge of CB warfare can be met and dealt with on the modern battlefield.

In the spring of 1944, Adolf Hitler firmly believed that the Allies would invade the Continent by landing troops on the beaches of Normandy, but anti-Nazi officers in German Intelligence ultimately persuaded him that Normandy would be a mere diversion. The "real" invasion, Hitler was assured, would be at Calais. "Righteous Deception" focuses on the activities of two officers whose consciences kept them from siding with Hitler and the Nazis. Their campaign of misinformation and deception convinced Hitler to keep half of the German forces in northern France to defend against an invasion that would never come. This decision ultimately cost Hitler the war.

Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of German Military Intelligence, turned against Hitler within a year after he had come to power. Canaris and his circle of friends in an opposition movement known as the "Schwarze Kapelle" (Black Orchestra) did everything possible to prevent Hitler from winning the war, which believed would be a catastrophe. Colonel Alexis von Roenne headed the "Fremde Heere West," the branch of Intelligence responsible for evaluating the strength of Allied forces. In a key position to alter findings and other information pertaining to Allied forces in Britain, he doubled the estimated number of troops assembling for D-Day, giving the impression that the Allies had enough men and equipment in Britain for both an invasion in Calais and a diversion in Normandy.

In the late 19th century, the United States began a period of increased engagement in the Western Pacific--a situation that continues to this day. Nimmo provides a study of U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military relations with the nations of East Asia and the Pacific from the late 1800s to 1945. In addition to interaction with China, Korea, and Japan, the book includes U.S. involvement in Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, and the Philippines. This one-volume treatment, ranging from the Spanish American War to the Second World War, examines the continuity in U.S. policy during this crucial period. Particular attention is devoted to the U.S. response to Japan's territorial aggression during this period, primarily its undeclared wars against China, in Manchuria in 1931, and in North and Central China from 1937 to 1945.

This examination counters revisionist claims that the United States led Japan into war in 1941 and that war could have been avoided by the pursuit of a more conciliatory policy on the part of the U.S. It explores why it was necessary for the U.S. to demand unconditional surrender and refutes claims that Japan was a victim of the war. The acquisition of U.S. territory in the Pacific initially began with the annexation of Hawaii and continued with the former possessions of Spain, ceded in the Spanish American War. Nimmo follows this story through the Philippine War, efforts to promote Philippine independence, the Commonwealth era, and finally independence in 1946.

From the outset, the war in Iraq was directed from Washington and executed by troops on the ground. Between Washington and the battlefields was the Green Zone, a four-square-mile enclave that hosted the American Embassy annex, the Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office, the planning, policy, strategy, and communications sections of Headquarters, Multi-national Force-Iraq, and the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq. Hope Is Not a Plan takes the reader inside the Green Zone courtesy of participant-observers brought to Iraq to diagnose the insurgency and develop a get-well plan. Focusing on the critical months of late 2004 and early 2005 --when a new sovereign government in Iraq tried to build legitimacy, and the coalition force tried to find the best way to help it do so--it looks at a slice of the war not previously examined. This is not the Beltway story, nor the grunt and jarhead story. Rather, the book looks at the process of taking political and military goals and turning them into action. In telling that story, Hope Is Not a Plan helps explain how Iraq got to where it is today. Organized by topic rather than on a strict chronological basis, it is practical, not theoretical, examining doctrines and lessons learned, not abstractions of the ivory tower. The book describes what happened in the Green Zone during this period and compares that reality with what history, experience, and doctrine suggests should have happened. Finally, it reflects on what can be learned from the experience. Rich in detail, the book is written to be accessible to anyone interested in first-hand information about the workings of a coalition staff during wartime--or to anyone who wants to understand howthings in Iraq went so very wrong.

Brodsky contends that three factors--constitutional, commercial, and technological--in turn, have caused Britain to raise large citizen forces. Because Britain traditionally has been an unmilitary state which has not maintained large standing armies, this ethos of amateurism merged with the professionalism of the Regular Army. He argues that it is this unique influence of amateurism which historically has been central to the British profession of arms and vital to its spirit of service. A wide range of prose and poetry illustrates that spirit and the military cultural experience in which it evolved in Great Britain from the Restoration through World War II. In an overview of later developments, including the Falklands War, Brodsky enunciates the challenge facing the traditional ethos in the nuclear age. Analyzing the effect of the literary idiom, he questions the future direction of representative literature.

"Vietnam, We've All Been There" is a unique collection of interviews with noted American writers who made the Vietnam war a subject of their work. The writers represented here were chosen by Dr. Schroeder because their books, plays, poems and reportage are among the best of the particular genre in which each one works--Norman Mailer, David Rabe, and Michael Herr among them. Provocative not only for the opinions and memories of the interviewees, this book is also interesting for its focus on the variety of literary forms and styles that emerged from the Vietnam experience.

The author makes the point that the more successful literature to come out of the war was from writers who stretched the limits of particular forms, giving birth to narratives that broke all the rules. For example, where journalism usually demands facts, Michael Herr, the author of "DispatcheS," insisted on much more. He described psychological states, assessed personal losses and personified the war in ways that were radically different from accepted reporting. As Dr. Schroeder reminds us, Vietnam deeply affected everyone who lived through it--thus there were many cultural effects that still beg for examination and thought. He spent nine years gathering these interviews and during that time the war was a constant presence in his life. For many Americans even a lifetime may not make it possible to come to terms with the war. And while it is important not to forget where we've been, it is also important to move forward. In this book, the writers we hear from, like the works they created, help us to remember the past with a reflective wisdom that is essential to informing our future.

The great Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, in his classic "On War," introduced the idea of friction in war. Friction was one of the most important ideas that Clausewitz put forward. His application of the term is generally taken to be limited to events on the field of battle. But had Clausewitz lived to the end of the 20th century, he undoubtedly would have broadened his understanding of friction to include the nexus between war and policy making. He would have done so because his most fundamental insight, apart from the significance of friction in war, was his insistence upon the priority of policy over war.

Cimbala applies the concept of friction to a number of 20th century cases of war and policy making. He also applies it to some plausible scenarios for the next century. Although many U.S. military planners and policy makers appear to place their faith in technology as the sine qua non of success in security and defense policy, technology can be self defeating and myopic if political and strategic vision are lacking. For example, the mindless pursuit of information warfare in all its varieties may convince potential U.S. opponents that infowar is a cost effective way of negating U.S. military power. A provocative analysis for scholars, students, military professionals and other policy makers involved with strategy and military policy issues.

This book is about the U.S. rush to arms in the Persian Gulf, the tragic loss of life on both sides, the destruction inflicted on Kuwait and Iraq, and the many uncertainties that confront America in the aftermath of the war. It reflects the views of millions who believe that the war could have been prevented through diplomacy and negotiation.

Menos concludes that the Persian Gulf war was unjust and unnecessary. To be just and necessary, it would have had to meet two key criteria: (1) the war would have had to be an act of last resort, after all efforts at a peaceful resolution had failed--which it was not, in view of the near-total absence of direct negotiations between the two sides; and (2) the good achieved from the war would have had to outweigh its harmful effects--which it did not, in light of the enormous destruction and loss of life caused by the fighting and its aftermath. Specialists in the fields of diplomacy, international relations, and the Middle East will find this book of particular interest.

Adolf Hitler had high hopes for his conquest of Norway, which held both great symbolic and great strategic value for the Fuhrer. Despite early successes, however, his ambitious northern campaign foundered and ultimately failed. Adam Claasen for the first time reveals the full story of this neglected episode and shows how it helped doom the Third Reich to defeat.

Hitler and Raeder, the chief of the German navy, were determined to take and keep Norway. By doing so, they hoped to preempt Allied attempts to outflank Germany, protect sea lanes for German ships, access precious Scandinavian minerals for war production, and provide a launchpad for Luftwaffe and naval operations against Great Britain. Beyond those strategic objectives, Hitler also envisioned Norway as part of a pan-Nordic stronghold--a centerpiece of his new world order. But, as Claasen shows, Hitler's grand expectations were never realized.

Gring's Luftwaffe was the vital spearhead in the invasion of Norway, which marked a number of wartime firsts. Among other things, it involved the first large-scale aerial operations over sea rather than land, the first time operational objectives and logistical needs were fulfilled by air power, and the first deployment of paratroopers.

Although it got off to a promising start, the German effort, particularly against British and arctic convoys, was greatly hampered by flawed strategic thinking, interservice rivalries between the Luftwaffe and navy, the failure to develop a long-range heavy bomber, the diversion of planes and personnel to shore up the German war effort elsewhere, and the northern theater's harsh climate and terrain.

Claasen's study covers every aspect of this ill-fated campaign from the 1940 invasion until war's end and shows how it was eventually relegated to a backwater status as Germany fought to survive in an increasingly unwinnable war. His compelling account sharpens our picture of the German air force and widens our understanding of the Third Reich's way of war.

This book is an analysis of President Bush's Regional Defense Strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado, on August 2, 1990. This strategy involves a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces, and General Colin Powell's Base Force. If implemented, the new strategy and force structure would return significant U.S. ground and air forces to the continental United States where most would be demobilized. In the event of a major crisis, the United States would rely on active and reserve forces for a contingency response, much as was done for Operation Desert Storm. The new national security strategy is based upon the 25 percent budget cut negotiated with Congress, a greatly depleted Russian threat, and a new international security environment that assumes two-years' warning of a European-centered global war with the former USSR.

There are four major critical factors upon which the new strategy depends: (1) the continued decline of the Russians as a threat to world stability; (2) the ability of the intelligence community to meet new challenges; (3) the behavior of the allies and Congress; and (4) the ability of industry to meet new demands. The new strategy is not simply an adjustment to existing defense doctrine or strategy, but rather a fundamental revision of the way the United States has approached defense since 1945. Students and scholars interested in politico-military strategy and government policy will find this book of great interest.

Using new archival material, Lawrence Tal examines how Jordan remained stable during the volatile period between 1955 and 1967. Tal asserts that Jordan's security was due primarily to the cohesion of its National Security Establishment, a ruling coalition of security and foreign policy professionals that included the monarchy, the political elite, and the military.

Although seen widely as the 20th century's great religious war, as a conflict between the god-fearing and the godless, the religious dimension of the Cold War has never been subjected to a scholarly critique. This unique study shows why religion is a key Cold War variable. A specially commissioned collection of new scholarship, it provides fresh insights into the complex nature of the Cold War. It has profound resonance today with the resurgence of religion as a political force in global society.

Foreshadowing the twentieth-century experience, the Spanish American War was America's first modern foreign war. Catapulting the United States into an international world power, the war had lasting international implications. Besides America's acquisition of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Hawaii, and Guam, the war led the United States to take to the international stage, confronting Germany and Japan (foreshadowing the conflict of World War II), and creating a diplomatic bridge between Great Britain and the United States. For Spain, the 1898-1899 conflict was the death knell of empire, which led to a national crisis culminating in the Spanish Civil War. This volume provides easily accessible information on the naval and army operations, Spanish operations, and the political background to the military events, with an emphasis on future foreign affairs.

The Spanish American War is seminal to an understanding of twentieth-century U.S. foreign relations--in Cuba, the Pacific, especially Japan, and with Great Britain. It is also central to an understanding of twentieth-century Spain. U.S. military history also requires an understanding of amphibious operations, naval and army reform, deployment command and control, and interservice cooperation as reflected in the Spanish American War. This book provides a quick reference to what was once called this splendid little war.

This exciting new book marks a major shift in the study of the South African War. It turns attention from the war's much debated causes onto its more neglected consequences. An international team of scholars explores the myriad legacies of the war - for South Africa, for Britain, for the Empire and beyond. The extensive introduction sets the contributions in context, and the elegant afterword offers thought-provoking reflections on their cumulative significance.

Whom a prime minister or president will not shake hands with is still more noticed than with whom they will. Public identity can afford to be ambiguous about friends, but not about enemies. Rodney Barker examines the available accounts of how enmity functions in the cultivation of identity, how essential or avoidable it is, and what the consequences are for the contemporary world.

The argument presented in this book arose from an extension to the question whether the suppression of the Jacobite Rising of 1745-46, as represented by a long-standing historiographical consensus, spelled the end of Jacobite hopes, and British fears, of another restoration attempt. The principal conclusion of this book is that the Jacobite Movement persisted as a viable threat to the British state, and was perceived as such by its opponents to 1759.

This book breaks new ground as the first full account of the role of amphibious warfare in British strategy between VE Day and the Anglo-French assault on Suez in 1956. Ian Speller analyzes the development of postwar strategic planning and the manner in which this influenced the nature of Britain's armed forces in the 1940s and 1950s. By detailing the development of equipment, doctrine and the role of the Royal Marines he sheds new light on the military response to a succession of overseas crises.

Since the end of the Cold War, the use of military power in a multpolar world has become increasingly complicated. Strategy, operational conduct, and technology have become key issues in the debate over the role of the military. Contributors to this volume analyze the ways in which the Forces are deployed, despite the fact that their essential purpose, to fulfill policy, remains the same.