"Explosion and Blast-Related Injuries" is an authoritative text that brings together diverse knowledge gained from both the experience of clinicians treating blast casualties and the insights of scientists obtained from research and modeling of blast exposures. By providing information on explosion and blast injury patterns, as well as the mechanism of blast-induced injuries, it is a useful reference for both physicians and researchers. With contributions by experts from around the globe, the book covers topics such as the epidemiology of blast and explosion injury, pathology and pathophysiology, and the modeling and mechanism of injury. Finally, this book might stimulate additional studies into ways to improve our current mass casualty response systems.
* Contains contributions from experts who had first hand experience dealing with explosion and blast injuries.
* Provides a diverse global experience derived from both military operations and terrorist attacks in civilian settings from the US, Europe and the Middle East.
* Covers such topics as epidemiology of blast and explosion injury, pathology and pathophysiology, modeling and mechanism of injury, and finally presents the global experiences of blast injury and mass casualty management.

Brodsky contends that three factors--constitutional, commercial, and technological--in turn, have caused Britain to raise large citizen forces. Because Britain traditionally has been an unmilitary state which has not maintained large standing armies, this ethos of amateurism merged with the professionalism of the Regular Army. He argues that it is this unique influence of amateurism which historically has been central to the British profession of arms and vital to its spirit of service. A wide range of prose and poetry illustrates that spirit and the military cultural experience in which it evolved in Great Britain from the Restoration through World War II. In an overview of later developments, including the Falklands War, Brodsky enunciates the challenge facing the traditional ethos in the nuclear age. Analyzing the effect of the literary idiom, he questions the future direction of representative literature.

In the late 19th century, the United States began a period of increased engagement in the Western Pacific--a situation that continues to this day. Nimmo provides a study of U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military relations with the nations of East Asia and the Pacific from the late 1800s to 1945. In addition to interaction with China, Korea, and Japan, the book includes U.S. involvement in Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, and the Philippines. This one-volume treatment, ranging from the Spanish American War to the Second World War, examines the continuity in U.S. policy during this crucial period. Particular attention is devoted to the U.S. response to Japan's territorial aggression during this period, primarily its undeclared wars against China, in Manchuria in 1931, and in North and Central China from 1937 to 1945.

This examination counters revisionist claims that the United States led Japan into war in 1941 and that war could have been avoided by the pursuit of a more conciliatory policy on the part of the U.S. It explores why it was necessary for the U.S. to demand unconditional surrender and refutes claims that Japan was a victim of the war. The acquisition of U.S. territory in the Pacific initially began with the annexation of Hawaii and continued with the former possessions of Spain, ceded in the Spanish American War. Nimmo follows this story through the Philippine War, efforts to promote Philippine independence, the Commonwealth era, and finally independence in 1946.

In the spring of 1944, Adolf Hitler firmly believed that the Allies would invade the Continent by landing troops on the beaches of Normandy, but anti-Nazi officers in German Intelligence ultimately persuaded him that Normandy would be a mere diversion. The "real" invasion, Hitler was assured, would be at Calais. "Righteous Deception" focuses on the activities of two officers whose consciences kept them from siding with Hitler and the Nazis. Their campaign of misinformation and deception convinced Hitler to keep half of the German forces in northern France to defend against an invasion that would never come. This decision ultimately cost Hitler the war.

Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of German Military Intelligence, turned against Hitler within a year after he had come to power. Canaris and his circle of friends in an opposition movement known as the "Schwarze Kapelle" (Black Orchestra) did everything possible to prevent Hitler from winning the war, which believed would be a catastrophe. Colonel Alexis von Roenne headed the "Fremde Heere West," the branch of Intelligence responsible for evaluating the strength of Allied forces. In a key position to alter findings and other information pertaining to Allied forces in Britain, he doubled the estimated number of troops assembling for D-Day, giving the impression that the Allies had enough men and equipment in Britain for both an invasion in Calais and a diversion in Normandy.

From the outset, the war in Iraq was directed from Washington and executed by troops on the ground. Between Washington and the battlefields was the Green Zone, a four-square-mile enclave that hosted the American Embassy annex, the Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office, the planning, policy, strategy, and communications sections of Headquarters, Multi-national Force-Iraq, and the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq. Hope Is Not a Plan takes the reader inside the Green Zone courtesy of participant-observers brought to Iraq to diagnose the insurgency and develop a get-well plan. Focusing on the critical months of late 2004 and early 2005 --when a new sovereign government in Iraq tried to build legitimacy, and the coalition force tried to find the best way to help it do so--it looks at a slice of the war not previously examined. This is not the Beltway story, nor the grunt and jarhead story. Rather, the book looks at the process of taking political and military goals and turning them into action. In telling that story, Hope Is Not a Plan helps explain how Iraq got to where it is today. Organized by topic rather than on a strict chronological basis, it is practical, not theoretical, examining doctrines and lessons learned, not abstractions of the ivory tower. The book describes what happened in the Green Zone during this period and compares that reality with what history, experience, and doctrine suggests should have happened. Finally, it reflects on what can be learned from the experience. Rich in detail, the book is written to be accessible to anyone interested in first-hand information about the workings of a coalition staff during wartime--or to anyone who wants to understand howthings in Iraq went so very wrong.

"Vietnam, We've All Been There" is a unique collection of interviews with noted American writers who made the Vietnam war a subject of their work. The writers represented here were chosen by Dr. Schroeder because their books, plays, poems and reportage are among the best of the particular genre in which each one works--Norman Mailer, David Rabe, and Michael Herr among them. Provocative not only for the opinions and memories of the interviewees, this book is also interesting for its focus on the variety of literary forms and styles that emerged from the Vietnam experience.

The author makes the point that the more successful literature to come out of the war was from writers who stretched the limits of particular forms, giving birth to narratives that broke all the rules. For example, where journalism usually demands facts, Michael Herr, the author of "DispatcheS," insisted on much more. He described psychological states, assessed personal losses and personified the war in ways that were radically different from accepted reporting. As Dr. Schroeder reminds us, Vietnam deeply affected everyone who lived through it--thus there were many cultural effects that still beg for examination and thought. He spent nine years gathering these interviews and during that time the war was a constant presence in his life. For many Americans even a lifetime may not make it possible to come to terms with the war. And while it is important not to forget where we've been, it is also important to move forward. In this book, the writers we hear from, like the works they created, help us to remember the past with a reflective wisdom that is essential to informing our future.

A revelatory look at the U.S. Government's plan to put weapons in outer space, by two bestselling experts.
""During the early portion of the twenty-first century, space power will also evolve into a separate and equal medium of warfare....The emerging synergy of space superiority with land, sea, and air superiority will lead to Full Spectrum Dominance.""--from ""U.S. Space Command Vision for 2020""
When most of us think about the potential of outer space for future generations, we think of world communications, satellite navigation, and scientific exploration. U.S. Space Command, however, thinks about weapons. Believing that conflict in space and wars fought from space are inevitable, the president has called on the agency to weaponize outer space and thus provoke an arms race that could cost the United States trillions of dollars and could lead to the demise of the human race.
In "War in Heaven," a Nobel Prize-nominated peace activist and a former U.S. foreign service officer (who helped write the Outer Space Treaty of 1967) look at the history of military uses of space and the current plans for "militarizing the heavens," including kinetic, laser, nuclear bombardment, and anti-satellite weapons. Contrary to the claims of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that the United States faces a "space Pearl Harbor," Caldicott and Eisendrath show that the United States itself is today the principal obstruction to passage of an international treaty banning weapons from outer space.
At a time when plans to build and deploy space weapons are on the administration's agenda but only just becoming known to the general public, this book will help launch a national discussion of acritical issue.

For General George S. Patton, Jr., the battle for Lorraine during the fall and winter of 1944 was a frustrating and grueling experience of static warfare. Plagued by supply shortages, critical interference from superiors, flooded rivers, fortified cities, and the highly-determined German army, Patton had little opportunity to wage a fast armored campaign. Rickard examines Patton's generalship during these bitter battles and suggests that Patton was unable to adapt to the new realities of the campaign, thereby failing to wage the most effective warfare possible.

By the beginning of the Ardennes offensive, Patton had crippled his worthy opponent, but had suffered the highest casualties of any campaign that he conducted during the war. Until now, his better known exploits in Sicily and Normandy have overshadowed this campaign. Relying on a broad range of sources, this treatment of Patton's operational performance in Lorraine goes beyond the official history. It describes Patton's philosophy of war and explains why it essentially failed in Lorraine. Supplemented by full orders of battle, casualty and equipment losses, and excellent maps, "Patton at Bay" is a penetrating study of America's best fighting general.

This book is about the U.S. rush to arms in the Persian Gulf, the tragic loss of life on both sides, the destruction inflicted on Kuwait and Iraq, and the many uncertainties that confront America in the aftermath of the war. It reflects the views of millions who believe that the war could have been prevented through diplomacy and negotiation.

Menos concludes that the Persian Gulf war was unjust and unnecessary. To be just and necessary, it would have had to meet two key criteria: (1) the war would have had to be an act of last resort, after all efforts at a peaceful resolution had failed--which it was not, in view of the near-total absence of direct negotiations between the two sides; and (2) the good achieved from the war would have had to outweigh its harmful effects--which it did not, in light of the enormous destruction and loss of life caused by the fighting and its aftermath. Specialists in the fields of diplomacy, international relations, and the Middle East will find this book of particular interest.

The great Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, in his classic "On War," introduced the idea of friction in war. Friction was one of the most important ideas that Clausewitz put forward. His application of the term is generally taken to be limited to events on the field of battle. But had Clausewitz lived to the end of the 20th century, he undoubtedly would have broadened his understanding of friction to include the nexus between war and policy making. He would have done so because his most fundamental insight, apart from the significance of friction in war, was his insistence upon the priority of policy over war.

Cimbala applies the concept of friction to a number of 20th century cases of war and policy making. He also applies it to some plausible scenarios for the next century. Although many U.S. military planners and policy makers appear to place their faith in technology as the sine qua non of success in security and defense policy, technology can be self defeating and myopic if political and strategic vision are lacking. For example, the mindless pursuit of information warfare in all its varieties may convince potential U.S. opponents that infowar is a cost effective way of negating U.S. military power. A provocative analysis for scholars, students, military professionals and other policy makers involved with strategy and military policy issues.

This technohistory, a genre invented by the author, is the history of the production and use of the famous Zero fighter aircraft, the finest dogfighter in the air for most of World War II. Superbly written with an eye to detail and to the poignant and resonant moment, this poetic, highly charged narrative presents World War II from the Japanese point of view. Ultimately more than the history of an airplane—though the Zero is presented with the grandeur due it—this book is an extremely astute presentation of the Japanese character and world view. From a North American standpoint, Zero Fighter makes a number of highly interesting points, having been written for the Japanese market. For example, North Americans are generally not aware of the success of the Zero fighter or of its significance in Japanese minds. Both the superiority of the aircraft in the early stages of the Pacific War and the great stature of Jiro Horikoshi as an aircraft designer (he is to Japan what the designer of the Spitfire is to the U.K.) will come as a revelation to most readers here. Also completely unknown to most North American readers is the story of the transport section at the Nagoya Aircraft Works. This information is woven nicely into the book, and has a great deal to say about the startling quality of Japanese wartime industry: rigid in many ways, while producing a plane of brilliant originality. The book is a moving picture of the patience of the Japanese in the face of adversity, but perhaps most important, Zero Fighter>/i> is Japanese. It is not often that a Japanese book is encountered here that divulges intimate knowledge about such a fascinating subject. There is significant value in this as we enter an era in which the Japanese and American people must share and respect the other's cultural point of view.

Adolf Hitler had high hopes for his conquest of Norway, which held both great symbolic and great strategic value for the Fuhrer. Despite early successes, however, his ambitious northern campaign foundered and ultimately failed. Adam Claasen for the first time reveals the full story of this neglected episode and shows how it helped doom the Third Reich to defeat.

Hitler and Raeder, the chief of the German navy, were determined to take and keep Norway. By doing so, they hoped to preempt Allied attempts to outflank Germany, protect sea lanes for German ships, access precious Scandinavian minerals for war production, and provide a launchpad for Luftwaffe and naval operations against Great Britain. Beyond those strategic objectives, Hitler also envisioned Norway as part of a pan-Nordic stronghold--a centerpiece of his new world order. But, as Claasen shows, Hitler's grand expectations were never realized.

Gring's Luftwaffe was the vital spearhead in the invasion of Norway, which marked a number of wartime firsts. Among other things, it involved the first large-scale aerial operations over sea rather than land, the first time operational objectives and logistical needs were fulfilled by air power, and the first deployment of paratroopers.

Although it got off to a promising start, the German effort, particularly against British and arctic convoys, was greatly hampered by flawed strategic thinking, interservice rivalries between the Luftwaffe and navy, the failure to develop a long-range heavy bomber, the diversion of planes and personnel to shore up the German war effort elsewhere, and the northern theater's harsh climate and terrain.

Claasen's study covers every aspect of this ill-fated campaign from the 1940 invasion until war's end and shows how it was eventually relegated to a backwater status as Germany fought to survive in an increasingly unwinnable war. His compelling account sharpens our picture of the German air force and widens our understanding of the Third Reich's way of war.

This book is an analysis of President Bush's Regional Defense Strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado, on August 2, 1990. This strategy involves a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces, and General Colin Powell's Base Force. If implemented, the new strategy and force structure would return significant U.S. ground and air forces to the continental United States where most would be demobilized. In the event of a major crisis, the United States would rely on active and reserve forces for a contingency response, much as was done for Operation Desert Storm. The new national security strategy is based upon the 25 percent budget cut negotiated with Congress, a greatly depleted Russian threat, and a new international security environment that assumes two-years' warning of a European-centered global war with the former USSR.

There are four major critical factors upon which the new strategy depends: (1) the continued decline of the Russians as a threat to world stability; (2) the ability of the intelligence community to meet new challenges; (3) the behavior of the allies and Congress; and (4) the ability of industry to meet new demands. The new strategy is not simply an adjustment to existing defense doctrine or strategy, but rather a fundamental revision of the way the United States has approached defense since 1945. Students and scholars interested in politico-military strategy and government policy will find this book of great interest.

Which human rights violations or war crimes allegations result in exclusion from the refugee regime? What human rights protections apply to someone declared an unlawful combatant? Which human rights obligations apply to the actions of armed forces acting abroad? Over the past ten years the content and application of international law in armed conflict has changed dramatically. An authoritiative and comprehensive study of the role of international law in armed conflicts, this Oxford Handbook engages in a broad analysis of international humanitarian law, human rights law, refugee law, international criminal law, environmental law, and the law on the use of force. With an international group of expert contributors, this book has a global, multi-disciplinary perspective on the place of law in war.
The Handbook consists of 35 Chapters in seven parts. Part A provides the historical background and sets out some of the contemporary challenges. Part B considers the relevant sources of international law. Part C describes the different legal regimes: land warfare, air war fare, maritime warfare, the law of occupation, the law applicable to peace operations, and the law of neutrality. Part D introduces crucial concepts in international humanitarian law: weapons and the concepts of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering, the principle of distinction, proportionality, genocide and crimes against humanity, grave breaches and war crimes, and internal armed conflict. Part E looks at fundamental rights: the right to life, the prohibition on torture, the right to fair trial, economic, social and cultural rights, the protection of the environment, the protection of cultural property, the human rights of the members of the armed forces, and the protection of children. Part F covers important issues such as: the use of force, terrorism, unlawful combatants, the application of human rights in times of armed conflict, refugee law, and the issues of gender in times of armed conflict. Part G deals with accountability issues including those related to private security companies and armed groups, as well as questions of state responsibility brought before national courts and issues related to transitional justice.

Although seen widely as the 20th century's great religious war, as a conflict between the god-fearing and the godless, the religious dimension of the Cold War has never been subjected to a scholarly critique. This unique study shows why religion is a key Cold War variable. A specially commissioned collection of new scholarship, it provides fresh insights into the complex nature of the Cold War. It has profound resonance today with the resurgence of religion as a political force in global society.

Using new archival material, Lawrence Tal examines how Jordan remained stable during the volatile period between 1955 and 1967. Tal asserts that Jordan's security was due primarily to the cohesion of its National Security Establishment, a ruling coalition of security and foreign policy professionals that included the monarchy, the political elite, and the military.

Military conflicts, particularly land combat, possess all of the key attributes of complex adaptive systems: combat forces are composed of many nonlinearly interacting parts and are organized in a dynamic command-and-control hierarchy; local action, which often appears disordered, self-organizes into long-range order; military conflicts, by their nature, proceed far from equilibrium; military forces adapt to a changing combat environment; and there is no master "voice" that dictates the actions of every soldier (i.e., battlefield action is decentralized). Nonetheless, most modern "state of the art" military simulations ignore the self-organizing properties of combat. This book develops the proposition that combat is more like an interpenetration of two living, coevolving fluids rather than an elastic collision between two hard billiard balls. Artificial-life techniques--specifically, multiagent-based models coupled with evolutionary learning algorithms--provide a powerful new approach to understanding the fundamental processes of war. The book introduces an artificial-life model of combat called EINSTein. Recently developed at the Center for Naval Analyses, USA by the author, EINSTein is one of the first systematic attempts to simulate combat on a small-to-medium scale by using autonomous agents to model individual behaviors and personalities rather than hardware. EINSTein shows that many aspects of land combat may be understood as self-organized, emergent phenomena resulting from the dynamic web of interactions among coevolving agents. Thus, its bottom-up, synthesist approach to modeling combat stands in vivid contrast to the current top-down, reductionist approach taken byconventional models. EINSTein is the first step toward a complex-systems-theoretic toolbox for identifying, exploring, and exploiting self-organized emergent patterns of behavior on the real battlefield.

Foreshadowing the twentieth-century experience, the Spanish American War was America's first modern foreign war. Catapulting the United States into an international world power, the war had lasting international implications. Besides America's acquisition of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Hawaii, and Guam, the war led the United States to take to the international stage, confronting Germany and Japan (foreshadowing the conflict of World War II), and creating a diplomatic bridge between Great Britain and the United States. For Spain, the 1898-1899 conflict was the death knell of empire, which led to a national crisis culminating in the Spanish Civil War. This volume provides easily accessible information on the naval and army operations, Spanish operations, and the political background to the military events, with an emphasis on future foreign affairs.

The Spanish American War is seminal to an understanding of twentieth-century U.S. foreign relations--in Cuba, the Pacific, especially Japan, and with Great Britain. It is also central to an understanding of twentieth-century Spain. U.S. military history also requires an understanding of amphibious operations, naval and army reform, deployment command and control, and interservice cooperation as reflected in the Spanish American War. This book provides a quick reference to what was once called this splendid little war.

This exciting new book marks a major shift in the study of the South African War. It turns attention from the war's much debated causes onto its more neglected consequences. An international team of scholars explores the myriad legacies of the war - for South Africa, for Britain, for the Empire and beyond. The extensive introduction sets the contributions in context, and the elegant afterword offers thought-provoking reflections on their cumulative significance.

This book breaks new ground as the first full account of the role of amphibious warfare in British strategy between VE Day and the Anglo-French assault on Suez in 1956. Ian Speller analyzes the development of postwar strategic planning and the manner in which this influenced the nature of Britain's armed forces in the 1940s and 1950s. By detailing the development of equipment, doctrine and the role of the Royal Marines he sheds new light on the military response to a succession of overseas crises.

The argument presented in this book arose from an extension to the question whether the suppression of the Jacobite Rising of 1745-46, as represented by a long-standing historiographical consensus, spelled the end of Jacobite hopes, and British fears, of another restoration attempt. The principal conclusion of this book is that the Jacobite Movement persisted as a viable threat to the British state, and was perceived as such by its opponents to 1759.

Whom a prime minister or president will not shake hands with is still more noticed than with whom they will. Public identity can afford to be ambiguous about friends, but not about enemies. Rodney Barker examines the available accounts of how enmity functions in the cultivation of identity, how essential or avoidable it is, and what the consequences are for the contemporary world.

There are a number of books on the Soviet armed forces that describe weapons and composition. Here is the most broad ranging, detailed treatment of the subject to date. Correlation of Forces traces the development of the Soviet military over the past forty years, decade by decade. In addition to weaponry and composition, this authoritative reference covers leadership and geopolitical ebb and flow--including current troop movements in the Third World and along the Soviet-Sino border. Author Hansen has also selected fourteen years of critical importance to the development of the Soviet military, assesses the events of those years, and analyzes their significance.

This is the story of two youthful combatants caught up in one of the most famous and important campaigns in all history. After two years of war and thirty-five days of intense marching along a hundred miles of hot summer roads, Thomas Ware, a Confederate soldier from rural Georgia, and Franklin Horner, a Union soldier from the coal country of Pennsylvania, end up fighting on virtually the same battlefield at Gettysburg. En route to that fateful day, both make daily entries in small, leather-bound diaries they carry. They write about what's important to them-receiving mail, writing letters, having something to eat, surviving combat. Historian Mark Nesbitt places the entries into the larger context of the war and amplifies the diarists's commentary.

1-Recce was die skerpste, veelsydigste en dodelikste spesialiseenheid in die ganse Suid-Afrikaanse weermag. Dié manne was superfiks, bomenslik taai en het vir niks gestuit nie. Hulle het telkens hul lewens op die spel geplaas in die uitvoering van hoogs geheime operasies agter vyandelike linies.

Dekades lank is oor al dié hoogs geheime sendings geswyg. Nou, vir die eerste keer, openbaar die Recce's se groot generaals (waaronder die legendariese kol Jan Breytenbach) hoe hulle gestuur is om verskeie polities sensitiewe operasies uit te voer.

Daar word onthul hoe hulle in die doodsnikke van die apartheidsera gestuur is, en op die laaste oomblik verhoed is, om sleutel ANC-figure op te blaas. Hulle vertel van 1-Recce se betrokkenheid by die omstrede Grensoorlog en die bestaan van 'n hoogsgeheime "Eskadron" in die destydse Rhodesiese Weermag.

Ná jare van mites en geheimhouding gee dié boek 'n totaal nuwe blik op die Recce's en die werk wat hulle onsigbaar agter die skerms gedoen het.