This is the first English language account of the 1809 campaign for Vienna to weave stories of individual persons into the larger motif of the struggle to dominate Europe. The book explores three themes: the decline of Napoleon's powers, the rise of German nationalism, the end of the era of cavalry dominance of the battlefield and the ascendance of artillery. The campaign for Vienna led to Napoleon's first defeat on the battlefield. In May, Napoleon sat with his defeated army at the end of a long and imperiled line of communications. At the moment of crisis, he displayed his formidable talents and prepared a masterful counterstroke. The Battle of Wagram—a battle of unprecedented lethality—was a triumph for Napoleon and led to a peace which he dictated. In 1809 the world's undisputed military genius—Napoleon Bonaparte—confronted his implacable continental foe, the Hapsburg Empire. During the Vienna campaign of that year, Napoleon suffered his first defeat since becoming Emperor, but rebounded to win Wagram, a battle of unprecedented lethality. Referring to the strategic importance of the battles he fought, Napoleon reflected: My power is dependent on my glory, and my glory on my victories. My power would fall if I did not base it on still more glory and still more victories. Conquest made me what I am; conquest alone can keep me there. Even in the midst of a life and death campaign struggle against Austria, Napoleon continued to make nearly every decision of state on a daily basis. During his bath, while being shaved, when eating his meals, aides presented petitions and requests for his tireless attention: a second lieutenant asks to retain his French citizenship while serving in the Dutch army? Granted. Emperor Alexander I of Russia asks that an English prisoner of war who is a relative of his personal surgeon be released? Granted. If genius lies in the attention to detail, here was genius at work. The sun rose on April 24, 1809, to illuminate a continent at war. From Poland to Spain, some 600,000 soldiers awakened to duty. Nowhere was the concentration of forces greater than in the Danube Valley where Napoleon had determined to launch his blow against the Austrian Generalissimus, Erzherzog (Archduke) Karl. If Karl triumphed, most of Europe stood poised to pounce. Napoleon and the French Empire would be attacked from all quarters. If Karl failed, all Europe—except England and perhaps Portugal and Spain—would make whatever accommodations were necessary to survive under Napoleonic hegemony. The ensuing campaign led to Napoleon's first defeat at Aspern-Essling. So, at the end of May, Napoleon sat with his battered army at the end of a long and imperiled line of communications while Europe erupted around him. Yet, at the moment of supreme crisis, Napoleon displayed his formidable talents and prepared a masterful counterstroke. French and Austrian alike suffered horrific losses at Wagram, but at battle's end, Napoleon's commanding presence produced a French triumph. It was a victory so complete that the Emperor forced Austria into unwilling alliance and even took the daughter of the Austrian Kaiser to be his new wife. For one last time, the French conqueror redrew Europe's map.

The first detailed account in English of the battle that defined the elite unit's fidelity to the mission. The battle was fought at Camerone, some 40 miles west of Vera Cruz, Mexico, on April 30, 1863; the opponents were the half-strength 3d Company, 1st Battalion, of the Legion opposed by more than 2,000 Mexican regulars and guerrillas. After several fights against the Mexican lancers just beyond the deserted La Trinidad Hacienda at Camerone, the 3d took cover behind the old walls of the hacienda. There, for ten hours the Legion withstands repeated assaults from a Mexican force that grew to more than 2,000 men. Finally, the surviving officer and four men of the 3d charge into the midst of the massed "juaristaS." The officer is mortally wounded, two men are killed, the other two captured. The Legion has never regarded Camerone as a defeat but rather as the prime example of fidelity to the mission. Annually, on April 30, Legion units, whether in peace or war, commemorate the gallantry of the 3d of the 1st.

Explains why most special operations the USA has conducted in recent years to achieve key foreign policy objectives have failed. Includes an in-depth examination, based extensively on primary material, of the Bay of Pigs, the Sontay raid, the Mayaguez operation, and the Iran rescue mission. Also examines recent efforts to revitalize US special operations.

The 1916 Anglo-French offensive comprising the battles of the Somme marked a change in the Allies' relationships, with the British beginning to play a more important role. From contemporaries to the present the Somme has also produced a number of controversies. This book shows the current state of historians' interpretations of the Somme. The initial section presents the historical background of the offensive, lays out the major interpretative disputes, and identifies the scholars and works in each school of thought. The second section provides a bibliography of more than 700 entries. The initial section of the book presents the historical background of the offensive and lays out the major interpretative disputes about it. The section identifies scholars and works in each school of thought, enables readers to determine where a specific work fits in the spectrum of views, and provides cross references to the bibliography. The second section provides an annotated bibliography of more than 700 entries.

The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars raged in Italy for 23 years. In that time, no fewer than eight campaigns involving hundred of thousands of troops were mounted in the Italian peninsula, as France and Austria struggled over this secondary, but still vitally important theater of war. As Frederick Schneid demonstrates in this groundbreaking work, control of Italy was rightly seen by Napoleon as an important means of applying strategic pressure on the Austrians, while simultaneously providing security for France's vulnerable southern flank. As the first in-depth consideration of the struggle for strategically key region, this book places the Italian campaigns into their proper historical context.

Beginning with a geo-strategic overview of the Italian peninsula and its place in French and Austrian calculations, Schneid moves on to a careful consideration of the major campaigns that began in 1805, 1809, and 1813. These include studies of the battles at Caldiero, Wagram, and Mincio. The book also provides appendices with complete orders of battle for each campaign.

A scholarly and compelling analysis of Marine Corps survival as seen through the lens of three different organizational theories, this volume is a sourcebook in management and public administration for the way of seeing view. Frank Marutollo, intimately familiar with the Marine ethic, provides a practical demonstration of how management theories can be regarded as different ways of seeing rather than predictive schemes. He applies three models--the Population Ecology Model, Resource Dependence Model, and Structural Contingency Model--to three separate case studies and evaluates their complementary nature as well as their strengths and weaknesses. This one of a kind approach to the interpretation of management theories will be of particular interest to undergraduate and graduate students of management science and public administration.

As scholar and practitioner, Marutollo combines both perspectives to analyze the survival of a major organization in our culture. He selects three management theory models, develops a theoretical framework, and describes his methodology. Marutollo then sets the stage and applies each model to three case studies entitled: The Marine Corps and Military Unification, The New Navy and the Ships Guard, and Paradigms of Attack. He concludes his precise and detailed study with an overall assessment of the case study-model analysis.

I was hooked by the unusual style and, moreso, by the unusual approach to the familiar material . . . Articulate, sensitive, and intelligent . . . an unusually readable and persuasive narrative. Robert W. Lewis North Dakota Quarterly When in 1968 an American rifle battalion known as the First Wolfhounds landed near Dau Tieng, a rest area controlled by the North Vietnamese Army, they expected to interdict the NVA supply line there within three days. Instead, the soldiers found a prohibitive network of NVA troops, headquarters, hospitals, supplies, and local support for the NVA. It seemed impossible, even for the Wolfhounds, famed for their numbers and fighting strength. In the vivid prose of a mission survivor, Some Even Volunteered chronicles these brave soldiers' daily, deadly contact with the NVA, their attempts to win the villagers' trust, and how they struggled to accept and survive their circumstances. Eight months later, the Wolfhounds succeeded--destroying, in the process, an NVA unit of their own size. Alfred Bradford's sardonic voice is compelling. This narrative is witty, sometimes hilarious, and always captivating. Bradford--now a history professor--also provides one of the most insightful discussions ever written of Vietnam's assumed position in military history. Some Even Volunteered provides a marvelous description and a succinct evaluation of the life and the achievement of the American soldier in Vietnam trying to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese. In a style reminiscent of Michael Herr in Dispatches but still distinctly his own, Bradford relates the story of the First Battalion of the 27th Infantry Regiment (First Wolfhounds) of the 25th Infantry Division as they pacified the district of Tri Tam. The First Battalion--which had the highest body count of any rifle battalion in Vietnam--was air-lifted into an NVA rest area south of Dau Tieng (IIId Brigade basecamp) in the district of Tri Tam on 24 October 1968. They had been ordered to interdict the NVA supply line that stretched from the Ho Chi Minh trail in Cambodia through Dau Tieng to Saigon. They were expected to complete their mission in three days, but they uncovered such an extensive network of headquarters, hospitals, supply, troop concentrations and local support that the mission was extended to a week, then to a month, and finally, to eight months. Eight months later, the Wolfhounds had succeeded. Their fire support base was assaulted three times, their Brigade base twice. They established four independent forts, ran missions throughout the Third Brigade Area of Operations, and accepted the surrender of dozens of Viet Cong and NVA. In effect, they had destroyed an NVA unit of their own size. In vivid, staccato prose, Bradford delivers a first-rate narrative. In addition, the last chapter, entitled, The Will of the People, provides the reader with one of the best discussions ever written of Vietnam's assumed position in military history.

When the Anglo-Boer War began at the end of 1899, Germans protested profusely. Everybody, from the Conservatives to the Social Democrats took a united stand against the "arch enemy", Britain, and her war in the South of Africa. Only when the South African Union was founded in 1910 did the German public interest in South Africa decrease. This interest left a great number of German publications, which is a reminder of the fact that the general public of the German Reich supported, with great interest, an important world historic event overseas, which remains unprecedented in its intensity and extent.

On 6 June 1944 when the allied armies landed on D-Day, the Second World War had already lasted almost five years.

Yet many of the British and American troops who invaded Normandy were virgin soldiers, never before committed to battle. They quit summer England to face within hours a storm of machine-gun and mortar fire. They witnessed scenes, above all of sudden death, such as no exercise had prepared them for.

In Sword, veteran chronicler of war Max Hastings explores with extraordinary vividness the actions of the Commando brigade, Montgomery’s 3rd Infantry and 6th Airborne divisions on and around a single British beach. He describes their frustrations, hopes, loves and fears through the apparently interminable years training and preparing in England, then their triumphs and tragedies on the beach and beyond. Here are the airborne assaults on the Caen Canal bridge and Merville Battery, the battles on the shoreline and against the German strongpoints inland, narrated and explained with all the insights that Hastings’ decades of study, veterans’ interviews and new archive research enable him to deploy. The book offers a searching analysis of why British troops did not reach Caen on 6 June, as Montgomery had promised Churchill that they would – and the story of the brigadier who was sacked for that failure. There is also a host of personal portraits of key figures from commando leader Lord Lovat, famously brave but supremely arrogant, to tank colonel Jim Eadie, whose tanks of the Staffordshire Yeomanry repulsed a panzer division in the last hours of 6 June, and some of the humbler participants to whom extraordinary things happened.

This is D-Day as you have never read the story told before, with the blend of narrative, analysis and human insight that made Max Hastings’ last book Operation Biting, like many of his earlier works, a Sunday Times No.1 bestseller.

This work examines and contrasts U.S. decisions concerning military intervention in Lebanon in 1958 and 1982, and how the decisions made by Presidents Eisenhower and Reagan resulted in certain outcomes and avoided others. To bring each administration's decisions into perspective, the events that shaped foreign policy are examined, while the quality of the decisions are assessed in terms of each leader's managerial style and cognition. Among the topics addressed with regard to the formulation and conduct of U.S. policy are the premises and rationale behind each president's policy decisions, the events that shaped specific responses, and the resulting lessons that apply to crisis situations.

Following a brief introduction, Agnes Korbani offers a concise review of the systematic and motivational opportunities for military intervention in Lebanon. A pair of chapters cover the 1958 intervention, beginning with a survey of the 1955-57 period and the circumstances that shaped U.S. responses, followed by a discussion of how the decision to intervene was formulated and why the action took the form it did. The 1982 interventions are the focus of the next chapters, which review President Reagan's intervention objective, the regional issues that influenced the decision to intervene, and the rationale behind the move. Two concluding chapters suggest ways to apply theory and decision models to the crises, and detail major errors that could have been avoided and lessons that should be learned. This is the first book to deal with decision making in an Arab country from a comparative perspective, and should be an essential reference source for scholars of U.S. foreign policy, Middle Eastern studies, and presidential studies.

This book tells the story of French interaction with Vietnam and the neighboring region, which began with the French seizure of Cochin-China and Tonking in the 19th century under Emperor Tu Duc and ended with their humiliating defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. After the conclusion of treaties with China in the nineteenth century, Western nations sought access to the resource-rich region of Yunnan. After attempts at exploring the Mekong River, the French turned their sights to the Red River. Only after Jean Dupuis successfully linked Hanoi with Yunnan was Admiral Dupre able to begin the conquest of Tonking. This volume begins where Chapuis's "History of Vietnam" left off, completing the colonial history of Vietnam.

The decline of French authority in Indochina began with Japanese demands and subsequent occupation during World War II. The 9 March 1945 Japanese coup would mark the beginning of the end of French supremacy; however, French authorities would return with troops to confront the Vietnamese demands for unity and independence after Japan's defeat. Although an agreement between Sainteny and Ho Chi Minh would allow the French army to land in North Vietnam, the creation of the southern Republic of Cochin-China would be a move that ran counter to Vietnamese nationalist sentiment. Nine years later, the French found themselves ousted from their former colony.

This intriguing volume examines how the small group communication of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and their key advisors influenced the decisions to escalate the war in Vietnam from January 1961 to July 1965. Using an historical-critical research method, Moya Ann Ball traces the Vietnam decisions from the combative rhetoric of Kennedy's presidential campaign through the creation of a small group communication culture in the Kennedy administration, which, sustained and reinforced in the Johnson administration, became the motivating force behind the decisions to overtly escalate the war in July 1965. Ball asserts that this small group communication culture was formed by the convergence of such characteristics as the decision-making group's assembly effect, the group's reaction to situational demands, the sharing of dramatic communication, and normative behavior. The analysis is based on primary sources (many of them declassified through the author's efforts) from the Kennedy and Johnson Libraries, and on correspondence and interviews with advisors such as McGeorge Bundy, Robert S. McNamara, Walt W. Rostow, Dean Rusk, and James C. Thomson. Contrary to current literature, Ball uncovers that: Kennedy was not the "natural leader" of the Vietnam decision-making group, but became the leader in death that he had not been in life; the decision makers' communication rooted them rhetorically to a combat position from which it seemed impossible to move; Johnson stalled on overt action in Vietnam and, rather than leading his advisors, was led by them; and the decisions to escalate the war emerged in a "context of discovery" in the Kennedy administration and then were rationalized in a "context ofjustification" in the Johnson administration. Vietnam-on-the-Potomac will prove invaluable to communication specialists, political scientists, and historians.

This book is a balanced account of the political, diplomatic, and military currents that influenced Japan's attempts to surrender and the United States's decision to drop the atomic bombs. Based on extensive research in both the United States and Japan, this book allows the reader to follow the parallel decision-making in Tokyo and Washington that contributed to lost opportunities that might have allowed a less brutal conclusion to the war. Topics discussed and analyzed include Japan's desperate military situation; its decision to look to the Soviet Union to mediate the conflict; the Manhattan Project; the debates within Truman's Administration and the armed forces as to whether to modify unconditional surrender terms to include retention of Emperor Hirohito and whether to plan for the invasion of Japan's home islands or to rely instead on blockade and bombing to force the surrender.

This volume examines how the U.S. military must rebuild in the wake of Iraq/Afghanistan, and refocus its power projection to face the new challenges emerging in the Pacific and with China. Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st-Century Strategy provides an all-encompassing look at the challenges facing the United States in shaping a 21st-century Pacific strategy: dealing with the growing Chinese colossus, the unpredictable nuclear challenge presented by North Korea, the dynamic of the Arctic opening, and maintaining the security of the conveyor belt of goods and services in the Pacific. Can the United States successfully train and prepare for the 21st century, and break free from the mindset that determined its strategies in the previous century? The authors of the work explain why a carefully considered, fully modernized Pacific strategy is a key element for the evolution of American military power-and why shaping an effective air and maritime strategy in the Pacific as well as globally is the crucial challenge facing the U.S. military and the policy community. Written by authors with significant access to the media, think tanks, and high-level politicians, the book provides an insider's look at how American military leaders are building out relevant capabilities in the Pacific to defend America and its allies, and it contains extensive interviews with those leaders. Examines the nature of the destabilizing threat that China presents to the power balance of the Pacific, along with how the United States can work with its allies to shape a 21st-century strategy Discusses in detail the necessity for reshaping the U.S. military after the land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the ways in which American forces can be rebuilt for the future Explains why the evolving Pacific theater is an area of critical operations and will require significant change in terms of how U.S. forces operate to deal with emerging threats Assesses how new capabilities associated with emerging technologies-notably the Osprey, the F-35 aircraft, the Aegis Combat Systems, and a number of new European systems-allow new opportunities to work with our allies

Over the last decade, the notion of counter-insurgency (COIN) has risen to prominence as the dominant paradigm in American and British thinking about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite the high level of attention paid to the subject by military analysts, the broader theoretical and historical factors which underpin counter-insurgency have received comparatively little critical scrutiny. This volume addresses the gap in existing scholarship by exploring and challenging several critical aspects of the prevailing orthodoxy on COIN.This critical reappraisal of counter-insurgency thinking and practice brings together a number of international academics and practitioners, providing a pluralistic insight on the effectiveness of counter-insurgency operations from military, academic, media and civilian administrative perspectives. It also combines US and British insights into the theory and practise of twenty-first century COIN. With the continuing relevance of 'big third party' COIN to Western engagement in future wars of choice, this book provides an important and timely analysis of an issue which will continue to impact American and British security policy and future interventions.This book will appeal to scholars of Military Studies, Strategic Studies, Security Studies and International Relations and to practitioners and policy-makers working in the field of counter-insurgency.

This groundbreaking study reveals the extent of British military planning against the Soviet Union during the first two years of the Second World War. These plans, formulated on the widespread belief that Soviet Russia was an active and willing partner in Adolf Hitler's war of conquest, were designed to bring the Soviets to their knees and deprive Nazi Germany of vital raw materials, especially oil. Churchill himself was one of the leading proponents of action that would have led to an Anglo-Soviet conflict even as the war with Germany raged on. Utilizing many never-before published documents, Osborn challenges conventional wisdom that Allied hopes were pinned on a Soviet entry into the war against Germany and proposes instead that, had the Nazis not successfully invaded France in May 1940, the Allies might well have launched their own offensive against the Soviet Union. Anti-Soviet rumblings began shortly after the Red Army seized eastern Poland in September 1939, and became more strident after Joseph Stalin invaded Finland later that year. Truly serious planning did not take place, however, until after Stalin's disastrous war with Finland ended in March 1940. Immediately following the abrupt end of that conflict the Red Army sent substantial reinforcements to the Black Sea region, the area most threatened by Allied attack. In March-April 1940, the British undertook secret reconnaissance flights to obtain photographs of important targets inside the Soviet Union. The swift collapse of France in May 1940 insured that British bombers were not launched against these targets, but suspicion lingered between Britain and the USSR throughout the war, contributing to Stalin's refusal to believeWinston Churchill's warnings that Hitler was preparing to invade the USSR in 1941.

The 1898 war between the United States and Spain receives relatively little attention in most American history texts, yet it is an event of major importance. The United States emerged as the world's greatest power in the 20th century. In many ways, the war with Spain was a stepping stone from one era of American history to the next, showing Americans that aggressive nationalism could be fraught with danger, even as it was crowned with splendor. This book includes an overview essay, five essays on specific aspects of the war, and a conclusion. A biographical section features sketches of Americans, Spaniards, Cubans, and Filipinos who played important roles, showing the human element of the events. Fifteen primary documents grant readers and researchers a direct view of the elements that transpired and how they were reported. This book provides everything students or general readers need to begin their research into a watershed conflict in American history.

An important contribution to the political science and military history literature, this is the first book to present the Argentinean side of the battle for the Malvinas (Falklands) in May 1982. The author, a senior official in the Argentine Air Force who took part in the conflict himself, uses a wealth of documents, including previously unreleased British intelligence data and records of conversations between the top authorities, to construct a comprehensive account of the political and diplomatic aspects of the war, as well as the day-by-day military operations in the South Atlantic.

The author begins by examining the facts and circumstances that put Great Britain and Argentina on a collision course, paying particular attention to the points at which war could have been avoided. He goes on to provide a detailed account of events, such as the attempts by the United States to intervene, the deployment of forces, the battle of May 1, the sinking of the cruiser ARA General Belgrano and the subsequent sinking of the British destroyer HMS Sheffield, the battle of San Carlos, the fight for Darwin-Goose Green, the march to Fitz Roy and Mount Kent, and the last stand of Puerto Argentino. In addition to offering a full portrayal of the battles and conflicts themselves, Moro also provides a cogent analysis of the interaction of political and military events in modern conflict, a particularly valuable case study of U.S.-Latin American relations, and a fascinating examination of weapons systems in modern warfare. Moro takes issue with published British reports that treat the war as a discreet event that is now over, arguing that the conflict is not only still alive but also threatens both hemispheric peace and U.S. influence in Latin America.

Eminent defense officials, scholars, and military officers offer a thoughtful, comprehensive, and well balanced evaluation of U.S. defense technology in this highly-informative volume. They carefully analyze such difficult questions as: What technologies should be pursued and for what purposes? How should these technologies be pursued and integrated into U.S. defense posture? What are the implications of America's increasing reliance on advanced technology? Throughout the book, the contributors provide cogent answers to these questions and more as they seek to illuminate understanding, clarify debates, and promote contributions of advanced technology to U.S. defense and security. Defense Technology offers both the interested citizen and the serious student of U.S. national security affairs a broad range of reasonable positions on the problems, prospects, and consequences of America's reliance on advanced technology in its national defense.

In its six comprehensive parts, "Defense Technology" offers vital information on its controversial topic. Part One introduces the role of technology in U.S. national security. Next, the contributors set the context of defense technology: its importance, its context in U.S. approaches to foreign and defense policy, its implications in international affairs, and the dilemmas it poses for U.S. policymakers. Part Three and Four present assessments of opportunities for exploiting advanced technologies in both strategic and conventional military force capabilities. In part five, experts examine various approaches for organizing and managing the development and integration of defense technology into the U.S. defense sector. The final part offers insights into the broad implications that emerge from the conclusions about these important questions.

This comprehensive assessment by experts of the significant literature and research about the Korean War has been designed for students, teachers, and researchers at various levels and for broad interdisciplinary use. Edited by Brune, this one-volume research tool evaluates traditional interpretations and recent findings and trends and points to studies that are still needed on various topics. Twenty-three topical chapters cover the historical background and general references, international aspects of the war and the role and perspectives of major combatants, military policies and the strategies and tactics of the various armed forces, the Korean unification struggle after the war, and the relationship of the U.S. homefront to the Korean War. The book is fully indexed and is easily accessible.

Twenty-three topical chapters cover the historical background and general references; international aspects of the war and the role and perspectives of major combatants--from the United Nations and Korea to European and Asian and Pacific nations, including information on the most recent sources from the Soviet Union and Communist China; the military policies and the strategies and tactics of the U.S. Army, Navy and Marines, and Air Force; the Korean unification struggle after the war; and the relationship of the U.S. homefront to the Korean War--from the Administration and Congress to public opinion, and the war as seen by women and minorities and through the eyes of the cinema and TV. The book is fully indexed and is easily accessible for varied use by students, teachers, and researchers in different fields and at all levels.

From the Cold War to the Persian Gulf War, the high drama of America's contemporary foreign policy crises comes to life in this collection of primary documents designed for use by high school and college students. The comprehensive work dramatizes, through memoirs and diaries of the major players as well as key public documents, eight major crises: The Origins of the Cold War, the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49, the Korean War, the Berlin Crises of 1958 and 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979-80, and the 1991 Persian Gulf War with Iraq. The selection of documents for each crisis dramatizes the tension between the opposing nations and illuminates the process of decision-making by U.S. policymakers. Meticulously culled from a wide variety of sources and voices, many of the 382 documents are available in no other resource. Following a general introduction on contemporary American foreign relations, each crisis begins with a narrative introduction and chronology of events. The story of each crisis unfolds through chronologically organized documents, each of which is preceded by an explanatory headnote. The section on each crisis concludes with a suggested reading list. Among the variety of voices heard are memoirs and official statements of every president from Truman to Bush, and memoirs, diaries, and reminiscences of key players including General Douglas MacArthur, Dean Acheson, Robert Kennedy, Henry Kissinger, Nikita Krushchev, Andrei Gromyko, the Shah of Iran, and Generals Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell. The variety of documents includes government reports and policy statements, private correspondence and memos, laws, speeches, positionstatements of interest groups, treaties and agreements, CIA directives, and interviews with key players. This basic research tool provides students with a rich panoply of voices, viewpoints, and key public documents that illuminate a crucial period in American and world history.

Grand strategy, strategy, and tactics--the three layers of policy and action inherent to all military efforts--are the focus of this historical analysis of the dynamics of the Vietnam War. The American theory of counterrevolutionary warfare is examined in light of American military practice, especially that of the Marine Corps, during the period of America's greatest involvement, 1965-1972, and at the site of the most intense combat, the five northern provinces known as I Corps. Drawing from two schools of thought that diverge over the appropriate strategy America should have pursued in South Vietnam, this inquiry indicates that both the number of troops and their tactical employment proved inadequate for redressing the threat within the parameters America set for itself. Specifically, this work demonstrates that the counterrevolutionary warfare strategy postulated for Vietnam was largely ignored in some quarters, and sowed the seeds of defeat in others.

Contrary to prevalent military historical thinking, the early medieval general was not an ignorant warrior chieftain, but an able, astute, intelligent, and often very cunning commander. Through the use of contemporary literature, art, and archaeological evidence, this study argues that these generals could and did effectively exercise command control before, during, and after battle. Using the examples of a dozen or so leaders and drawing upon over 60 battles, this study brings to light the genius and the adaptability of medieval generals.

For more than 500 years, the Portuguese built or adapted fortifications along the coasts of Africa, Asia and South America. At a macro scale, mapping this network of power reveals a gigantic territorial and colonial project. Forts articulated the colonial and the metropolitan, and functioned as nodes in a mercantile empire, shaping early forms of capitalism, transforming the global political economy, and generating a flood of images and ideas on an unprecedented scale. Today, they can be understood as active material legacies of empire that represent promises, dangers and possibilities. Forts are marks and wounds of the history of human violence, but also timely reminders that buildings never last forever, testimonies of the fluidity of the material world. Illustrated by case studies in Morocco, Cape Verde, SAGBPo Tome and PrA ncipe and Kenya, this book examines how this global but chameleonic network of forts can offer valuable insights into both the geopolitics of Empire and their postcolonial legacies, and into the intersection of colonialism, memory, power and space in the postcolonial Lusophone world and beyond.

More than 300,000 people visit the site of George Armstrong Custer's Last Stand each year; however the 1876 Battle of Little Bighorn is only part of Custer's story on the Great Plains. The famed general and his Seventh Cavalry spent 10 years on the plains prior to Little Bighorn, participating in campaigns from Texas to North Dakota and leaving behind a colourful, controversial and enduring legacy. The Great Plains Guide to Custer is the first book that directs readers to all of the sites Custer visited west of the Mississippi River. Featured are more than 80 locations in 10 states that the general is confirmed to have visited, as well dozens of related places of interest to Western, Plains Indian, and army historians. Also included is all-new information on Custer's 1872 Great Buffalo Hunt with the Russian grand duke Alexis, an expedition that featured many of the most famous figures of the nineteenth-century American West sure to appeal to the many Custer aficionados. About the Author Jeff Barnes is a freelance writer who lives in Omaha, Nebraska. He is a former newspaper editor and past chairman of the Nebraska Hall of Fame commission.