This work examines and contrasts U.S. decisions concerning
military intervention in Lebanon in 1958 and 1982, and how the
decisions made by Presidents Eisenhower and Reagan resulted in
certain outcomes and avoided others. To bring each administration's
decisions into perspective, the events that shaped foreign policy
are examined, while the quality of the decisions are assessed in
terms of each leader's managerial style and cognition. Among the
topics addressed with regard to the formulation and conduct of U.S.
policy are the premises and rationale behind each president's
policy decisions, the events that shaped specific responses, and
the resulting lessons that apply to crisis situations.
Following a brief introduction, Agnes Korbani offers a concise
review of the systematic and motivational opportunities for
military intervention in Lebanon. A pair of chapters cover the 1958
intervention, beginning with a survey of the 1955-57 period and the
circumstances that shaped U.S. responses, followed by a discussion
of how the decision to intervene was formulated and why the action
took the form it did. The 1982 interventions are the focus of the
next chapters, which review President Reagan's intervention
objective, the regional issues that influenced the decision to
intervene, and the rationale behind the move. Two concluding
chapters suggest ways to apply theory and decision models to the
crises, and detail major errors that could have been avoided and
lessons that should be learned. This is the first book to deal with
decision making in an Arab country from a comparative perspective,
and should be an essential reference source for scholars of U.S.
foreign policy, Middle Eastern studies, and presidential
studies.
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