This book is devoted to Israel's asymmetric wars, those conducted against irregular armed groups that have attacked it. It seeks to understand the Israeli strategy in the fight against terrorists acting under the guise of civilians or using the population as human shields. The army has implemented a loosely devised, if not simplistic, doctrine of "disproportionate response" since Israel's founding. The results have been mediocre, nearly always leading to the death of innocent Arab civilians and exacerbating anti-Israeli sentiment. Each time it has led to an escalation that is difficult to control and thrown the entire country into an increasingly inextricable situation. Practically every time it has made Israel, the aggressed party, look like the aggressor. What explains such perseverance? This research is based on vast documentation collected in Israel as well as on more than 60 in-depth interviews with officers and simple soldiers, senior counterterrorism officials, politicians, journalists and NGOs.

Few figures in American history are accorded greater honor than the military commander at the head of his troops. This study identifies and recounts the careers of those men who have given their lives while serving as general officers from the beginnings of our nation's military history to the present day. In addition to offering profiles of American military heroes, the study also provides a basis for consideration of some of the ways in which military leadership techniques have changed over the years.

Biographical information for each general officer includes year of birth, branch of service, and state from which the officer entered the service, a brief synopsis of preservice and service achievements, and an account of the cause and circumstances of death. The highest rank held with date of commission and specific date and place of death are given for every officer, and each entry closes with a list of sources.

Although it is generally assumed that there have always been limits to what soldiers are permitted to do in war, it was not until 1863, in the heat of the Civil War, that the United States issued its first Army manual. Subsequently, manuals of land warfare were issued in 1914, 1934, 1940, 1944, 1956, and 1976 by the American military. In this volume, Wells provides a systematic examination of the evolution of American rules of warfare. In addition to providing the texts of key elements of the manuals and analyzing them, Wells relates the manuals to international attempts to set limits on war practices. This book will be invaluable to those concerned with military law, here and abroad, to students of international law, and to military policy makers.

Despite the mighty invasion force the Americans and British mustered in England in early 1944, a top Allied general warned: If the Germans have even a 48-hour advance notice of the time and place of the Normandy landings, we could suffer a monstrous catastrophe For his part, Adolf Hitler planned to inflict such a massive bloodbath on the invaders that the Allies would agree to a negotiated peace with Nazi Germany.

"Hoodwinking Hitler" is an action-packed, you-are-there account about a colossal and incredibly intricate deception scheme created and implemented by ingenious and diabolical minds, machinations intended to bamboozle the Germans on true Allied invasion plans. Facets of the global chicanery included electronic spoofing, double agents, diplomatic deceit, whispering campaigns, femmes fatales, camouflage, strategic feints, the French underground, murder plots, phony military installations, misleading bombing raids, sabotage, propaganda, traps, fake codes, and kidnap schemes. On D-Day, June 6, 1944, the Allies gained total surprise, mostly because of what Winston Churchill called the greatest hoax in history. But not until two months later, when the Allies broke out of Normandy, did the deception scheme pass into history. By that time, ultimate Allied victory in Europe was assured.

When should the United States intervene abroad militarily? When does it have a security interest in going into another country, even if it means fighting an unconventional war? Examining five case studies, this book concludes Americans have been too eager to intervene abroad, often exaggerating and misperceiving threats. They have also been ill prepared to fight unconventional wars like Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The United States requires more discrimination in choosing to intervene, more awareness that the costs of intervention often outweigh the benefits, and more preparedness to fight unconventional wars when necessary.

The French North African Crisis analyzes the postwar breakdown in French imperial rule in North West Africa, concentrating primarily upon the Algerian war of independence. This book highlights the human tragedy involved and the divisive consequences within French metropolitan politics of intractable colonial conflict. It further examines how far the protracted crisis of colonial control in North Africa shaped French foreign and security policy and this impacted upon Anglo-French relations, the western alliance and the wider process of decolonization.

This description of the military struggle for Afghanistan concerns the objectives, operations, tactics and effectiveness of the forces involved in that struggle. The aim is to describe the war as objectively and in as much detail as possible.

The Algerian War 1954-62 was one of the most prolonged and violent examples of decolonization. Bringing to an end 132 years of French rule, the Algerian struggle caused the fall of six French prime ministers, the collapse of the Fourth Republic, and expulsion of one million French settlers. This volume, bringing together leading experts in the field, focuses on one of the key actors in the drama - the French army. They show that the Algerian War was just as much about conflicts of ideas, beliefs and loyalties as it was about simple military operations. In this way, the collection goes beyond polemic and recrimination to explore the many and varied nuances of what was one of the historically most important of the grand style colonial wars.

It is 1966, the war is escalating, and a young Air Force Academy graduate's assignment is to patrol unfriendly territory with six-man hunter-killer teams. As a Forward Air Controller, flying single engine spotter planes, Flanagan is the link between fighter-bomber pilots and ground forces. This autobiographical account recreates the period when Flanagan, assigned to Project Delta, was plunged into major operations in key combat areas. Spectacular airstrikes, team rescues, lost men, thwarted attempts to save comrades--all are recounted here with raw honesty. A factual combat history from one man's perspective, this is also a thoughtful look at the warrior values of bravery, honesty, and integrity. Flanagan examines the influences that help build these values--educational institutions, the military training system (including the service academies), and religion--and reflects on the high cost of abandoning them. In Vietnam Above the Treetops, Flanagan traces his life from adolescence through the training period, combat missions of all kinds, and re-entry into the everyday world. His war tales take us to key regions: from the Demilitarized Zone, south through the Central highlands, and into War Zone C near Cambodia. Flanagan tells the absolute truth of his experience in Vietnam-- call signs, bomb loads, and target coordinates are all historically accurate. He offers observations on the Vietnamese and Korean forces he worked with, comparing Eastern and Western cultures, and he vents his frustrations with the U.S. command structure. Determined to reconstruct the past, Flanagan re-read old letters from Vietnam, examined maps, deciphered pocket diaries, interviewed former comrades, and let his own long-buried memories surface. Flanagan did not find this book easy to write, but he wanted to pay tribute to his fellow warriors, especially those still missing in action; he wanted to exorcise his war nightmares and further understand his experience. Even more important, he needed to communicate the values he and his comrades lived by, in distant jungles where they faced some of the toughest circumstances known to human beings.

This two-part book examines the roots of warfare and the development of the peace movement in America from the Colonial period through the Vietnam War. From the Colonial period on, war has inevitably divided U.S. society into pro-war and antiwar factions, and few subjects have proven so polarizing or long-lasting as a nexus of public discourse. In the contest over war and peace, uninformed beliefs have been conflated with uncontested truths by both sides, fueling a lack of bipartisanship in foreign policy that has been prevalent since the nation's earliest days. A History of War Resistance in America delineates clearly the tradition of war opposition in the United States. It examines the military, preparations for war, and war's justifiable prosecution, as well as pacifism, legitimate resistance to war, and the appropriate and free exercise of civil liberties. This thought-provoking volume offers an analysis of the reasons for conflict among peoples, the prosecution of war among nations, and the development of war resistance movements. It also explores the role of the media in forming public opinion and that of the courts in protecting—or limiting—civil liberties.

The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited is a comprehensive overview of the great cornucopia of new materials recently released by the Soviet Union, United States, and Cuba. The authors, some of whom were participants in the crisis, have all had a major role in bringing to light either significant reevaluations of the crisis, or in some cases, truly startling revelations of the extant wisdom surrounding much of the crisis. The collection, edited by a long-time student of the crisis, is a coherent, original, and up-to-date work that bears on a moment when the world, for good cause, held its breath in fear that the morning might bring the apocalypse.

"Understanding Homeland Security: Policy, Perspectives, and Paradoxes" provides the first truly comprehensive analysis of the historical, social, psychological, technological, and political aspects that form the broad arena of homeland defense and security. Utilizing an interdisciplinary approach, the text provides a view of past events and how they formed the terrain for current events, allowing the audience to gain a detailed knowledge of government response and policy implications. With both the public and private sectors investing heavily in protection efforts, this text offers the essential starting point for the dynamic and emerging homeland defense arena.

The conclusion of a war typically signals the beginning of a flood of memoirs and instant campaign histories, many presenting the purported, but often dubious lessons of the recent conflict. Cordesman is careful to avoid such pitfalls in this detailed and closely reasoned analysis, and helps us to begin to understand the implications of this dramatic conflict on its own terms. Based on a combination of official and unofficial (but always authoritative) sources, he builds a thorough case for the true lessons of NATO's first battle fought within Europe.

After consideration of the historical, major political, and strategic factors that set the stage for the Kosovo campaign, Cordesman critically examines the actual effectiveness of the NATO air campaigns, both in Kosovo and Serbia proper. Operations in this rugged part of Europe were difficult, and compounding the challenges of terrain and weather were the conflicting national agendas within the Allied coalition that seriously hampered focused and decisive action by NATO. Although Milosevic ultimately conceded defeat, all of these factors played an important role in limiting the intensity and shaping the military outcome of the campaign, and the likely political and strategic results were far from certain. Cordesman unflinchingly concludes, that the air campaign over Kosovo exposed deep fault lines within and among the NATO countries and fundamental flaws in the way the West wages war.

Watson presents five sieges for detailed analysis. The author utilizes the methodology John Keegan developed to define sieges as a form of battle and to explore the "categories of combat"--those relationships of men versus weapons and the commitment to battle on the part of the contestants--which determined the outcome of battles and wars. Watson's unique study is a contribution to the study of siege warfare and provides a background for understanding the Gulf War--which, Watson shows, was a siege--as well as contemporary global conflict. The sieges--Jerusalem, Malta, Sebastopol, Kut-al-Amara, and Singapore--are analyzed in great detail. From his analysis, Watson developes a set of characteristics of sieges that is useful for understanding the siege--a form of battle that has been with us for a long time and that will remain a major element of modern warfare. Students of military history and tactics--buffs and professionals--will find value and entertainment in this provocative study.

This is the only available book on the Congo war, the most important current conflict in Africa. Two chapters situate the war in its historical and theoretical context, while others survey the interests of the Congolese government, of the rebel groups, and of intervening states in the war. These chapters reveal the underlying sources of the war and explain the strategies of the various combatants. Other chapters examine the impact of the war on neighboring countries, individual citizens, refugees, and other non-state actors in the zone of conflict and beyond.

The United States faces extraordinary challenges on both the strategic and operational levels. At the strategic level, the national security environment is in flux and many of the structures, concepts, and methods of the past no longer apply to the conditions we now face. Containment, the alliance system, our military doctrine, and many other elements of national security policy were not designed for prolonged struggle with militant Islam, an ascendant China, a Russia which is no longer a containable super power enemy but a rival for influence at America's expense, a decline in American influence, and a sharply divided American polity. Generals Zeb Bradford and Frederic Brown, co-authors of the highly influential book on the U.S. military in Vietnam, U.S. Army in Transition, have teamed up again to discuss the need for a new era of transition within the Armed Forces. Bradford and Brown point to the current war in Iraq, a lack of interagency competence across the national government, and the botched disaster relief efforts of Katrina as glaring examples of the failure of America's Army to adapt to present-day challenges. Given the rapid and dramatic changes throughout the world, the authors stress how selective adaptation of specific programs and procedures can contribute to improving policy execution within and across all facets of government, including the armed forces. Yet this adaptation to change must be institutionalized, requiring the Army to become a constantly evolving learning organization. Only within this context can the army manage to act on the myriad demands of the day including taking the leadership in international cooperation, fighting the amorphous enemy of "The LongWar" against terrorism, responding effectively to disaster scenarios, and engaging in stabilization and reconstruction efforts around the world.

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"A beautifully written, richly descriptive, and thoroughly-researched account of the importance of Staten Island in the American Revolution. This is an important book, demonstrating that a close examination and analysis of local politics, economics, and social structure can hold the key to understanding national history."
--Carol Berkin, author of "Revolutionary Mothers"

aIs not only a micro-history, it provides lessons in the winning--and keeping--the ahearts and mindsa of a local civilian population.a--"On Point"

aAn excellent bookasuccinct yet deeply researched, well written and filled with telling bits of evidence worked smoothly into an interpretive narrative. An insightful, important study.a
--Robert Calhoon, author of "The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760-1781"Of crucial strategic importance to both the British and the Continental Army, Staten Island was, for a good part of the American Revolution, a bastion of Loyalist support. With its military and political significance, Staten Island provides rich terrain for Phillip Papas's illuminating case study of the local dimensions of the Revolutionary War.

Papas traces Staten Island's political sympathies not to strong ties with Britain, but instead to local conditions that favored the status quo instead of revolutionary change. With a thriving agricultural economy, stable political structure, and strong allegiance to the Anglican Church, on the eve of war it was in Staten Island's self-interest to throw its support behind the British, in order to maintain its favorable economic, social, and political climate.

Over the course of the conflict, continualoccupation and attack by invading armies deeply eroded Staten Island's natural and other resources, and these pressures, combined with general war weariness, created fissures among the residents of "that ever loyal island," with Loyalist neighbors fighting against Patriot neighbors in a civil war. Papas's thoughtful study reminds us that the Revolution was both a civil war and a war for independence - a duality that is best viewed from a local perspective.

The brief, successful Gulf War resulted in few casualties, but there were still recognizable "pockets of trauma." This study examines the Mental Health Services available in the theater of operations, the preparations made to train the soldiers for the stress of combat, and details of how they coped with the experience of combat. It assesses the Gulf War in terms of mental health. Some attention is also given to the phenomenon named "Gulf War Syndrome." The authors conclude that United States Military Forces were not prepared for the mental health requirements of combat.

In 1857-1858, rebels in northern India recruited tens of thousands of civilian volunteers in a mutiny that threatened to engulf the entire subcontinent. This study explores a fundamental question never explicitly investigated in histories of the mutiny: How could a vastly outnumbered British army, with dangerously extended lines of supply and reinforcement, defeat so large a force on its home ground? Watson addresses the problem by focusing on the Lucknow campaign, which was pivotal to the success of the British, and abandons the usual narrative approach to the subject in favor of an analysis of the leadership, armies, and other crucial elements in the campaign. After reviewing the religious, economic, and political unrest that set the stage for the mutiny, Watson provides a brief history of the campaign. In his comparative analysis of the armies and leadership of the combatants, a panorama of contrasts emerges. The British had the advantages of experienced and well-organized leadership, a better trained and organized army, superior weapons, and a cohesive sense of purpose. The rebel forces, on the other hand, consisted of decentralized armies whose effectiveness was compromised by the influx of untrained volunteers and whose leaders were mainly revolutionaries and military amateurs with few common goals. In his analytical comparisons of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and other factors affecting fighting ability, Watson applies John Keegan's "categories of battle" to develop equations that spell out the character of battle not only for the Lucknow campaign but for the entire conflict. Adding a new dimension to our understanding of the mutiny, this book is relevant to historical study ofIndia, the British Empire, and the British army, and will also appeal to military history buffs.

In 1987–1988 was die stowwerige Angolese dorpie Cuito Cuanavale die toneel van die laaste gevegte van die Grensoorlog. Sedertdien is dit die fokuspunt van ’n openbare debat oor wie eintlik hierdie oorlog gewen het.

Die leierskorps van die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag (SAW) hou vol hulle is nooit verslaan nie, terwyl die alliansie van die Angolese MPLA-regering, Kuba en Swapo beweer hulle het die SAW uit Angola en Suidwes-Afrika verdryf. Hulle glo voorts die SAW wou Cuito Cuanavale beset en as afspringplek gebruik om Luanda in te neem.

Maar was Cuito Cuanavale ooit regtig ’n doelwit vir die Suid-Afrikaners? Dit is die vraag wat Leopold Scholtz vra wanneer hy onlangs gedeklassi-fiseerde dokumente in die weermagargief bestudeer en die taktiese en strategiese besluite ondersoek wat ’n bepalende rol in die ses groot veldslae van dié veldtog gespeel het.

Sy kritiese ontleding wys hoe maklik propaganda en politiek in die pad van feite kan staan.

This work provides a theoretical and historical examination of the relationship between provision of military assistance and success in achieving donor aims. Eight case studies, which include the American Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Vietnam War, are examined to assess four prominent features of the donor-recipient relationship: the convergence of donor and recipient aims; donor control; commitment of donor military forces; and coherence of donor policies and strategies. As an essential part of the expanding body of multidisciplinary international scholarship, this book links history and theory to policy and narrows the gap between economics, political science, and military strategy.

Each chapter refines the relevant features of the observed donor-recipient relationships into a pattern for comparison with other episodes. The final chapter collects the observations, compares them, and develops a set of uniformities that suggest a prototypical, successful donor-recipient relationship, suitable for direct application as a policy paradigm or for theoretical investigation. Mott suggests that both donor and recipient governments can use military assistance as a deliberate instrument of national policy and military strategy to achieve national aims.

In 1968 in South Vietnam, a U.S. infantry battalion was ordered to charge a fortified North Vietnamese Army force 200 yards away over an open field with no artillery or air support. The defenders had every advantage. The Americans started moving across the field just before noon, every man a target. By the time they reached the tree line at the other side of the open field, nearly one half of the 400-man battalion was a casualty. Nine long, agonizing hours afterwards, U.S. artillery units began support fire, although the units remained desperately short of ammunition. The entrapped men saw their fate: death or captivity. Help from headquarters was neither offered nor available. The following night the battalion commander decided to make a run for it. It was a gamble with high stakes. But the battalion did make it through enemy lines to a mountaintop where the NVA could not follow. When the Lost Battalion finally escaped encirclement, after nine hours with no artillery or air support, and 30 hours of fighting against an enemy that outnumbered them three to one, the tragic episode disappeared from official memory and relevant U.S. Army records - as if nothing had happened. Krohn tells the whole story - and tells it with the words of those present. That some of the testimony comes from those responsible is remarkable.

This narrative history of the French Navy in Indochina from 1945 to 1954 draws on recently published French language sources, as well as English sources, to create a detailed, highly readable account of the critical first ten years of the 30-year war in the maritime crossroads of Southeast Asia. Captain Charles W. Koburger, Jr. examines the specific naval organization, equipment, and skills demanded by coastal and riverine warfare, focusing on the unique French-developed naval infantry assault divisions called, in a convenient French acronym, dinassauts. The French development of such river assault groups, their successful performance, whether on coastal patrol, river patrol, or river assault--and a review of some of their tactics, techniques, and battles, compose the bulk of the book. The authoritative text is complemented by maps of the area, photographs of naval craft used in the campaigns, and tables pertaining to battles and military organization. Appendixes survey Indochinese geography and weather as well as ships and craft.

Early chapters narrate the historical situation in French Indochina in August and September 1945, emphasizing the naval picture. The heart of the book, covering the periods 1946-50, 1951, and 1952, holds the story of the dinassauts' early development and their later expanded operations as well as the naval strategies employed. The final chapters trace the last years of the French in Indochina, describing the culmination of dinassaut organization and highlighting their last operations necessitated by the communist victory in China, and made possible by U.S. aid. The French Navy in Indochina addresses historians, naval officers, diplomats, government officials, and war gamers, but informed general readers will find it an entertaining and useful read as well.

A ground-breaking study of how literature both reflected and contributed to the eclipse and subsequent revival of militarism in the nineteenth century. Focusing on four major disputes in the Crimea, India, the Sudan, and South Africa as well as the role of the army in Britain, John Peck examines how Victorian writers responded to military issues. At the heart of the book is a dilemma that characterises the Victorian period: the impossibility of reconciling imperial aggression with liberal domestic values.

In his new book, Tony Le Tissier provides the first detailed account of the Soviet-German conflict east of Berlin, culminating in 1945 with the last major land battle in Europe that proved decisive for the fate of Berlin. When the first Red Army soldier reached the Oder on the 31st of January, everyone at the Soviet Headquarters expected Marshall ZhukoV's troops to bring a quick end to the war. However, despite desperate fighting by both sides, a stalemate persisted for two months, at the end of which the Soviet bridgeheads north and south of Kustrin were united and the fortress finally fell. By drawing not only on official sources, but also on the accounts of individuals involved, Le Tissier meticulously reconstructs the difficult breakthrough achieved on the Oder: the establishment of bridgeheads, the battle for the fortress of Kustrin, the bloody fight for Seelow Heights. Numerous maps and step by step illustrations show the operations of both contestants in detail and reveal a most interesting episode in the history of the Second World War in Europe.

In his new book, Tony Le Tissier provides the first detailed account of the Soviet-German conflict east of Berlin, culminating in 1945 with the last major land battle in Europe that proved decisive for the fate of Berlin. When the first Red Army soldier reached the Oder on the 31st of January, everyone at the Soviet Headquarters expected Marshall ZhukoV's troops to bring a quick end to the war. However, despite desperate fighting by both sides, a stalemate persisted for two months, at the end of which the Soviet bridgeheads north and south of Kustrin were united, and the fortress finally fell.

By drawing not only on official sources, but also on the accounts of individuals involved, Le Tissier meticulously reconstructs the difficult breakthrough achieved on the Oder: the establishment of bridgeheads, the battle for the fortress of Kustrin, and the bloody fight for Seelow Heights. Numerous maps and step by step illustrations show the operations of both contestants in detail and reveal a most interesting episode in the history of the Second World War in Europe.