In 1857-1858, rebels in northern India recruited tens of thousands of civilian volunteers in a mutiny that threatened to engulf the entire subcontinent. This study explores a fundamental question never explicitly investigated in histories of the mutiny: How could a vastly outnumbered British army, with dangerously extended lines of supply and reinforcement, defeat so large a force on its home ground? Watson addresses the problem by focusing on the Lucknow campaign, which was pivotal to the success of the British, and abandons the usual narrative approach to the subject in favor of an analysis of the leadership, armies, and other crucial elements in the campaign. After reviewing the religious, economic, and political unrest that set the stage for the mutiny, Watson provides a brief history of the campaign. In his comparative analysis of the armies and leadership of the combatants, a panorama of contrasts emerges. The British had the advantages of experienced and well-organized leadership, a better trained and organized army, superior weapons, and a cohesive sense of purpose. The rebel forces, on the other hand, consisted of decentralized armies whose effectiveness was compromised by the influx of untrained volunteers and whose leaders were mainly revolutionaries and military amateurs with few common goals. In his analytical comparisons of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and other factors affecting fighting ability, Watson applies John Keegan's "categories of battle" to develop equations that spell out the character of battle not only for the Lucknow campaign but for the entire conflict. Adding a new dimension to our understanding of the mutiny, this book is relevant to historical study ofIndia, the British Empire, and the British army, and will also appeal to military history buffs.

This work provides a theoretical and historical examination of the relationship between provision of military assistance and success in achieving donor aims. Eight case studies, which include the American Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Vietnam War, are examined to assess four prominent features of the donor-recipient relationship: the convergence of donor and recipient aims; donor control; commitment of donor military forces; and coherence of donor policies and strategies. As an essential part of the expanding body of multidisciplinary international scholarship, this book links history and theory to policy and narrows the gap between economics, political science, and military strategy.

Each chapter refines the relevant features of the observed donor-recipient relationships into a pattern for comparison with other episodes. The final chapter collects the observations, compares them, and develops a set of uniformities that suggest a prototypical, successful donor-recipient relationship, suitable for direct application as a policy paradigm or for theoretical investigation. Mott suggests that both donor and recipient governments can use military assistance as a deliberate instrument of national policy and military strategy to achieve national aims.

Five months after being deployed to Iraq, Lima Company's 1st Platoon, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, found itself in Fallujah, embroiled in some of the most intense house-to-house, hand-to-hand urban combat since World War II. In the city's bloody streets, they came face-to-face with the enemy-radical insurgents high on adrenaline, fighting to a martyr's death, and suicide bombers approaching from every corner. award-winning author and historian Patrick O'Donnell stood shoulder to shoulder with this modern band of brothers as they marched and fought through the streets of Fallujah, and he stayed with them as the casualties mounted.

In 1968 in South Vietnam, a U.S. infantry battalion was ordered to charge a fortified North Vietnamese Army force 200 yards away over an open field with no artillery or air support. The defenders had every advantage. The Americans started moving across the field just before noon, every man a target. By the time they reached the tree line at the other side of the open field, nearly one half of the 400-man battalion was a casualty. Nine long, agonizing hours afterwards, U.S. artillery units began support fire, although the units remained desperately short of ammunition. The entrapped men saw their fate: death or captivity. Help from headquarters was neither offered nor available. The following night the battalion commander decided to make a run for it. It was a gamble with high stakes. But the battalion did make it through enemy lines to a mountaintop where the NVA could not follow. When the Lost Battalion finally escaped encirclement, after nine hours with no artillery or air support, and 30 hours of fighting against an enemy that outnumbered them three to one, the tragic episode disappeared from official memory and relevant U.S. Army records - as if nothing had happened. Krohn tells the whole story - and tells it with the words of those present. That some of the testimony comes from those responsible is remarkable.

This narrative history of the French Navy in Indochina from 1945 to 1954 draws on recently published French language sources, as well as English sources, to create a detailed, highly readable account of the critical first ten years of the 30-year war in the maritime crossroads of Southeast Asia. Captain Charles W. Koburger, Jr. examines the specific naval organization, equipment, and skills demanded by coastal and riverine warfare, focusing on the unique French-developed naval infantry assault divisions called, in a convenient French acronym, dinassauts. The French development of such river assault groups, their successful performance, whether on coastal patrol, river patrol, or river assault--and a review of some of their tactics, techniques, and battles, compose the bulk of the book. The authoritative text is complemented by maps of the area, photographs of naval craft used in the campaigns, and tables pertaining to battles and military organization. Appendixes survey Indochinese geography and weather as well as ships and craft.

Early chapters narrate the historical situation in French Indochina in August and September 1945, emphasizing the naval picture. The heart of the book, covering the periods 1946-50, 1951, and 1952, holds the story of the dinassauts' early development and their later expanded operations as well as the naval strategies employed. The final chapters trace the last years of the French in Indochina, describing the culmination of dinassaut organization and highlighting their last operations necessitated by the communist victory in China, and made possible by U.S. aid. The French Navy in Indochina addresses historians, naval officers, diplomats, government officials, and war gamers, but informed general readers will find it an entertaining and useful read as well.

A ground-breaking study of how literature both reflected and contributed to the eclipse and subsequent revival of militarism in the nineteenth century. Focusing on four major disputes in the Crimea, India, the Sudan, and South Africa as well as the role of the army in Britain, John Peck examines how Victorian writers responded to military issues. At the heart of the book is a dilemma that characterises the Victorian period: the impossibility of reconciling imperial aggression with liberal domestic values.

Highly readable political and military account of the war that devastated both Paraguay and Bolivia. Based exclusively on published sources, emphasizes Bolivian actions more than those of Paraguay"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 58.

The leader of an empire invades Iraq. He has inadequate intelligence and underestimates the resistance of the locals, but he believes his overwhelming military strength will bring him a swift victory. His army overruns the area between the Tigris and the Euphrates, but as soon as he occupies the area a massive insurgency arises, made up of various ethnic and religious groups. What began as a simple conquest for dominance bogs down in deadly fighting as the once-victorious commander-in-chief now desperately searches for an exit strategy.... This scenario could be any number of Roman campaigns, not to mention America in 2003 CE. Both ancient and modern attempts to invade Iraq have been plagued with the same problems. These problems have been caused by lack of adequate intelligence gathering, both strategic and tactical, and have resulted in long drawn out wars that have been costly in both money and manpower. Ultimately, they led to little political or military gain. Could more have been accomplished through diplomacy rather than brute force? This book details Rome's military encounters with Parthia from the bumbling campaign of Crassus to the fall of the Parthian regime. America's recent war in Iraq has shown that invading Mesopotamia without proper intelligence is a bad idea, but it is not a new idea. Time after time the Romans stormed into the area between the Tigris and Euphrates thinking 'shock and awe' was all they needed to prevail. What they discovered was that it takes more than just overrunning an empire to defeat it. *** "Of particular value is Sheldon's analysis of the consequences of the frequent conflicts on the political, economic, and military health of both empires, noting that periods in which diplomatic solutions were employed generally proved more beneficial than any of the wars. Rome's Wars in Parthia is an important read for anyone interested in ancient military history, and one that can be enjoyed by the interested layman as well." - New York Military Affairs Symposium (NYMAS), March 3, 2013

Making use of newly-researched archival materials, this collection of original essays on wartime and post-war US foreign policy re-evaluates well-known crises and documents many less familiar aspects of the nation's mid-twentieth century conflicts. Leading diplomatic historians address familiar subjects from new angles. They offer new evidence about the risks run and the costs incurred in the prosecution of the Cold War, from Korea to the Caribbean. And they provide an up-to-date accounting of mid-twentieth century American diplomacy's global purposes and consequences.

In this book Robert E. Harkavy analyses the modern status and the associated diplomacy of basing access, against the background of past political, military, and technological relationships. He provides a comprehensive description of the major powers' global basing networks, including their types, their locations, and the politics and economics of their acquisition. Professor Harkavy also gives details of the facilities the bases make available - naval, air, ground, missile, intelligence, communications, research and testing, environmental monitoring, and space-related - and provides a wealth of tables and maps depicting US and Soviet global networks. He analyses the roles of these bases for the USA, the USSR and other major powers, and discusses emerging political and technological developments which may alter basing diplomacy: the diffusion of power away from the superpowers, the increasing leverage of the smaller countries that host bases, the strengthened role of satellites in comparison with facilities on land and the possible impact of space defences on basing requirements. The crucial link between arms transfers and the politics of basing is emphasized, and the final section is devoted to the politics and economics of foreign military presence.

By examining Mauritius and the Indian Ocean, this synthesis of imperial and naval/military history reveals the depths of colonial involvement in the Second World War and the role of colonies in British strategic planning from the 18th century. In the century of total war, the British Empire was fully mobilized. The author looks at how the Mauritian home front became regimented, troops were recruited for service overseas, the Eastern fleet guarded the Indian Ocean, and Mauritius became a base for SOE operations and intelligence-gathering for Bletchley.

The advent of the twenty-first century was marked by a succession of conflicts and catastrophes that demanded unrestrained journalism. Yet, the principle mass news medium of television has become torn between strategies of containment and the amplification of security threats. Hoskins and O'Loughlin demonstrate that television, tarnished by its economy of liveness and its default impositions of immediacy, brevity and simultaneity, fails to deliver a critical and consistent exposition adequate to our conflicting times.

The Challenges of High Command explores British ideas of command and control of military operations and looks at the practicalities of British experience in World War I and II. The contributors cast new light on themes as diverse as the trench warfare of World War I, the conduct of the Gallipoli and Norway campaigns, and the command performance of Bomber Harris and Bill Slim. The book concludes with a major review of how military operations should be conducted in the new political and technological conditions of today and includes an informal and frank commentary by General Sir Mike Jackson on his experience in Bosnia and Kosovo.

This book examines the contribution of the military to the exploration, settlement, development, and defense of Alaska. The work covers the period of time from its purchase from Russia in 1867 to the present. During that time Alaska emerged from an obscure colonial dependency to a resource-rich state. This same period confirmed its strategic significance in hemispheric and continental defense, first during the second world war, when Japanese forces occupied the Aleutian Islands, and then during the cold war confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. While in some ways analagous to the western experience generally, the duties of the military on the Alaska frontier were unique. Geography, climate, and unprecendented responsibilities of governance and law enforcement imposed many new challenges. In recent years Alaska and the Arctic have acquired military significance for both the United States and Russia. This fascinating study is in inquiry into the historical evidence and the major themes, events, and personalities that have shaped the development of our forty-ninth state. It offers original research in archival and manuscript sources, and provides a useful synthesis of the published documentary record, and brings together in a comprehensive bibliography resources that are available for those who wish to pursue specific areas of interest. The broad scope, both interpretive and narrative, of this important work will make it an indispensable aid to students and scholars of the western historical experience, American military history, and world history.

This book uses history in two ways: as the source of ideas about strategy and as examples to illustrate the elements by showing their application to specific campaigns and their utility in understanding the role of strategy in military operations. The focus is on American military campaigns from the American Indian Wars to the War in the Gulf. Those case studies are used to illustrate the strategy behind land, sea, and air campaigns. Over a fifth of the book examines the U.S. war against Japan because it furnishes such fine examples of independent and interdependent operations on land, on the sea, and in the air. The cases studied are not only intended to illustrate strategic ideas but also to show the utility of the author's distinctive approach to organizing military strategy. The book will appeal to military professionals, students of military science, and enthusiasts.

Since the Revolutionary War, American military men have published troop newspapers to provide amusement, to keep themselves informed, to aid in maintaining morale, and to encourage those engaged in boring or dangerous pursuits. Beginning as informal ventures, these papers received official sanction as high command began to realize their morale benefits and eventually became an accepted adjunct to the waging of war. Based on a close reading of many soldiers' newspapers, this volume is the first book to provide a historical survey of the U.S. military press from the Revolutionary War to the present. Drawing on the rich detail in the troop newspapers, the book also provides a social record of the attitudes, aspirations, and life of those engaged in war, and considers the increasingly controversial issue of freedom of the press in war time.

Taking a chronological approach, the study opens with a consideration of the Revolutionary War and turns to a consideration of the Mexican War of 1846-1848 in chapter 2. The Civil War papers are covered in chapter 3. Chapter 4 discusses the period from 1865 to 1917, when the military press matured. The next two chapters cover the ground forces papers and the air service papers of World War I. Chapters 7 and 8 are devoted to World War II, and the final chapter covers the period since World War II. This volume should become a standard in journalism history.

Naval forces have not yet received the attention they are due for their role in Operation Desert Shield. This chronological account offers a unique, and as yet, unseen level of detail regarding the Navy's contribution throughout the operation. Relying on primary sources whenever possible, this book discusses naval decisions in terms of information available to decision-makers at the time and presents the pros and cons for alternative courses of action, as argued at the time of the original decision. It details the Navy's role in planning for successful operations, its constant vigil against surprise attack, and its daily contribution to the maritime interception effort to enforce U.N. economic sanctions against Iraq.

Naval forces upheld the sanctions at sea in such a way as to avoid disabling a civilian ship and provided the glue that helped create and maintain the multi-national coalition. The complexity of the situation required the naval forces to adapt their command and control to a highly centralized operation which placed unprecedented demands on the Navy's communications systems. This study provides an insider view of the various plans, even those that were not carried out, and valuable insights into the personalities of the leading officials. Sources include first-hand observations of the events at ComUSNavCent, where the author had access to nearly all events and decisions; hundreds of thousands of messages and other briefing materials; the post-war analysis done by the Center for Naval Analyses; and interviews with almost all of the key players.

Having evolved over the past two and a quarter centuries to become the premier military force in the world, the U.S. Army has a heritage rich in history and tradition. This historical dictionary provides short, clear, authoritative entries on a broad cross section of military terms, concepts, arms and equipment, units and organizations, campaigns and battles, and people who have had a significant impact on Army. It includes over 900 entries written by some 100 scholars, providing a valuable resource for the interested reader, student, and researcher.

For those interested in pursuing specific subjects further, the book provides sources at the end of each entry as well as a general bibliography. Appendixes provide a useful list of abbreviations and acronyms and a listing of ranks and grades in the U.S. Army.

The history of United Nations peacekeeping is largely one of failure. This book puts a case for augmenting "ad hoc" peacekeepers with competent contract labour; and within the constraints of a new legal regime, supporting future operations with well-trained contractors who might subdue by force those who inflict gross human rights abuses on others.

Every American should read this book in order to gain a clear insight about military combat and war. From the foreword by Ross Perot Recommended for readers who enjoy suspenseful accounts of close combat. Publishers Weekly Most Americans remember...the two troubling televised images that follwed [the operation]....But there is more about that day that is told in this book and that should be known by Americans. The Wall Street Journal Among America's clearest memories of ongoing conflict in Somalia will certainly be the swollen, bloodied face of helicopter pilot Michael Durant, displayed on the international television news reports after his capture in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993. While the failed mission leading to Durant's imprisonment captured the rage and anguish of the world, few Americans truly understood how many U.S. Army Ranger compatriots shared Durant's fortitude and courage there. Indeed, Durant was only one member of the elite Task Force Ranger Regiment deployed to apprehend Mohammed Farrah Aidid, Somailia's most powerful warlord on the fateful October day. Here is the little-known story of the 15 fierce, deadly hours of fighting that followed the Americans tightly calibrated attempt to target Aidid. Moment by moment, Mogahishu! recounts how this mission, intended to deflate the heart of Somali resistance, became instead a tragic showcase for the heroism and breathtaking self-sacrifice of the American servicement--and the catalyst of U.S. withdrawal of peacekeeping troops. Mogadishu! reveals while the operation produced on the most decorated military units in American history, it cost 18 of America's best-trained servicemen their lives. Using rare testimony from other military personnel, Kent DeLong offers the first complete account of how these Americans died, not for glory but for each other, far from their loved ones in a God-forsaken place called Mogadishu.

This book analyzes the strategic implications of the shift in focus for the US Armed Forces from regular to irregular war.
Lawrence Freedman closely examines the difficulty the US Armed Forces face in shifting their focus from preparing for regular wars, in which combat is separated from civil society, to irregular wars, in which combat is integrated with civil society. He argues that the political context of contemporary irregular wars requires that the purpose and practice of western forces be governed by liberal values, showing that this is also the case with regular wars, to the extent they occur, but it is the integration with civil society that makes the application of liberal values so challenging.
"The Transformation of Strategic Affairs" suggests that this challenge becomes easier to meet when military operations are understood to contribute to the development of a compelling narrative about the likely course and consequence of a conflict, in which these values are shown to be respected. At the same time, however, while it is vital that the employment of armed force remains sensitive at all times to the underlying political context, and sensitive to the role of narratives in shaping this context, the book shows that a key test of success will always be the defeat of the opposing forces. The "war on terror" has highlighted these issues, and this "Adelphi Paper" concludes with much-needed suggestions for a strategic response.
This book will be of great interest to students of the US Armed Forces, politics, strategic studies and military history.

In this collection scholars, policymakers, and military officials explore the conditions that gave rise to the Balkan wars in the 1990s, the application of international law to the wars, the conduct of the wars, and post-war issues. The essays are based on presentations given at the International Conference on the Balkans held at Florida Atlantic University in February 2002. The contributors come from varied backgrounds, including international law, genocide studies, peacekeeping, European politics, communications, history, and military studies.

The second of a series, this study analyzes the historical relationships between the provision of military assistance and success in achieving Soviet aims during the Cold War. Mott looks at Soviet donor-recipient relationships across seventeen case studies to identify the generalities or regularities that relate the classical wartime relationship to achievement of donor Cold War aims. He refines the four critical features of the wartime donor-recipient relationship--convergence of donor and recipient aims, donor control, commitment of donor military forces, and coherence of donor policies and strategies--to reflect the unique political economic constraints of the Cold War. Findings challenge orthodox separation of politics, history, military science, and economics, and refute the common wisdom that economic aid is a more effective policy instrument than military assistance.

Mott contends that both successes and failures of Cold War Soviet military assistance were predictable, explicit consequences of donor policies and strategies and of convergence of donor and recipient aims. This book presents a pattern for both policy development and theoretical analysis in which military assistance is a viable, robust policy option and bilateral relationship with a clear set of requirements, features, processes, and predictable results. Its primary methodology is the search for uniformities across historical observations through low-level, ordinary, multivariate regressions. Each chapter focuses on Soviet military assistance in a region and refines the relevant features of the observed relationships into a tentative pattern for comparison with other regions.

The astonishing true story of how the CIA, MI6 and a Soviet defector saved the world in 1962, as told in the new film, The Courier, starring Benedict Cumberbatch. In August 1960, a Soviet colonel called Oleg Penkovsky tried to make contact with the West. His first attempt was to approach two young American students in Moscow. He handed them a bulky envelope and pleaded with them to deliver it to the American embassy. MI6 and the CIA came to believe Penkovsky was genuine and so the two agencies decided to run the operation jointly. It ran right through the Berlin crisis - in an astonishing near-miss, Penkovsky learned that the Wall was going to be built four days before it happened but was unable to contact his handlers - and the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which rocket manuals Penkovsky had handed over were crucial in determining what President Khrushchev was doing, and helped President John F. Kennedy and his team end the crisis and avert a nuclear war. Penkovsky, codenamed HERO, is widely seen as the most important spy of the Cold War, and the CIA-MI6 joint operation to run him has never been bettered. But had the KGB already 'turned' Penkovsky and were the Russians making sure he saw the information they wanted him to see? If so, it may even have been possible that the whole Cuban Missile Crisis might have been a Russian deception operation. Thrilling, evocative and hugely controversial, Dead Drop blows apart some of the myths about one of the Cold War's most well-known operations as the world stood on the brink of nuclear destruction.