Many aspects of the Tet offensive of 1968 are brought to light here. The offensive is acknowledged as the turning point of the Vietnam War. Using Communist Vietnamese documents combined with Western sources, the author provides a more accurate version of the events, their significance, and reveals the crucial role played by US intelligence. This book illustrates that in the 1960s the Communist Vietnamese were well aware of the political and diplomatic nature of a People's War.

Civilians in Gaza and Israel are caught up in complex, violent situations that have overstepped conventional battle lines. Both sides of the conflict have found ways to legitimate the use of violence, and continually swap accusations of violations of domestic and international humanitarian laws. Israel's Military Operations in Gaza provides an ideological critique of the legal, military, and social media texts that have been used to legitimate historical incursions into the Gaza, with special focus on Operation Protective Edge. It argues that both the Palestinians and the Israelis have deployed various forms of 'telegenic' warfare. They have each used argumentative rhetorics based on competing interpretations of events, and are locked in a battle to convince international audiences and domestic constituencies of the righteousness of their causes. This critical genealogical study analyses a range of texts and images, from selfies circulated near the Gaza border to judicial opinions produced by the High Court of Israel. With its multidisciplinary approach and original analysis of the Israel/Gaza situation, this book will be of interest to students and scholars of Middle East studies and the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as security studies and communication studies.

Over the last decade (and indeed ever since the Cold War), the rise of insurgents and non-state actors in war, and their readiness to use terror and other irregular methods of fighting, have led commentators to speak of 'new wars'. They have assumed that the 'old wars' were waged solely between states, and were accordingly fought between comparable and 'symmetrical' armed forces. Much of this commentary has lacked context or sophistication. It has been bounded by norms and theories more than the messiness of reality. Fed by the impact of the 9/11 attacks, it has privileged some wars and certain trends over others. Most obviously it has been historically unaware. But it has also failed to consider many of the other dimensions which help us to define what war is--legal, ethical, religious, and social.
The Changing Character of War, the fruit of a five-year interdisciplinary program at Oxford Univeresity of the same name, draws together all these themes, in order to distinguish between what is really changing about war and what only seems to be changing. Self-evidently, as the product of its own times, the character of each war is always changing. But if war's character is in flux, its underlying nature contains its own internal consistency. Each war is an adversarial business, capable of generating its own dynamic, and therefore of spiralling in directions that are never totally predictable. War is both utilitarian, the tool of policy, and dysfunctional. This book brings together scholars with world-wide reputations, drawn from a clutch of different disciplines, but united by a common intellectual goal: that of understanding a problem of extraordinary importance for our times.
This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Program on the Changing Character of War.

From the beginning of the twentieth century through 1941, Latin America was involved in a number of conflicts and revolutions, many of which escalated into what could truly be called wars. Border disputes and domestic insurrections shaped the history of this area as many countries made the rocky transition from agrarian to industrial societies. Beginning with the War of the Thousand Days, this volume provides a concise survey of Latin American wars between 1899 and 1941. It compares and contrasts the wars and considers them in light of military theory. It also demonstrates how instrumental wars have been in directing the history of Latin America. Only major conflicts between two distinct parties (with one numbering at least a thousand people) and involving sustained combat with significant deployment of troops and an eventual victor have been included. Wars addressed include border disputes in Peru, Bolivia, Panama and Costa Rica, and domestic revolutions in Colombia, Cuba, Mexico and Nicaragua. The effect of U.S. influence and industrialization is also discussed. Numerous photographs and maps are also included.

The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice is an original contribution to the general theory of strategy. While heavily indebted to Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and the very few other classic authors, this book presents the theory, rather than merely comments on the theory as developed by others. The author explains that the purpose of strategy is to connect purposefully politics and policy with the instruments they must use. The primary focus of attention is on military strategy, but this focus is well nested in discussion of grand strategy, for which military strategy is only one strand. The book presents the general theory of strategy comprehensively and explains the utility of this general theory for the particular strategies that strategists need to develop in order to meet their historically unique challenges. The book argues that strategy's general theory provides essential education for practicing strategists at all times and in all circumstances. As general theory, The Strategy Bridge is as relevant to understanding strategic behaviour in the Peloponnesian War as it is for the conflicts of the twenty-first century. The book proceeds from exposition of general strategic theory, to address three basic issue areas that are not at all well explained, let alone understood with a view to advancing better practice, in the extant literature. Specifically, the book tackles the problems that harass and imperil strategic performance; it probes deeply into the hugely underexamined subject of just what it is that the strategist produces-strategic effect; and it 'joins up the dots' from theory through practice to consequences by means of a close examination of command performance. The author takes a holistic view of strategy, and it is rigorously attentive to the significance of the contexts within which and for which strategies are developed and applied. The book regards the strategist as a hero, charged with the feasible, but awesomely difficult, task of converting the threat and use of force (for military strategy) into desired political consequences. He seeks some control over the rival or enemy via strategic effect, the instrumental produce of his instrumental labours. In order to maximise his prospects for success, the practicing strategist requires all the educational assistance that strategic theory can provide.

In 1927, Chiang Kai-shek - the head of China's military academy and leader of the Kuomintang (KMT) - began the `northern expeditions' to bring China's northern territories back under the control of the state. It was during this period that the KMT purged communist activities, fractured the army and sparked the Chinese Civil War - which would rage for over twenty years. The communists, led by General Mao Tse-Tsung, were for much of the period forced underground and concentrated in the Chinese countryside. As the author argues, this resulted in China's war featuring unusually high levels of espionage and sabotage, and increased the military importance of information gathering. Based on newly declassified material, Panagiotis Dimitrakis charts the double-crossings, secret meetings and bloody assassinations which would come to define China's future. Uniquely, The Secret War for China gives equal weighting to the role of foreign actors: the role of British intelligence in unmasking Communist International (Comintern) agents in China, for example, and the allies' attempts to turn nationalist China against the Japanese. The Secret War for China also documents the clandestine confrontation between Mao and Chiang and the secret negotiations between Chiang and the Axis Powers, whose forces he employed against the CCP once the Second World War was over. In his turn, Mao employed nationalist forces who had defected - during the last three years of the civil war about 105 out of 869 KMT generals defected to the CCP. This book is an urgent and necessary guide to the intricacies of the Chinese Civil War, a war which decisively shaped the modern Asian world.

At the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775, the colonies faced the daunting task of creating the first American army, and its requisite leadership, capable of combating a global superpower whose standing army and generalship were among the finest in the world. Built largely from state and local militias, the colonial army performed surprisingly well and produced a number of fine generals. Some were experienced before the war, like George Washington of the Virginia Militia and the British-born Horatio Gates, while others were as green as the soldiers they led. This book presents basic biographical information about America's first generals in the Revolutionary War. Included are all generals of the Continental Army, along with those commissioned in the colonies' militias. Drawn from primary sources, including death and census records, records of the Continental Congress, and contemporary writings, each biographical sketch provides date and place of birth, prewar education and occupation, wartime service, date and place of death, and place of burial. Portraits of each general are included where available, and appendices display important statistics, including comparative ages; occupations; officers lost by death, resignation, murder or changing loyalty; and states or countries of origin.

The epic story of a man born into Caribbean slavery, who defeated Napoleon's armies and crowned himself a free black king. How did a man born enslaved on a plantation triumph over Napoleon's invading troops and become king of the first free black nation in the Americas? This is the forgotten, remarkable story of Henry Christophe. Christophe fought as a child soldier in the American War of Independence, before serving in the Haitian Revolution as one of Toussaint Louverture's top generals. Following Haitian independence, Christophe crowned himself King Henry I. His attempts to build a modern black state won the support of leading British abolitionists-but his ambition helped to plunge his country into civil war. Christophe saw himself as an Enlightenment ruler, and his kingdom produced great literary works, epic fortresses and opulent palaces. He was a proud anti-imperialist and fought off French plots against him. Yet the Haitian people chafed under his authoritarian rule. Today, all that remains is Christophe's mountaintop Citadelle, Haiti's sole World Heritage site-a monument to a revolutionary black monarchy, in a world of empire and slavery.

* Covers the equipment, operations, and individual security and combat skills essential for soldiers and others who must act as infantry * Extensively updated to include both the latest doctrine and lessons learned from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq * Essential for Army infantry NCOs and officers at the platoon and company level, Special Forces A-teams, Air Force and Navy Special Operations, Marines, and any other element that operates as infantry" A guide to the basic skills all soldiers, sailors, and Marines must know to prevail in small-unit dismounted combat operations, including planning, battle drills for offense and defense operations, patrols, construction and emplacement of fighting positions, use of weapons and call for fire, land navigation and map reading, communications, close quarter battle, and tactical combat casualty care.

This new edition of Frank Ledwidge's eye-opening analysis of British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan unpicks the causes and enormous costs of military failure. Updated throughout, and with fresh chapters assessing and enumerating the overall military performance since 2011-including Libya, ISIS, and the Chilcot findings-Ledwidge shows how lessons continue to go unlearned. "A brave and important book; essential reading for anyone wanting insights into the dysfunction within the British military today, and the consequences this has on the lives of innocent civilians caught up in war."-Times Literary Supplement

Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011, ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In "Spec Ops, "a well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven analyzes eight classic special operations. Six are from WWII: the German commando raid on the Belgian fort Eben Emael (1940); the Italian torpedo attack on the Alexandria harbor (1941); the British commando raid on Nazaire, France (1942); the German glider rescue of Benito Mussolini (1943); the British midget-submarine attack on the Tirpitz (1943); and the U.S. Ranger rescue mission at the Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines (1945). The two post-WWII examples are the U.S. Army raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam (1970) and the Israeli rescue of the skyjacked hostages in Entebbe, Uganda (1976). McRaven--who commands a U.S. Navy SEAL team--pinpoints six essential principles of "spec ops" success: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. For each of the case studies, he provides political and military context, a meticulous reconstruction of the mission itself and an analysis of the operation in relation to his six principles. McRaven deems the Son Tay raid "the best modern example of a successful spec op which] should be considered textbook material for future missions." His own book is an instructive textbook that will be closely studied by students of the military arts. Maps, photos.

This work argues that logistics in warfare is crucial to achieving strategic success. The author identifies logistical capabilities as an arbiter of opportunity, which plays a critical role in determining which side will hold the strategic iniative in war. Armies which have secured reliable resources of supply have a great advantage in determining the time and manner in which engagements take place. Often, they can fight in ways their opponents cannot. The author illustrates this point with case studies of British logistics during the Burma campaign in the World War II, American logistical innovations during the Pacific War, Communist supply methods during the American phase of the Vietnam War and the competing logistical systems of both NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces during the Cold War.

With the end of the Second World War a new world order arose based on the prohibition of military force in international relations, and yet since 1945 British troops have been regularly deployed around the globe: most notably to Korea, Suez, Cyprus, and the Falklands during the Cold War; and Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq since the fall of the Berlin Wall. British forces have been involved in many different capacities: as military observers, peacekeepers, peace-enforcers, state-builders and war-fighters. The decisions to deploy forces are political ones made within several constitutional frameworks, national, regional and international. After considering the various legal and institutional regimes, this book examines the decision to deploy troops from the perspective of international law.
In its military interventions Britain has consistently tried to utilize international law to justify its actions, though often it argues against orthodox interpretation of the laws. In gauging whether its actions are in breach of international law we can again make judgments at different levels using various forms of accountability - from judicial fora (for example the International Court of Justice in The Hague or the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg), to political ones (the UN General Assembly in New York or the House of Commons in Westminster). While this book examines international and regional mechanisms, tumultuous debates on the Suez crisis, Afghanistan, Iraq and others in the House of Commons and its Committees are highlighted to show how international law impacts upon domestic politics. In considering whether democratic accountability is effective in upholding the principles of international law, this book throws new light on an old democracy, and thereby makes a contribution to the current reform proposals that are aimed at improving democratic decision-making.

The Normans who originally came to Italy and Sicily in the 11th and 12th centuries were looking for adventure or a livelihood, but only saw and took chances to gain fame and fortune. The story of the Norman conquest in Italy and Sicily is indeed one of knights and adventurers, great battles and lowly pillage, opportunism and statesmanship, and crusade and coexistence. This rich and often dramatic study focuses on the eight sons of Tancred of Hauteville, especially Robert Guiscard, who has been called ""the most dazzling military ruler between Julius Caesar and Napoleon,"" and his youngest brother Roger, who conquered Sicily, and discusses how they expanded their lands throughout southern Italy and then took Sicily from its Muslim rulers. The brothers, often in conflict with each other, challenged both the Papacy and the Byzantine Empire, became the main supporters of the reformed Papacy, and founded a rich, sophisticated kingdom that lasted until the nineteenth century.

Iran's Revolutionary Guards are one of the most important forces in the Middle East today. As the appointed defender of Iran's revolution, the Guards have evolved into a pillar of the Islamic Republic and the spearhead of its influence. Their sway has spread across the Middle East, where the Guards have overseen loyalist support to Bashar al-Assad in Syria and been a staunch backer in Iraq's war against ISIS-bringing its own troops, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and Shiite militias to the fight. Links to terrorism, human rights abuses, and the suppression of popular democracy have shrouded the Revolutionary Guards in controversy. In spite of their prominence, the Guards remain poorly understood to outside observers. In Vanguard of the Imam, Afshon Ostovar has written the first comprehensive history of the organization. Situating the rise of the Guards in the larger contexts of Shiite Islam, modern Iranian history, and international affairs, Ostovar takes a multifaceted approach in demystifying the organization and detailing its evolution since 1979. Politics, power, and religion collide in this story, wherein the Revolutionary Guards transform from a rag-tag militia established in the midst of revolutionary upheaval into a military and covert force with a global reach. The Guards have been fundamental to the success of the Islamic revolution. The symbiotic relationship between them and Iran's clerical rulers underpins the regime's nearly unshakeable system of power. The Guards have used their privileged position at home to export Iran's revolution beyond its borders, establishing client armies in their image and extending Iran's strategic footprint in the process. Ostovar tenaciously documents the Guards' transformation into a power-player and explores why the group matters now more than ever to regional and global affairs. The book simultaneously serves as a history of modern Iran, and provides a crucial and engrossing entryway into the complex world of war, politics, and identity in the Middle East.

Approximately one-fifth of the earth's surface consists of desert, and throughout history these arid regions have witnessed some of the world's most decisive battles. Here, Bryan Perrett gives an absorbing account of desert conflicts from the first century BC to more contemporary conflicts such as those in Iran and Iraq. As he demonstrates, acclimatization and familiarization with the day-to-day problems of desert life are vital not only to teach troops how to protect themselves and their equipment, but also to bring them to terms with the harsh environment. The desert does not compromise, and battles fought there result in total victory or total defeat, often at horrific cost. Initially released in 1988 by Patrick Stephens Limited, this re-issue marks a determination on the author's and the publisher's part to keep an esteemed publication in print.

Since 2008 increasing pirate activities in Somalia, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean have once again drawn the international community's attention to piracy and armed robbery at sea. States are resolved to repress these impediments to the free flow of trade and navigation. To this end a number of multinational counter-piracy missions have been deployed to the region.
This book describes the enforcement powers that States may rely upon in their quest to repress piracy in the larger Gulf of Aden region. The piracy rules of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the legal safeguards applicable to maritime interception operations are scrutinized before the analysis turns to the criminal prosecution of pirates and armed robbers at sea. The discussion includes so-called shiprider agreements, the transfers of alleged offenders to regional states, the jurisdictional bases for prosecuting pirates, and the feasibility of an internationalized venue for their trial. In addressing a range of relevant issues, this book presents a detailed and comprehensive up-to-date analysis of the legal issues pertaining to the repression of piracy and armed robbery at sea and assesses whether the currently existing legal regime is still adequate to effectively counter piracy in the 21st century.

Why did Napoleon succeed in 1805 but fail in 1812? Could the European half of World War II have been ended in 1944? These are only two of the many questions that form the subject-matter of this meticulously researched, lively book. Drawing on a very wide range of sources, van Creveld examines the specifics of war: namely, those formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration, so often mentioned - but rarely explored - by the vast majority of books on military history. In doing so he casts his net far and wide, from Gustavus Adolphus to Rommel, from Marlborough to Patton, subjecting the operations of each to a thorough analysis from an unusual point of view. In this edition with a new introduction, van Creveld revisits his now-classic text, and comments in a new afterword on the role of logistics in high-tech, modern warfare.

In North Africa, on the beaches at Normandy, and in the Battle of the Bulge, Dwight David Eisenhower proved himself as one of the world's greatest leaders, skilful both as a diplomat and a military strategist. In his new book, first published by Doubleday in 1970, Ambrose, who was associate editor of the general's official papers, analyses his subject's decisions. Throughout Supreme Commander he traces the steady development of Eisenhower's generalcy, from its dramatic beginnings through to his time at the top post of Allied command. About the Author Stephen E. Ambrose wrote twenty books on military affairs and foreign policy. Early in his career he was an associate editor of The Eisenhower Papers, and he later went on to publish the definitive, three-part biography of Eisenhower, as well as many bestselling books of military history, including Band of Brothers and Undaunted Courage. He died in 2002.

After Italy's surrender to the Allies in September 1943, German naval forces took control of the entire Aegean, and the resulting guerrilla war in the narrow seas and littoral waters would continue to rage until the general peace. Naval warfare in the narrow seas is different from naval actions on the high seas, requiring different types of ships and craft and different mindsets. In the cramped and narrow inshore waters, which can easily be dominated from the shore, sea mines, shore-based air support, and small submarines play a major role. An analysis of the battle for the Aegean provides a good example of the types of fighting the U.S. Navy might face in a future conflict, now that "grande guerre" on the high seas has become more and more unlikely.

In attempt to assist an embattled Greece, the British Mediterranean Fleet fought the Italians and the Germans in a valiant effort to hold the Aegean. By the time Italy left the war in 1943, the Allies' big battalions and mighty fleets were being transferred to other more pressing campaigns, leaving behind the remaining small craft to take up the fight. Adopting a policy of pinning down those Germans garrisoning the Aegean, the British resorted to the use of raiding and coastal forces, a tactic which would eventually force the Germans from all but their most key positions.

In early 1965, the United States had about 23,000 troops in South Vietnam. Through that date, 140 Americans had been killed in action, 1,138 had been wounded and 11 were listed as missing. On March 8, American combat troops (Battalion Landing Team 3, Ninth Marines of the 3d Marine Division) came ashore at 9:02 a.m. on Red Beach 2: by June 1, 1965, 50,000 troops were stationed in the country. The escalation had begun. This is a chronological listing of over 600 Army and marine combat operations from 1965 through 1973. Each entry includes the dates, name, location, type of action, units involved, events (individual activities within the area of operations), casualties, and resulting political or military activity. Information was derived in part from official documents. Interspersed chronologically are brief summaries of significant events that affected the conduct of the war, such as major developments, ceasefires, political observations, and troop strength.

Chris Hughes, the "Daily Mirror's" defence correspondent, was the first western reporter into Iraq after 9/11, the first into Saddam's secret bunker and the only one to visit Osama bin Laden's mountain lair. He was also the only western journalist present when American Marines killed and wounded unarmed demonstrators in Fallujah, sparking the savage insurgency. He's survived carjackings and missile attacks, watched mothers weep over the skeletons of sons dragged from mass graves and joined mercenaries flying crates of guns out of Baghdad. Hughes has been to every major troublespot in Iraq in a dozen visits, mixing with the SAS, British mercenaries and ordinary Iraqis; in "Road Trip To Hell", he tells their stories with wit and irreverence in a very readable style. He admits he's no expert on the Middle East - 'I wanted to call this book "Clueless in Gaza",' he writes, 'but George W Bush rarely invades places with potential for witty literary allusion' - but he has a fine eye for detail and black humour and gives a unique insight into a terrible, crazy war.

The threat of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler's surprise invasion of Russia in June 1941, succeeding prompted Churchill to decide to send vital military supplies to Britain's new ally. The early sailings to Northern Russia via the Arctic Ocean between August 1941 and February 1942 were largely unopposed. But this changed dramatically during the course of 1942 when German naval and air operations inflicted heavy losses on both merchantmen and their escorts. Problems were exacerbated by the need to divert Royal Navy warships to support the North African landing. Strained Anglo-Soviet relations coupled with mounting losses and atrocious weather and sea conditions led to the near termination of the programme in early 1943. Again, competing operational priorities, namely the invasion of Sicily and preparations for D-Day, affected the convoy schedules. In the event, despite often crippling losses of lives, ships and supplies, the convoys continued until shortly before VE-Day. This thoroughly researched and comprehensive account examines both the political, maritime and logistic aspects of the Arctic convoy campaign. Controversially it reveals that the losses of merchant vessels were significantly greater than hitherto understood. While Churchill may not have described the convoys as the worst journey in the world', for the brave men who undertook he mission often at the cost of their lives, it most definitely was.

Is war an institution of international society and how is it constituted as such across the evolution of international society? This book is an inquiry into the purpose of war as a social institution, as originally put forward by Hedley Bull. It offers a comprehensive examination of what is entailed in thinking of war as a social institution and as a mechanism for order. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the subject of war has become increasingly relevant, with questions about who can wage war against whom, the way war is fought, and the reasons that lead us to war exposing fundamental inadequacies in our theorisation of war. War has long been considered in the discipline of International Relations in the context of the problem of order. However, the inclusion of war as an 'institution' is problematic for many. How can we understand an idea and practice so often associated with coercion, destruction, and disorder as contributing to order and coexistence? This study contends that an understanding of the core elements that establish the character of war as an institution of modern international society will give us important insights into the purpose, if any, of war in contemporary international relations. This ground-breaking book will be of strong interest to students and scholars of international relations, international relations theory, the English school, security studies and warfare.