This work by Sir James Outram (1803 63), subtitled A Commentary and originally published in two parts in 1846, is an attempt by the author to vindicate his reputation which, he believes, was sullied by Sir William Napier's book The Conquest of Scinde (1845; also reissued in this series), in which he is represented as devoid alike of military and diplomatic skill. (William Napier was the brother of Sir Charles Napier, the British Commander-in-Chief in India, and his account is not unbiased.) In Part 1, Outram declares his intention to expose these misrepresentations and to vindicate a reputation which for a quarter of a century he had 'maintained unimpeached'. He claims to corroborate his version of events using personal correspondence, describing in detail and in the first person the political and diplomatic intrigues and the military actions which led to the conquest of the Province of Sindh by the British.

Hybrid warfare has been an integral part of the historical landscape since the ancient world, but only recently have analysts - incorrectly - categorised these conflicts as unique. Great powers throughout history have confronted opponents who used a combination of regular and irregular forces to negate the advantage of the great powers' superior conventional military strength. As this study shows, hybrid wars are labour-intensive and long-term affairs; they are difficult struggles that defy the domestic logic of opinion polls and election cycles. Hybrid wars are also the most likely conflicts of the twenty-first century, as competitors use hybrid forces to wear down America's military capabilities in extended campaigns of exhaustion. Nine historical examples of hybrid warfare, from ancient Rome to the modern world, provide readers with context by clarifying the various aspects of conflicts and examining how great powers have dealt with them in the past.

After recounting his early days as a naval cadet, including a voyage to the Far East aboard the cruiser _K ln_, and as the navigator/observer of the floatplane carried by the pocket battleship _Admiral Scheer_ during the Spanish Civil War, the author describes his flying training as a Stuka pilot. The author's naval dive-bomber Gruppe was incorporated into the Luftwaffe upon the outbreak of war. What follows is a fascinating Stuka pilot's-eye-view of some of the most famous and historic battles and campaigns of the early war years: the Blitzkrieg in France, the Dunkirk Evacuation, the Battle of Britain, the bombing of Malta, North Africa, Tobruk, Crete and, finally, the invasion of the Soviet Union. The author also takes the reader behind the scenes into the day-to-day life of his unit and brings the members of his Gruppe to vivid life; describing their off-duty antics and mourning their loss in action. The story ends when he himself is shot down in flames by a Soviet fighter and severely burned. He was to spend the remainder of the war in various staff appointments.

The Cambridge Geographical Series originated in the late nineteenth century as a means of providing introductory guides to a broad variety of topics. In this volume, which was first published in 1899, the focus is on theories and principles in military geography as they existed at the time of publication. The text is consummately researched, containing a wealth of examples from various conflicts together with numerous illustrative figures. It is also highly readable, being primarily aimed at the general reader. This is a fascinating document that will be of value to anyone with an interest in military geography, military history, and the complexities surrounding conflict.

Canadians have been celebrated participants in numerous conflicts on foreign soil, but most Canadians arent aware that theyve also had to defend themselves many times at home. From U.S. General Benedict Arnolds covetous attempts to declare Canada the 14th colony during the American Revolution to the German U-boat battles in the Gulf of St. Lawrence in the Second World War, Canada has successfully defended itself against all invaders.

Jennifer Crump brings to life the battles fought by Canadians to ensure the countrys independence, from the almost ludicrous Pork n Beans War to the deadly War of 1812. She reveals the complex American and German plans to invade and conquer Canada, including the nearly 100-page blueprint for invading Canada commissioned by the U.S. government in 1935 a scheme that remains current today

"Thai politics is driven by actors and actions of paradox such as anti-election movements for accountability or independent, partisan organizations. This lucidly written book uncovers the 'military-led civil affairs' that earn the armed forces the omnipotent role in Thai society. It enriches our understanding of the Thai military in both empirical and theoretical ways. Empirically, the book illuminates how the soldiers have been intensively involved in supposedly civic activities ranging from forest land management to poverty reduction. Such long-lasting and extensive involvement means the military could mobilize the organized mass of over 500,000 strong when necessary. Theoretically, readers will learn how an ideological discourse ("threats to national security") has been continuously redefined to serve the military's evolving political and rent-seeking missions from the Cold War era to the twenty-first century. It also traces the persistence and mutation of this highly adaptable organization, the one that knows when to roar and when to camouflage. Still waters run deep; Thai military operations run deeper and wider."--Veerayooth Kanchoochat, Associate Professor of Political Economy, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo "A truly monumental work about Thailand's military from the 1960s until today, this solid study focuses upon the armed forces' internal security role across Thai society, how the military has succeeded in legitimizing itself and boosting its power as a counterinsurgency force, guardian of monarchy and engine of development. The book also valuably looks at the military's establishment of mass organizations beginning during the Cold War and mobilization of royalists since 2006. The book thus illustrates how the military has been able to enhance and sustain its overwhelming influence and is thus a valuable study for anyone wanting to understand key power-brokers in Thailand."-- Dr Paul Chambers, Center of ASEAN Community Studies, Naresuan University, Thailand.

War lay at the heart of life in the classical world, from conflicts between tribes or states to internal or civil wars. Battles were resolved by violent face-to-face encounters: war was a very personal experience. At the same time, warfare and its conduct often had significant and wide-reaching economic, social, or political consequences. The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World offers a critical examination of war and organized violence. The volume's introduction begins with the ancient sources for the writing of war, preceded by broad surveys of warfare in ancient Greece and Rome. Also included herein are chapters analyzing new finds in battlefield archaeology and how the environment affected the ancient practice of war. A second section is comprised of broad narratives of classical societies at war, covering the expanse from classical Greece through to the later Roman Empire. Part III contains thematic discussions that examine closely the nature of battle: what soldiers experienced as they fought; the challenges of conducting war at sea; how the wounded were treated. A final section offers six exemplary case studies, including analyses of the Peloponnesian War, the Second Punic War, and Rome's war with Sasanid Persia. The handbook closes with an epilogue that explores the legacy of classical warfare. Authored by experts in classics, ancient history, and archaeology, this handbook presents a vibrant map of the field of classical warfare studies.

The Wars of the Roses call to mind bloody battles, treachery and deceit, and a cast of characters known to us through fact and fiction: Edward IV, Elizabeth Woodville, Richard III, Warwick the Kingmaker, the Princes in the Tower, Henry Tudor. But the whole era also creates a level of bewilderment among even keen readers. John Ashdown-Hill gets right to the heart of this 'thorny' subject, dispelling the myths and bringing clarity to a topic often shrouded in confusion. Between 1455 and 1487, a series of dynastic wars for the throne of England were fought. These have become known as the Wars of the Roses. But there never was a red rose of Lancaster ... This book sets the record straight on this and many other points, getting behind the traditional mythology and reaching right back into the origins of the conflict to cut an admirably clear path through the thicket.

The first of two ground-breaking, prize-winning volumes on the Waterloo campaign, this book is based upon a detailed analysis of sources old and new in four languages. It highlights the political stresses between the Allies and their resolution, examining the problems of feeding and paying for 250,000 Allied forces assembling in Belgium during the undeclared war', and how a strategy was thrashed out. Hussey investigates the neglected topic of how the slow and discordant Allies beyond the Rhine hampered the plans of Bl cher and Wellington, thus allowing Napoleon to snatch the initiative from them. Napoleon's operational plan is analysed (and Soult's mistakes in executing it) and accounts from both sides help provide a vivid impression of the fighting on the first day, 15 June. The volume ends with the joint battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras the next day.

In August 334 BC, Alexander the Great invaded the Persian Empire and systematically set about its conquest. At the core of Alexander's army were 10,000 members of the phalanx, the phalangites. Armed with a long pike and fighting in formations up to 16 ranks deep, these grizzled veterans were the mainstay of the Macedonian army.

Facing them were the myriad armies of the peoples that made up the Persian Empire. At the centre of these forces was the formation known as the Immortals: 10,000 elite infantry, armed with spears and bows.

In this study, a noted authority assesses the origins, combat role and battlefield performance of Alexander's phalangites and their Persian opponents in three key battles of the era - the Granicus River, Issus and Gaugamela - at the dawn of a new way of waging war.

This book offers an original combination of cultural and narrative theory with an empirical study of identity and political action. It is at once a powerful critique of rational choice theories of action and a solution to the historiographical puzzle of why Sweden went to war in 1630. Erik Ringmar argues that people act not only for reasons of interest, but also for reasons of identity, and that the latter are, in fact, more fundamental. Deploying his alternative, non-rational theory of action in his account of the Swedish intervention in the Thirty Years War, he shows it to have been an attempt on behalf of the Swedish leaders to gain recognition for themselves and their country. Further to this, he demonstrates the importance of questions of identity to the study of war and of narrative theories of action to the social sciences in general.

The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice is an original contribution to the general theory of strategy. While heavily indebted to Carl von Clausewitz, Sun-tzu, and the very few other classic authors, this book presents the theory, rather than merely comments on the theory as developed by others. The author explains that the purpose of strategy is to connect purposefully politics and policy with the instruments they must use. The primary focus of attention is on military strategy, but this focus is well nested in discussion of grand strategy, for which military strategy is only one strand. The book presents the general theory of strategy comprehensively and explains the utility of this general theory for the particular strategies that strategists need to develop in order to meet their historically unique challenges. The book argues that strategy's general theory provides essential education for practicing strategists at all times and in all circumstances. As general theory, The Strategy Bridge is as relevant to understanding strategic behaviour in the Peloponnesian War as it is for the conflicts of the twenty-first century. The book proceeds from exposition of general strategic theory, to address three basic issue areas that are not at all well explained, let alone understood with a view to advancing better practice, in the extant literature. Specifically, the book tackles the problems that harass and imperil strategic performance; it probes deeply into the hugely underexamined subject of just what it is that the strategist produces-strategic effect; and it 'joins up the dots' from theory through practice to consequences by means of a close examination of command performance. The author takes a holistic view of strategy, and it is rigorously attentive to the significance of the contexts within which and for which strategies are developed and applied. The book regards the strategist as a hero, charged with the feasible, but awesomely difficult, task of converting the threat and use of force (for military strategy) into desired political consequences. He seeks some control over the rival or enemy via strategic effect, the instrumental produce of his instrumental labours. In order to maximise his prospects for success, the practicing strategist requires all the educational assistance that strategic theory can provide.

This book presents an edition of two treatises that examine the legal issues that arose during the Hundred Years War, namely the laws governing the succession to the French crown, English claims to territories within France, and the responsibility for the breeches of various treaties and truces. The first treatise, Pour ce que plusieurs, was written in 1464 by a French diplomat and administrator, Guillaume Cousinot, and is most famous for its part in establishing the myth that the royal succession in France was determined by a otiose law code of the Franks, the Salic Law. The second is an English response to these arguments, A declaracion of the trew and dewe title of Henrie VIII, written during the reign of Henry VIII (1509-1547). The declaracion provides valuable evidence of English reactions to the rhetoric and propaganda generated by the French crown at the end of the middle ages.

Today, even as America asserts itself globally, it lacks a grand strategy to replace "containment of communism." In this short, sharp book, Gary Hart outlines a new grand strategy, one directing America's powers to the achievement of its large purposes. Central to this strategy is the power of American ideals, what Hart calls "the fourth power." Constitutional liberties, representative government, press freedom--these and other democratic principles, attractive to peoples worldwide, constitute a resource that may prove as important to national security and the national interest in this dangerous new century as traditional military, economic and political might.
A bracing vision of an America responsive to a full spectrum of global challenges, The Fourth Power calls for a deeper understanding both of the threats we face and the profound strengths at our disposal to fight them.

This book examines the background to the English military intervention in the Thirty Years War. Blending accounts of diplomacy and factional in-fighting at Court with parliamentary and popular politics, it aims to illuminate the 'revolution' of 1624 when the Palatine crisis forced James I to abandon his long-held dream of an Anglo-Spanish dynastic alliance in favour of a more aggressive policy against the Habsburgs. In studying the English polity in a period of crisis, Professor Cogswell challenges many of the revisionist assumptions about early seventeenth-century England and highlights the dangers in confusing the history of Court faction with the broader political history of the period. In particular, the author stresses the vital importance of Parliament, an institution which in 1624 had no trouble delaying the passage of the subsidy bill until the government redressed a long list of grievances. Indeed, the 'blessed revolution' celebrated the evolution of Parliament into what many contemporaries regarded as its proper role in the state as much as it did the collapse of the longstanding Anglo-Spanish entente.

This two-volume history of counterinsurgency covers all the major and many of the lesser known examples of this widespread and enduring form of conflict, addressing the various measures employed in the attempt to overcome the insurgency and examining the individuals and organizations responsible for everything from counterterrorism to infrastructure building. How and when should counterinsurgency be pursued as insurgency is growing in frequency and, conversely, while conventional warfare continues to decline as a means by which political rivals seek to impose their will upon each other? What lessons from the past should today's policymakers, strategists, military leaders, and soldiers in the field keep in mind while facing off against 21st-century insurgents? This two-volume set offers a comprehensive history of modern counterinsurgency, covering the key examples of this widespread and enduring form of conflict. It identifies the political, military, social, and economic measures employed in attempting to overcome insurgency, examining the work of the individuals and organizations involved, demonstrating how success and failure dictated change from established policy, and carefully analyzing the results. Readers will gain valuable insight from the detailed assessments of the history of counterinsurgency that demonstrate which strategies have succeeded and which have failed-and why. After an introductory essay on the subject, each chapter provides historical background to the insurgency being addressed before focusing on the specific policies pursued and actions taken by the counterinsurgency force. Each section also provides an assessment of those operations, including in most cases an analysis of lessons learned and, where appropriate, their relevance to counterinsurgency operations today. The set's coverage spans modern counterinsurgencies from Europe to Asia to Africa since 1900 and includes the ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan today. Its wide, international approach to the subject makes the set a prime resource for readers seeking specific information on a particular conflict or a better understanding of the general theories and practices of counterinsurgency. Provides an extremely broad coverage of counterinsurgency that spans the period from 1900 to the present day and addresses geographical areas such as Algeria, India, Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan, Malaya, Cyprus, Vietnam, and many other regions and countries Supplies historical and geographical perspectives that enable the reader to examine each chapter as an independent case study and compare and contrast each event with others to draw lessons across time Includes an extensive bibliography that covers all aspects of modern counterinsurgency-based themes, including geographical regions, theory, and tactics

The governance of post-conflict territories embodies a central contradiction: how does one help a population prepare for democratic governance and the rule of law by imposing a form of benevolent autocracy? Transitional administrations represent the most complex operations attempted by the United Nations. The operations in East Timor and Kosovo are commonly seen as unique in the history of the UN - perhaps never to be repeated. But they may also be seen as the latest in a series of operations that have involved the United Nations in 'state-building' activities, where it has attempted to develop the institutions of government by assuming some or all of those sovereign powers on a temporary basis. The circumstances that have demanded such interventions certainly will be repeated. Seen in the context of earlier UN operations, such as those in Namibia, Cambodia, and Eastern Slavonia, the view that these exceptional circumstances may not recur is somewhat disingenuous. Moreover, the need for such policy research has been brought into sharp focus by the weighty but ambiguous role assigned to the UN in Afghanistan and the possibility of a comparable role in Iraq. This book fills that gap. Aimed at policy-makers, diplomats, and a wide academic audience (including international relations, political science, international law, and war studies), the book provides a concise history of UN state-building operations and a treatment of the five key issues confronting such an operation on the ground: peace and security, the role of the UN as government, judicial reconstruction, economic reconstruction, and exit strategies.

The publication of The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road in 1972 marked the birth of the 'new military history', which emphasized military organization - mobilization, pay, supply, morale and, above all, logistics - rather than military 'events' such as sieges and battles. Geoffrey Parker studied one of the great logistical feats of early modern Europe: how Habsburg Spain managed to maintain and mobilize the largest army in Europe in an 80-year effort to suppress the Dutch Revolt, at 700 miles' distance. Using a unique combination of surviving records, he presented strikingly the logistical problems of fighting wars in early modern Europe, and demonstrated why Spain failed to suppress the Dutch Revolt. The book has been constantly cited since its first publication in English (with translations into Spanish and Dutch). This revised second edition includes some new sources and updates some references but otherwise remains faithful to the original version.

The destruction of the French army at Crecy in 1346 and the subsequent siege and capture of Calais marked a new era in European history. The most powerful, glamorous and respected of all western monarchies had been completely humiliated by England, a country long viewed either as a chaotic backwater or a mere French satellite. The young Edward III's triumph would launch both countries, as we now know, into a grim cycle of some 90 years of further fighting ending with English defeat, but after Crecy anything seemed possible - Edward's claim to be King of France could be pressed home and, in any event, enormous rewards of land, treasure and prestige were available both to the king and to the close companions who had made the victory possible. It was to enshrine this moment that Edward created one of the most famous of all knightly orders, the Company of the Garter. Barber writes about both the great campaigns and the individuals who formed the original membership of the Company - and through their biographies makes the period tangible and fascinating. This is a book about knighthood, battle tactics and grand strategy, but it is also about fashion, literature and the privates lives of everyone from queens to freebooters. Barber's book is a remarkable achievement - but also an extremely enjoyable one.

Based on new information recently come to light, this history reveals how Britain's staunchly anti-communist Prime Minister was deceived into supporting communist Tito and into cutting all aid to the anti-communist forces resisting the Germans in Yugoslavia. If it had not been for Churchill’s change of heart in December of 1948, this record argues, Tito would not have overcome his political opponents and have emerged as the country's undisputed ruler after the war. Exposing the skullduggery behind the blue-blooded British Establishment, this account also reveals how Tito used the munitions received from the British and Americans not to kill Germans, as promised to Churchill, but mostly to eliminate his political rivals; how he accused his political opponents of accepting weapons from the Italians while he was proposing joint action to the Germans to resist an Allied landing in the Balkans; and how his Partisans massacred thousands of anti-communist Yugoslavs handed over to him by the British in good faith. In essence, this account is a revisionist biography of Tito, puncturing the wartime myths surrounding the communist leader.  

While the development of tanks had largely led to the replacement of cavalry in most armies by 1939, the Soviets retained a strong mounted arm. In the terrain and conditions of the Eastern Front they were able to play an important role denied them elsewhere. John Harrel shows how the Soviets developed a doctrine of deep penetration, using cavalry formations to strike into the Axis rear, disrupting logistics and lines of communication, encircling and isolating units. Interestingly he shows that this doctrine did not stem from the native cavalry tradition of the steppe but from the example of the American Civil War. The American approach was copied by the Russians in WWI and the Russian Civil War, refined by the Soviets in the early stages of World War Two and perfected during the last two years of the war. The Soviet experience demonstrated that deep operations (cavalry raids) against enemy rear echelons set the conditions for victory. Although the last horse-mounted units disappeared in the 1950s, their influence led directly to the formation of the Operational Manoeuvre Groups that, ironically, faced US forces in the Cold War.

Professor Graham compares the performance of the British Army in the two world wars. He identifies as a source of failure in the World War I, Sir Douglas Haig's inability to adopt appropriate operations for his chosen strategy, or suitable tactics for the operations. Montgomery usually avoided that mistake in the World War II. Graham draws upon his own experience of combat to help the reader make a connection between the orders given to corps and their effect on small units.

The Byzantines had a remarkably sophisticated approach to politics and military strategy. Unlike most of their contemporaries, they learnt very early in their history that winning a battle did not necessarily win a war, and they frequently bought off their enemies with treaties and bribes rather than squander men and materiel in potentially fruitless campaigns. The Byzantine army of the 10th and early 11th centuries, at the height of its power and efficiency, was the best-organised, best-trained, best-equipped and highest-paid in the known world. This splendid book by Ian Heath examines the Byzantine Armies from 886-1118, including the lusty, hard-fighting, hard-drinking 'barbarian' Varangian guard.

In this study Brian Bosworth looks at the critical period between 329 and 325 BC, when Alexander the Great was active in Central Asia and what is now Pakistan. He documents Alexander's relations with the peoples he conquered, and addresses the question of what it meant to be on the receiving end of the conquest, drawing a bleak picture of massacre and repression. At the same time Alexander's views of empire are investigated, his attitude to his subjects, and the development of his concepts of personal divinity and universal monarchy. Analogies are thus drawn with the Spanish conquest of Mexico, which has a comparable historiographical tradition and parallels many of Alexander's dealings with his subjects. Although of concern to the specialist, this book is equally directed at the general reader interested in the history of Alexander and the morality of empire.

This book looks at the development of Israeli-Arab relations during the formative years 1949 to 1956, focusing on Arab infiltration into Israel and Israeli retaliation. Palestinian refugee raiding and cross-border attacks by Egyptian-controlled irregulars and commandos were a core phenomenon during this period and one of the chief causes of Israel's invasion of Sinai and the Gaza strip in 1956. Morris deepens our understanding of the current situation in the Middle East and of the prospects for a lasting peace there.