No country has worked harder to coerce others to adopt liberal institutions than the United States. This book examines the promotion of democracy during U.S. military interventions in the twentieth century, showing it to be one of the central ways in which the United States attempts to reconcile the potential contradictions involved in being a liberal great power.

Examining interventions from the Spanish-American War through recent actions in Bosnia, Mark Peceny shows how the United States has encouraged the institution of free elections and other liberal reforms--often at the point of bayonets. Peceny applies statistical analysis to ninety-three cases of intervention and presents six case studies: Cuba and the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, Vietnam during the Kennedy administration, El Salvador during Reagan's first term, and Clinton's interventions in Haiti and Bosnia.

By forging a synthesis of realist and domestic liberal approaches, Peceny illuminates the roles that both security concerns and liberal values play in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. He shows how presidents often initially choose proliberalization policies to serve U.S. security interests and how Congress exerts pressure when presidents fail to take the initiative. Under these circumstances, he shows, presidents use the promotion of democracy to build domestic political consensus and to legitimize interventions.

Although the United States has failed to promote democracy in most interventions, Peceny demonstrates that it has often had a profound and positive impact on the democratization of target states. His study offers new insight into the relationship between American power, the promotion of democracy, and prospects for the liberal peace in the decades to come.

Desert Storm was the largest naval operation since World War II. Although naval forces did not play the central role, they fulfilled an important function throughout the operation, facing many formidable challenges and considerable risk. This book provides a close examination of the problems encountered by the Navy, both in the military situation and in dealing with the other services, and the decisions made to address these issues. While interservice rivalries sometimes intruded at higher levels, jointness at the tactical level often led to effective combined-arms operations.

Despite the information revolution and improvements in technology, the Fog of War still obscured the battlefield and affected nearly all decisions. This study offers page-turning action, such as SEAL activity and combat search and rescue missions, as well as the exciting and dangerous surface operations that gained sea control of the northern Persian Gulf. Using primary sources such as interviews and many documents cleared only recently for public release, the author covers the relations between General Schwarzkopf and Vice Admirals Mauz and Arthur; the major contribution of Tomahawk cruise missiles to the first wave of attacks on Baghdad; the controversial use of aircraft carriers in the Gulf; as well as the Navy's possible role in the event of an amphibious assault into Kuwait. Those preparing to fight in future naval actions will learn much from this detailed analysis.

Traditionally historians of the Little Big Horn fight have focused on Custer and his troops -- on what they were doing and where they died. But as one Miniconjou warrior told a gathering at a 1926 commemoration of the battle, the Lakotas and Cheyennes also lost brave men. These men had died defending their homes and families, and they too deserved recognition.

Hokahey! A Good Day to Die! details the final moments of each of the fallen Cheyenne and Lakota heroes. Richard G. Hardorff sifted through the many interviews with Indian survivors of the battle, cross-checking every story of a wounded or dead individual to ascertain who was killed, in which action, and by whom. He concludes that the Indian dead comprised thirty-one men, six women, and four children -- astonishingly light losses when compared with the number of cavalry dead. Concise, well-written, and respectful of Cheyenne and Lakota cultural practices, this book is an essential contribution to our understanding of how the Cheyennes and Lakotas waged the Battle of the Little Big Horn.

This account of the Gulf War reveals its importance from a military and political point of view, highlighting how modern military technology made possible, with relative ease, a victory that would have been nearly impossible by traditional means. It has become fashionable to trivialize the impressive military achievements of the Coatition victory over Iraq, but Bin, Hill, and Jones demonstrate that the Gulf War represents a defining moment in military and political history. The text includes numerous firsthand eyewitness accounts.

Readers will discover why a multinational coalition deployed 800,000 soldiers to the Middle East to challenge to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. They will find out the truth behind political maneuvering by nations involved in the conflict, as well as those on the sidelines, and they will learn the details of the various weapons systems employed. The authors analyze the aftermath of the war and draw important lessons from it. This book provides an authoritative and provocative review of what will surely be remembered as one of the key events of the last half century.

This authoritative and concise work surveys the range of warfare in the high Middle Ages while reflecting on the society that produced these military struggles. The book brings together for the first time a wealth of information on such topics as knighthood, military organization, weaponry and fortifications, and warfare in the East. In 1095 with the launching of the First Crusade, Europeans established a great military endeavour to save the Holy Land, an undertaking that remained a central preoccupation until the end of the thirteenth century. While the expeditions that went forth to fight the Muslims involved armies of exceptional size, much of the warfare within western Europe itself was conducted by small armies on behalf of landowners who were often neighbours and kin. In his approach to his subject, John France considers political, social, and economic development in the age of the crusades. He emphasizes the significance of four factors in shaping medieval warfare: the dominance of land as a form of wealth, the limited competence of government, the state of technology that favoured defence over attack, and the geography and climate of western Europe. His coverage of the castle and the knight in armour depicts the role of landowners in producing these characteristic medieval instruments of war. In addition, France provides an extensive analysis of battles in which he reconstructs a series of encounters in superb detail.

During the American Revolutionary War, Great Britain's Royal Navy faced foes that included, in addition to American forces, the navies of France, Spain and the Netherlands. In this operational history of a period that proved to be a turning point for one of the world's great naval powers, David Syrett presents a saga of battles, blockades, great fleet cruises and, above all, failures and lost opportunities. He explains that the British government severely underestimated the Americans' maritime strength and how that error led to devastating consequences. The seemingly invincible navy failed to muster even one decisive victory during the extensive naval conflict. Noting the complex reasons for British failure in European waters, Syrett lays primary blame at the feet of Britain's political leadership. He describes how Lord North, the first lord of the Treasury and head of government, abdicated control of Britain's military to individual members of the cabinet. Syrett suggests that constant vacillations in policy and strategy, which resulted from power shifts among the cabinet ministers, prevented North's government from formulating a comprehensive wartime strategy or providing the Royal navy with the strategic guidance to launch a successful campaign. Syrett concludes that Britain's inability to gain naval superiority in European waters had a profound effect on the outcome of the American Revolutionary War. He demonstrates how the Royal Navy's failure to hunt down and destroy American blockade runners allowed Yankee rebels easy access to European arms and munitions. He also shows that the inability of the British to defeat French and Spanish naval power off the Continent gave Bourbon monarchies the means to aid American naval forces and to conduct naval operations against the British in such areas as the West Indies and the Indian Ocean.

The Day is Ours is a dramatic account of two battles that turned the tide of the American Revolution. In this distinguished, highly readable, and richly detailed narrative history, William M. Dwyer reveals as vivid a picture as we are likely to see of a critical period in the American Revolution. He lets the participants--from American, British, and Hessian soldiers to myriad fearful and ambivalent citizens--tell the story in their own words. "Telling the story from the perspective, and often the words, of men in the ranks, Dwyer has written a dramatic account of this turning point in the American Revolution." --James M. McPherson, author of Battle Cry of Freedom " Dwyer] has cast his net wide, taking advantage of newly found or long-obscure accounts published during the celebration of the Revolution's bicentennial. We learn exactly how it was in that momentous time, from letters, diaries and recollections of officers and men on both sides and civilians caught in the middle." --New York Times Book Review "Dwyer has put together a wonderful, lively account that reflects a reporter's respect for quotes from eyewitnesses . . . He presents the facts and lets history speak for itself. The result is enthralling." --The Philadelphia Inquirer "The courage of the common soldier who stayed and fought when the sunshine patriots had all gone home is a story that deserves to be told--and Mr. Dwyer has told it well." --The Wall Street Journal William M. Dwyer is an author, teacher, and veteran journalist who has written for the Trenton Times, New York Times, Commonweal, Christian Science Monitor, and New Jersey Monthly.

This study is one of the rare contributions to the very small library of genuine strategic studies. (Strategy here covers all military activity.) The broad purpose is to show how strategy works, using air power and special operations as substantial case studies, but also addressing sea power, nuclear deterrence, and information warfare. Although this book has many interesting things to say about the future of air power, the reliability of non-nuclear deterrence, the true character of joint warfare, the utility of special warriors, and the limitations of excellence in information warfare, the primary intention is to deepen the understanding of the nature and working of strategy and strategic effect.

An impressive and serious study one of the most fascinating military campaigns in history. September 7, 1812, by itself is one of the most cataclysmic days in the history of war: 74,000 casualties at the Battle of Borodino. And tiffs was well before the invention of weapons of mass destruction like machine guns or breech-loading rifles.

Nafziger's detailed study includes a clear exposition on the power structure in Europe at the time leading up to Napoleon's fateful decision to attempt what turned out to be impossible: the conquest of Russia. Also included are complete orders of battle and detailed descriptions of the opposing forces.

Patrick Pearse, an important Irish journalist, educator, and artist, came to play the pivotal role in the Easter Rising of 1916. Here Sean Farrell Moran examines Pearse within the context of contemporary Irish politics and culture to explain how this unlikely revolutionary became the spokesman of the violent forces within the nationalist movement.

The battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, 1862-63, were remarkable in several respects. Both revealed the problems of mounting a serious attack at night and provided the first examples of the now-familiar trench warfare. Fredericksburg featured street fighting and river crossings under fire. Chancellorsville was marked by Stonewall Jackson's death and the rare instance of mounted cavalry attacking infantry. In addition, the latter battle also demonstrated in striking fashion the profound influence of the commander on the battle. The Union committed more soldiers, supplies, money, and better equipment than did the Confederacy, and yet Lee won.

Eyewitness accounts by battle participants make these guides an invaluable resource for travelers and nontravelers who want a greater understanding of five of the most devastating yet influential years in our nation's history. Explicit directions to points of interest and maps--illustrating the action and showing the detail of troop position, roads, rivers, elevations, and tree lines as they were 130 years ago--help bring the battles to life. In the field, these guides can be used to recreate each battle's setting and proportions, giving the reader a sense of the tension and fear each soldier must have felt as he faced his enemy.

When Fort Sumter fell in 1861, Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885) was an obscure clerk in Galena, Illinois, without influential friends and lacking a reputation for success. Yet within three years this man rose to command the Union armies, and just over a year later secured the defeat of the Confederacy. How can this emergence be explained? What were the characteristics of such a man and by what means did he acquire his knowledge? Did he earn his honors or did he owe them to chance and luck? The Rise of U. S. Grant focuses on the widely ignored first two years of his career in the West. Colonel Conger eschewed the general's justly acclaimed but inaccurate memoirs, relying instead on contemporaneous messages, dispatches, and reports undimmed by time and undistorted by later reflection. From the raid on Belmont through Grant's capture of Forts Henry and Donelson to his near defeat at Shiloh and the triumphant siege of Vicksburg, this book is a brilliant, penetrating exploration that goes a long way toward explaining the phenomenon of Grant, while letting the readers experience with gripping immediacy how he mastered the crises that confronted him.

This book is a reexamination of the Persian Gulf War by a number of academic and military historians to determine what we did right, what we did wrong, and how our performance could have been improved. This study addresses the questions: Why did the war happen? Was the Gulf War a vindication of Vietnam? Did the American military really learn anything from the war in Vietnam? Did they really adapt? What did the Allies actually win in the Gulf War, if anything? Finally, have we learned anything from the Gulf War? Some authors conclude that in retrospect many analysts have become convinced that despite its military successes the United States garnered little of worth from the Gulf War. Others believe a great deal was achieved, and some have withheld final judgement.

Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor provide a definitive, behind-the-scenes account and anaylsis of the planning and execution of the Gulf War. While one war was being waged against Iraq, another was being fought among the generals themselves. The Generals' War offers unvarnished portraits of the top military commanders, challenges the performances of Powell, Schwarzkopf, and their generals, and provides disturbing information about the power struggles within the American high command. Using previously undisclosed military documents, The Generals' War goes beyond what happened to explain why and how, exploding myths that have crept into other accounts of the war.

This is the first English-language military history of what the People's Republic of China called the "War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea." Based upon a vast array of recently available Chinese sources, it provides a revealing new look at the far-reaching influence of Mao Zedong's political and military thought on China's conduct of the war.

As Shu Guang Zhang reminds us, many observers in 1950 thought it foolhardy for this young and underdeveloped communist nation to engage in yet another war. Coming so soon after its costly civil war with the Nationalists, the Korean crisis presented China with the uninviting prospect of fighting a technologically superior (and nuclear-armed) opponent on foreign terrain.

Mao, however, was convinced from more than a decade of fighting against the Japanese and the Nationalists that political gain and warfare were inseparable. ("Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," he'd declared as early as 1927.) Zhang argues that war in Korea offered Mao yet another opportunity to expand and consolidate his political power at home, while at the same time uniting the Chinese proletariat against Yankee imperialism and proving to the international community that China had arrived as a major world power.

As Zhang shows, Mao's decision to go to war against the United States was guided by a devoutly romantic belief that human forces would always triumph over modern technology. Victory, according to Mao, did not necessarily go to those who had bigger and better guns. It was reserved instead for those who possessed an unwavering commitment to a superior cause.

Merging the martial thought of both Clausewitz and Sun-Tze with Marx's concept of class struggle, Mao galvanized China's military and citizenry at every level to fight a people's war against Yankee imperialism. Fueled by Mao's call to safeguard China and East Asia from American invasions, the Chinese showed how a relatively outgunned but inspired fighting force could deprive a technologically superior opponent of victory in a limited war. As Zhang concludes, subsequent conflicts in Vietnam and elsewhere have proven the value of that lesson.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in support of a Marxist-Leninist government, and the subsequent nine-year conflict with the indigenous Afghan Mujahedeen was one of the bloodiest conflicts of the Cold War. Key details of the circumstances surrounding the invasion and its ultimate conclusion only months before the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 have long remained unclear; it is a confidential narrative of clandestine correspondence, covert operations and failed intelligence. The Secret War in Afghanistan undertakes a full analysis of recently declassified intelligence archives in order to asses Anglo-American secret intelligence and diplomacy relating to the invasion of Afghanistan and unveil the Cold War realities behind the rhetoric. Rooted at every turn in close examination of the primary evidence, it outlines the secret operations of the CIA, MI6 and the KGB, and the full extent of the aid and intelligence from the West which armed and trained the Afghan fighters. Drawing from US, UK and Russian archives, Panagiotis Dimitrakis analyses the Chinese arms deals with the CIA, the multiple recorded intelligence failures of KGB intelligence and secret letters from the office of Margaret Thatcher to Jimmy Carter. In so doing, this study brings a new scholarly perspective to some of the most controversial events of Cold War history. Dimitrakis also outlines the full extent of China's involvement in arming the Mujahedeen, which led to the PRC effectively fighting the Soviet Union by proxy. This will be essential reading for scholars and students of the Cold War, American History and the Modern Middle East.

Summer's inspired analysis of America's war in Vietnam answers the most pressing questions remaining from that terrible conflict more than a decade before Robert McNamara's painful admissions.

In 1874, Fort Robinson was founded amid the piney ridges of northwest Nebraska to stem the attacks of the Sioux, angered by settlers encroaching on the High Plains and by gold prospectors invading their sacred Black Hills. Fort Robinson's residents--including black troops, members of the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry Regiments--were divided by rank and sometimes by race. Schubert makes clear the vital importance of Fort Robinson during the Sioux wars, including the Ghost Dance Uprisings of 1890, and he blends social analysis with military history in his concern for the families of soldiers and civilians.

From the time of her husband's death at the Battle of the Little Big Horn until her own death fifty-seven years later, at the age of ninety, Mrs. George Armstrong Custer devoted herself to defending or embellishing her husband's reputation. This account, the second in Elizabeth's trilogy of her life with the General, focuses on the period immediately following the Civil War, when the Custers were stationed in Louisiana, Texas, and Kansas. She portrays the aftermath of the Civil War in Texas and life in Kansas while her husband took part in General Winfield Hancock's 1867 expedition against the Indians between the Arkansas and Platte rivers. Throughout, she provides detailed descriptions of an army officer's home life on the frontier during this major period of Indian unrest. This edition, an abridgment of the original 1887 edition, with an Introduction by Jane R. Stewart and a Foreword by Shirley A. Leckie, brings together in a single volume one of the most significant documents of the Old West, here made accessible to a new generation of readers.

Presenting a significant new interpretation of Napoleonic warfare, Robert M. Epstein argues persuasively that the true origins of modern war can be found in the Franco-Austrian War of 1809.

Epstein contends that the 1809 war--with its massive and evenly matched armies, multiple theaters of operation, new command-and-control schemes, increased firepower, frequent stalemates, and large-scale slaughter--had more in common with the American Civil War and subsequent conflicts than with the decisive Napoleonic campaigns that preceded it.

Epstein examines 1809 in terms of the evolving new systems of recruitment, organization, and command used by both sides. As he shows, this was the first time that two states confronted each other on the battlefield with armies created by large-scale conscription, organized in corps, and coordinated along two major theaters of operation (Danubian and Italian). As a result, the opponents were forced into "distributed maneuvers" that produced broad operational fronts in which battles became both sequential and simultaneous, but ultimately indecisive.

Ironically, as Epstein points out, neither Napoleon nor the opposing commander Archduke Charles ever fully understood that a paradigm shift had occurred in the conduct of war. Regardless, after 1809, warfare would never be the same.

On September 15, 1944, General William Rupertus and the 16,000 Marines of the U.S. 1st Marine Division moved confidently toward Peleliu, an obscure speck of coral island 500 miles east of the Philippines. Though he knew a tough fight awaited him, Rupertus anticipated a quick two-day crush to victory, strengthening Gen. Douglas MacArthur's flank in his drive on the Philippines. Instead, as "The Devil's Anvil" reveals, American forces struggled desperately for more than two months against 10,000 deeply entrenched Japanese soldiers who had spent six months preparing for the battle. By the time the weary Americans could claim a victory, the fight had become one of the war's most costly successes. Even more tragic, Peleliu was later deemed a more or less unnecessary seizure.

For those who survived, Peleliu remains a bitter, emotionally exhausting chapter of their lives. In "The Devil's Anvil," Hallas reports on the personal combat experience of scores of officers and enlisted men who were at Peleliu. These men describe the heartbreaking loss of friends, the pain of wounds, and the heat, dirt, and exhaustion of a fight that never seemed to end.

Military history buffs and scholars will revel in Wiley Sword's exciting narrative, the first comprehensive history of the United States-Indian war of 1790-1795. The struggle for the Old Northwest Territory (modern-day Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Michigan) was as vicious and bitter a conflict as any war in our history. Indeed, the very survival of the new nation was in doubt.The years from 1790 to 1795 may have been the turning point in Indian white relations on the North American continent. At this time the Indians of the Ohio country-tribes such as the Miamis, the Shawnees, and the Ottawas-engaged in a last-ditch effort to stop the settlers who were moving west into the ""Black Forest"" wilderness of mid America. They were aided by British agents, based in Detroit, who manipulated the Indian confederacy in an attempt to recoup some of their losses from the Revolutionary War. Josiah Harmar and Arthur St. Clair led early disastrous campaigns, including possibly the worst defeat of a United States army at the hands of Indians. Ultimately, President George Washington assigned ""Mad Anthony"" Wayne to rebuild and expand the army, despite considerable domestic opposition. This is the most detailed history yet published of the battles and skirmishes, the futile treaty negotiations with the Indians, and the tribes' intrigues among themselves and with the British, leading to Wayne's final victory 'over the Indian confederacy at Fallen Timbers. Most impressive is the extent and depth of the author's research in primary and secondary sources. With extraordinary vividness Sword recounts the battles and the life in the American and Indian encampments, quoting from diaries, letters, and statements by American officers and soldiers as well as the accounts of their enemies, such as Little Turtle of the Miamis, Blue Jacket of the Shawnees, and Joseph Brant of the Iroquois. Nor does Sword neglect the activities and life-ways of Britain's traders, agents, and haughty commandants.

This text is the first to closely compare and contrast the Gulf and Vietnam Wars on both the war and home fronts. Widely respected experts give a balanced, new perspective on the Vietnam War, based on considerable new primary research to explain the salient factors that contributed to the decision making, air and ground considerations, and outcome. This text, carefully focused for classes in modern American history and military studies, appraises the legacies of the Vietnam War that have been felt in the United States for the last two decades.

"Easily the most significant book yet published on the Battle of the Little Bighorn."-Paul L. Hedren, Western Historical Quarterly " Gray] has applied rigorous analysis as no previous historian has done to these oft-analyzed events. His detailed time-motion study of the movements of the various participants frankly boggles the mind of this reviewer. No one will be able to write of this battle again without reckoning with Gray"-Thomas W. Dunlay, Journal of American History "Gray challenges many time honored beliefs about the battle. Perhaps most significantly, he brings in as much as possible the testimony of the Indian witnesses, especially that of the young scout Curley, which generations of historians have dismissed for contradictions that Gray convincingly demonstrates were caused not by Curley but by the assumptions made by his questioners . . . The contrasts in this] book. . . restate the basic components of what still attracts the imagination to the Little Bighorn."-Los Angeles Times Book Review "Gray's analysis, by and large, is impressively drawn; it is an immensely logical reconstruction that should stand the test of time. As a contribution to Custer and Indian wars literature, it is indeed masterful."-Jerome A. Greene, New Mexico Historical Review John S. Gray was a distinguished historian whose books included the acclaimed Centennial Campaign: The Sioux War of 1876. Custer's Last Campaign is the winner of the Western Writers of American Spur award and the Little Bighorn Associates John M. Carroll Literary Award.