Few studies of Middle East wars go beyond a narrative of events and most tend to impose on this subject the rigid scheme of superpower competition. The Gulf War of 1991, however, challenges this view of the Middle East as an extension of the global conflict. The failure of the accord of both superpowers to avoid war even once regional superpower competition in the Middle East had ceased must give rise to the question: Do regional conflicts have their own dynamic? Working from this assumption, the book examines local-regional constraints of Middle East conflict and how, through escalation and the involvement of extra-regional powers, such conflicts acquire an international dimension. The theory of a regional subsystem is employed as a framework for conceptualising this interplay between regional and international factors in Tibi's examination of the Middle East wars in the period 1967-91. Tibi also provides an outlook into the future of conflict in the Middle East in the aftermath of the most recent Gulf War.

Walter the Chancellor's vivid first-hand account of the wars between the Muslims and the principality of Antioch in the early 12th century describes a less well-known period in the history of the Crusades, and provides a useful counterpart to the usual focus on Jerusalem. It is here presented for the first time in English, along with a selection of comparative sources and an important introduction assessing the work's place in the historiography of the Crusader states, and analysing the military campaigns it details. As a highly-placed Antiochene official, Walter was able to write the most authoritative account of the principality's fortunes and internal workings, and his book also sheds light on the relationship between Latin settlement in the Levant and contemporary Western perceptions of Islam and Eastern Christianity.

An exciting account of a little-known, yet vital part of World War II, the Allied effort to blockade Axis forces in North Africa with a relatively small number of planes and submarines included some of the war's most spectacular air battles, and opened the way to the attack on Fortress Europe from the south. This is the first book-length treatment of the crucial struggle to cut Axis supply lines in the Tunisian campaign of 1942-1943, a battle often ignored or played down even by official historians. The campaign marked the first big U.S. victory against the Axis powers and served as a proving ground for several top Allied commanders. This study fills an important gap in the history of the war, reevaluating the development of Allied airpower and the role of Italy in the campaign.

Allied success in interdiction was a critical factor in the greatest Allied victory in the Mediterranean campaign, a victory which left the enemy so weakened that it could not stop the subsequent invasion of Europe from the south. Despite initial disorganization and early disappointments, the British waged one of only two successful submarine campaigns ever fought. This study describes some of the war's most amazing air battles, notably Operation Flax against the enemy's air transport fleet, and attacks on convoys, all interwoven with the events of the ground war in the desert and comparisons with the Pacific effort. It details the struggle to reorganize and improve the Allied effort, the belated success of sea sweeps against enemy ships, and the final victory in the spring of 1943, in which an air blockade was clamped on the sea and sky approaches to Tunisia.

A neglected war in the history of the United States, the Korean conflict played a key role in greatly expanding America's commitments worldwide and contributed to the U.S. decision to engage in direct military action in Vietnam fifteen years later. This up-to-date, readable analysis and ready-reference guide to the Korean War is designed to help students and interested readers understand the causes, events, and implications of the War and to provide a wealth of material for student research. Materials include a detailed timeline of events, six topical essays on various aspects of the war and its impact, seventeen lengthy biographical profiles of key players, the text of fifteen important primary documents, a glossary, and a comprehensive annotated bibliography.

Following an introductory essay that explains the causes and history of the war, five topical essays examine the Western Alliance and, in particular, our relations with Great Britain over the War, an analysis and new insights on the role of the Soviet Union and China, the Chinese Communist intervention, the prisoners of war issue, and the meaning and implications of the Korean conflict. Primary documents include the text of speeches, memoranda, telegrams, and official government reports. Biographical sketches provide thorough discussion of the role of major players in the conflict. A section of photographs complements the text. Because it is based on the most recent scholarship and written for the high school and college student researcher, it is the ideal companion to a study of the Korean conflict and its implications for post-World War II America.

This is the compelling story of the most exciting and decisive battles fought under harsh Arctic conditions during the Second World War. Each battle is described in detail, with discussions of the various weapons and strategies that led to victory or defeat, and an analysis of how the battle affected the overall course of the war. The failure of early attempts to supply the Soviets with vital mat DEGREESD'eriel would eventually give rise to tensions among the Allies that would continue long after the end of the war, and would ultimately lead to the Cold War. Despite the fears of many men on both sides that they were being sacrificed for political expediency, their brave and heroic actions became an integral part of the war effort for each coalition.

The Arctic was a difficult and costly theater where battle was often characterized by massive convoys and lurking U-Boats. Some of the worst weather in history hit the Arctic in the midst of the war, making the elements as tough an opponent as any human enemy. The enormous scope of the war, combined with political and economic limitations to restrict the available resources of both sides. Evans's access to recently declassified documents and his use of the personal accounts and reflections of the men who fought there sheds an entirely new light on this often-neglected theater.

For General George S. Patton, Jr., the battle for Lorraine during the fall and winter of 1944 was a frustrating and grueling experience of static warfare. Plagued by supply shortages, critical interference from superiors, flooded rivers, fortified cities, and the highly-determined German army, Patton had little opportunity to wage a fast armored campaign. Rickard examines Patton's generalship during these bitter battles and suggests that Patton was unable to adapt to the new realities of the campaign, thereby failing to wage the most effective warfare possible.

By the beginning of the Ardennes offensive, Patton had crippled his worthy opponent, but had suffered the highest casualties of any campaign that he conducted during the war. Until now, his better known exploits in Sicily and Normandy have overshadowed this campaign. Relying on a broad range of sources, this treatment of Patton's operational performance in Lorraine goes beyond the official history. It describes Patton's philosophy of war and explains why it essentially failed in Lorraine. Supplemented by full orders of battle, casualty and equipment losses, and excellent maps, "Patton at Bay" is a penetrating study of America's best fighting general.

Naval forces have not yet received the attention they are due for their role in Operation Desert Shield. This chronological account offers a unique, and as yet, unseen level of detail regarding the Navy's contribution throughout the operation. Relying on primary sources whenever possible, this book discusses naval decisions in terms of information available to decision-makers at the time and presents the pros and cons for alternative courses of action, as argued at the time of the original decision. It details the Navy's role in planning for successful operations, its constant vigil against surprise attack, and its daily contribution to the maritime interception effort to enforce U.N. economic sanctions against Iraq.

Naval forces upheld the sanctions at sea in such a way as to avoid disabling a civilian ship and provided the glue that helped create and maintain the multi-national coalition. The complexity of the situation required the naval forces to adapt their command and control to a highly centralized operation which placed unprecedented demands on the Navy's communications systems. This study provides an insider view of the various plans, even those that were not carried out, and valuable insights into the personalities of the leading officials. Sources include first-hand observations of the events at ComUSNavCent, where the author had access to nearly all events and decisions; hundreds of thousands of messages and other briefing materials; the post-war analysis done by the Center for Naval Analyses; and interviews with almost all of the key players.

Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919) lived an extraordinary life distinguished by a stunning array of accomplishments: war hero, 26th President, reformer, historian, conservationist, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, author, and explorer. But it was the navy that most fascinated him throughout his long and varied career, and it was in The Naval War of 1812 (published in 1882 when he was only 23) that he first declared his interest. Praised for its scholarship, assurance, and originality, this classic naval history offers stirring and comprehensive accounts of the war's dramatic naval battles, and of the American and English commanders who fought on the vast North American lakes and on the ocean for control of the continent. The book proved instrumental in securing Roosevelt's appointment as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1897, and decisively influenced the U.S. Navy's transformation from a skeletal isolationist force into a formidable international sea power that made U.S expansionism not only possible but inevitable.

Ever present in the Pacific from Pearl Harbor to VJ-Day during World War II (1939-1945), the B-24 Liberator proved to be the staple heavy bomber of the campaign. From its ignominious beginnings in the Allied rout in the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, the bomber weathered the Japanese storm with a handful of bomb groups, which played a crucial role in checking the enemy's progress firstly in New Guinea, and then actively participating in the 'island hopping' campaign through the south-west Pacific.

Sheffer deals with some of the oldest continuing constitutional problems confronting the American government: the judicial development of presidential war powers, potential constitutional dictatorship, and a wartime constitution. What enhances these problems is the very cryptic language presented by Article II itself. First, the generalities of Article II are read expansively enough to cover specific presidential actions, while a theory of inherent powers tends to justify the means. This combination of action and theory, Sheffer asserts, presumes that ends and means are determined only by the president. The end result is that presidential action takes on the characteristics of constitutional power. As this casebook demonstrates, in times of grave national emergency--especially war--the president acts as a constitutional dictator. There is a tacit understanding that nothing will be permitted to block the winning of the war. What is necessary, as determined by the chief executive, is done. The president must insure the national survival. Legal niceties are given little attention. Congress does not interfere with the manner in which the president conducts a war; it is a ready ally in almost everything he does, so long as he continues to be successful. As the cases demonstrate, the courts seek to avoid having to rule on the president's conduct, but, when they do rule, they usually uphold the president.

The impact of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 was incalculable. It was the first victory by an Asian power over a European one since the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century. Japanese victory was ascribed to the "spirit" of the Japanese people, which helped their soldiers to overcome superior numbers and technology. A fascinating glimpse into prevailing nationalistic and militaristic attitudes in early-twentieth-century Japan, "Human Bullets" is also an engaging story of combat and an excellent source of insights about a relatively obscure but immensely influential conflict. Tadyoshi Sakurai was a junior officer in the Japanese campaign against Port Arthur, Russia's ice-free port in China. His account is an interesting introduction to the concept of "yamato-damashii," or "traditional Japanese spirit." This spirit was something greater than mere high morale. Japanese soldiers were the emperor's "human bullets." Like bullets, they were unconcerned with victory, comfort, or self-preservation, existing only to strike the enemy.

This account of the Gulf War reveals its importance from a military and political point of view, highlighting how modern military technology made possible, with relative ease, a victory that would have been nearly impossible by traditional means. It has become fashionable to trivialize the impressive military achievements of the Coatition victory over Iraq, but Bin, Hill, and Jones demonstrate that the Gulf War represents a defining moment in military and political history. The text includes numerous firsthand eyewitness accounts.

Readers will discover why a multinational coalition deployed 800,000 soldiers to the Middle East to challenge to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. They will find out the truth behind political maneuvering by nations involved in the conflict, as well as those on the sidelines, and they will learn the details of the various weapons systems employed. The authors analyze the aftermath of the war and draw important lessons from it. This book provides an authoritative and provocative review of what will surely be remembered as one of the key events of the last half century.

For decades, the CIA's top secret postmortem on the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion has been the holy grail of historians, students, and survivors of the failed invasion of Cuba. But the scathing internal report on the worst foreign policy debacle of the Kennedy administration, written by the CIA's then–inspector general Lyman Kirkpatrick, has remained tightly guarded—until now. Dislodged from the government through the Freedom of Information Act, here is an uncompromising look at high officials' arrogance, ignorance, and incompetence, as displayed in their attitude toward Castro's revolution and toward the Cuban exiles the CIA had organized to invade the island. Including the complete report and a wealth of supplementary materials, Bay of Pigs Declassified provides a fascinating picture of the operation and of the secret world of the espionage establishment, with stories of plots, counterplots, and intra-agency power struggles worthy of a Le Carré novel. Includes: the complete text of the CIA report; a critical introduction; the newly declassified response to the report from Richard Bissell, who masterminded the operation; the first joint interview with the managers of the invasion, Jacob Esterline and Colonel Jack Hawkins; a comprehensive chronology; and biographies of the key participants.

This account of the Gulf War reveals its importance from a military and political point of view, highlighting how modern military technology made possible, with relative ease, a victory that would have been nearly impossible by traditional means. It has become fashionable to trivialize the impressive military achievements of the Coatition victory over Iraq, but Bin, Hill, and Jones demonstrate that the Gulf War represents a defining moment in military and political history. The text includes numerous firsthand eyewitness accounts.

Readers will discover why a multinational coalition deployed 800,000 soldiers to the Middle East to challenge to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. They will find out the truth behind political maneuvering by nations involved in the conflict, as well as those on the sidelines, and they will learn the details of the various weapons systems employed. The authors analyze the aftermath of the war and draw important lessons from it. This book provides an authoritative and provocative review of what will surely be remembered as one of the key events of the last half century.

For many years historians of the Cuban missile crisis have concentrated on those thirteen days in October 1962 when the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war. Mark White s study adds an equally intense scrutiny of the causes and consequences of the crisis. "Missiles in Cuba" is based on up-to-date scholarship as well as Mr. White s own findings in National Security Archive materials, Kennedy Library tapes of ExComm meetings, and correspondence between Soviet officials in Washington and Havana all newly released. His more rounded picture gives us a much clearer understanding of the policy strategies pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union (and, to a lesser extent, Cuba) that brought on the crisis. His almost hour-by-hour account of the confrontation itself also destroys some venerable myths, such as the unique initiatives attributed to Robert Kennedy. And his assessment of the consequences of the crisis points to salutary effects on Soviet-American relation and on U.S. nuclear defense strategy, but questionable influences on Soviet defense spending and on Washington s perception of its talents for "crisis management," later tested in Vietnam.

In this study Brian Bosworth looks at the critical period between 329 and 325 BC, when Alexander the Great was active in Central Asia and what is now Pakistan. He documents Alexander's relations with the peoples he conquered, and addresses the question of what it meant to be on the receiving end of the conquest, drawing a bleak picture of massacre and repression. At the same time Alexander's views of empire are investigated, his attitude to his subjects, and the development of his concepts of personal divinity and universal monarchy. Analogies are thus drawn with the Spanish conquest of Mexico, which has a comparable historiographical tradition and parallels many of Alexander's dealings with his subjects. Although of concern to the specialist, this book is equally directed at the general reader interested in the history of Alexander and the morality of empire.

An inside account of the U.S. military operation to restore Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in 1994, this study demonstrates progress made in joint warfighting in the period following the end of the Cold War, including improvements in command and control, joint force integration, and techniques for successful humanitarian operations. DEGREESL With ties to Haiti that date back over one hundred years, the United States could not stand by as a coup ousted Aristide in 1990. When the coup leaders refused to leave peacefully, forces authorized by the U.N. Security Council deployed toward Haiti. Diplomatic efforts by former President Carter, General Powell, and Senator Nunn eventually obtained the cooperation of coup leaders in the final hour, and on September 19, 1994, the first of over 50,000 U.S. military personnel arrived to ensure security, facilitate Aristide's return, and professionalize the Haitian security forces. DEGREESL General Henry Shelton, later the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commanded the joint task force that entered Haiti under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter during one of the few recent instances of U.N. intervention without the concurrence of the host nation. While the operation was unique, its innovations will benefit planners for decades as humanitarian actions around the world continue to be important. This book illustrates the challenges of remaining engaged in support of the United Nations and of conducting modern military operations, which are highly dependent on close interagency and multinational coordination.

The Day is Ours is a dramatic account of two battles that turned the tide of the American Revolution. In this distinguished, highly readable, and richly detailed narrative history, William M. Dwyer reveals as vivid a picture as we are likely to see of a critical period in the American Revolution. He lets the participants--from American, British, and Hessian soldiers to myriad fearful and ambivalent citizens--tell the story in their own words. "Telling the story from the perspective, and often the words, of men in the ranks, Dwyer has written a dramatic account of this turning point in the American Revolution." --James M. McPherson, author of Battle Cry of Freedom " Dwyer] has cast his net wide, taking advantage of newly found or long-obscure accounts published during the celebration of the Revolution's bicentennial. We learn exactly how it was in that momentous time, from letters, diaries and recollections of officers and men on both sides and civilians caught in the middle." --New York Times Book Review "Dwyer has put together a wonderful, lively account that reflects a reporter's respect for quotes from eyewitnesses . . . He presents the facts and lets history speak for itself. The result is enthralling." --The Philadelphia Inquirer "The courage of the common soldier who stayed and fought when the sunshine patriots had all gone home is a story that deserves to be told--and Mr. Dwyer has told it well." --The Wall Street Journal William M. Dwyer is an author, teacher, and veteran journalist who has written for the Trenton Times, New York Times, Commonweal, Christian Science Monitor, and New Jersey Monthly.

When Major Michael Donnelly was instructing his U.S. Air Force student pilots, he used to tell them three things: Timing is everything; it's nice to be lucky; and there is no justice. Highly decorated fighter pilot, proud young patriot, loyal friend with a mischievous sense of humor, loving husband and father of two, he could not have imagined the tragic meaning those words would assume just a few years after his tour of duty in Desert Storm. In 1996 Major Donnelly was diagnosed with ALS, Lou Gehrig's Disease, at the unusually young age of 35; the onset of this illness marked the beginning of a kind of torture beyond the scope of even the most rigorous military survival training. Betrayed by his body, eventually paralyzed and confined to a wheelchair, he experienced another betrayal perhaps even more difficult to comprehend--betrayal by his country. For despite the fact that over 110,000 Desert Storm veterans are sick, many dying of mysterious cancers and neurological diseases, including more than ten times the normal incidence of ALS--and despite all evidence pointing to U.S. troops having been dosed by low levels of Iraqi nerve agents and exposed to chemical weapons' fallout--the Pentagon adamantly denies any connection between their illnesses and their service in the Gulf War. "Falcon's Cry: A Desert Storm Memoir," Michael Donnelly's unforgettable story, is his courageous attempt to unearth the truth and force an acknowledgment of that truth by the government he and his fellow veterans defended with their lives.

Flying 44 fighter jet combat missions in a war fought on an all-or-nothing scale was thrilling for Michael Donnelly. When the war was won, he and his country rejoiced in the knowledge that, unlike in Vietnam, America had gotten it right in the Persian Gulf. Less than a decade later, the world is learning what veterans and their families have known since Desert Storm--we did not get it right at all. Saddam Hussein is still terrorizing a large portion of the globe. Moreover, we did not learn the lesson of Agent Orange which the Department of Defense denied for decades was the cause of early deaths and birth defects among Vietnam veterans and their families. Yet, thanks largely to the testimony of the author before the House of Representatives in 1997, a first step has been taken toward justice for the tens of thousands of Desert Storm veterans who are suffering virtually in isolation, many without any medical or disability benefits. Major Donnelly believes the truth about Gulf War Illnesses will be uncovered by studies funded in the recently passed Omnibus Appropriations bill, as well as through stories like his own, and he fervently hopes that America can, at last, get it right.

The Gulf War has been the only conflict in the last half-century that featured the possible use of chemical-biological weapons against U.S. forces. Vulnerability to such an attack spurred the Department of Defense to action from the first hint of trouble in August 1990 through the end of hostilities in March 1991. Nearly disbanded in 1972, the U.S. Army Chemical Corps would be the prime force in ensuring that U.S. forces could both survive and sustain combat operations under chemical-biological warfare conditions. Focussing on the work of senior Army officials, this account assesses the degree of readiness achieved by the ground war's initiation and the lessons learned since the conflict.

For an appropriately trained and equipped military force, chemical weapons pose not the danger of mass destruction but the threat of mass disruption, no more deadly than smart munitions or B-52 air strikes. This book will reveal a coordinated response to train and equip U.S. forces did take place prior to the feared Iraqi chemical and biological attacks. Undocumented in any other book, it details the plans that rushed sixty Fox reconnaissance vehicles to the Gulf, the worldwide call for protective suits and masks, and the successful placement of biological agent detectors prior to the air offensive. In addition, the work addresses what really happened at Khamisiyah. Were troops exposed to chemical weapons and what is behind the mysterious Gulf War Syndrome?

This work examines the evolution of the British Expeditionary Force's (BEF's) logistic and administrative infrastructure in France and its impact on operations. In so doing, it challenges the popular notion of British generals as bungling incompetents by analyzing an all too often ignored, but crucial, facet of military campaigns. While the BEF may be found wanting in some areas, administration was not one of them. The British generals proved themselves to be thoroughly modern professional officers in the manner in which they solved the ongoing crises that attended the explosive growth of the BEF and its artillery-intensive style of warfare. This study reinvigorates the debate about World War I by examining the understudied field of logistics.

Between 1946 and 1958, the U.S. conducted some 66 nuclear bomb tests in the Marshall Islands. In 1959, this scattering of coral atolls was again chosen as the testing site for a new generation of weapons-long-range missiles fired in the U.S. Then in 1984 a missile fired from California was intercepted by one from Kwajalein atoll: SDI, or Star Wars, was declared a realizable dream. As military researcher Owen Wilkes has noted: "If we could shut down the Pacific Missile Range, we could cut off half the momentum of the nuclear race." This is the story of the preparations for war which every day impinge on tire lives of Pacific Islanders caught on the cutting edge of the nuclear arms race. It is the story of a displaced people contaminated by nuclear fallout, forcibly resettled as their own islands become uninhabitable, and reduced to lives of poverty, ill-health, and dependence. It is also a stirring account of the Marshall Islanders themselves, of their resilience and protest, and of their attempts to seek redress in the courts. It is a shocking and timely study.

When Colonel Charles S. Wainwright (1826-1907), later a brevet brigadier general, was commissioned in the First New York Artillery Regiment of the Army of the Potomac in October 1861, he began a journal. As an officer who fought at Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the Wilderness, Cold Harbor, Spotsylvania, and Petersburg, and who witnessed the leadership of Generals McClellan, Hooker, Burnside, Meade, Grant, and Sheridan, he brilliantly describes his experiences, views, and emotions. But Wainwright's entries go beyond military matters to include his political and social observations. Skillfully edited by Allan Nevins, historian and author of the classic multivolume Ordeal of the Union , this journal is Wainwright's vivid and invaluable gift to posterity.

This important study seeks to address the issues of state building and regime security as key variables affecting and determining a foreign policy-making process during a crisis and confrontation. Mohamedou proceeds from the notion that decision makers' dispositions matter their worldview, ideology, beliefs, and axioms play a role in state building as well as the historical operational environment (societal, regional, and international). The case this study is concerned with is the Second Gulf War, initiated on August 2, 1990, with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and which came to an end on February 28, 1991, after a military confrontation between Iraq and an international coalition of twenty-eight countries led by the United States of America.

This is the first book written that discusses the physics of designing warheads against ballistic missiles. In his exploration of the mathematical equations and logic behind antiballistic missiles (ATBMs) warhead design, Lloyd takes an in-depth look at warhead design and endgame concepts against ATBMs. Conventional Warhead Systems Physics and Engineering Design features a previously unpublished investigation of energy, momentum, and methods for estimating damage on very complex ballistic missile payloads, such as submunitions of chemical and biological nature. Direct hit, warhead design, and fragmentation are comprehensively discussed for the first time in print. High strain rate, explosives, thermodynamics, heat transfer, chemistry, penetration mechanics, statistics, dynamics, and finite element equations are also covered extensively in this single, compact volume.