The controversial memoir of a top British spy which finally reveals what really went on behind the scenes of the Falklands War For five years before the Falklands War, Hugh Bicheno was one of the top British spies in Argentina. As such, he gathered hard, corroborated intelligence on Argentine intentions over the Falklands - which the British establishment then chose to ignore. The reasons behind this British decision, and its disastrous and inevitable consequences in the South Atlantic, are the main story of this book. There were three main players in the war, each of them trying to overcome their own cultural baggage. The Argentines were riddled with guilt: after years of fighting a morally repugnant campaign against its own people, the Argentine military saw a war for the Malvinas islands as a perfect opportunity to win back their self-respect. The hands of the Americans were also bloody from the likewise dirty wars they had sponsored and abetted in Central America. For Britain it was simply the last straw after decades of humiliation.

In August 1942, Hitler directed all German state institutions to assist Heinrich Himmler, the chief of the SS and the German police, in eradicating armed resistance in the newly occupied territories of Eastern Europe and Russia. The directive for “combating banditry” (Bandenbekämpfung), became the third component of the Nazi regime’s three-part strategy for German national security, with genocide (Endlösung der Judenfrage, or “the Final Solution of the Jewish Question”) and slave labor (Erfassung, or “Registration of Persons to Hard Labor”) being the better-known others. An original and thought-provoking work grounded in extensive research in German archives, Hitler’s Bandit Hunters focuses on this counterinsurgency campaign, the anvil of Hitler’s crusade for empire. Bandenbekämpfung portrayed insurgents as political and racial bandits, criminalized to a greater degree than enemies of the state; moreover, violence against them was not constrained by the prevailing laws of warfare. Philip Blood explains how German forces embraced the Bandenbekämpfung doctrine, demonstrating the equal culpability of both the SS police forces and the “heroic” Waffen-SS combat arm and shattering the contrived postwar distinctions between them. He challenges the traditional view of Himmler as an armchair general and bureaucrat, exposing him as the driving force behind one of the most successful security campaigns in history, and delves into the contentious issue of the complicity of ordinary German police, soldiers, and citizens, as well as the citizens of occupied territories, in these state-sponsored manhunts. This book provokes new debates on the Nazi terrorization of Europe, the blind acquiescence of many, and the courageous resistance of the few.

An overview of higher-level decision making and modern methods to improve decision support. A selective review of modern decision science and implications for decision-support systems. The study suggests ways to synthesize lessons from research on heuristics and biases with those from "naturalistic research." It also discusses modern tools, such as increasingly realistic simulations, multiresolution modeling, and exploratory analysis, which can assist decisionmakers in choosing strategies that are flexible, adaptive, and robust.

At a time when the US and UK are contemplating further imperial adventures in Iran, Not One More Death lays bare the act of blatant state terrorism that is the invasion and occupation of Iraq, and reveals the extraordinary tapestry of lies, distortions and gross media manipulation that underpin it. Here, prominent artists, musicians, playwrights, scientists and writers look at the reality behind the rhetoric: how public opinion is wilfully ignored and democracy used as a figleaf for the furthering of colonial ambitions in the Middle East. Not One More Death calls on the US and UK to withdraw troops from Iraq now, and for Bush and Blair to be brought to account for this illegal war.

A remarkable compendium of the worst military
decisions and the men who made them

The annals of history are littered with horribly bad military leaders. These combat incompetents found amazing ways to ensure their army's defeat. Whether it was a lack of proper planning, miscalculation, ego, bad luck, or just plain stupidity, certain wartime stratagems should never have left the drawing board. Written with wit, intelligence, and eminent readability, "How to Lose a Battle" pays dubious homage to these momentous and bloody blunders, including:

Cannae, 216 B.C.: the bumbling Romans lose 80,000 troops to Hannibal's forces.

The Second Crusade: an entire Christian army is slaughtered when it stops for a drink of water.

The Battle of Britain: Hitler's dreaded Luftwaffe blows it big-time.

Pearl Harbor: more than one warning of the impending attack is there, but nobody listens.

"How to Lose a Battle" includes more than thirty-five chapters worth of astonishing (and avoidable) disasters, both infamous and obscure -- a treasure trove of trivia, history, and jaw-dropping facts about the most costly military missteps ever taken.

Technical appendixes for a study that describes American public opinion toward the use of military force in support of the global war on terrorism. This document supplies the technical appendixes for a study that describes American public opinion toward the use of military force in support of the global war on terrorism (GWOT), delineates the sources of support and opposition, and identifies potential fault lines in support.

Foreign Military Intervention brings together prominent scholars in an ambitious and innovative comparative study. The six case studies-the United States in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Syria in Lebanon, Israel in Lebanon, South Africa and Cuba in Angola, and India in Sri Lanka-constitute a diverse set, involving superpowers and regional powers, democracies and nondemocracies, neighboring states and distant states, and incumbent regimes and insurgent movements.

Using a case study based on the Army's Stryker Brigade Combat team, the authors explore how the Army might improve its ability to contribute to prompt global power projection, that is, strategically responsive early-entry forces for time-critical events.

A Cuban woman who moved to New Orleans in the 1850s, Loreta Janeta Velazquez fought in the Civil War as the cross-dressing Harry T. Buford. As Buford, she single-handedly organized an Arkansas regiment; participated in the historic battles of Bull Run, Fort Donelson, and Shiloh; romanced men and women; and eventually decided that spying as a woman better suited her cause. In the North, she was posed as a double agent and worked to traffic information, drugs, and counterfeit bills to support the Confederate cause. Originally published in 1876, Velazquez's seemingly impossible account has divided scholars, some believing this book to be a generally honest autobiography and others believing it to be mostly fiction.

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 was important for many reasons, even though it has been regarded as something of a side-show by many military historians. It was the first conflict in northern Europe since the Napoleonic era, and the French belief that they still had the elan and verve of the Old Guard was shattered by German needle rifles and long range guns. Aerial warfare had its genesis in the balloons of Paris, yet the belief in Vauban and the system of wall defences prevailed: it was a war of the old versus the new. Forbes, as special correspondent for the 'Daily News' of London saw a great deal of the war. He travelled freely from Cologne in the earliest days of the war, to Paris for the end of it. His observations, although written in a tone seemingly reserved for war correspondents of the nineteenth Century, are culled from his dispatches and have an urgency and currency that is fascinating to read. In view of his position he was privy to the deliberations of both sides, and yet had time to notice the uniform of a Zouave and to include a Prussian military music concert programme. Altogether a first class introduction to a war which deserves more interest than it has so far received. If nothing else, it shows that the standard of war reporting now is not up to that of 1870

A lethal germ is unleashed in the U.S. mail. A chain of letters spreads terror from Florida to Washington, D.C., from New York to Connecticut, from the halls of Congress to the assembly lines of the U.S. Postal Service. Five people die, and ten thousand more line up for antibiotics to protect against exposure. The government, already outsmarted by the terrorist hijackers of 9/11, leaves its workers vulnerable and a diabolical killer on the loose.

Based on hundreds of hours of interviews and a review of thousands of pages of government documents, "The Killer Strain is the definitive account of the year in which bioterrorism became a reality in the United States. Revealing the little-known victims and unsung heroes in the anthrax debacle, investigative reporter Marilyn Thompson also examines the FBI's slow-paced investigation of the crimes and the unprecedented scientific challenges posed by the case.

"The Killer Strain, more than just a thrilling read, is also a clarion wake-up call. It shows how billions of dollars and a decade of elaborate bioterror dress rehearsals meant nothing in the face of a real attack -- and how we may still be at risk.

On Friday, August 7, 1942, at 1300, after a furious cannonading by the Navy fighting vessels slamming salvo after salvo into the shores, 36-year-old Marine Sergeant Abraham Felber jumped from a Higgins boat onto Beach Red in the first-wave assault on the deadly jungle island of Guadalcanal. Felber was responsible for writing the Record of Events for his unit, and recorded in meticulous detail the fighting that wrested Guadalcanal from the enemy in the skies, off the shores, and in the muddy jungles.

This work is part of the diary that Abraham Felber kept during his service in World War II. It begins with January 7, 1941, and ends with December 31, 1945. As the 1st Sergeant of Headquarters Battery, 11th Marines, Felber dealt with both officers and enlisted men, which exposed him to the perspectives and insights of both. Felber was also granted the unusual privilege of taking photographs during the Guadalcanal and Cape Gloucester campaigns, some of which are published here for the first time. Felber's accounts of his units role in the combat at Guadalcanal and Cape Gloucester; his time at Guantanamo Bay, Parris Island and Camp Lejune; daily life, and other experiences are presented here as he recorded them.

Provides a definition of capabilities-based planning, puts it in the larger context of defense activities generally, and sketches an analytic architecture for carrying it out. Capabilities-based planning has become a central theme of defense planning. It is defined in broad terms in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, but opinions differ about its details and how to implement it. This book reviews and extends ideas developed over the last decade regarding capabilities-based planning. It puts capabilities-based planning in the larger context of defense activities generally, sketches an analytic architecture for carrying it out, and offers recommendations about how to proceed, including a suggested architecture that emphasizes mission-level work and such concepts as mission-system analysis, exploratory analysis, and hierarchical portfolio methods for integration and tradeoffs in an economical framework. Capabilities-based planning is related to the objective of transforming U.S. forces to deal effectively with the changes taking place in military affairs. The book also emphasizes that the new paradigm of capabilities-based planning is particularly apt given the objective of transforming U.S. forces to deal effectively with the changes taking place in military affairs.