Presenting a significant new interpretation of Napoleonic warfare, Robert M. Epstein argues persuasively that the true origins of modern war can be found in the Franco-Austrian War of 1809.

Epstein contends that the 1809 war--with its massive and evenly matched armies, multiple theaters of operation, new command-and-control schemes, increased firepower, frequent stalemates, and large-scale slaughter--had more in common with the American Civil War and subsequent conflicts than with the decisive Napoleonic campaigns that preceded it.

Epstein examines 1809 in terms of the evolving new systems of recruitment, organization, and command used by both sides. As he shows, this was the first time that two states confronted each other on the battlefield with armies created by large-scale conscription, organized in corps, and coordinated along two major theaters of operation (Danubian and Italian). As a result, the opponents were forced into "distributed maneuvers" that produced broad operational fronts in which battles became both sequential and simultaneous, but ultimately indecisive.

Ironically, as Epstein points out, neither Napoleon nor the opposing commander Archduke Charles ever fully understood that a paradigm shift had occurred in the conduct of war. Regardless, after 1809, warfare would never be the same.

Undoubtedly the most famous work of military history of the nineteenth century, Edward S. Creasy's "Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World" has been read and re-read for close to 150 years. It is not only the authoritative account of each battle that makes Creasy's work such a classic--it is his command of narrative, his interest in human struggle, his profound deductions as to effects of the battles, and his striving after truth. Furthermore, his selections seem as wise and well-considered today as when "Fifteen Decisive Battles" first appeared in 1851: Nobody since has made better ones, nor given us better accounts. Apart from the scholarship and literary skill of Creasy's book, there is another reason it has endured: Creasy was essentially fair-minded. He had been a judge, and when he became England's great military critic and historian, he maintained a thoroughly judicial attitude. He was not a British partisan, nor French, nor German--he was a cosmopolitan observer of great events.Out of 2300 years, Creasy only found fifteen battles which he called decisive in the highest sense. He chose them not for the number of killed and wounded, nor for their status in myth and lore, but because they fundamentally changed the course of world history. In doing so, he made his book a miniature military history of the western world, a classic that will repay continued study for generations to come, as it has for generations.

America's victory came as a surprise to many people. How did untrained American generals, essentially military amateurs at the outbreak of war, and their ragged, half-starved troops manage to defeat British professionals? To what extent did the quality of British military leadership affect the outcome? Was the American success due to the British commanders' incompetence and faulty strategy, or were timing and opportunity more responsible for Washington and his colleagues' achievement? This book provides superbly balanced portraits of the British and American leadership. Renowned historians have contributed concise, remarkably informative, and authoritative essays on generals of both sides. The military gallery includes such Americans as George Washington, Nathaniel Greene, Benedict Arnold, Marquis de Lafayette, and eight others. The British are well-represented by Thomas Gage, Sir William Howe, Charles Lord Cornwallis, and seven others.Each piece not only explores the subject's personality and exploits, but interprets his contribution to victory or defeat. In the process the scholarship never loses sight of the brave, touchy, brilliant, and flawed personalities who fought beside and against one another. Rarely, if ever, has one volume offered such stimulating commentary and insights into key commanders of the Revolutionary War.

The battle of Leipzig was, in terms of the number of combatants involved, the largest engagement of the entire Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815). It was the only battle of the wars in which all Allied armies (including even the Swedes) fielded troops against Napoleon. Peter Hofschroer looks at the run-up to this crucial encounter as well as the battle itself. A wealth of background information is chronicled, including the strategies of both sides and detailed information on each of the combatant forces. The numerous battles leading up to Leipzig are also discussed, providing a fascinating and illuminating overview of the whole campaign.

"Brilliant, hardhitting description of modern war on the U.S. Army's premier training ground. A must-read tactical primer for today's warrior."--John C. "Doc" Bahnsen, Brigadier General, USA (Ret.) At the turn of the century a small, humorous book on tactics was published. The Defense of Duffer's Drift quickly became a bestseller and today is still widely read. The Defense of Hill 781 is a modem version of this classic--a tactical primer with ample funpoking, but with serious lessons to be learned. Lt. Col. A. Tack Always Finds himself in the California high desert, alone, disheveled, confused. A guide soon appears to inform him of his situation: He has died and is now in Purgatory (his humility in the Army was somewhat lacking) where he must atone for past sins. Purgatory is, aptly, the U.S. Army's National Training Center (NTC), and Lt. Col. Always may earn his way out by completing a successful mission. Through a series of six missions, the reader plans and fights with Lt. Col. Always, making the split-second decisions that determine victory or defeat, life or death. Through successive difficulties, some important lessons are burned into the commander's brain--lessons about tactics, about people, about what it takes to fight a winning battle. Like Duffer's Drift this book is a valuable resource for all military tacticians. For the armchair general, it is a fascinating look at how the members of a military unit work together in combat.

The earliest battle in history which can be reconstructed in detail, Qadesh (c. 1300 BC) pitted the two great warriors of the age against each other, Muwatallish of Hatti and the great warrior-Pharaoh Rameses II. With the Hittites gaining the initial advantage, all seemed lost until Rameses himself led his personal followers into the fray. However, in spite of the appearance of Egyptian reinforcements, the bravery of the pharaoh and the tactically superior showing of the Egyptian chariotry, the dislocation of his army frustrated the Pharaoh's wider strategic aspirations. Mark Healy recounts the course of this key battle, which could so easily have gone either way.

'. . . an extraordinarily accurate and insightful account of the Cuban missile crisis. I remember well the fear of which he writes so persuasively.'--Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson

This is the first in-depth comparison of German and British infantry tactics, training, and leadership techniques during World War I. Samuels' study undercuts some traditional views about the reasons for German successes and British failures during the Great War and points to how different value systems in the two countries affected their military prowess. This historical study of the doctrines underlying the British and German strategies and their implementation is intended for students of military history and contemporary military strategy. This history first analyzes the development of German infantry tactics and the role of the Storm Battalions and then examines the British attempt to adopt the German defensive systems and points to reasons for flaws in the British doing so. In comparing and contrasting the British and German armies, Samuels outlines the key concepts on which the German defensive system was based and analyzes how forces were trained and leadership was decentralized to produce a dynamic and flexible system. British efforts to adopt the key concepts failed because leadership was centralized and poor training contributed also to combat ineffectiveness.

General George B. McClellan, the self-styled American Napoleon, is one of the most controversial figures of the American Civil War. General-in-chief of the entire Union army at one point, he led the Army of the Potomac through the disaster at Antietam Creek, was subsequently dismissed by Lincoln, and then ran against him in the 1864 presidential campaign. This collection of McClellan's candid letters about himself, his motivations, and his intentions reveals much fresh information on the military operations and political machinations he was involved with, and sheds new light on his complex personality. Stephen Sears, a Civil War expert, Prize-winning author, and biographer of McClellan, here lets this once-removed and now notorious commander speak of himself, providing us with an important first-hand view of what went on behind the scenes of America's greatest and most awful war.

In this volume, historian Milan Hauner brilliantly links the lessons of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with the East/West political struggles of today. Masterfully, he demonstrates the geographical and historical predicates of Russian imperialism in Asia. His analysis focuses on the failed military campaign in Afghanistan and Soviet diplomacy in Southwest Asia as a whole. The results are impressive. The reader is given the advantage of a fuller historical spectrum, and can better grasp the true shape of the present. More importantly, the reader can look into the future. From this vantage point, the constraints, possibilities, and obligations of U.S. diplomacy become more clear. Co-published with the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Noting that the documents pertaining to the Battle of the Little Big Horn are often garbled in editing and quoted out of context, Loyd J. Overfield set out to compile the original orders, letters, and telegrams that put a great fighting machine into motion and soon conveyed the shock of its destruction. Far more readable than today's official documents, they carry the sound of individual voices and clearly state the circumstances surrounding Custer's fall.
The communications of this collection begin with Custer's successful plea to President Grant, who in a fit of pique had originally forbidden him to join his regiment in fighting the hostile Indians. A series of carefully spelled-out field orders is followed by a letter from Major Marcus Reno asking for medical aid for his wounded men after two days of fighting. Included are dispatches from Reno, Gen. Alfred H. Terry, Col. John Gibbon, Capt. Frederick Benteen, and Capt. E.W. Smith. The rosters of officers and enlisted men who fought at the Little Big Horn will be of interest to Custer buffs and historians and also to family genealogists trying to trace ancestors who made history there. Overfield has provided primary sources that amount to a detailed postmortem of events from participants only too aware that history would ask questions.

This collection of exciting, absorbing personal accounts from survivors of the Battle of the Little Bighorn, includes interviews with John Martin, trumpeter and orderly to Lt. Col. George Armstong Custer; Medal of Honor winner Stanislas Roy; Second Lt. Winfield Edgerly; Second Lt. Charles DeRudio; Private Roman Rutten; Sergeant Daniel Knipe; and other Seventh Cavalry men and officers. It also includes accounts from Custer's Indian scouts: Goes Ahead, Hairy Moccasin, Little Sioux, Strike Two, and notably, Curley, the Crow scout who witnessed the attack on the Custer Column. Most importantly, here for the first time are memorable accounts from American Indians who actually fought against Custer: Turtle Rib, Black Bear, He Dog, White Bull, Sturdy Bear, and Foolish Elk, who fought with Crazy Horse on the day of the battle. These American Indian interviews are an important source for scholars of Native American cultures, as well as students of the Indian Wars and Custer's ""Last Stand.

By the 15th century BC the valley of Hwang Ho was dominated by a palace-based military caste which owed its supremacy to a monopoly of bronze-working techniques among a still mainly Stone Age population. To the Shang Dynasty, war was a means of legitimising the power of their new aristocracy. This fascinating volume by C. J. Peers covers the period of China's history from the first documented civilisation to the establishment of an enduring unified empire, examining the history, organisation, uniform and weapons of ancient Chinese armies.

The birth of the Ottoman state is shrouded in legend. Whatever the truth of its origins, the Ottomans formed an Empire which almost succeeded in bringing Christian Europe to its knees. During the last decades of the 13th century, the ambitious Osman Bey's tiny mountain state took eight frontier castles plus the Turkish town of Eskisehir. In 1299 Osman seized Yenisehir after working up the Kara Su valley. With this as its first real capital, the Ottoman state emerged into history poised above the fertile shores of the Sea of Marmara.

Apacheria ran from the Colorado to the Rio Grande and beyond, from the great canyons of the North for a thousand miles into Mexico. Here, where the elusive, phantomlike Apache bands roamed, life was as harsh, cruel, and pitiless as the country itself. The conquest of Apacheria is an epic of heroism, mixed with chicanery, misunderstanding, and tragedy, on both sides.

The author's account of this important segment of Western American history includes the Walapais War, an eyewitness report on the death of the gallant lieutenant Howard B. Cushing, the famous Camp Grant Massacre, General Crook's offensive in Apacheria and his difficulties with General Miles, and the formidable Apache leaders, including Cochise, Delshay, Big Rump, Chunz, Chan-deisi, Victorio, and Geronimo.

Few analysts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would agree with the provocative conclusion of this book. The thesis of most postmortems is that the United States lost the war because of the failure of its foreign policy decisionmaking system. According to Gelb and Betts, however, the foreign policy failed, but the decisionmaking system worked. They attribute this paradox to the efficiency of the system in sustaining an increasingly heavy commitment based on the shared conviction of six administrations that the United States must prevent the loss of Vietnam to communism. However questionable the conviction, and thus the commitment, may have been, the authors stress that the latter "was made and kept for twenty-five years. That is what the system -the shared values, the political and bureaucratic pressures -was designed to do, and it did it." The comprehensive analysis that supports this contention reflects the widest use thus fare of available sources, including recently declassified portions of negotiations documents and files in presidential libraries. The frequently quoted statement of the principals themselves contradict the commonly held view that U.S. leaders were unaware of the consequences of their decisions and deluded by false expectations of easy victory. With few exceptions, the record reveals that these leaders were both realistic and pessimistic about the chances for success in Vietnam. Whey they persisted nonetheless is explained in this thorough account of their decisionmaking from 1946 to 1968, and how their mistakes might be avoided by policymakers in the future is considered in the final chapter.

This is a remarkable series of personal narrations from Western Apaches before and just after the various agencies and sub-agencies were established. It also includes extensive commentary on weapons and traditions, with Apache words and phrases translated and complete annotation.

The reign of Philip IV of Spain is fascinating, as after a century of dominance in Europe, the Spanish hegemony was seriously challenged by France. At the beginning of Philip IV's reign, Spanish dominions were vast, not only in Europe but also in South America, Asia and Africa. The defense policy of such vast territories was established in the XVI century and consisted of the deployment of two core armies, in the Low Countries and in north Italy, the maintenance of strategic garrisons, and of fleets in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean to control communications between all the territories of the monarchy. The different military formations were actively supported by a powerful diplomatic network among the European countries. The aim of the book is to examine the armies and troops of Philip IV and particularly the famous Spanish Tercios deployed in north Europe, Italy and in the Iberian Peninsula. The book covers the organization and development of the Tercios, the tactics used, recruitment and the life of the ordinary soldiers. The development of the Spanish cavalry and its organization is also covered in depth, along with the financing of the army. The book also explores the impact of continuous fighting during a period of 44 years to keep the honor and reputation of the Spanish monarchy, as well as their territories intact, and how the army responded to these challenges.

The book describes and analyses the Scanian War, which was fought from 1675 to 1679 between, on one side, primarily Brandenburg and Denmark-Norway and, on the other, Sweden. The war was mainly fought in Scania, the former Danish lands along the border with Sweden, and in northern Germany. The Danish objective was to retrieve Scania which, a generation earlier, had been captured by Sweden and ceded by Denmark. However, the Danish invasion of Scania was defeated by the young Swedish King Charles XI. Although the Danish fleet was victorious at sea, and an alliance headed by Brandenburg defeated the Swedes in Germany, the subsequent peace negotiations resulted in no major territorial changes. Danish partisans continued guerrilla operations in Scania for years, yet the former Danish territories remained in Swedish hands. The Scanian War was bloody, even by contemporary standards, and from a military point of view, quite inconclusive. Yet, Sweden's experiences in the Scanian War laid the foundation for the first substantial reform of the Swedish army since the Thirty Years' War. Based on what he had learnt, King Charles XI restructured the Swedish army and established a comprehensive military system that enabled Sweden to repeatedly mobilise trained armies during the even more devastating Great Northern War (1700-1721) which followed a generation later. Moreover, several recent archaeological excavations have increased our knowledge of the Scanian War, as well as the conditions of late seventeenth-century battles. The book describes the war and its results, and summarises the archaeological findings.

Over 2600 years ago the Parian poet Archilochus wrote "we chased seven and killed them.. the thousand of us." In all parts of the world, and in all civilizations, the history of warfare, as well as the ironic humour of those who fight and die, can be traced back to the earliest records. But the vocabulary of modern warfare - army, military, strategy, tactics - derives from Greek and Latin, while metaphors of conflict similarly evoke ancient times. Such expressions and phrases as "Live by the sword and die by the sword", "Pyrrhic victory", and "arms and the man" are commonplace, and all come from the classical age. Wilfred Owen, famous soldier of the Great War, could write the bitter line "the old lie: Dulce et decorum est/pro patria mori" while expecting his readers to understand both Latin and allusion. Combining astute analysis of the logistics of conflict with the ethics of war, and drawing on a diverse range of cultural texts (from the Iliad to Hugo Grotius and von Clausewitz), Alfred S Bradford draws fascinating parallels between warfare and battle in ancient and modern societies. He shows that despite huge differences in weaponry and firepower, the basic principles of warfare have remained unchanged over thousands of years. War in the modern age is persistently illuminated by antiquity.

The arrival of the aerostatic balloon at the end of the nineteenth century ushered in a new perspective on the battlefield, taking over from the mount - the hill at the edge of the field of combat - and the fortified tower positioned within it. Since then there has been no perspective more culpable in war, violence and security than the aerial one. From Above explores the aerial view in new depth and clarity. It draws in vivid detail on studies of the aerial perspective today and on rich empirical investigations of the aerial view from the past. Chapters examine a range of case studies and examples, from Vietnam and the balloon prospect, camouflage, colonial policing, to today's drone wars. The contributors draw on perspectives from history, international relations, political geography and cultural studies in order to provide a truly interdisciplinary perspective on the view from above. They also consider the view from above in relation to its technologies, legalities, practices, doctrines, and visual culture. Among the contributors are renowned international experts such as Derek Gregory, Trevor Paglen, Caren Kaplan, Klaus Dodds and Priya Satia. The aerial view is a perspective that can no longer be ignored, one that is of growing significance for those interested in geopolitics, militarism and conflict.

In 1779 Sir Henry Clinton and more than eight thousand British troops left the waters of New York, seeking to capture the colonies' most important southern port, Charleston, South Carolina. Clinton and his officers believed that victory in Charleston would change both the seat of the war and its character. In this comprehensive study of the 1780 siege and surrender of Charleston, Carl P. Borick offers a full examination of the strategic and tactical elements of Clinton's operations. Suggesting that the importance of the siege has been underestimated, Borick contends that the British effort against Charleston was one of the most critical campaigns of the war. Borick examines the reasons for the shift in British strategy, the efforts of their army and navy, and the difficulties the patriots faced as they defended the city. He explores the roles of key figures in the campaign, including Benjamin Lincoln, William Moultrie, and Lord Charles Cornwallis. Borick relies on an impressive array of primary and secondary sources relating to the siege and includes maps that depict the British approach to the city and the complicated military operations that led to the patriots' greatest defeat of the American Revolution.

An analysis and summary of the events of the Cold War. It discusses the different interpretations and provides a selection of essays on the origins of the Cold War by well-known politicians and scholars, including Averell Harriman, John Gaddis, Thomas McCormick, Radomir Luza, Geir Lundestad, Alan S. Milward, Antony Carew, Michael Hogan, Lutz Niethammer, Marc Trachtenberg and Mark Kramer. The roles of the giants of history, such as Churchill, Stalin and Truman, as well as those of local leaders, are illuminated. Special emphasis is placed on the political economy of the Cold War, the Marshall Plan, and welfare capitalism. This third edition draws upon documentation from Soviet archives that was not previously available, and opens up the role of nuclear strategy in the Soviet-American conflict. The editor's introduction likewise reconsiders the historiography of the Cold War in the light of the archival disclosures.

Now in paperback From the author of the Navy SEALs Oral History series-an intimate look at the world's most efficient and deadly warriors.
Snipers have a rich history. This fascinating book follows their tasks and techniques from the Revolutionary and Civil Wars through both World Wars, to the Korean War and Vietnam-the genesis of modern sniping-to the current conflicts in the Middle East. Also, readers will see how sniping has evolved on the civilian side in law enforcement. Readers will learn about the tools of the trade, but most importantly, they will hear from the experts themselves: military snipers, as well as civilian police and SWAT snipers. Capturing the suspense and action of the hunt, the words of these men draw readers into the close-knit, little-known world of men who need only one bullet to get the job done.

In The Costs of War: International Law, the UN, and World Order After Iraq, Richard Falk, brings together some of his recent essays, published and unpublished, examining the impact that the Iraq War has had and will have on international law, human rights, and democracy.

A new introduction provides an overview as well as a sense of the current context and reflects on the internal prospects for Iraq and on the logic of an early U.S. military and political withdrawal.

Having been revised and updated to take account of the march of events, the essays are organized into the following sections:

• Part 1 addresses the effects of the American invasion and occupation of Iraq on the current dimensions of world order
• Part 2 provides a normative inquiry into the larger intentions and consequences of the Iraq War
• Part 3 considers the more fundamental implications of the Iraq War, especially on our understanding of war as an instrument for the solution of conflict.

Falk demonstrates the dysfunctionality of war in relation to either anti-terrorism or the pursuit of a global security system based on military dominance; the historical potential of a realistic Gandhiism as a positive alternative in the setting of global policy in the twenty-first century.

The Costs of War will be of interest to students and scholars of political science, media studies, and politics and international relations in general.