This book is an abridged edition of the critically acclaimed, three-volume "Dictionary of American Military Biography" (Greenwood Press, 1984). The scope of the original work encompassed a much wider range of people than soldiers; it included politicians, scientists, inventors, explorers, physicians, and humanitarians who had a significant impact on American military history. This new edition focuses on the most distinguished and important battle commanders in American history from colonial times to the present. Each essay incorporates the latest scholarship on the life under study, depicting the background, education, professional development, and accomplishments of the most notable practitioners of the art of war. Unlike most works of this genre, "American Military LeaderS" offers critical appraisals of its subjects. The essays were contributed by some 100 military historians. Cross references and bibliographies are provided. There is a new introduction and an enhanced reference index.

This careful abridgement of an acknowledged classic guide to military history can be used as a supplementary text for courses on the evolution of war and American military history. Professional soldiers will welcome its emphasis on battlefield warriors and military history buffs will find it both insightful and enjoyable reading.

First published in 1926 and respected ever since for its measured view of the most famous battle in the American West, "The Story of the Little Big Horn" asks questions that are still being debated. What were the causes of the debacle that wiped out Custer's command? Was it due to lack of a definite battle plan? To lack of correct information about the number, organization, and equipment of the Indians? To Custer's hot-headedness and thirst for glory? To Reno's alleged cowardice? To Benteen's delay in providing reinforcement? In his factual but dramatic account, W. A. Graham suggests that an awesome concatenation of attitudes and circumstances ensured the defeat of the Seventh Cavalry. On that Sunday in June 1876, the Indians were simply better (though not braver) soldiers.

The British Army currently enjoys, both at home and abroad, the reputation of being one of the best in the world. Composed entirely of volunteers, its morale sustained by its curious and little-understood attitudes towards tradition, the British Army attracts respect and admiration from the military expert and the layman alike. Written and illustrated by a former British Army infantryman with 22 years' experience, this book details the Army's history, organization, uniforms and distinctions. The text is backed by numerous illustrations and photographs.

This engrossing anthology gathers together a remarkable collection of writings on the use of strategy in war. Gerard Chaliand has ranged over the whole of human history in assembling this collection--the result is an integration of the annals of military thought that provides a learned framework for understanding global political history.
Included are writings from ancient and modern Europe, China, Byzantium, the Arab world, Persia, and the Ottoman Empire. Alongside well-known militarists such as Julius Caesar, Napoleon, Walter Raleigh, Rommel, and many others are "irregulars" such as Cortes, Lawrence of Arabia, and even Gandhi. Contrary to standard interpretations stressing competition between land and sea powers, or among rival Christian societies, Chaliand shows the great importance of the struggles between nomadic and sedentary peoples, and of the conflicts between Christianity and Islam. With the invention of firepower, a relatively recent occurrence in the history of warfare, modes of organization and strategic concepts--elements reflecting the nature of a society--have been key to how war is waged.
Unparalleled in its breadth, this anthology will become the standard work for understanding a fundamental part of human history--the conduct of war.
"This anthology is not only an unparalleled corpus of information and an aid to failing memory; it is also and above all a reliable and liberating guide for research. . . . Ranging "from the origins to the nuclear age," it compels us to widen our narrow perspectives on conflicts and strategic action and open ourselves up to the universal."--from the Foreword

"An Apache Campaign in the Sierra Madre" is a crackling, swift-moving narrative of General George Crook's pursuit of Geronimo and other Apache Indians across southern Arizona and New Mexico to the Sierra Madre in Mexico in 1883. The Chiricahua Apaches and their culture, the towns and landscapes, the progress of the military expedition--all are observed at first hand by General Crook's aide-de-camp, Captain John G. Bourke, who will be remembered for this and another classic, "On the Border with Crook."

Public consciousness of the threat of nuclear war is rising steadily. Responses to the nuclear dilemma are conflicting and often confusing. Never have we been more in need of information and perspective, for if we wish to avoid war we must understand it. Michael Howard offers an analysis of our present predicament by discussing those issues that cause war and make peace. His book includes an examination of nuclear strategy today, views of the past about the conduct of international relations, ethics, modes of defense, and studies of military thinkers and leaders. "The Causes of Wars" illuminates the interrelationship between men and ideas, between war and other social forces, and between our present situation and its roots in the past.

Apacheria ran from the Colorado to the Rio Grande and beyond, from the great canyons of the North for a thousand miles into Mexico. Here, where the elusive, phantomlike Apache bands roamed, life was as harsh, cruel, and pitiless as the country itself. The conquest of Apacheria is an epic of heroism, mixed with chicanery, misunderstanding, and tragedy, on both sides.

The author's account of this important segment of Western American history includes the Walapais War, an eyewitness report on the death of the gallant lieutenant Howard B. Cushing, the famous Camp Grant Massacre, General Crook's offensive in Apacheria and his difficulties with General Miles, and the formidable Apache leaders, including Cochise, Delshay, Big Rump, Chunz, Chan-deisi, Victorio, and Geronimo.

This is a remarkable series of personal narrations from Western Apaches before and just after the various agencies and sub-agencies were established. It also includes extensive commentary on weapons and traditions, with Apache words and phrases translated and complete annotation.

From 1832 to 1891 the states from the Great Lakes west to Oregon and south to Mexico saw scenes of massacre, bloody rout, amabush, fire, and pillage as the great Indian tribes--Blackfoot, Cheyenne, Sioux, Arapaho, Modoc, and Apache--fought desperately to turn back the invading white men. Recreated in this volume are twenty-odd battles crucial in the opening of the American West to white settlement. Among the battles included here are the Pierre's Hole fight, the battle of Bandera Pass, the battle of Pyramid Lake, the battle of Wood Lake, the Canyon de Chelly rout, the battles of Adobe Walls, the Fetterman, Hayfield, and Wagon Box fights, the fight at Beecher Island, the battle of the Washita, the battles of Massacre Canyon and Palo Duro Canyon, the battle of the Rosebud, the battle of the Little Bighorn, the Dull Knife massacre, and the final, tragic battle at Wounded Knee. "A fine guide to the conflict that transpired across the wide Missouri."--San Francisco Sunday Chronicle "An excellent account of most of the major fights between the white man and the Indian in...the western part of the United States." --Library Journal "Two dozen of the most celebrated and hair-raising Indian fights on record. Good, solid reading, and a whole peck of it."--New York Times Book Review

"The times Kakar writes about have . . . pervasively influenced every life in Afghanistan. . . . He was continuously faced with different versions of the Afghan experience as his country went through one of the great cataclysms of its history. We are fortunate to have his account."--Robert Canfield, editor of "Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective

"This is the first history of recent events in Afghanistan by a native historian trained in London. Kakar writes objectively about the Soviets, the Afghan government, and the Mujahideen. With personal observations, including years spent in Kabul's notorious Pul-i Charkhi prison, this book is unique in revealing many events hitherto not known or recorded. It will remain a standard work on the tragic years of contemporary Afghanistan."--Richard N. Frye, Harvard University

"Kakar, one of Afghanistan's most distinguished scholars, has provided an outstanding account of a complex and interesting phase of modern Afghanistan history. . . . A fascinating and absorbing analysis . . . exhaustive and most valuable."--Vartan Gregorian, President, Brown University

From the North African desert to the bloody stalemate in Italy, from the London blitz to the D-Day beaches, a group of highly courageous and extremely talented American journalists reported the war against Nazi Germany for a grateful audience. Based on a wealth of previously untapped primary sources, War Beat, Europe provides the first comprehensive account of what these reporters witnessed, what they were allowed to publish, and how their reports shaped the home front's perception of some of the most pivotal battles in American history. In a dramatic and fast-paced narrative, Steven Casey takes readers from the inner councils of government, where Franklin D. Roosevelt and George Marshall held clear views about how much blood and gore Americans could stomach, to the command centers in London, Algiers, Naples, and Paris, where many reporters were stuck with the dreary task of reporting the war by communique. At the heart of this book is the epic journey of reporters like Wes Gallagher and Don Whitehead of the Associated Press, Drew Middleton of the New York Times, Bill Stoneman of the Chicago Daily News, and John Thompson of the Chicago Tribune; of columnists like Ernie Pyle and Hal Boyle; and of photographers like Margaret Bourke-White and Robert Capa. These men and women risked their lives on countless occasions to get their dispatches and their images back home. In providing coverage of war in an open society, they also balanced the weighty responsibility of adhering to censorship regulations while working to sell newspapers and maintaining American support for the war. These reporters were driven by a combination of ambition, patriotism, and belief in the cause. War Beat, Europe shows how they earned their reputation as America's golden generation of journalists and wrote the first draft of World War II history for posterity.

Few would contest that the U.S. occupation of Iraq is a clear example of just how fraught a military occupation can become. In Occupational Hazards, David M. Edelstein elucidates the occasional successes of military occupations and their more frequent failures. Edelstein has identified twenty-six cases since 1815 in which an outside power seized control of a territory where the occupying party had no long-term claim on sovereignty.

In a book that has implications for present-day policy, he draws evidence from such historical cases as well as from four current occupations Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq where the outcome is not yet known. Occupation is difficult, in Edelstein's view, because ambitious goals require considerable time and resources, yet both the occupied population and the occupying power want occupation to end quickly and inexpensively; in drawn-out occupations, impatience grows and resources dwindle.

This combination sabotages the occupying power's ability to accomplish two tasks: convince an occupied population to suppress its nationalist desires and sustain its own commitment to the occupation. Structural conditions and strategic choices play crucial roles in the success or failure of an occupation. In describing those factors, Edelstein prescribes a course of action for the future."

The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice is an original contribution to the general theory of strategy. While heavily indebted to Carl von Clausewitz, Sun-tzu, and the very few other classic authors, this book presents the theory, rather than merely comments on the theory as developed by others. The author explains that the purpose of strategy is to connect purposefully politics and policy with the instruments they must use. The primary focus of attention is on military strategy, but this focus is well nested in discussion of grand strategy, for which military strategy is only one strand. The book presents the general theory of strategy comprehensively and explains the utility of this general theory for the particular strategies that strategists need to develop in order to meet their historically unique challenges. The book argues that strategy's general theory provides essential education for practicing strategists at all times and in all circumstances. As general theory, The Strategy Bridge is as relevant to understanding strategic behaviour in the Peloponnesian War as it is for the conflicts of the twenty-first century. The book proceeds from exposition of general strategic theory, to address three basic issue areas that are not at all well explained, let alone understood with a view to advancing better practice, in the extant literature. Specifically, the book tackles the problems that harass and imperil strategic performance; it probes deeply into the hugely underexamined subject of just what it is that the strategist produces-strategic effect; and it 'joins up the dots' from theory through practice to consequences by means of a close examination of command performance. The author takes a holistic view of strategy, and it is rigorously attentive to the significance of the contexts within which and for which strategies are developed and applied. The book regards the strategist as a hero, charged with the feasible, but awesomely difficult, task of converting the threat and use of force (for military strategy) into desired political consequences. He seeks some control over the rival or enemy via strategic effect, the instrumental produce of his instrumental labours. In order to maximise his prospects for success, the practicing strategist requires all the educational assistance that strategic theory can provide.

A magisterial survey of medieval siege warfare in the middle ages, tracing links across continents and linking contemporary historical accounts with archaeological studies. Sieges were the predominant form of warfare across the medieval world and siege methods and technology developed alongside improvements in defence. This book goes back to the original sources to present a comprehensive view of thewhole subject, tracing links across continents and analysing the relationship with changes in the design of town and castle defences, and linking contemporary historical accounts with archaeological studies. It considers the mostimportant questions raised by siege warfare: who designed, built and operated siege equipment? How did medieval commanders gain their knowledge? What were the roles of theoretical texts and the developing science of siege warfare? How did nomadic peoples acquire siege skills? Were castles and town walls built purely of a military purpose, or did they play a symbolic role also? The first volume begins in 450 AD with the replacement of the westernRoman empire by barbarian successor states, but also examines the development of the Byzantine Empire, the Muslim Caliphate and its successors, and the links with China, through to the early thirteenth century. The second continues with the Mongol conquests in Asia and Europe and the thirteenth-century apogee of pre-gunpowder siege warfare, before examining the slow impact of guns and the cumulatively massive changes in attack and defence of the fifteenthcentury.

Based on official records held at the National Archives and other published sources, 'Hunters over Arabia' presents an in-depth account of the operations performed by the Hawker Hunter squadrons policing the desert wastelands and high mountain ranges of the Middle East. Copiously illustrated with colour and black and white photographs, a high percentage of operations performed by this versatile British ground attack and reconnaissance fighter are described in detail. Using a chronological format, the narrative focuses on the period during which the Hunter served in the Middle East, from 1960 to 1971. Further chapters are dedicated to the three Hunter variants most closely associated with the Middle East, the FGA.9, FR.10 and T.7, together with their respective allocation dates. A short background to Aden, its historical links to Britain, and RAF airfields administered by Middle East Command complete this factual account.

'War,' wrote Cardinal Richelieu, 'is one of the scourges with which it has pleased God to afflict men'. Yet the prelate's mournful observation scarcely begins to encapsulate the full complexity and unspeakable horror of the greatest man-made calamity to befall Europe before the twentieth century. Claiming far more lives proportionately than either the First or Second World Wars, it was a contest involving all the major powers of Europe, in which vast mercenary armies extracted an incalculable toll upon helpless civilian populations as their commanders and the men who equipped them frequently grew rich on the profits. Swedish troops alone are said to have destroyed some 2,000 German castles, 18,000 villages and 1,500 towns, while other vast armies in the pay of Spain, France, the Holy Roman Emperor and a host of pettier princelings brought death to as many as 8 million souls. Rarely has such a perplexing tale been more in need of a new account that is both compelling and informed, and no less comprehensible than comprehensive.

The 48th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook analyses developments in 2016 in: -Security and conflicts -Military spending and armaments -Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament The SIPRI Yearbook contains extensive annexes on the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements and a chronology of events during the year in the area of security and arms control.

In the first half of the twentieth century, both czarist Russia and its successor, the Soviet Union, were confronted with the problem of conducting military operations involving mass armies along the broad fronts, a characteristic of modern war. Despite the ideological and technological differences between the two regimes, both strove toward a theory which became known as operational art-that level of warfare that links strategic goals to actual combat engagements.

From the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, through World War I, the civil war, and to the eve of World War II, modern operational art grew from theoretical speculations by a small group of officers to become a critical component of the Soviet art of war. In this first comprehensive treatment of the subject, Richard Harrison shows how this theory emerged and developed to become--despite radically different political settings and levels of technology--essential to the Red Army's victory over Germany in World War II.

Tracking both continuity and divergence between the imperial and Red armies, Harrison analyzes, on the basis of theoretical writings and battlefield performance, the development of such operationally significant phenomena as the "front" (group of armies), consecutive operations, and the deep operation, which relied upon aircraft and mechanized formations to penetrate the kind of intractable defense systems that characterized so much of World War I.

Drawing upon a wide range of sources, including memoirs, theoretical works, and materials from the Russian military archives (many presented here for the first time), Harrison traces the debates within the Russian and Soviet armies that engaged such theorists as Neznamov, Svechin, Triandafillov, and Isserson. The end result is an exemplary military intellectual history that helps illuminate a critical element in the "Russian way of war."

The impact of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 was incalculable. It was the first victory by an Asian power over a European one since the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century. Japanese victory was ascribed to the "spirit" of the Japanese people, which helped their soldiers to overcome superior numbers and technology. A fascinating glimpse into prevailing nationalistic and militaristic attitudes in early-twentieth-century Japan, "Human Bullets" is also an engaging story of combat and an excellent source of insights about a relatively obscure but immensely influential conflict. Tadyoshi Sakurai was a junior officer in the Japanese campaign against Port Arthur, Russia's ice-free port in China. His account is an interesting introduction to the concept of "yamato-damashii," or "traditional Japanese spirit." This spirit was something greater than mere high morale. Japanese soldiers were the emperor's "human bullets." Like bullets, they were unconcerned with victory, comfort, or self-preservation, existing only to strike the enemy.

Victor Israelyan was a senior ambassador in the Soviet Foreign Ministry when the armies of Egypt and Syria invaded Israeli-occupied territory on October 6, 1973. Critical to the outcome of this conflict were the Soviet Union and the United States, whose diplomatic maneuverings behind the scenes eventually ended what came to be known as the Yom Kippur War. During the crisis, however, tensions between the superpowers nearly escalated into nuclear war. Israelyan is the first Soviet official to give us a firsthand account of what actually happened inside the Kremlin during these three important weeks in 1973.

Israelyan's account is a fascinating mixture of memoir, anecdotes, and historical reporting. As a member of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's staff, he was assigned to a four-man task force that attended the many Politburo meetings held during the war. The job of this task force was to take notes and prepare drafts of letters and other documents for the Politburo. In remarkable detail, made possible by his sharp memory and the notes and documents he saved, Israelyan chronicles the day-by-day activities of Kremlin leaders as they confronted the crisis. For the first time we can see how the cumbersome Soviet policy-making mechanism, headed by the Politburo, functioned in a tense international situation. We see how the actions of Henry Kissinger, Anwar Sadat, Hafiz al-Assad, and other participants in the crisis were interpreted in Moscow. From his own experience Israelyan gives us intimate portraits of top Soviet officials including Brezhnev, Gromyko, and Andropov. His access to important documents--including letters from Richard Nixon to Leonid Brezhnev, never officially released in the U.S.--provide a much-needed corrective to assertions made by Kissinger, Nixon, and Sadat about the war.

Supplemented by rare photographs and interviews with other Soviet officials, Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War is more than a record of the past. Israelyan offers a unique vantage point on the continuing Middle East conflict, and his candid assessment of the mindset of Russian leaders is instructive for understanding how the present leadership of Russia faces its new role in the post-Cold War world.

The first book to appear in the illustrious Oxford History of the United States, this critically acclaimed volume-a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize-offers an unsurpassed history of the Revolutionary War and the birth of the American republic. Beginning with the French and Indian War and continuing to the election of George Washington as first president, Robert Middlekauff offers a panoramic history of the conflict between England and America, highlighting the drama and anguish of the colonial struggle for independence. Combining the political and the personal, he provides a compelling account of the key events that precipitated the war, from the Stamp Act to the Tea Act, tracing the gradual gathering of American resistance that culminated in the Boston Tea Party and "the shot heard 'round the world." The heart of the book features a vivid description of the eight-year-long war, with gripping accounts of battles and campaigns, ranging from Bunker Hill and Washington's crossing of the Delaware to the brilliant victory at Hannah's Cowpens and the final triumph at Yorktown, paying particular attention to what made men fight in these bloody encounters. The book concludes with an insightful look at the making of the Constitution in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 and the struggle over ratification. Through it all, Middlekauff gives the reader a vivid sense of how the colonists saw these events and the importance they gave to them. Common soldiers and great generals, Sons of Liberty and African slaves, town committee-men and representatives in congress-all receive their due. And there are particularly insightful portraits of such figures as Sam and John Adams, James Otis, Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, and many others. This new edition has been revised and expanded, with fresh coverage of topics such as mob reactions to British measures before the War, military medicine, women's role in the Revolution, American Indians, the different kinds of war fought by the Americans and the British, and the ratification of the Constitution. The book also has a new epilogue and an updated bibliography. The cause for which the colonists fought, liberty and independence, was glorious indeed. Here is an equally glorious narrative of an event that changed the world, capturing the profound and passionate struggle to found a free nation.

Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution vests in Congress the power "to declare War." Pursuant to that power, Congress has enacted 11 declarations of war during the course of American history relating to five different wars, the most recent being those that were adopted during World War II. In addition, Congress has adopted a number of authorizations for the use of military force, the most recent being the joint resolution enacted on October 16, 2002, authorizing the use of military force against Iraq. To buttress the nations ability to prosecute a war or armed conflict, Congress has also enacted numerous statutes which confer standby authority on the President or the executive branch and are activated by the enactment of a declaration of war, the existence of a state of war, or the promulgation of a declaration of national emergency. This book examines a number of topics related to declarations of war and authorizations for the use of military force by the United States. It provides historical background on each of the declarations of war and on several major authorizations for the use of force that have been enacted; analyzes the implications of declarations of war and authorizations for the use of force under both international law and domestic law; lists and summarizes the more than 250 standby statutory authorities that can come into effect pursuant to a declaration of war, the existence of a state of war, and/or a declaration of national emergency; describes the procedures in Congress governing the consideration of declarations of war and authorizations for the use of force, including the procedures under the War Powers Resolution; and sets forth in two appendices the texts of all of the declarations of war and the major authorisations for the use of force that have been enacted.

Throughout its history, the Department of Defense (DOD) has relied on contractors to support a wide range of military operations. Operations over the last thirty years have highlighted the critical role that contractors play in supporting U.S. troops - both in terms of the number of contractors and the type of work being performed. Over the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan, and before that, in the Balkans, contractors accounted for 50% or more of the total military force. Regardless of whether future operations are similar to, or significantly different from, those of the past decade most analysts and defence officials believe that contractors will continue to play a central role in overseas military operations. Consequently, these observers believe that the DOD should be prepared to effectively award and manage contracts at a moment's notice, anywhere in the world, in unknown environments, and on a scale that may exceed the total contract obligations of any other federal agency. This book provides background information and identifies issues for Congress on the use of contractors to support military operations. The DOD's extensive use of contractors poses several potential policy and oversight issues for Congress and has been the focus of numerous hearings. Congress' decisions on these issues could substantially affect the extent to which the DOD relies on contractors in and is capable of planning for and overseeing contractors in future operations.

In this pioneering book, Irwin M. Wall unravels the intertwining threads of the protracted agony of France's war with Algeria, the American role in the fall of the Fourth Republic, the long shadow of Charles de Gaulle, and the decisive postwar power of the United States. At the heart of this study is an incisive analysis of how Washington helped bring de Gaulle to power and a penetrating revisionist account of his Algerian policy. Departing from widely held interpretations of the Algerian War, Wall approaches the conflict as an international diplomatic crisis whose outcome was primarily dependent on French relations with Washington, the NATO alliance, and the United Nations, rather than on military engagement.
Wall makes extensive use of previously unexamined documents from the Department of State, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and heretofore secret files of the Archives of the French Army at Vincennes and the Colonial Ministry at Aix-en-Provence. He argues convincingly that de Gaulle always intended to keep Algeria French, in line with his goal to make France the center of a reorganized French union of autonomous but depen- dent African states and the heart of a Europe of cooperating states. Such a union, which the French called Eurafrica, would further France's chance to be an equal partner with Britain and the United States in a reordered "Free World."
In recent years the Algerian War has reclaimed its place in popular memory in France. Its interpreters have continued to view the conflict as a national, internal drama and de Gaulle as the second-time savior who ended French participation in a ruinous colonial war. But by analyzing the conflict in terms of French foreign policy, Wall shows the pivotal role of the United States and counters certain political myths that portray de Gaulle as an emancipator of colonial peoples. Wall's interpretation of the Algerian conflict may well spark controversy and will open important new avenues of debate concerning postwar international affairs.