Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919) lived an extraordinary life distinguished by a stunning array of accomplishments: war hero, 26th President, reformer, historian, conservationist, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, author, and explorer. But it was the navy that most fascinated him throughout his long and varied career, and it was in The Naval War of 1812 (published in 1882 when he was only 23) that he first declared his interest. Praised for its scholarship, assurance, and originality, this classic naval history offers stirring and comprehensive accounts of the war's dramatic naval battles, and of the American and English commanders who fought on the vast North American lakes and on the ocean for control of the continent. The book proved instrumental in securing Roosevelt's appointment as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1897, and decisively influenced the U.S. Navy's transformation from a skeletal isolationist force into a formidable international sea power that made U.S expansionism not only possible but inevitable.

How do military organizations assess strategic policy in war? In this book Scott Gartner develops a theory to explain how military and government leaders evaluate wartime performance, how much they change strategies in response to this evaluation, and why they are frequently at odds when discussing the success or failure of strategic performance. Blending history, decision theory, and mathematical modeling, Gartner argues that military personnel do reevaluate their strategies and that they measure the performance of a strategy through quantitative, "dominant" indicators. But different actors within a government use different indicators of success: some will see the strategy as succeeding when others see it as failing because of their different dominant indicators. Gartner tests his argument with three case studies: the British shift to convoys in World War I following the German imposition of unrestricted submarine warfare; the lack of change in British naval policy in the Battle of the Atlantic following the German introduction of Wolf Packs in World War II; and the American decision to deescalate in Vietnam after the Tet Offensive. He also tests his approach in a nonwar situation, analyzing the Carter Administration's decision to launch the hostage rescue attempt. In each case, his dominant indicator model better predicts the observed behavior than either a standard-organization or an action-reaction approach.

The Gulf War has been the only conflict in the last half-century that featured the possible use of chemical-biological weapons against U.S. forces. Vulnerability to such an attack spurred the Department of Defense to action from the first hint of trouble in August 1990 through the end of hostilities in March 1991. Nearly disbanded in 1972, the U.S. Army Chemical Corps would be the prime force in ensuring that U.S. forces could both survive and sustain combat operations under chemical-biological warfare conditions. Focussing on the work of senior Army officials, this account assesses the degree of readiness achieved by the ground war's initiation and the lessons learned since the conflict. For an appropriately trained and equipped military force, chemical weapons pose not the danger of mass destruction but the threat of mass disruption, no more deadly than smart munitions or B-52 air strikes. This book will reveal a coordinated response to train and equip U.S. forces did take place prior to the feared Iraqi chemical and biological attacks. Undocumented in any other book, it details the plans that rushed sixty "Fox" reconnaissance vehicles to the Gulf, the worldwide call for protective suits and masks, and the successful placement of biological agent detectors prior to the air offensive. In addition, the work addresses what really happened at Khamisiyah. Were troops exposed to chemical weapons and what is behind the mysterious Gulf War Syndrome?

Containing the histories (from 1945 to the present) of the nuclear strategies of NATO, Britain and France, and of the defence preferences of the FRG (West Germany) this book shows how strategies were functions of a perceived Soviet threat and an American "nuclear guarantee". There were three options for West Europeans: a compromise with differing American needs in NATO, pursued by Britain and the FRG; national nuclear forces, developed by Britain and France; and projects for an independent European nuclear force.

Desert Storm was the largest naval operation since World War II. Although naval forces did not play the central role, they fulfilled an important function throughout the operation, facing many formidable challenges and considerable risk. This book provides a close examination of the problems encountered by the Navy, both in the military situation and in dealing with the other services, and the decisions made to address these issues. While interservice rivalries sometimes intruded at higher levels, jointness at the tactical level often led to effective combined-arms operations.

Despite the information revolution and improvements in technology, the Fog of War still obscured the battlefield and affected nearly all decisions. This study offers page-turning action, such as SEAL activity and combat search and rescue missions, as well as the exciting and dangerous surface operations that gained sea control of the northern Persian Gulf. Using primary sources such as interviews and many documents cleared only recently for public release, the author covers the relations between General Schwarzkopf and Vice Admirals Mauz and Arthur; the major contribution of Tomahawk cruise missiles to the first wave of attacks on Baghdad; the controversial use of aircraft carriers in the Gulf; as well as the Navy's possible role in the event of an amphibious assault into Kuwait. Those preparing to fight in future naval actions will learn much from this detailed analysis.

Traditionally historians of the Little Big Horn fight have focused on Custer and his troops -- on what they were doing and where they died. But as one Miniconjou warrior told a gathering at a 1926 commemoration of the battle, the Lakotas and Cheyennes also lost brave men. These men had died defending their homes and families, and they too deserved recognition.

Hokahey! A Good Day to Die! details the final moments of each of the fallen Cheyenne and Lakota heroes. Richard G. Hardorff sifted through the many interviews with Indian survivors of the battle, cross-checking every story of a wounded or dead individual to ascertain who was killed, in which action, and by whom. He concludes that the Indian dead comprised thirty-one men, six women, and four children -- astonishingly light losses when compared with the number of cavalry dead. Concise, well-written, and respectful of Cheyenne and Lakota cultural practices, this book is an essential contribution to our understanding of how the Cheyennes and Lakotas waged the Battle of the Little Big Horn.

This authoritative and concise work surveys the range of warfare in the high Middle Ages while reflecting on the society that produced these military struggles. The book brings together for the first time a wealth of information on such topics as knighthood, military organization, weaponry and fortifications, and warfare in the East. In 1095 with the launching of the First Crusade, Europeans established a great military endeavour to save the Holy Land, an undertaking that remained a central preoccupation until the end of the thirteenth century. While the expeditions that went forth to fight the Muslims involved armies of exceptional size, much of the warfare within western Europe itself was conducted by small armies on behalf of landowners who were often neighbours and kin. In his approach to his subject, John France considers political, social, and economic development in the age of the crusades. He emphasizes the significance of four factors in shaping medieval warfare: the dominance of land as a form of wealth, the limited competence of government, the state of technology that favoured defence over attack, and the geography and climate of western Europe. His coverage of the castle and the knight in armour depicts the role of landowners in producing these characteristic medieval instruments of war. In addition, France provides an extensive analysis of battles in which he reconstructs a series of encounters in superb detail.

The Day is Ours is a dramatic account of two battles that turned the tide of the American Revolution. In this distinguished, highly readable, and richly detailed narrative history, William M. Dwyer reveals as vivid a picture as we are likely to see of a critical period in the American Revolution. He lets the participants--from American, British, and Hessian soldiers to myriad fearful and ambivalent citizens--tell the story in their own words. "Telling the story from the perspective, and often the words, of men in the ranks, Dwyer has written a dramatic account of this turning point in the American Revolution." --James M. McPherson, author of Battle Cry of Freedom " Dwyer] has cast his net wide, taking advantage of newly found or long-obscure accounts published during the celebration of the Revolution's bicentennial. We learn exactly how it was in that momentous time, from letters, diaries and recollections of officers and men on both sides and civilians caught in the middle." --New York Times Book Review "Dwyer has put together a wonderful, lively account that reflects a reporter's respect for quotes from eyewitnesses . . . He presents the facts and lets history speak for itself. The result is enthralling." --The Philadelphia Inquirer "The courage of the common soldier who stayed and fought when the sunshine patriots had all gone home is a story that deserves to be told--and Mr. Dwyer has told it well." --The Wall Street Journal William M. Dwyer is an author, teacher, and veteran journalist who has written for the Trenton Times, New York Times, Commonweal, Christian Science Monitor, and New Jersey Monthly.

From the roots of the conflict, through a profile of the two armies, to descriptions of the great battles and events of the war this work captures in one lavishly illustrated volume one of America's first great crises. Scarcely three decades after the United States won its independence, the massive strength of Mother country returned, seeking to enforce its will on its wayward offspring. The combats were various in scale and ferocity, stretching from the wilds of the Canadian border to the swamps of New Orleans, while on the high seas the fledgling American navy slugged it out bravely with fearsome Brittania, achieving shocking success. On land the Americans initially had less luck and witnessed the burning of their new capital at Washington DC by British redcoats, even as a gallant bastion off Baltimore continued to hold its flag high beneath the"rockets' red glare." Though unnecessary at the end for geopolitical purposes (the war had already ended), General Andrew Jackson punctuated the conflict profoundly with a disastrous defeat of Wellington's veterans near the Crescent City. Author Arnold Blumberg is a Visiting Scholar at the History Department of Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, and a contributor to a number of leading military history journals. Illustrated with 100 images of the fighting and the soldiers, this book illuminates an exciting, even if frequently forgotten, episode in history.

This account of the Gulf War reveals its importance from a military and political point of view, highlighting how modern military technology made possible, with relative ease, a victory that would have been nearly impossible by traditional means. It has become fashionable to trivialize the impressive military achievements of the Coatition victory over Iraq, but Bin, Hill, and Jones demonstrate that the Gulf War represents a defining moment in military and political history. The text includes numerous firsthand eyewitness accounts.

Readers will discover why a multinational coalition deployed 800,000 soldiers to the Middle East to challenge to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. They will find out the truth behind political maneuvering by nations involved in the conflict, as well as those on the sidelines, and they will learn the details of the various weapons systems employed. The authors analyze the aftermath of the war and draw important lessons from it. This book provides an authoritative and provocative review of what will surely be remembered as one of the key events of the last half century.

During the American Revolutionary War, Great Britain's Royal Navy faced foes that included, in addition to American forces, the navies of France, Spain and the Netherlands. In this operational history of a period that proved to be a turning point for one of the world's great naval powers, David Syrett presents a saga of battles, blockades, great fleet cruises and, above all, failures and lost opportunities. He explains that the British government severely underestimated the Americans' maritime strength and how that error led to devastating consequences. The seemingly invincible navy failed to muster even one decisive victory during the extensive naval conflict. Noting the complex reasons for British failure in European waters, Syrett lays primary blame at the feet of Britain's political leadership. He describes how Lord North, the first lord of the Treasury and head of government, abdicated control of Britain's military to individual members of the cabinet. Syrett suggests that constant vacillations in policy and strategy, which resulted from power shifts among the cabinet ministers, prevented North's government from formulating a comprehensive wartime strategy or providing the Royal navy with the strategic guidance to launch a successful campaign. Syrett concludes that Britain's inability to gain naval superiority in European waters had a profound effect on the outcome of the American Revolutionary War. He demonstrates how the Royal Navy's failure to hunt down and destroy American blockade runners allowed Yankee rebels easy access to European arms and munitions. He also shows that the inability of the British to defeat French and Spanish naval power off the Continent gave Bourbon monarchies the means to aid American naval forces and to conduct naval operations against the British in such areas as the West Indies and the Indian Ocean.

When Colonel Charles S. Wainwright (1826-1907), later a brevet brigadier general, was commissioned in the First New York Artillery Regiment of the Army of the Potomac in October 1861, he began a journal. As an officer who fought at Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the Wilderness, Cold Harbor, Spotsylvania, and Petersburg, and who witnessed the leadership of Generals McClellan, Hooker, Burnside, Meade, Grant, and Sheridan, he brilliantly describes his experiences, views, and emotions. But Wainwright's entries go beyond military matters to include his political and social observations. Skillfully edited by Allan Nevins, historian and author of the classic multivolume Ordeal of the Union , this journal is Wainwright's vivid and invaluable gift to posterity.

For more than a century, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has been building fortifications along the American coastline in an effort to protect our vulnerable shores. With the prospect of seaborne invasion becoming increasingly unlikely, the Corps has turned its attention to a more subtle but no less dangerous threat: the insidious effects of coastal erosion.In "The Corps and the Shore," Orrin H. Pilkey, the nation's most outspoken coastal geologist, and Katharine L. Dixon, an educator and activist for national coastal policy reform, provide a comprehensive examination of the impact of coastal processes on developed areas and the ways in which the Corps of Engineers has attempted to manage erosion along America's coastline.Through detailed case studies of large-scale projects in Texas, Maine, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and South Carolina, the authors demonstrate the shortcomings of the Corps's underlying assumptions and methodology. As they discuss the role of local citizens in the project process, they highlight the interaction between local Corps offices and community officials and residents. By focusing on different types of problems in various regions of the country, Pilkey and Dixon clearly show how the Corps has repeatedly failed to act in the best interest of those most affected by the projects. As well as criticizing Corps practices, the authors provide numerous suggestions for reforming the Corps and making it both more scientifically accountable and more accountable to the citizens it is intended to serve."The Corps and the Shore" is essential reading for coastal residents, environmentalists, planners, and coastal city officials as well as geologists, civil engineers, marine scientists, and anyone concerned with the impact of human society on our shorelines.

This study provides a picture of the US Army's performance during the Gulf War. It begins by chronicling the Army's regeneration in the two decades after Vietnam - the foundation of the Desert Storm victory. Each chapter starts with a personal combat story that puts the conflict into a human perspective. The book brings the civilian reader into battle alongside individual soldiers. It is a comprehensive account that allows individual conclusions, including accounts by Iraqi soldiers, about the largest armour battle since World War II.

Patrick Pearse, an important Irish journalist, educator, and artist, came to play the pivotal role in the Easter Rising of 1916. Here Sean Farrell Moran examines Pearse within the context of contemporary Irish politics and culture to explain how this unlikely revolutionary became the spokesman of the violent forces within the nationalist movement.

This authoritative and concise work surveys the range of warfare in the high Middle Ages while reflecting on the society that produced these military struggles. The book brings together for the first time a wealth of information on such topics as knighthood, military organization, weaponry and fortifications, and warfare in the East. In 1095 with the launching of the First Crusade, Europeans established a great military endeavour to save the Holy Land, an undertaking that remained a central preoccupation until the end of the thirteenth century. While the expeditions that went forth to fight the Muslims involved armies of exceptional size, much of the warfare within western Europe itself was conducted by small armies on behalf of landowners who were often neighbours and kin. In his approach to his subject, John France considers political, social, and economic development in the age of the crusades. He emphasizes the significance of four factors in shaping medieval warfare: the dominance of land as a form of wealth, the limited competence of government, the state of technology that favoured defence over attack, and the geography and climate of western Europe. His coverage of the castle and the knight in armour depicts the role of landowners in producing these characteristic medieval instruments of war. In addition, France provides an extensive analysis of battles in which he reconstructs a series of encounters in superb detail.

This study is one of the rare contributions to the very small library of genuine strategic studies. (Strategy here covers all military activity.) The broad purpose is to show how strategy works, using air power and special operations as substantial case studies, but also addressing sea power, nuclear deterrence, and information warfare. Although this book has many interesting things to say about the future of air power, the reliability of non-nuclear deterrence, the true character of joint warfare, the utility of special warriors, and the limitations of excellence in information warfare, the primary intention is to deepen the understanding of the nature and working of strategy and strategic effect.

The Hill and Wang Critical Issues Series: concise, affordable works on pivotal topics in American history, society, and politics.

Using newly available documents from both American and Vietnamese archives, Hunt reinterprets the values, choices, misconceptions, and miscalculations that shaped the long process of American intervention in Southeast Asia, and renders more comprehensible--if no less troubling--the tangled origins of the war.

When Fort Sumter fell in 1861, Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885) was an obscure clerk in Galena, Illinois, without influential friends and lacking a reputation for success. Yet within three years this man rose to command the Union armies, and just over a year later secured the defeat of the Confederacy. How can this emergence be explained? What were the characteristics of such a man and by what means did he acquire his knowledge? Did he earn his honors or did he owe them to chance and luck? The Rise of U. S. Grant focuses on the widely ignored first two years of his career in the West. Colonel Conger eschewed the general's justly acclaimed but inaccurate memoirs, relying instead on contemporaneous messages, dispatches, and reports undimmed by time and undistorted by later reflection. From the raid on Belmont through Grant's capture of Forts Henry and Donelson to his near defeat at Shiloh and the triumphant siege of Vicksburg, this book is a brilliant, penetrating exploration that goes a long way toward explaining the phenomenon of Grant, while letting the readers experience with gripping immediacy how he mastered the crises that confronted him.

The battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, 1862-63, were remarkable in several respects. Both revealed the problems of mounting a serious attack at night and provided the first examples of the now-familiar trench warfare. Fredericksburg featured street fighting and river crossings under fire. Chancellorsville was marked by Stonewall Jackson's death and the rare instance of mounted cavalry attacking infantry. In addition, the latter battle also demonstrated in striking fashion the profound influence of the commander on the battle. The Union committed more soldiers, supplies, money, and better equipment than did the Confederacy, and yet Lee won.

Eyewitness accounts by battle participants make these guides an invaluable resource for travelers and nontravelers who want a greater understanding of five of the most devastating yet influential years in our nation's history. Explicit directions to points of interest and maps--illustrating the action and showing the detail of troop position, roads, rivers, elevations, and tree lines as they were 130 years ago--help bring the battles to life. In the field, these guides can be used to recreate each battle's setting and proportions, giving the reader a sense of the tension and fear each soldier must have felt as he faced his enemy.

"Eastern Destiny: Russia in Asia and the North Pacific" is the history of a remarkable eastern expansion under tsars, emperors, and commissars. The narrative spans the period from the Mongol conquest in the 13th century to the Cold War of the 20th. An intense anxiety for security, owed in large part to the Mongol incursion, would impel the eastern Slavs relentlessly toward territorial aggrandizement. Over the centuries, the modest Grand Duchy of Moscow in Eastern Europe was so successful that it grew into the massive Russian Empire, whose lands stretched from the Holy Roman Empire in Central Europe to the edge of British power in the wilds of North America.

"Eastern Destiny: Russia in Asia and the North Pacific" is a saga of entrepreneurs pressing ever-eastward for the wealth of pelts, whether sable or sea otter. It features the arrival of the servants of the state who ensured control of these lands and negotiated--whether subtly or otherwise--with the nations of East Asia. Also chronicled are the voluntary release by treaty of Alaska and the northern Kurils, the humiliating temporary loss of southern Sakhalin and the ultimate dismemberment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Despite such losses, the Russian Federation still comprises the most expansive country on earth, most of whose territory is the result of Asian conquests dating back 400 years.

Originally published in 1896, "Small Wars" is an ambitious attempt to analyze and draw lessons from Western experience in fighting campaigns of imperial conquest. The quality of C. E. Callwell's analysis, the sweep of his knowledge, and his ability to integrate information from an impressive variety of experiences resulted in Small War's reputation as a minor classic.

For the historian, "Small Wars" remains a useful and vital analysis of irregular warfare experiences ranging from Hoche's suppression of the Vendee revolt during the French Revolution, to the British wars against semi-organized armies of Marathas and Sikhs in mid-nineteenth-century India, to the Boer War of 1899-1902.

The military specialist discovers in Callwell lessons applicable to what today is called "low-intensity conflict." his message is clear, and it is relevant to current debates about conflicts as diverse as those in Bosnia, Somalia, and Vietnam. Technological superiority is an important, but seldom critical, ingredient in the success of low-intensity operations. An ability to adapt to terrain and climate, to match the enemy in mobility and inventiveness, to collect intelligence, and above all the capacity to "seize what the enemy prizes most," will determine success or failure. This reprint adds vital historical dimension to the growing literature on unconventional conflict.

This book is a reexamination of the Persian Gulf War by a number of academic and military historians to determine what we did right, what we did wrong, and how our performance could have been improved. This study addresses the questions: Why did the war happen? Was the Gulf War a vindication of Vietnam? Did the American military really learn anything from the war in Vietnam? Did they really adapt? What did the Allies actually win in the Gulf War, if anything? Finally, have we learned anything from the Gulf War? Some authors conclude that in retrospect many analysts have become convinced that despite its military successes the United States garnered little of worth from the Gulf War. Others believe a great deal was achieved, and some have withheld final judgement.

From the time of her husband's death at the Battle of the Little Big Horn until her own death fifty-seven years later, at the age of ninety, Mrs. George Armstrong Custer devoted herself to defending or embellishing her husband's reputation. This account, the second in Elizabeth's trilogy of her life with the General, focuses on the period immediately following the Civil War, when the Custers were stationed in Louisiana, Texas, and Kansas. She portrays the aftermath of the Civil War in Texas and life in Kansas while her husband took part in General Winfield Hancock's 1867 expedition against the Indians between the Arkansas and Platte rivers. Throughout, she provides detailed descriptions of an army officer's home life on the frontier during this major period of Indian unrest. This edition, an abridgment of the original 1887 edition, with an Introduction by Jane R. Stewart and a Foreword by Shirley A. Leckie, brings together in a single volume one of the most significant documents of the Old West, here made accessible to a new generation of readers.

Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor provide a definitive, behind-the-scenes account and anaylsis of the planning and execution of the Gulf War. While one war was being waged against Iraq, another was being fought among the generals themselves. The Generals' War offers unvarnished portraits of the top military commanders, challenges the performances of Powell, Schwarzkopf, and their generals, and provides disturbing information about the power struggles within the American high command. Using previously undisclosed military documents, The Generals' War goes beyond what happened to explain why and how, exploding myths that have crept into other accounts of the war.