Adolf Hitler had high hopes for his conquest of Norway, which held both great symbolic and great strategic value for the Fuhrer. Despite early successes, however, his ambitious northern campaign foundered and ultimately failed. Adam Claasen for the first time reveals the full story of this neglected episode and shows how it helped doom the Third Reich to defeat.

Hitler and Raeder, the chief of the German navy, were determined to take and keep Norway. By doing so, they hoped to preempt Allied attempts to outflank Germany, protect sea lanes for German ships, access precious Scandinavian minerals for war production, and provide a launchpad for Luftwaffe and naval operations against Great Britain. Beyond those strategic objectives, Hitler also envisioned Norway as part of a pan-Nordic stronghold--a centerpiece of his new world order. But, as Claasen shows, Hitler's grand expectations were never realized.

Gring's Luftwaffe was the vital spearhead in the invasion of Norway, which marked a number of wartime firsts. Among other things, it involved the first large-scale aerial operations over sea rather than land, the first time operational objectives and logistical needs were fulfilled by air power, and the first deployment of paratroopers.

Although it got off to a promising start, the German effort, particularly against British and arctic convoys, was greatly hampered by flawed strategic thinking, interservice rivalries between the Luftwaffe and navy, the failure to develop a long-range heavy bomber, the diversion of planes and personnel to shore up the German war effort elsewhere, and the northern theater's harsh climate and terrain.

Claasen's study covers every aspect of this ill-fated campaign from the 1940 invasion until war's end and shows how it was eventually relegated to a backwater status as Germany fought to survive in an increasingly unwinnable war. His compelling account sharpens our picture of the German air force and widens our understanding of the Third Reich's way of war.

Did the Vietnam War have to happen? And why couldn't it have ended earlier? These are among the questions that Robert McNamara and his collaborators ask in "Argument Without End," a book that will stand as a major contribution to what we know about the Vietnam War. Drawing on a series of meetings that brought together, for the first time ever, senior American and Vietnamese officials who had served during the war, the book looks at the many instances in which one side, or both, made crucial mistakes that led to the war and its duration. Using Vietnamese and Chinese documents, many never before made public, McNamara reveals both American and Vietnamese blunders, and points out ways in which such mistakes can be avoided in the future. He also shows conclusively that war could not be won militarily by the United States.McNamara's last book on Vietnam was one of the most controversial books ever published in this country. This book will reignite the passionate debate about the war, about McNamara, and about the lessons we can take away from the tragedy.

A pilot for the China-based airline reputed to be the most shot at in the world, Felix Smith recounts in vivid detail his experiences ferrying troops and equipment for the Nationalists during China's civil war; providing medicine and supplies to war-torn regions; and flying under CIA contract during the French war in Indochina, the Korean War, America's secret war in Laos, and the Vietnam War. China Pilot provides a rare view of the Cold War in Asia, documenting not only the hair-raising adventures of Civil Air Transport's pilots but also those of the men and women behind the scenes.

Grayston Lynch presents an exceptional portrayal of actual events that led to the betrayal of extraordinary, patriotic, and courageous men. Lynch's unmasking of "Kennedy's Camelot" reveals heart-wrenching facts that continue to stir emotions among Brigade 2506 veterans.

America's "forgotten war" lasted just thirty-seven months, yet 54,246 Americans died in that time -- nearly as many as died in ten years in Vietnam. On the fiftieth anniversary of this devastating conflict, James Brady tells the story of his life as a young marine lieutenant in Korea.

In 1947, seeking to avoid the draft, nineteen-year-old Jim Brady volunteered for a Marine Corps program that made him a lieutenant in the reserves on the day he graduated college. He didn't plan to find himself in command of a rifle platoon three years later facing a real enemy, but that is exactly what happened after the Chinese turned a so-called police action into a war.

The Coldest War vividly describes Brady's rapid education in the realities of war and the pressures of command. Opportunities for bold offensives sink in the miasma of trench warfare; death comes in fits and starts as too-accurate artillery on both sides seeks out men in their bunkers; constant alertness is crucial for survival, while brutal cold and a seductive silence conspire to lull soldiers into an often fatal stupor.

The Korean War affected the lives of all Americans, yet is little known beyond the antics of "M*A*S*H." Here is the inside story that deserves to be told, and James Brady is a powerful witness to a vital chapter of our history.

This critical reappraisal of the siege of Mafikeng provides a fresh examination of the role of Major-General Baden-Powell in the conflict, during which approximately 2000 people died in action or expired from disease or starvation.

This new edition of the Carnegie Endowment bestseller selected by Choice as ""an outstanding academic book of 1995"" now also discusses the interventions in Haiti and Bosnia, the 1998 crisis (and earlier skirmishes) with Iraq, and the decision to not intervene to halt apparent genocide in Central Africa.In the core original study, which draws upon twelve cases including Somalia, Lebanon, Panama, Grenada, and the Gulf War Richard Haass suggests political and military guidelines for potential U.S. military interventions ranging from peacekeeping and humanitarian operations to preventive strikes and all-out warfare.

Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919) lived an extraordinary life distinguished by a stunning array of accomplishments: war hero, 26th President, reformer, historian, conservationist, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, author, and explorer. But it was the navy that most fascinated him throughout his long and varied career, and it was in The Naval War of 1812 (published in 1882 when he was only 23) that he first declared his interest. Praised for its scholarship, assurance, and originality, this classic naval history offers stirring and comprehensive accounts of the war's dramatic naval battles, and of the American and English commanders who fought on the vast North American lakes and on the ocean for control of the continent. The book proved instrumental in securing Roosevelt's appointment as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1897, and decisively influenced the U.S. Navy's transformation from a skeletal isolationist force into a formidable international sea power that made U.S expansionism not only possible but inevitable.

The Gulf War has been the only conflict in the last half-century that featured the possible use of chemical-biological weapons against U.S. forces. Vulnerability to such an attack spurred the Department of Defense to action from the first hint of trouble in August 1990 through the end of hostilities in March 1991. Nearly disbanded in 1972, the U.S. Army Chemical Corps would be the prime force in ensuring that U.S. forces could both survive and sustain combat operations under chemical-biological warfare conditions. Focussing on the work of senior Army officials, this account assesses the degree of readiness achieved by the ground war's initiation and the lessons learned since the conflict. For an appropriately trained and equipped military force, chemical weapons pose not the danger of mass destruction but the threat of mass disruption, no more deadly than smart munitions or B-52 air strikes. This book will reveal a coordinated response to train and equip U.S. forces did take place prior to the feared Iraqi chemical and biological attacks. Undocumented in any other book, it details the plans that rushed sixty "Fox" reconnaissance vehicles to the Gulf, the worldwide call for protective suits and masks, and the successful placement of biological agent detectors prior to the air offensive. In addition, the work addresses what really happened at Khamisiyah. Were troops exposed to chemical weapons and what is behind the mysterious Gulf War Syndrome?

Traditionally historians of the Little Big Horn fight have focused on Custer and his troops -- on what they were doing and where they died. But as one Miniconjou warrior told a gathering at a 1926 commemoration of the battle, the Lakotas and Cheyennes also lost brave men. These men had died defending their homes and families, and they too deserved recognition.

Hokahey! A Good Day to Die! details the final moments of each of the fallen Cheyenne and Lakota heroes. Richard G. Hardorff sifted through the many interviews with Indian survivors of the battle, cross-checking every story of a wounded or dead individual to ascertain who was killed, in which action, and by whom. He concludes that the Indian dead comprised thirty-one men, six women, and four children -- astonishingly light losses when compared with the number of cavalry dead. Concise, well-written, and respectful of Cheyenne and Lakota cultural practices, this book is an essential contribution to our understanding of how the Cheyennes and Lakotas waged the Battle of the Little Big Horn.

Desert Storm was the largest naval operation since World War II. Although naval forces did not play the central role, they fulfilled an important function throughout the operation, facing many formidable challenges and considerable risk. This book provides a close examination of the problems encountered by the Navy, both in the military situation and in dealing with the other services, and the decisions made to address these issues. While interservice rivalries sometimes intruded at higher levels, jointness at the tactical level often led to effective combined-arms operations.

Despite the information revolution and improvements in technology, the Fog of War still obscured the battlefield and affected nearly all decisions. This study offers page-turning action, such as SEAL activity and combat search and rescue missions, as well as the exciting and dangerous surface operations that gained sea control of the northern Persian Gulf. Using primary sources such as interviews and many documents cleared only recently for public release, the author covers the relations between General Schwarzkopf and Vice Admirals Mauz and Arthur; the major contribution of Tomahawk cruise missiles to the first wave of attacks on Baghdad; the controversial use of aircraft carriers in the Gulf; as well as the Navy's possible role in the event of an amphibious assault into Kuwait. Those preparing to fight in future naval actions will learn much from this detailed analysis.

In the summer of 1966, in the middle of the Vietnam War, eighty young volunteers arrived at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot on Parris Island, South Carolina, from all over the Eastern United States. For the next eight weeks, as Platoon 1005, they endured one of the most intense basic training programs ever devised. Parris Island was not a place for idle conversation or social gatherings, and these men remained from start to finish almost complete strangers. Ehrhart did get to know one Marine, his bunkmate John Harris, who quietly shared his sweetheart's letters. He was a friend who died in Vietnam only a year later.

Twenty-seven years after basic training, Ehrhart began what became a five-year search for the men of his platoon. Who were these men alongside whom he trained? Why had they joined the Marines at a time when being sent to war was almost a certainty? What do they think of the war and of the country, that sent them to fight it? What does the Corps mean to them? What Ehrhart learned offers an extraordinary window into the complexities of the Vietnam Generation and the United States of America then and now.

Based on supporting materials from military records and family members as well as interviews-some of which Ehrhart held in such active secondary roles as dairy farmhand, fishing companion, and impromptu guest at a family wedding-this book records the more-than-30-year journey that each man took after his boot-camp graduation on August 12, 1966. Photos of the men, both then and now, accompany the profiles. Their stories are diverse, but as Ehrhart says, "It was, in short, history, and each of these men was and is a part of that history.... There are, no doubt, scoundrels andliars and losers among these men, but as a group they have mostly impressed me with their decency and their loyalty and their hard work and their perseverance in the face of hardship and hurdles, the everyday obstacles that make ordinary lives extraordinary."

This account of the Gulf War reveals its importance from a military and political point of view, highlighting how modern military technology made possible, with relative ease, a victory that would have been nearly impossible by traditional means. It has become fashionable to trivialize the impressive military achievements of the Coatition victory over Iraq, but Bin, Hill, and Jones demonstrate that the Gulf War represents a defining moment in military and political history. The text includes numerous firsthand eyewitness accounts.

Readers will discover why a multinational coalition deployed 800,000 soldiers to the Middle East to challenge to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. They will find out the truth behind political maneuvering by nations involved in the conflict, as well as those on the sidelines, and they will learn the details of the various weapons systems employed. The authors analyze the aftermath of the war and draw important lessons from it. This book provides an authoritative and provocative review of what will surely be remembered as one of the key events of the last half century.

This authoritative and concise work surveys the range of warfare in the high Middle Ages while reflecting on the society that produced these military struggles. The book brings together for the first time a wealth of information on such topics as knighthood, military organization, weaponry and fortifications, and warfare in the East. In 1095 with the launching of the First Crusade, Europeans established a great military endeavour to save the Holy Land, an undertaking that remained a central preoccupation until the end of the thirteenth century. While the expeditions that went forth to fight the Muslims involved armies of exceptional size, much of the warfare within western Europe itself was conducted by small armies on behalf of landowners who were often neighbours and kin. In his approach to his subject, John France considers political, social, and economic development in the age of the crusades. He emphasizes the significance of four factors in shaping medieval warfare: the dominance of land as a form of wealth, the limited competence of government, the state of technology that favoured defence over attack, and the geography and climate of western Europe. His coverage of the castle and the knight in armour depicts the role of landowners in producing these characteristic medieval instruments of war. In addition, France provides an extensive analysis of battles in which he reconstructs a series of encounters in superb detail.

Most often viewed as a prelude to Robert E. Lee's Civil War victories of 1862, Joseph E. Johnston's campaign in Virginia early that year has been considered uninspired at best, catastrophic at worst. Steven Newton now offers a revisionist account of Johnston's operations between the York and James Rivers to show how his performance in the "Peninsular War" contributed to a crucial strategic victory for the Confederacy.

Newton acknowledges the limitations usually attributed to Johnston by other historians but suggests that assessments of the general's performance in Virginia have been colored by later controversies. He argues that contemporary sources portray Johnston as conducting his operations competently and within the strategic framework laid down in Richmond, even when he personally disagreed with those decisions. By holding his outnumbered army together and delaying the advance of Union forces, the general bought critical time for the Confederacy to recruit, organize, and arm the expanded army that would drive the Federals away from Richmond soon after Johnston himself was wounded at Seven Pines.

Focusing on the period between mid-February and late May 1862, Newton examines in detail the high-level conferences in Richmond to set strategy and the relationship of the Peninsula campaign to operations in the Shenandoah Valley and the western Confederacy. What emerges is a portrait of a general who was much more complex in thought and action than even his advocates have argued. By examining what Johnston actually accomplished rather than speculating on what he might have done, Newton shows that his overall conduct of the campaign holds up well under scrutiny.

Marked by painstaking research and analysis, Newton's reconsideration of Johnston is a key account of Confederate operations in the pivotal eastern Virginia theater in 1862. It provides an important new look at an episode in the war that until now has received little attention and helps rescue an unduly maligned leader from the shadow of Lee.

The Day is Ours is a dramatic account of two battles that turned the tide of the American Revolution. In this distinguished, highly readable, and richly detailed narrative history, William M. Dwyer reveals as vivid a picture as we are likely to see of a critical period in the American Revolution. He lets the participants--from American, British, and Hessian soldiers to myriad fearful and ambivalent citizens--tell the story in their own words. "Telling the story from the perspective, and often the words, of men in the ranks, Dwyer has written a dramatic account of this turning point in the American Revolution." --James M. McPherson, author of Battle Cry of Freedom " Dwyer] has cast his net wide, taking advantage of newly found or long-obscure accounts published during the celebration of the Revolution's bicentennial. We learn exactly how it was in that momentous time, from letters, diaries and recollections of officers and men on both sides and civilians caught in the middle." --New York Times Book Review "Dwyer has put together a wonderful, lively account that reflects a reporter's respect for quotes from eyewitnesses . . . He presents the facts and lets history speak for itself. The result is enthralling." --The Philadelphia Inquirer "The courage of the common soldier who stayed and fought when the sunshine patriots had all gone home is a story that deserves to be told--and Mr. Dwyer has told it well." --The Wall Street Journal William M. Dwyer is an author, teacher, and veteran journalist who has written for the Trenton Times, New York Times, Commonweal, Christian Science Monitor, and New Jersey Monthly.

From the roots of the conflict, through a profile of the two armies, to descriptions of the great battles and events of the war this work captures in one lavishly illustrated volume one of America's first great crises. Scarcely three decades after the United States won its independence, the massive strength of Mother country returned, seeking to enforce its will on its wayward offspring. The combats were various in scale and ferocity, stretching from the wilds of the Canadian border to the swamps of New Orleans, while on the high seas the fledgling American navy slugged it out bravely with fearsome Brittania, achieving shocking success. On land the Americans initially had less luck and witnessed the burning of their new capital at Washington DC by British redcoats, even as a gallant bastion off Baltimore continued to hold its flag high beneath the"rockets' red glare." Though unnecessary at the end for geopolitical purposes (the war had already ended), General Andrew Jackson punctuated the conflict profoundly with a disastrous defeat of Wellington's veterans near the Crescent City. Author Arnold Blumberg is a Visiting Scholar at the History Department of Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, and a contributor to a number of leading military history journals. Illustrated with 100 images of the fighting and the soldiers, this book illuminates an exciting, even if frequently forgotten, episode in history.

This study is one of the rare contributions to the very small library of genuine strategic studies. (Strategy here covers all military activity.) The broad purpose is to show how strategy works, using air power and special operations as substantial case studies, but also addressing sea power, nuclear deterrence, and information warfare. Although this book has many interesting things to say about the future of air power, the reliability of non-nuclear deterrence, the true character of joint warfare, the utility of special warriors, and the limitations of excellence in information warfare, the primary intention is to deepen the understanding of the nature and working of strategy and strategic effect.

During the American Revolutionary War, Great Britain's Royal Navy faced foes that included, in addition to American forces, the navies of France, Spain and the Netherlands. In this operational history of a period that proved to be a turning point for one of the world's great naval powers, David Syrett presents a saga of battles, blockades, great fleet cruises and, above all, failures and lost opportunities. He explains that the British government severely underestimated the Americans' maritime strength and how that error led to devastating consequences. The seemingly invincible navy failed to muster even one decisive victory during the extensive naval conflict. Noting the complex reasons for British failure in European waters, Syrett lays primary blame at the feet of Britain's political leadership. He describes how Lord North, the first lord of the Treasury and head of government, abdicated control of Britain's military to individual members of the cabinet. Syrett suggests that constant vacillations in policy and strategy, which resulted from power shifts among the cabinet ministers, prevented North's government from formulating a comprehensive wartime strategy or providing the Royal navy with the strategic guidance to launch a successful campaign. Syrett concludes that Britain's inability to gain naval superiority in European waters had a profound effect on the outcome of the American Revolutionary War. He demonstrates how the Royal Navy's failure to hunt down and destroy American blockade runners allowed Yankee rebels easy access to European arms and munitions. He also shows that the inability of the British to defeat French and Spanish naval power off the Continent gave Bourbon monarchies the means to aid American naval forces and to conduct naval operations against the British in such areas as the West Indies and the Indian Ocean.

When Colonel Charles S. Wainwright (1826-1907), later a brevet brigadier general, was commissioned in the First New York Artillery Regiment of the Army of the Potomac in October 1861, he began a journal. As an officer who fought at Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the Wilderness, Cold Harbor, Spotsylvania, and Petersburg, and who witnessed the leadership of Generals McClellan, Hooker, Burnside, Meade, Grant, and Sheridan, he brilliantly describes his experiences, views, and emotions. But Wainwright's entries go beyond military matters to include his political and social observations. Skillfully edited by Allan Nevins, historian and author of the classic multivolume Ordeal of the Union , this journal is Wainwright's vivid and invaluable gift to posterity.

For more than a century, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has been building fortifications along the American coastline in an effort to protect our vulnerable shores. With the prospect of seaborne invasion becoming increasingly unlikely, the Corps has turned its attention to a more subtle but no less dangerous threat: the insidious effects of coastal erosion.In "The Corps and the Shore," Orrin H. Pilkey, the nation's most outspoken coastal geologist, and Katharine L. Dixon, an educator and activist for national coastal policy reform, provide a comprehensive examination of the impact of coastal processes on developed areas and the ways in which the Corps of Engineers has attempted to manage erosion along America's coastline.Through detailed case studies of large-scale projects in Texas, Maine, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and South Carolina, the authors demonstrate the shortcomings of the Corps's underlying assumptions and methodology. As they discuss the role of local citizens in the project process, they highlight the interaction between local Corps offices and community officials and residents. By focusing on different types of problems in various regions of the country, Pilkey and Dixon clearly show how the Corps has repeatedly failed to act in the best interest of those most affected by the projects. As well as criticizing Corps practices, the authors provide numerous suggestions for reforming the Corps and making it both more scientifically accountable and more accountable to the citizens it is intended to serve."The Corps and the Shore" is essential reading for coastal residents, environmentalists, planners, and coastal city officials as well as geologists, civil engineers, marine scientists, and anyone concerned with the impact of human society on our shorelines.

An impressive and serious study one of the most fascinating military campaigns in history. September 7, 1812, by itself is one of the most cataclysmic days in the history of war: 74,000 casualties at the Battle of Borodino. And tiffs was well before the invention of weapons of mass destruction like machine guns or breech-loading rifles.

Nafziger's detailed study includes a clear exposition on the power structure in Europe at the time leading up to Napoleon's fateful decision to attempt what turned out to be impossible: the conquest of Russia. Also included are complete orders of battle and detailed descriptions of the opposing forces.

Patrick Pearse, an important Irish journalist, educator, and artist, came to play the pivotal role in the Easter Rising of 1916. Here Sean Farrell Moran examines Pearse within the context of contemporary Irish politics and culture to explain how this unlikely revolutionary became the spokesman of the violent forces within the nationalist movement.