This comprehensive introduction to the study of war and genocide presents a disturbing case that the potential for slaughter is deeply rooted in the political, economic, social and ideological relations of the modern world.

Most accounts of war and genocide treat them as separate phenomena. This book thoroughly examines the links between these two most inhuman of human activities. It shows that the generally legitimate business of war and the monstrous crime of genocide are closely related. This is not just because genocide usually occurs in the midst of war, but because genocide is a form of war directed against civilian populations. The book shows how fine the line has been, in modern history, between 'degenerate war' involving the mass destruction of civilian populations, and 'genocide', the deliberate destruction of civilian groups as such.

Written by one of the foremost sociological writers on war, "War and Genocide" has four main features:

- an original argument about the meaning and causes of mass killing in the modern world;

- a guide to the main intellectual resources - military, political and social theories - necessary to understand war and genocide;

- summaries of the main historical episodes of slaughter, from the trenches of the First World War to the Nazi Holocaust and the killing fields of Cambodia, Bosnia and Rwanda;

- practical guides to further reading, courses and websites.

This book examines war and genocide together with their opposites, peace and justice. It looks at them from the standpoint of victims as well as perpetrators. It is an important book for anyone wanting to understand - and overcome - thecontinuing salience of destructive forces in modern society.

Britain's military involvement in Afghanistan is a contentious subject, yet it is often forgotten that the current conflict is in fact the fourth in a string of such wars dating back as far as the early nineteenth century. Aiming to protect the British territories in India from the expanding Russian empire, the British fought a series of conflicts on Afghan territory between 1838 and 1919. The Anglo-Afghan wars of the 19th and early 20th centuries were ill-conceived and led to some of the worst military disasters ever sustained by British forces in this part of the world, with poor strategy in the First Afghan War resulting in the annihilation of 16,000 soldiers and civilians in a single week. In his new book, Jules Stewart explores the potential danger of replaying Britain's military catastrophes and considers what can be learnt from revisiting the story of these earlier Afghan wars.

What influences have shaped air power since human flight became a reality more than a hundred years ago? "Global Air Power" provides insight into the evolution of air power theory and practice by examining the experience of six of the world s largest air forces those of the United Kingdom, the United States, Israel, Russia, India, and China and of representative smaller air forces in Pacific Asia, Latin America, and continental Europe. The chapters, written by highly regarded scholars and military leaders, explore how various nations have integrated air power into their armed forces and how they have applied air power in both regular and irregular warfare and in peacetime operations. They cover the organizational, professional, and doctrinal issues that air forces confronted in the past, the lessons learned from victory and defeat, and emerging challenges and opportunities.Further, "Global Air Power" supplements the traditional military perspective with examinations of the ideological, economic, and cultural factors that give air forces their distinctive characters. Chapters show how the interplay among these internal factors, together with external challenges, determines the structure, role, and effectiveness of air forces. Together, these chapters illuminate universal trends as well as similarities and differences among the world s air forces. Its combination of military history and sociopolitical analysis makes "Global Air Power" especially valuable to a broad range of historians, air power specialists, and general readers interested in national defense and international relations.

For military planners, the control of information is critical to military success, and communications networks and computers are of vital operational importance. The use of technology to both control and disrupt the flow of information has been generally referred to by several names, information warfare, electronic warfare, cyberwar, netwar, and Information Operations (IO). This book is a focus on electronic warfare which is defined as a military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. This book consists of public documents which have been located, gathered, combined, reformatted, and enhanced with a subject index, selectively edited and bound to provide easy access.

Documents a study whose goals were to develop an understanding of commanders' information requirements for cultural and other "soft" factors in order to improve the effectiveness of combined arms operations, and to develop practical ways for commanders to integrate information and influence operations activities into combined arms planning/assessment in order to increase the usefulness to ground commanders of such operations.

The protection of cyberspace, the information medium, has become a vital national interest because of its importance both to the economy and to military power. An attacker may tamper with networks to steal information for the money or to disrupt operations. Future wars are likely to be carried out, in part or perhaps entirely, in cyberspace. It might therefore seem obvious that maneuvering in cyberspace is like maneuvering in other media, but nothing would be more misleading. Cyberspace has its own laws; for instance, it is easy to hide identities and difficult to predict or even understand battle damage, and attacks deplete themselves quickly. Cyberwar is nothing so much as the manipulation of ambiguity. The author explores these topics in detail and uses the results to address such issues as the pros and cons of counterattack, the value of deterrence and vigilance, and other actions governments can take to protect themselves in the face of deliberate cyberattack. For more than 60 years, decisionmakers in the public and private sectors have turned to the RAND Corporation for objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the nation and the world.

Since the mid-1950s, successive Canadian governments have responded to US ballistic missile defence initiatives with fear and uncertainty. Officials have endlessly debated the implications - at home and abroad - of participation. Drawing on previously classified government documents and interviews with senior officials, James Fergusson offers the first full account of Canada's unsure response to US initiatives. He reveals that factors such as weak leadership and a tendency to place uncertain and ill-defined notions of international peace and security before national defence have resulted in indecision. In the end, policy-makers have failed to transform the ballistic missile defence issue into an opportunity to define Canada's strategic interests at home and on the world stage.

U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that improving U.S. capacity for stabilization and reconstruction operations is critical to national security. The authors recommend building civilian rather than military capacity, realigning and reforming existing agencies, and funding promising programs. They also suggest improvements to deployable police capacity, crisis-management processes, and guidance and funding.

This book provides historical background on the enactment of declarations of war and authorisations for the use of force and analyses their legal effects under international and domestic law. It also sets forth their texts in two appendices. Because the statutes that confer standby authority on the President and the executive branch potentially play such a large role in an armed conflict to which the United States is a party, the book includes an extensive listing and summary of the statutes that are triggered by a declaration of war, a declaration of national emergency, and/or the existence of a state of war. The book concludes with a summary of the congressional procedures applicable to the enactment of a declaration of war or authorisation for the use of force and to measures under the War Powers Resolution.

This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. It argues that successful counterinsurgency requires effective indigenous security forces, especially police; a viable and legitimate local government; and the suppression of external support for insurgents.An examination of the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan illustrates that successful counterinsurgency requires effective indigenous security forces, especially police; a viable local government; and the suppression of external support for insurgents.

Enlisting Madison Avenue extracts lessons from business practices and adapts them to U.S. military efforts in a unique approach to shaping the attitudes and behavior of local populations in a theater of operations. Foremost among these lessons are the concepts of branding, customer satisfaction, and segmentation of the target audience, all of which serve to maximize the impact and improve the outcome of U.S. shaping efforts.

Since current policies for assigning military women were issued, the U.S. Army has changed how it organizes and fights. Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women considers the whether the Army is adhering to the assignment policies as well as the appropriateness of the current U.S. Department of Defense and Army assignment policies, given how units are operating in Iraq.

The problem of multinational force compatibility requires a planning framework to guide the U.S. Army's investments with partner armies. This report defines the Niche Capability Planning Framework, which provides a conceptual template for integrating the various considerations implicit in a strategy for cultivating compatible niche capabilities in armies that lack a stable, long-term, collaborative program of assistance with the U.S. Army.

Few would contest that the U.S. occupation of Iraq is a clear example of just how fraught a military occupation can become. In Occupational Hazards, David M. Edelstein elucidates the occasional successes of military occupations and their more frequent failures. Edelstein has identified twenty-six cases since 1815 in which an outside power seized control of a territory where the occupying party had no long-term claim on sovereignty.

In a book that has implications for present-day policy, he draws evidence from such historical cases as well as from four current occupations Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq where the outcome is not yet known. Occupation is difficult, in Edelstein's view, because ambitious goals require considerable time and resources, yet both the occupied population and the occupying power want occupation to end quickly and inexpensively; in drawn-out occupations, impatience grows and resources dwindle.

This combination sabotages the occupying power's ability to accomplish two tasks: convince an occupied population to suppress its nationalist desires and sustain its own commitment to the occupation. Structural conditions and strategic choices play crucial roles in the success or failure of an occupation. In describing those factors, Edelstein prescribes a course of action for the future."

Concern in United States military and policymaking circles about civilian casualties and collateral damage in military operations appears to have increased since the end of the Cold War. In part, this concern appears to be based on the belief that press and public reaction to civilian casualties reduces public support and constrains military operations. to determine whether these incidents affect media reporting or public support for military operations, and if so, how. After reviewing the major literature on American public opinion and war, the authors examine case studies of U.S. and foreign press, public, and leadership responses to civilian deaths during four recent conflicts: Operation Desert Storm (Iraq, 1991), Operation Allied Force (Kosovo, 1999), Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan, 2001), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq, 2003). has realistic expectations about avoiding casualties. Second, the press reports heavily on civilian casualty incidents. Third, adversaries understand and seek to exploit the public's sensitivities to civilian deaths. Fourth, other factors have been more important determinants of American's support and opposition during armed conflict than civilian casualties, while for foreign publics it may be among the most important factors. Fifth, while sizeable majorities of the American public gives U.S. military and political leaders the benefit of the doubt when civilian casualty incidents occur, this does not necessarily extend to foreign audiences. Sixth, when civilian casualty incidents occur, it may be more important to get the story right than to get the story out. abroad have increased in recent years and may continue to do so, perhaps becoming an even more salient concern in the conduct of future military operations.

Published posthumously on the occasion of America's centennial celebration, George Lippard's Washington and His Generals, "1776" compiles into a single volume his five popular books of Revolutionary-era historical fiction. The first book, "The Battle-Day of Germantown," features Lippard's hometown and George Washington's intricate and ultimately overcomplicated assault on the British during the Philadelphia campaign of the American Revolution."The Wissahikon," the second book, depicts the defecting of a Tory to the rebel cause after witnessing General William Howe's failed attempt to bribe a pious George Washington following the British capture of Philadelphia. In "Benedict Arnold," the infamous treachery of the treasonous Continental Army general is the subject.

With "The Battle of the Brandywine," Lippard recounts the American despair over the September 11, 1777, battle that drove back the Continental forces, leaving the capital in Philadelphia under British occupation. The collection ends with the fifth book, "The Fourth of July, 1776," his imagined version of the day that inspired most of Lippard's patriotic writing. It includes the often quoted "Speech of the Unknown" given by an anonymous revolutionary, which in the book provided the final impetus for the delegates to sign the Declaration of Independence.

Kevin Sites is a man on a mission. Venturing alone into the dark heart of war, armed with just a video camera, a digital camera, a laptop, and a satellite modem, the award-winning journalist covered virtually every major global hot spot as the first Internet correspondent for Yahoo! News. Beginning his journey with the anarchic chaos of Somalia in September 2005 and ending with the Israeli-Hezbollah war in the summer of 2006, Sites talks with rebels and government troops, child soldiers and child brides, and features the people on every side, including those caught in the cross fire. His honest reporting helps destroy the myths of war by putting a human face on war's inhumanity. Personally, Sites will come to discover that the greatest danger he faces may not be from bombs and bullets, but from the unsettling power of the truth.

This report presents a framework for assessing U.S. Army International Activities (AIA). It also provides a matrix of eight AIA "ends," derived from top-level national and Army guidance, and eight AIA "ways," which summarize the various capabilities inherent in AIA programs. In addition, the report describes the new online AIA Knowledge Sharing System (AIAKSS) that is being used to solicit programmatic and assessment data from AIA officials in the Army's Major Commands.

It was supposed to be quick and easy. The Bush Administration even promised that it wouldn't cost American taxpayers a thing - Iraqi oil revenues would pay for it all. But billions and billions of dollars and thousands of lives later, the Iraqi reconstruction is an undeniable failure. Iraq pumps out less oil now than it did under Saddam. At best, Iraqis average all of twelve hours a day of electricity. American soldiers lack body armour and adequate protection for their motor vehicles. Increasingly worse off, Iraqis turn against us. Increasingly worse off, our troops are killed by a strengthening insurgency. As T. Christian Miller reveals in this searing and timely book, the Bush Administration has fatally undermined the war effort and our soldiers by handing out mountains of cash not to the best companies for the reconstruction effort, but to buddies, cronies, relatives and political hacks - some of whom have simply taken the money and run with it.

In August 1942, Hitler directed all German state institutions to assist Heinrich Himmler, the chief of the SS and the German police, in eradicating armed resistance in the newly occupied territories of Eastern Europe and Russia. The directive for “combating banditry” (Bandenbekämpfung), became the third component of the Nazi regime’s three-part strategy for German national security, with genocide (Endlösung der Judenfrage, or “the Final Solution of the Jewish Question”) and slave labor (Erfassung, or “Registration of Persons to Hard Labor”) being the better-known others. An original and thought-provoking work grounded in extensive research in German archives, Hitler’s Bandit Hunters focuses on this counterinsurgency campaign, the anvil of Hitler’s crusade for empire. Bandenbekämpfung portrayed insurgents as political and racial bandits, criminalized to a greater degree than enemies of the state; moreover, violence against them was not constrained by the prevailing laws of warfare. Philip Blood explains how German forces embraced the Bandenbekämpfung doctrine, demonstrating the equal culpability of both the SS police forces and the “heroic” Waffen-SS combat arm and shattering the contrived postwar distinctions between them. He challenges the traditional view of Himmler as an armchair general and bureaucrat, exposing him as the driving force behind one of the most successful security campaigns in history, and delves into the contentious issue of the complicity of ordinary German police, soldiers, and citizens, as well as the citizens of occupied territories, in these state-sponsored manhunts. This book provokes new debates on the Nazi terrorization of Europe, the blind acquiescence of many, and the courageous resistance of the few.

An overview of higher-level decision making and modern methods to improve decision support. A selective review of modern decision science and implications for decision-support systems. The study suggests ways to synthesize lessons from research on heuristics and biases with those from "naturalistic research." It also discusses modern tools, such as increasingly realistic simulations, multiresolution modeling, and exploratory analysis, which can assist decisionmakers in choosing strategies that are flexible, adaptive, and robust.

A remarkable compendium of the worst military
decisions and the men who made them

The annals of history are littered with horribly bad military leaders. These combat incompetents found amazing ways to ensure their army's defeat. Whether it was a lack of proper planning, miscalculation, ego, bad luck, or just plain stupidity, certain wartime stratagems should never have left the drawing board. Written with wit, intelligence, and eminent readability, "How to Lose a Battle" pays dubious homage to these momentous and bloody blunders, including:

Cannae, 216 B.C.: the bumbling Romans lose 80,000 troops to Hannibal's forces.

The Second Crusade: an entire Christian army is slaughtered when it stops for a drink of water.

The Battle of Britain: Hitler's dreaded Luftwaffe blows it big-time.

Pearl Harbor: more than one warning of the impending attack is there, but nobody listens.

"How to Lose a Battle" includes more than thirty-five chapters worth of astonishing (and avoidable) disasters, both infamous and obscure -- a treasure trove of trivia, history, and jaw-dropping facts about the most costly military missteps ever taken.

Technical appendixes for a study that describes American public opinion toward the use of military force in support of the global war on terrorism. This document supplies the technical appendixes for a study that describes American public opinion toward the use of military force in support of the global war on terrorism (GWOT), delineates the sources of support and opposition, and identifies potential fault lines in support.