More Than A Few Good Men tells the compelling soldiers story of Robert J. Driver's life from childhood to his retirement from the United States Marine Corps. Driver witnessed and was part of many extreme, and sometimes chilling, events. These actions come to life through Driver's own letters home to his wife, encompassing the challenge of boot camp, Officer's Candidate School, and his tours of duty in the Vietnam War. Driver collected declassified documents and information from many of the Marines he served with in Vietnam in order to provide the reader with this exceptionally detailed account. Driver's letters home offer a clear reckoning of the traumatic events of combat and the bravery of his young Marines. The book also features biographies of the many contributors. Driver's admiration for the men he fought with is evident-they were More Than A Few Good Men.

This book addresses the problem of a country telling a grand narrative to itself that does not hold up under closer examination, a narrative that leads to possibly avoidable war. In particular, the book explains and questions the narrative the United States was telling itself about East Asia and the Pacific in the late 1930s, with (in retrospect) the Pacific War only a few years away. Through empirical methods, it details how the standard narrative failed to understand what was really happening based on documents that later became available. The documents researched are from the Diet Library in Japan, the Foreign Office in London, the National Archives in Washington, the University of Hawai'i library in Honolulu and several other primary sources. This research reveals opportunities unexplored that involve lessons of seeing things from the "other side's" point of view and of valuing the contribution of "in-between" people who tried to be peacemakers. The crux of the standard narrative was that the United States, unlike European imperialist powers, involved itself in East Asia in order to bring openness (the Open Door) and democracy; and that it was increasingly confronted by an opposing force, Japan, that had imperial, closed, and undemocratic designs. This standard American narrative was later opposed by a revisionist narrative that found the United States culpable of a "neo-imperialism," just as the European powers and Japan were guilty of "imperialism." However, what West Across the Pacific shows is that, while there is indubitably some truth in both the "standard" and the "revisionist" versions, more careful documentary research reveals that the most important thing "lost" in the1898-1941 period may have been the real opportunity for mutual recognition and understanding, for cooler heads and more neutral "realistic" policies to emerge; and for more attention to the standpoint of the common men and women caught up in the migrations of the period. West Across the Pacific is both a contribution to peace research in history and to a foreign policy guided modestly by empiricism and realism as the most reliable method. It is a must read for diplomats and people concerned about diplomacy, as it probes the microcosms of diplomatic negotiations. This brings special relevance and approachability as yet another generation of Americans returns from war and occupation in Iraq. The book also speaks to Vietnam veterans, by drawing lessons from the Japanese war in China for the American war in Vietnam. This is particularly true of the conclusion, co-authored by distinguished Vietnam specialist Sophie Quinn-Judge.

Helsing provides a unique perspective on the escalation of the Vietnam War. He examines what many analysts and former policymakers in the Johnson administration have acknowledged as a crucial factor in the way the United States escalated in Vietnam: Johnson's desire for both guns and butter--his belief that he must stem the advance of communism in Southeast Asia while pursuing a Great Society at home.

He argues that the United States government, the president, and his key advisers in particular engaged in a major pattern of deception in how the United States committed its military force in Vietnam. He then argues that a significant sector of the government was deceived as well. The first half of the book traces and analyzes the pattern of deception from 1964 through July 1965. The second half shows how the military and political decisions to escalate influenced--and were influenced by--the economic advice and policies being given the President. This in-depth analysis will be of particular concern to scholars, students, and researchers involved with U.S. foreign and military policy, the Vietnam War, and Presidential war powers.

"Fight of the Phoenix" is a historical personal account of duties as an Advisor in the Delta of Vietnam in 1972. The author counters claims of other Advisors and Academics and sets the record straight on the vicious nature of the Communist insurgency that killed their own people and the spectacular success of the Phoenix Program throughout the country and especially in the Delta Region MR-4 in targeting and neutralizing the enemy Viet Cong insurgents.

Investigative reporter Patrick J. Sloyan, a former member of the White House Press Corps, revisits the last years of John F. Kennedy's presidency, his fateful involvement with Diem's assassination, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Civil Rights Movement. Using recently released White House tape recordings and interviews with key inside players, The Politics of Deception reveals: The Politics of Deception is a fresh and revealing look at an iconic president and the way he attempted to manage public opinion and forge his legacy, sure to appeal to both history buffs and those who were alive during his presidency.

This is a fascinating and hard-hitting account kept in the journal of a young Marine Corps infantryman during his tour of duty in the Vietnam War. The epilogue follows the author back to Vietnam in the 1990's.

For those with a vivid memory of the Vietnam war, there is consolation in knowing that the impact of that war altered and shaped politics and warfare for the next generations. But in that altering we must take the lessons and apply them to new situations, new challenges and new policy dilemmas. To fail to do so would mean that the warriors at Khe Sanh and all of Vietnam were truly expendable, The battle of Khe Sanh was won and the Vietnam war was lost at the same time. Expendable Warriors describes at multiple levels the soldiers and marines who were expendable in the American political chaos of Vietnam, 1968. On January 21, 1968, nine days before the Tet offensive, tens of thousands of North Vietnamese regulars began the attacks on the Khe Sanh plateau, which led to the siege of the Khe Sanh Combat Base. Gen. Westmoreland was fully aware that the North Vietnamese would attack but he declined to alert or warn the small unit of American soldiers and marines serving at Khe Sanh in an advisory capacity, considering them expendable in the greater strategy. Not just an analysis of the battle, Expendable Warriors also ponders the question of how to win an unpopular war on foreign soil, linking battlefield events to political reality.

The book starts out picturing a young man who foolishly wants to go to war where he in vision's himself receiving all these high class medals for heroism but never once taking into account what it is going to take physically and mentally to get those medals. He's constantly playing a head game within himself and those that surround him. He like so many other young men of past eras are trying to be something that they're not and that small initial lie grows into a tremendous reputation that he has to live with and soon regrets that he's known by such. Come walk with the author and his brothers of the sword through the dark, humid, unforgiving jungles of Vietnam and experience the death, destruction, and mental sacrificial anguish they had to endure. Come see why you fear being alone in the denseness of a jungle or a forest that you have never entered before. Feel the heat of the Asian jungle floor intermixed with the leaches, ants, mosquitoes, snakes and humans searching you out only to destroy you at any cost. You see our author starts out innocently enough but soon finds out that war is not only a physical hardship demanding its pounds of flesh, but also is a horrendous mental agonizing hazard from which there is only one means of escape and/or retreat. That means to an end is death. Yes the author and his brothers of the sword will take their heroic missions and sacrificial allegiances to the grave with them. But, the real tragedy of it all is no one really cares about them in the first place. For they were and still are the "Secret Soldiers of the Second Army" willing to go anywhere, any time, to do the impossible for the ungrateful.

VIETNAM SUMMARY 2003 MESSAGE The soldier is a warrior and must live by a code. A sentry for America who stands between slavery and freedom for his family and love ones. Soldiers kill people and soldiers get killed. They die for their country. In reality they fight for each other. They train day and night for months and years. Soldiers honor, serve and obey America and hold her above all others. Can I rationalize a war where 60% to 70% of the casualties were civilians? Did those children, women and old people have too die? Why? There is no glamour or honor in war. "I love thee dear so much love I not honor more " Open the gates and fools rush in- "Once a Fool. " America the beautiful from sea to shining sea. The movies make war look so glorious and when your first friend is killed you know it was all a lie. After you get over the initial shock, you're torn between elation and guilt. Elation because it wasn't you who was killed and guilt for even thinking that way. All any man wants is to leave this world with a little dignity, believing that some how he made a difference. Just maybe this is a better place because he was a visitor here for a brief period. He hopes to be remembered for the good deeds and forgotten for the embarrassing moments when expectations were not met. However, one is remembered as a whole being, good and bad. You come into this world in less than a spectacular way, more often through pain. No clothes, crying, smacked on the bottom, complaining and very helpless. Many of us leave this world in the same way, minus the smacked bottom. A few Americans refused service induction and paid a price. Other Americans went to Vietnam and paid a greater price. Did over 58,000 Americans have too die in Vietnam? We who made it home must speak for them by making a contribution, a difference. I became a school teacher to affect the way young people think. If we are to survive, our leaders can not make the same historical mistakes. I hope the Vietnam people will someday forgive me. If I am to turn the page of my life and live; I must forgive all those who have trespassed against me. There will be a time when I can forgive the United States Government from President Kennedy to Henry Kissinger for sending American soldiers to Vietnam. Yes, I am over fifty now, I must forgive and forget the Vietnam experience so I can move on with my life. A soldier should not feel sorry for himself. No one cares; he is alone in his world. Soldiers were in Vietnam completing service obligations while their friends were getting married and finishing college. People in the United States were moving on with their lives. Many soldiers came home sick and or wounded to a hostile environment and difficult times. As they healed, trying to adjust to civilian life, the student demonstrations and war protest continued. There were few job offers, only cries of baby killers and war losers. Today, many Vietnam soldiers are here in body but they never made it back. Everyone who served in that war died a little and if you weren't there you will never understand. The country has changed forever. Hopefully, we have all changed for the better. We as a people will never be the same again. There will be a time I can forgive everyone and forgive myself so I can come to closure, but not today.

This book is about the unseen Shadow War that occurred between 1968 and 1976. It was written to honor those who served our country and didn't come back. They may have been ignored or denied by the "Powers That Be," but they will live in my heart and my nightmares as long as I live. The profits from the sale of this book will go to help homeless veterans. Reading this book will open a new world for you -- The world of Special Intelligence Operations. From Viet Nam to Cambodia to Laos and North Viet Nam the action will show you why so many veterans from the Viet Nam War have PTSD. The potential for recurring nightmares will be apparent. Next you will take a trip from Libya to Spain to Italy and Romania. You will find out that the war against terror did not start in 2001. The following exert will demonstrate what Inside the World of Mirrors is all about. In 1974, I met and was briefed by a "Mr. Martin," a high level individual from the American Embassy in Rome, Italy, on an operation to insure that a particular individual would not continue funding communist political activities in Italy. He was a bag man for the KGB. It was less than two months until a very important election was to take place. He was spreading money around to help the communist political candidates get elected. I was simply told "Make Him Stop" They gave me carte blanche to get it done. Anytime in the next seven days would be just fine. This was only one of the 83 missions ran by a Special Intelligence Operative code named the Iceman

How Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger pursued their public vow to end the Vietnam War and win the peace has long been entangled in bitter controversy and obscured by political spin. Recent declassifications of archival documents, on both sides of the former Iron and Bamboo Curtains, have at last made it possible to uncover the truth behind Nixon's and Kissinger's management of the war and to better understand the policies and strategies of the Vietnamese, Soviets, and Chinese. Drawing from this treasure trove of formerly secret files, Jeffrey Kimball has excerpted more than 140 print documents and taped White House conversations bearing on Nixon-era strategy. Most of these have never before been published and many provide smoking-gun evidence on such long-standing controversies as the "madman theory" and the "decent-interval" option. They reveal that by 1970 Nixon's and Kissinger's madman and detente strategies had fallen far short of frightening the North Vietnamese into making concessions. By 1971, as Kissinger notes in one Key document, the administration had decided to withdraw the remaining U.S. combat troops while creating "a healthy interval for South Vietnam's fate to unfold." The new evidence uncovers a number of behind-the-scenes ploys--such as Nixon's secret nuclear alert of October 1969--and sheds more light on Nixon's goals in Vietnam and his and Kissinger's strategies of Vietnamization, the "China card," and "triangular diplomacy." The excerpted documents also reveal significant new information about the purposes of the LINEBACKER bombings, Nixon's manipulation of the POW issue, and the conduct of the secret negotiations in Paris--as well as other key topics, events, andissues. All of these are effectively framed by Kimball, whose introductions to each document provide insightful historical context. Building on the ground-breaking arguments of his earlier prize-winning book, "Nixon's Vietnam War, Kimball also offers readers a concise narrative of the evolution of Nixon-era strategy and a critical assessment of historical myths about the war. The story that emerges from both the documents and Kimball's contextual narratives directly contradicts the Nixon-Kissinger version of events. In fact, they did "not pursue a consistent strategy from beginning to end and did "not win a peace with honor.

This book celebrates the achievements in Viet Nam of the US Special Forces soldiers, popularly known as "The Green Berets." These are America's finest warriors, our elite force who fuse military and civil skills in a new form of victorious warfare. This book focuses on Viet Nam during 1968 and 1969, the two most crucial years of that conflict. The Berets learned many lessons in Viet Nam. Not only are these historically interesting, but they are the keys to success in our Global War on Terrorism. The first lesson emphasizes the proper advisory relationships that must exist when our American military train and work with the military of other coalition nations. The second lesson stresses the need for the integration of the military and civilian sides of any war. Little is accomplished if bloody battles only result in producing more enemy. Rather our strategies must combine appropriate military measures with psychological operations and civic actions that win over nonaligned groups, and attract even hostile forces. The third lesson demands mutual and unwavering loyalty between America's forces and those they train and advise. An enemy has no greater weapon than to boast that Americans will eventually grow weary and desert their friends while the enemy will always endure. The fourth lesson calls for our American military to know how to work with others, not merely in spite of differences, but actually appreciating and building upon this diversity of races, religions, cultures, political views, and tribal backgrounds. I am positive that the reader will find many more lessons from the accomplishments of the Green Berets related in this book.

Following the myths and legends about Nazis recruited by the French Foreign Legion to fight in Indochina, Eric Meyer's new book is based on the real story of one such former Waffen-SS man who lived to tell the tale. The Legion recruited widely from soldiers left unemployed and homeless by the defeat of Germany in 1945. They offered a new identity and passport to men who could bring their fighting abilities to the jungles and rice paddies of what was to become vietnam. These were ruthless, trained killers, brutalised by the war on the Eastern Front, their killing skills honed to a razor's edge. They found their true home in Indochina, where they fought and became a byword for brutal military efficiency.

Reprint of 1982 book from the US Army Center of Military History. An account of Army helicopter ambulances in Vietnam that evaluates leadership, procedures, and logistical support.