There were no marching bands welcoming home returning troops from Vietnam, no ticker-tape parades for its heroes and no celebrations in Time Square. Instead, returning Vets were confronted with a range of reactions, not the least of which were indifference, silent disapproval, criticism, hostility and even contempt, in some quarters, for their lack of cleverness in not avoiding service in a war zone. Most returning Vietnam warriors were bewildered by the reactions of their fellow countrymen; but, then how could they possibly comprehend the psychological phenomenon which was only beginning to take hold and would later be named the "Vietnam Syndrome," a phenomenon which, at its extremes, was manifested in a revulsion to all things military? Even those who were proud of the returning servicemen and women were hardly effusive in their praise and greeted them with only muted enthusiasm. Most of these young veterans of an undeclared war had been shaped and molded in their formative years by the patriotic fervor which seized America during World War II and continued for perhaps a decade and a half after V. J. day. But, American society had profoundly changed in the 1960s with a shift in emphasis away from national goals to more individual ones such as civil rights, sexual liberation, pacifism, academic freedom, consciousness raising and a reaction against the excesses of the "military industrial complex," ironically named by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The cataclysmic cultural revolution of the 1960s collided violently with the more nationalistic goals of containing the spread of international communism and curbing the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union and Red China. Those who actually fought the Vietnam War became collateral victims of a wrenching cultural war, not of their own making; for the core values of these young men and women had, for the most part, not changed. Just as the World War II generation was imbued with traditional values of patriotism, loyalty to one's comrades, anti-totalitarianism and democratic freedom, most heroes of the Vietnam War were similarly grounded. The major difference is that while the former were celebrated, the latter were largely forgotten. Last Full Measure of Devotion calls upon us to revisit this remarkable generation of military heroes and, at long last, accord them the recognition withheld from them for almost four decades. The 22 individual profiles of Vietnam heroes contained between these covers are meant to be representative of the vast majority of Americans who served with honor in that lonely and beleaguered country on the South China Sea, more than thirty-five years ago.

The Vietnam War was different from most previous U.S. wars of the twentieth century. It was an undeclared and limited war. The draft to supply the soldiers and serious problems in the Selective Service system meant that the burden of the war was carried disproportionately by minorities and working class whites, many of whom did not want to serve. While many Americans saw service in Vietnam as their patriotic duty, others opposed the war. This is the story of the men and women who served in that war, whether overseas in active combat or in support roles in Viet Nam and stateside. Working from newspaper and other primary accounts, including soldiers' letters to and from home, government documents, interviews with Vietnam Era veterans, and other resources, James E. Westheider covers these issues of the war: The draft and problems in the Selective Service System. Draft resistance and the antiwar movement Can you be "Black and Navy Too?" African Americans and the Armed Forces The effects of climate and terrrain on fighting Life in camp, the food, and types of R & R Morale Getting along with the South Vietnamese Casualties and medical treatment Reception back in the United States Problems of transition: jobs, employment, posttraumatic stress syndrome The book also includes a timeline to put dates and events in better perspective; a comprehensive, topically arranged bibliography; and a thorough index.

The Pentagon Papers, officially titled "Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force," was commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1967. In June of 1971, small portions of the report were leaked to the press and widely distributed. However, the publications of the report that resulted from these leaks were incomplete and suffered from many quality issues.

On the 40th anniversary of the leak to the press, the National Archives, along with the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Presidential Libraries, has released the complete report. The 48 boxes in this series contain a complete copy of the 7,000 page report along with numerous copies of different volumes of the report, all declassified. Approximately 34% of the report is available for the first time.

What is unique about this, compared to other versions, is that:

* The complete Report is now available with no redactions compared to previous releases

* The Report is presented as Leslie Gelb presented it to then Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford on January 15, 1969

* All the supplemental back-documentation is included. In the Gravel Edition, 80% of the documents in Part V.B. were not included

This release includes the complete account of peace negotiations, significant portions of which were not previously available either in the House Armed Services Committee redacted copy of the Report or in the Gravel Edition.

Part IV. C. 1. Evolution of the War. U.S. Programs in South Vietnam, November 1963-April 1965: NASM 273 -- NSAM 288 -- Honolulu

Part IV. C. 2. a. Evolution of the War. Military Pressures Against NVN. February - June 1964

Part IV. C. 2. b. Evolution of the War. Military Pressures Against NVN. July - October 1964

Part IV. C. 2. c. Evolution of the War. Military Pressures Against NVN. November - December 1964

Part IV. C. 3. Evolution of the War. ROLLING THUNDER Program Begins: January - June 1965

Part IV. C. 4. Evolution of the War. Marine Combat Units Go to DaNang, March 1965

Part IV. C. 5. Evolution of the War. Phase I in the Build-up of U.S. Forces: March - July 1965

The Pentagon Papers, officially titled "Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force," was commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1967. In June of 1971, small portions of the report were leaked to the press and widely distributed. However, the publications of the report that resulted from these leaks were incomplete and suffered from many quality issues.

On the 40th anniversary of the leak to the press, the National Archives, along with the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Presidential Libraries, has released the complete report. The 48 boxes in this series contain a complete copy of the 7,000 page report along with numerous copies of different volumes of the report, all declassified. Approximately 34% of the report is available for the first time.

What is unique about this, compared to other versions, is that:

* The complete Report is now available with no redactions compared to previous releases

* The Report is presented as Leslie Gelb presented it to then Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford on January 15, 1969

* All the supplemental back-documentation is included. In the Gravel Edition, 80% of the documents in Part V.B. were not included

This release includes the complete account of peace negotiations, significant portions of which were not previously available either in the House Armed Services Committee redacted copy of the Report or in the Gravel Edition.

Part IV. B. 1. Evolution of the War. Counterinsurgency: The Kennedy Commitments and Programs, 1961

Part IV. B. 2. Evolution of the War. Counterinsurgency: Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961-63

Part IV. B. 3. Evolution of the War. Counterinsurgency: The Advisory Build-up, 1961-67

Part IV. B. 4. Evolution of the War. Counterinsurgency: Phased Withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Vietnam, 1962-64

Part IV. B. 5. Evolution of the War. Counterinsurgency: The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May-Nov. 1963

Ever since the American Revolution, military service has been a proud tradition for the Zumwalt family. Tradition initially led the author to join his father and brother in the Navy, before later transferring to the US Marine Corps. During his 26 years in uniform, the author saw service in three conflicts-Vietnam, Panama and the first Persian Gulf war. It was Vietnam, however, that ultimately would launch him on an unexpected journey-long after the guns of that war had fallen silent-triggered by the loss of a brother who had fought there. This journey was an emotional one-initially of anger towards the Vietnamese and the conflict that claimed his older brother. But it unexpectedly took a change in direction. In Vietnam almost two decades after Saigon's fall, the author, in a private talk with a former enemy general officer, came to understand an aspect of the war he never before had. In that talk, they shared personal insights about the war-discovering a common bond. It unlocked a door through which the author passed to start his own healing process. It began a journey where he would meet hundreds of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong veterans-listening to their personal stories of loss, sacrifice and hardship. It opened the author's eyes to how a technically inferior enemy, beaten down by superior US firepower, was able to get back up-driven by an "iron will" to emerge triumphant. "Bare Feet, Iron Will" takes the reader on a fascinating journey, providing stories-many never before told-as to how enemy ingenuity played a major role in the conflict, causing us not to see things that were there or to see things there that were not It shares unique insights into the sacrifice and commitment that took place on the other side of Vietnam's battlefields. About the Author JAMES G. ZUMWALT Lieutenant Colonel James Zumwalt is a retired Marine infantry officer who served in the Vietnam war, the 1989 intervention into Panama and Desert Storm. An author, speaker and business executive, he also currently heads a security consulting firm named after his father-Admiral Zumwalt & Consultants, Inc. He writes extensively on foreign policy and defense issues, having written hundreds of articles for various newspapers, magazines and professional journals. His articles have covered issues of major importance, oftentimes providing readers with unique perspectives that have never appeared elsewhere. His work, on several occasions, has been cited by members of Congress and entered into the US Congressional Record.

A small team from the US Navy arrives in Vietnam in the spring of 1962. At first, its members only hear whispers about what they are supposed to accomplish. The unit goes by the name MTT 10-62 because its mission is so secret. This is the first Sea, Air and Land team-later known as the SEALs-and it's gearing up to train a group of volunteers from the Vietnamese Junk Force in counterinsurgency and maritime warfare. Told mostly through the perspective of Chris "Doc" David-a first class hospital corpsman, first class diver, and diving medical technician-and Lt. Bill Evans, "SEAL Doc" shows how the first SEALs work in conjunction with Army Special Forces and others to stop the spread of communism. While the SEALs are outstanding fighters and tacticians, they get little material support to accomplish their mission. The team arrives in Da Nang with nothing but stateside uniforms, and their vehicles and gasoline must be "liberated" from Vietnamese motor pools. Meanwhile, the daily challenges the SEALs face are preparing them for a final explosive mission and setting the stage for the future development of Navy SEALs in "SEAL Doc, " a historical novel based on the true story of the SEALs.

The Pentagon Papers, officially titled "Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force," was commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1967. In June of 1971, small portions of the report were leaked to the press and widely distributed. However, the publications of the report that resulted from these leaks were incomplete and suffered from many quality issues.

On the 40th anniversary of the leak to the press, the National Archives, along with the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Presidential Libraries, has released the complete report. The 48 boxes in this series contain a complete copy of the 7,000 page report along with numerous copies of different volumes of the report, all declassified. Approximately 34% of the report is available for the first time.

What is unique about this, compared to other versions, is that:

* The complete Report is now available with no redactions compared to previous releases

* The Report is presented as Leslie Gelb presented it to then Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford on January 15, 1969

* All the supplemental back-documentation is included. In the Gravel Edition, 80% of the documents in Part V.B. were not included.

This release includes the complete account of peace negotiations, significant portions of which were not previously available either in the House Armed Services Committee redacted copy of the Report or in the Gravel Edition.

This facsimile volume contains:

Part IV. A. 1.] Evolution of the War. NATO and SEATO: A Comparison

Part IV. A. 2.] Evolution of the War. Aid for France in Indochina, 1950-54

Part IV. A. 3.] Evolution of the War. U.S. and France's Withdrawal from Vietnam, 1954-56

Part IV. A. 4.] Evolution of the War. U.S. Training of Vietnamese National Army, 1954-59

Part IV. A. 5.] Evolution of the War. Origins of the Insurgency

This controversial and timely book about the American experience in Vietnam provides the first full exploration of the perspectives of the North Vietnamese leadership before, during, and after the war. Herbert Y. Schandler offers unique insights into the mindsets of the North Vietnamese and their response to diplomatic and military actions of the Americans, laying out the full scale of the disastrous U.S. political and military misunderstandings of Vietnamese history and motivations. Including frank quotes from Vietnamese leaders, the book offers important new knowledge that allows us to learn invaluable lessons from the perspective of a victorious enemy. Unlike most military officers who served in Vietnam, Schandler is convinced the war was unwinnable, no matter how long America stayed the course or how many resources were devoted to it. He is remarkably qualified to make these judgments as an infantry commander during the Vietnam War, a Pentagon policymaker, and a scholar who taught at West Point and National Defense University. His extensive personal interviews with North Vietnamese are drawn from his many trips to Hanoi after the war. Schandler provides not only a definitive analysis of the American failure in Vietnam but a crucial foundation for exploring the potential for success in the current guerrilla wars the United States is fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This book contains descriptions of all of the naval and riverine weapons used by both sides during the Vietnam War. It also includes the dates that most major weapons were involved.

Conventional wisdom holds that the US Army in Vietnam, thrust into an unconventional war where occupying terrain was a meaningless measure of success, depended on body counts as its sole measure of military progress. In No Sure Victory, Army officer and historian Gregory Daddis looks far deeper into the Army's techniques for measuring military success and presents a much more complicated-and disturbing-account of the American misadventure in Indochina.
Daddis shows how the US Army, which confronted an unfamiliar enemy and an even more unfamiliar form of warfare, adopted a massive, and eventually unmanageable, system of measurements and formulas to track the progress of military operations that ranged from pacification efforts to search-and-destroy missions. The Army's monthly "Measurement of Progress" reports covered innumerable aspects of the fighting in Vietnam-force ratios, Vietcong/North Vietnamese Army incidents, tactical air sorties, weapons losses, security of base areas and roads, population control, area control, and hamlet defenses. Concentrating more on data collection and less on data analysis, these indiscriminate attempts to gauge success may actually have hindered the army's ability to evaluate the true outcome of the fight at hand--a roadblock that Daddis believes significantly contributed to the many failures that American forces suffered in Vietnam.
Filled with incisive analysis and rich historical detail, No Sure Victory is not only a valuable case study in unconventional warfare, but a cautionary tale that offers important perspectives on how to measure performance in current and future armed conflict. Given America's ongoing counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, No Sure Victory provides valuable historical perspective on how to measure--and mismeasure--military success.

Thirty-five long years and I was still seeking answers. If I could make someone in the government listen to the facts, I knew they'd want to act on them. After all, who wouldn't want to find one of our POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War? IS ANYBODY LISTENING? tells of dignitaries, presidents and those involved with the POW/MIA issue as I've known it since November 1968 when my husband, a Special Forces officer, became missing-in-action. The pages reveal my feelings and torment during my many trips to Southeast Asia in search of answers, and my frustrations while wandering the halls of Washington D.C. for help. The book was written to show the issue's insidious cover-up and my commitment to the truth.

This book chronicles one man's journey through life, finding happiness among the hardships and amusement amid the danger in Vietnam. This vivid account takes you on an armchair ride through an unpredictable and intriguing life. Set against the backdrop of The War, follow this young civilian engineer, family man and patriot through a war torn land as he strives to secure his young family's future and seek a more meaningful purpose to his own life. He returns home a changed man, only to confront a completely new set of obstacles, not least of which is a country in turmoil.

Part I is a compendium of World War II service recollections embracing the unusual, bizarre and humorous, most of which never appeared in the news or any publications. However, I do believe readers will be very interested in the other side of war. Part II is an incisive review of Vietnam, and why we failed or should never have been involved militarily. Part III is a current analysis of terrorism and the Iraq war, including a new proposal to address the global aspects of terrorism and the Palestinian issue.

The Vietnam War has had many long-reaching, traumatic effects, not just on the veterans of the war, but on their children as well. In this book, Weber examines the concept of the war as a social monad, a confusing array of personal stories and public histories that disrupt traditional ways of knowing the social world for the second generation.