High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1972 study. This study documents the conception, birth, death and resurrection of gunship beacon offset firing techniques. Two entirely different systems--Pave Mace and Combat Rendezvous--are discussed. These systems enabled USAF fixed wing gunships to deliver safe, sustained, and effective aerial fire on enemy ground forces in close proximity to friendly forces when both are invisible from the air. The primary purpose of this report is to show from well-documented experience that these systems represent an in-being, revolutionary, all-weather, close air support capability never before achieved. The report also examines the sometimes unconventional, often torturous, and almost always frustrating process by which the USAF developed, tested, introduced, and finally used these systems in combat. In so doing it suggests some obvious lessons which may facilitate more systematic management of future weapons systems. The report also shows how interservice rivalry, roles and missions considerations, and force structure issues impeded and almost prevented the introduction of systems who rapid deployment would have been in the best interest of both services. Hopefully, this experience may suggest how such opposition can be overcome in the future by showing how it was overcome in this instance. The report seeks to provide sufficient technical information about each system to enable the reader to understand how each system operates and to compare their relative merits and shortcomings. In so doing it reveals a number of problems with both systems which have not yet been overcome and discussed possible solutions that have been advanced. Finally, this study shows how each system has saved the lives of friendly ground forces who would otherwise have died had it not been for these systems.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1971 study. The unique demands of the operational environment in Southeast Asia dictated that the United States Air Force meet many mission requirements for which hardware did not exist. The lateral firing gunship evolved from this environment, and it constituted an immediate and effective solution for several tactical problems. This weapon system performed significantly in Southeast Asia. AC-47 gunship activity during 1965 and early 1966 was documented in four previous CHECO reports. Another CHECO report, Night Close Air Support in RVN, also dealt in detail with AC-47 combat operations. The Role of Gunships in SEA, a CHECO report dated 30 August 1969, recounts the continuing mission of the AC-47 as well as the introduction and employment of AC-119G, AC-119K, and AC-130A gunships in 1968 and 1969. The effectiveness of this unique weapon system generated significant interest at all command levels, and the combat role of gunships merits further attention and analysis. This report updates previous gunship studies with special emphasis on new developments in the AC-130 weapon system. This report also examines the current performance and effectiveness of the AC-47, long noted for its role in providing close air support for troops in contact; the AC-119G/K which functioned in armed reconnaissance and close air support roles; and the AC-130 which covered the whole spectrum of gunship operations but performed primarily as a night interdiction weapon system.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1969 study. A study requested by the Secretary of Defense in 1965 showed that "when national interests are involved and tactical forces are deployed without a declaration of national emergency or war, a quick-reacting, heavy repair force, organic to the Air Force, is essential." Between June and September 1965, a study group from the Directorate of Civil Engineering at Headquarters USAF had analyzed the problem and obtained Air Staff approval to form such a force. On 23 September 1965, the Tactical Air Command (TAC) was given responsibility for organizing, training, procuring equipment and supplies, and administering the formation of the first two Red Horse Squadrons (the 554th and 555th Civil Engineering Heavy Repair Squadrons). By 18 October 1965, Hq TAC at Langley Field, Virginia, completed and distributed a comprehensive programming plan covering the objectives, timetable of actions, reporting procedures, staffing requirements, and the naming of primary and subordinate unit project officers. The mission and capabilities of the squadrons, their limitations, and material requirements were also recorded. Thus, in the fall of 1965, responding to the changing military and political situation in Southeast Asia and the projected need for a rapid increase of U.S. military forces in that part of the world, Project RED HORSE was initiated. The rapidity of planning, organizing, and executing which characterized these early beginnings, was to become a permanent part of RED HORSE activities.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1969 study. Combine adverse effects of darkness and weather conditions on air operations in a combat situation, and a very hazardous operational environment is likely to prevail. This CHECO report investigates problems and limitations of the impact which darkness and weather have on air operations in Southeast Asia. Throughout this report, special emphasis is placed on tactics, techniques, and innovations developed to counteract unfavorable effects of night and weather on mission accomplishment.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1971 study. This report describes the effects of the Consolidated Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP) on each of the Vietnamese Air Divisions (ADs). Each chapter of this report was written by a different author. Thus, the reader has not one, but five views of American efforts to improve and modernize the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF). Each author presents the results of his own investigation, and while they generally agree on the overall success of the program, they sometimes differ on details. Problems and achievements that were significant to one author were sometimes less important to another. Therefore, each chapter of this report should be evaluated on its own merit as well as by comparison to the other four. The history of the VNAF and the United States Air Force (USAF) advisory role in its development has been traced in three previous CHECO reports: Organization, Mission and Growth of the Vietnamese Air Force, 1949-1968; VNAF Improvement and Modernization Program 1968-1970]; and The Vietnamization of the Air War, 1970-1971. The Vietnamization of the Air War is a companion volume to The VNAF Air Divisions: Reports on Improvement and Modernization. The former describes VNAF improvement and modernization (I&M) by mission function-- airlift" for example, or "logistics,"--and thus deals with the broad out lines of the entire VNAF. The VNAF Air Divisions, on the other hand, focuses on one Air Division in each chapter and investigates the details of I&M at the unit level. Together, these two volumes describe the VNAF as it developed between January 1970 and July 1971.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1971 study. This report describes the improvement and modernization of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) from January 1970 to July 1971. The growth and development of the VNAF during this period was an integral part of the Consolidated Republic of Vietnam Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP). The goal of CRIMP was to assure the self-sufficiency of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) after the withdrawal of United States combat forces. Self-sufficiency in this context implied that the armed forces of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) could maintain the level of security that had been won jointly by the United States and South Vietnam. This did not mean that United States assistance would no longer be required to protect South Vietnamese independence. South Vietnam did not possess or plan to develop the industrial capacity to produce the equipment necessary for defense. The United States would continue to provide the materiel support for the defense of South Vietnam, as well as a military team to advise the RVNAF--but the RVNAF would have the capability of effectively using that equipment to maintain the security of South Vietnam without the active armed assistance of United States military forces. Though the United States advisory effort would still be needed, the United States would no longer be required to bear arms in defense of South Vietnam. That is the meaning of the term "self-sufficiency" as it is used in this study.

High quality reprint of a recently declassified 1971 study. The period from July 1971 through the end of 1973 was a time of transition, growth, and profound challenge for the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF). As U.S. personnel continued to withdraw from South Vietnam (SVN), the VNAF was faced with growing combat requirements and demanding force expansions. Then, following a massive Communist offensive in the Spring of 1972, VNAF personnel, support, and operational capabilities were pushed to the limit to respond to intensified combat needs, force structure increases, and accelerated squadron activation schedules. These difficulties were overshadowed in late 1972 when, in anticipation of a cease-fire and an accompanying total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, there was an unprecedented infusion of aircraft and equipment into South Vietnam, and a massive transfer of remaining U.S. facilities to the South Vietnamese. Once more the VNAF force structure was expanded and activation schedules were accelerated. Shortly thereafter, on 27 January 1973, the Agreement to End the War and Restore Peace in Vietnam was signed, and during the next 60 days U.S. forces and advisors were withdrawn from Vietnam. Unfortunately, the "cease-fire' did not bring with it a period of peace and stability, thus necessitating continuing VNAF combat requirements in addition to its monumental transition, expansion, and training tasks. The combination of these factors--marked VNAF growth, continuing combat requirements, and withdrawal of U.S. forces and advisors--presented the VNAF with its greatest challenge of the conflict. This report examines the events which occurred, the goals pursued, the problems encountered, and the achievements attained in the program to improve and modernize the Vietnamese Air Force between July 1971 and December 1973. It also addresses the limitations which, as of the end of 1973, remained to be overcome on the road toward VNAF self-sufficiency.

High quality reprint of a recently declassified 1970 study. The French founded the VNAF in 1951 as a liaison flight. Manned by Vietnamese, it was part of the French Air Force under the command of French officers. In 1953, two observation squadrons manned by Vietnamese were added, but command, administration, and logistics support remained in French hands. The departure of the French in 1955 left the VNAF with an inventory of aging Morane-Saulnier observation aircraft, Grumman F-8F Bearcats, and C-47s. The new VNAF staff organized these resources into two liaison squadrons, two fighter squadrons, a special-airlift-mission squadron, and a transport squadron. Throughout South Vietnam's first year of independence, the advisors to the VNAF were French. In May 1956, a U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) assumed responsibility for training the South Vietnamese Army and entered into a joint arrangement with the French to advise and train the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force. The Franco-American association lasted a year. At a time when unification of North and South Vietnam began to appear more and more impossible, the U.S. took action to expand the South Vietnamese armed forces. The next five years saw a remodeling of the force following the organization of the USAF, with English-language training and American management techniques. Expansion of the VNAF was still relatively modest. In November 1961, the USAF established a special unit at Bien Hoa VNAF AS to train Vietnamese pilots and maintenance personnel--Operation FARM GATE. For nearly three years, there were joint, operations under this program, with VNAF personnel required on each mission. As VNAF officers and airmen became familiar with USAF equipment and techniques from 1956 to 1961, the air effort became standardized, with more efficient aid possible under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). The period also laid the foundation for a much more extensive and accelerated expansion program over the next three years.

This recently declassified 1967 report traces the development of the Assault Airlift capability from its inception through June, 1966. its growth, and the problems associated therewith including equipment, support, facilities and personnel are discussed. Operations during the French/Indo China War are briefly covered in the Introduction as well as "interim" operations following the close of that conflict and up to 1 January 1961. From the latter date, forward, the accomplishments of the 315th Air Division in its assault airlift role are more detailed. To examine the role of assault airlift in Southeast Asia without considering the effects of "out-country," or inter-theater airlift efforts would leave unexplained many of the logistical handicaps under which assault airlift operates today. Hence, the reader will find several references to "out-country" airlift and to organization and control beyond the geographical limits of South Vietnam.

After World War II, the escalating tensions of the Cold War shaped the international system. Fearing the Worst explains how the Korean War fundamentally changed postwar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union into a militarized confrontation that would last decades. Samuel F. Wells Jr. examines how military and political events interacted to escalate the conflict. Decisions made by the Truman administration in the first six months of the Korean War drove both superpowers to intensify their defense buildup. American leaders feared the worst-case scenario-that Stalin was prepared to start World War III-and raced to build up strategic arms, resulting in a struggle they did not seek out or intend. Their decisions stemmed from incomplete interpretations of Soviet and Chinese goals, especially the belief that China was a Kremlin puppet. Yet Stalin, Mao, and Kim Il-sung all had their own agendas, about which the United States lacked reliable intelligence. Drawing on newly available documents and memoirs-including previously restricted archives in Russia, China, and North Korea-Wells analyzes the key decision points that changed the course of the war. He also provides vivid profiles of the central actors as well as important but lesser known figures. Bringing together studies of military policy and diplomacy with the roles of technology, intelligence, and domestic politics in each of the principal nations, Fearing the Worst offers a new account of the Korean War and its lasting legacy.

Moving from the White House to the B-52 cockpits to the missile sites and POW camps of Hanoi, "The Eleven Days of Christmas" is a gripping tale of heroism and incompetence in a battle whose political and military legacy is still a matter of controversy.

Once Upon a Distance War tells the stories of such young Vietnam war correspondents as Neil Sheehan, Peter Arnett, and David Halberstam, providing a riveting chronicle of high adventure and brutal slapstick, gallantry and cynicism, as well as a vital addition to the history they shaped. "Prochnau . . . tells a Vietnam story we haven't heard before. . . . Complex, witty, and humane."--Tobias Wolff. of photos.

Women presented the first effective challenge to the Islamic regime and the clerical authority in post-revolutionary Iran. Women's activism in support of their legal rights and personal freedom, however, did not develop into a strong movement against the rising fundamentalism. The Iranian socialists did not support women's autonomous organizations. The convergence of the Left's populism with Islamic populism, and the influence of the Iranian/Shiite political culture that promotes male authority and female submission, could not reconcile with women's claims to individual rights, choice, and personal freedom and their struggle for autonomy and self-determination in private or public life.

Artillery XO...back into the Ia Drang Valley is my story of entering the Vietnam War in January 1966 as a young artillery officer and volunteer. It follows my adventures and experiences with the people I meet through my assignment as an executive officer of a 105mm howitzer battery and a bloody contest with a hard core North Vietnamese unit at the base of Chu Pong Mountain on the Cambodian border, in the same area where the 1st Air Cav became famous in a similar but more prolonged fight six months earlier, now recounted in a popular book "We Were Soldiers...and Young" (Random House 1992)

The U.S. Marine Corps' Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam was an enlightened gesture of strategic dissent. Recognizing that search-and-destroy operations were immoral and self-defeating and that the best hope for victory was "winning hearts and minds," the Corps stationed squads of Marines, augmented by Navy corpsmen, in the countryside to train and patrol alongside village self-defense units called Popular Forces. Corporal Edward F. Palm became a combined-action Marine in 1967. His memoir recounts his experiences fighting with the South Vietnamese, his readjustment to life after the war, and the circumstances that prompted him to join the Corps in the first place. A one-time aspiring photojournalist, Palm includes photographs he took while serving, along with an epilogue describing what he and his former sergeant found during their 2002 return to Vietnam.

Vietnam veteran Don Yost explores the pain and rage of his experience as a correspondent near Mai Laid in 1968, transforming it through writing to a elegaic and powerful memoir, imbued with a significant message for our time.

Originally published in 1976. This narrative describes the evacuation of more than 1,400 American soldiers, Marines, and airmen, and Vietnamese men, women, and children from the Kham Duc Special Forces camp in southern I Corps on 12 May 1968. It treats the geographical and topographical setting, the threat to the camp posed by two regiments of the North Vietnamese Army, and the danger to the camp and its inhabitants from the communist seizure of all the high ground around the camp. The monograph devotes individual chapters to the US Army and Marine helicopter rescue efforts, tactical air support, and tactical airlift. The final chapter deals with the attempts to rescue the last three men at Kham Duc. American aircraft losses were severe during the evacuation, and the successful outcome of the mass rescue depended upon the skill and courage of American aircrews. Had command and control been better, losses probably would have been less severe.

Originally published in 1986 by the Naval Historical Center, United States Department of the Navy. 608 pages. maps. ill.

'Combines elements of In Cold Blood and Black Hawk Down with Apocalypse Now as it builds towards its terrible climax...Extraordinary' New York Times Iraq's 'Triangle of Death', 2005. A platoon of young soldiers from a U.S. regiment known as 'the Black Heart Brigade' is deployed to a lawless and hyperviolent area just south of Baghdad. Almost immediately, the attacks begin: every day another roadside bomb, another colleague blown to pieces. As the daily violence chips away, and chips away at their sanity, the thirty-five young men of 1st Platoon, Bravo Company descend into a tailspin of poor discipline, substance abuse, and brutality -- with tragic results. Black Hearts is a timeless true story of how modern warfare can make or break a man's character. Told with severe compassion, balanced judgement and the magnetic pace of a thriller, it looks set to become one of the defining books about the Iraq War. 'Black Hearts is the obverse of Band of Brothers, a story not of combat unity but of disharmony and disarray' Chicago Sun-Times 'A riveting picture of life outside the wire in Iraq, where "you tell a guy to go across a bridge, and within five minutes he's dead."' Kirkus Reviews (starred)

The defeat of South Vietnam was arguably America's worst foreign policy disaster of the 20th Century. Yet a complete understanding of the endgame--from the 27 January 1973 signing of the Paris Peace Accords to South Vietnam's surrender on 30 April 1975--has eluded us. Black April addresses that deficit. A culmination of exhaustive research in three distinct areas: primary source documents from American archives, North Vietnamese publications containing primary and secondary source material, and dozens of articles and numerous interviews with key South Vietnamese participants, this book represents one of the largest Vietnamese translation projects ever accomplished, including almost one hundred rarely or never seen before North Vietnamese unit histories, battle studies, and memoirs. Most important, to celebrate the 30th Anniversary of South Vietnam's conquest, the leaders in Hanoi released several compendiums of formerly highly classified cables and memorandum between the Politburo and its military commanders in the south. This treasure trove of primary source materials provides the most complete insight into North Vietnamese decision-making ever complied. While South Vietnamese deliberations remain less clear, enough material exists to provide a decent overview. Ultimately, whatever errors occurred on the American and South Vietnamese side, the simple fact remains that the country was conquered by a North Vietnamese military invasion despite written pledges by Hanoi's leadership against such action. Hanoi's momentous choice to destroy the Paris Peace Accords and militarily end the war sent a generation of South Vietnamese into exile, and exacerbated a societal trauma in America over our long Vietnam involvement that reverberates to this day. How that transpired deserves deeper scrutiny.

The Tet Offensive of January 1968 was the most important military campaign of the Vietnam War. The ancient capital city of Hue, once considered the jewel of Indochina's cities, was a key objective of a surprise Communist offensive launched on Vietnam's most important holiday. But when the North Vietnamese launched their massive invasion of the city, instead of the general civilian uprising and easy victory they had hoped for, they faced a devastating battle of attrition with enormous casualties on both sides. In the end, the battle for Hue was an unambiguous military and political victory for South Vietnam and the United States. In Fire in the Streets, the dramatic narrative of the battle unfolds on an hour-by-hour, day-by-day basis. The focus is on the U.S. and South Vietnamese soldiers and Marines-from the top commanders down to the frontline infantrymen-and on the men and women who supported them. With access to rare documents from both North and South Vietnam and hundreds of hours of interviews, Eric Hammel, a renowned military historian, expertly draws on first-hand accounts from the battle participants in this engrossing mixture of action and commentary. In addition, Hammel examines the tremendous strain the surprise attack put on the South Vietnamese-U.S. alliance, the shocking brutality of the Communist "liberators," and the lessons gained by U.S. Marines forced to wage battle in a city-a task for which they were utterly unprepared and which remains highly relevant today. Re-issued in the fiftieth anniversary year of the battle, with an updated photo section and maps this is the only complete and authoritative account of this crucial landmark battle.