In 1985 Thomas C. Thayer's War Without Fronts offered a wealth of data and analysis on U.S. military operations in the Vietnam War and provided a fresh and provocative take on the infamous conflict. When first published, reviewers agreed it was an invaluable text; Vietnam War historians still cite Thayer in modern studies. Long out-of-print, this new edition should facilitate the ongoing conversation about how the American war in Vietnam continues to serve as a comparison for more recent U.S. overseas military campaigns. Thomas Thayer worked as a systems analyst for the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the late 1960s and early 1970s, compiling data to better understand the war and find trends that might help improve U.S. civil and military operations. His work thus offers an insider's view of American military strategy during the Vietnam War and of how military operations affected the Vietnamese people.

In 1950, America pledged 15 million dollars in aid and the assignment of military advisors to French forces fighting in Vietnam. By the mid 50's, Americans began dying in a war that would go on to claim more than 58,000 of our bravest. Still, while Saigon had once been romantically dubbed "Paris of the Orient," very few Americans had yet heard of Vietnam. Their first introduction came in the early 60's, as they watched Buddhist Monks on the 6 o'clock news, publicly burning themselves to death in protest of their president's policies; and as Vietnam's First Lady - Madame Nhu - made headlines as an outspoken critic of the United States. Following the assassination of her husband and Vietnam's first president - Ngo Dinh Diem - Madame Nhu faded from view. Vietnam did not. 1964 brought the Tonkin Gulf incident, in which an American ship - the U.S.S. Maddox - was reportedly attacked by two North Vietnamese PT boats. For the next nine years, the Vietnam War and images of young soldiers dying, dominated the news. On April 30, 1975, two years after the official withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Vietnam, Saigon fell to the Communist North. The last official American casualties were still to come. Those who survived, returned home to the sight of protests, flag burnings, chants of "Hell no, we won't go " and unfeeling questions of "So, how's it feel to be a baby killer?" Coming Home is written in honor of all those who served and whose lives were affected by the Vietnam War as well as those who lead the fight to create the Vietnam Memorial and to ensure that their sacrifices will never be forgotten. Reflections of Vietnam - a story told in verse by a then young Navy Journalist - reminds us all of the unforgettable, expansive, granite monument saluting each of more than 58,000 brave Americans who died in a far off place - 58,000 of our finest, who died honoring America's commitment to protect and preserve God's gift of freedom. Coming Home: Reflections of Vietnam is an American story. If you're a veteran (of any war) - if you feel chill bumps when you hear the National Anthem, or "Proud to be an American" - if you cannot walk past the Vietnam War Memorial without shedding a tear, this is your story.

In The War after the War, Johannes Kadura offers a fresh interpretation of American strategy in the wake of the cease-fire that began in Vietnam on January 28, 1973. The U.S. exit from Vietnam continues to be important in discussions of present-day U.S. foreign policy, so it is crucial that it be interpreted correctly. In challenging the prevailing version of the history of the events, Kadura provides interesting correctives to the different accounts, including the ones of the key actors themselves, President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger foremost among them. In so doing, Kadura aims to forge a synthesis between orthodox and revisionist interpretations of this important period.Kadura finds that the strategy employed by Nixon and Kissinger centered on the concepts of "equilibrium strategy" and "insurance policy." That approach allowed them to follow a twofold strategy of making a major effort to uphold South Vietnam while at the same time maintaining a fallback strategy of downplaying the overall significance of Vietnam. Whether they won or lost on their primary bet to secure South Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger expected to come through the crisis in a viable strategic position.

No experience etched itself more deeply into Air Force thinking than the air campaigns over North Vietnam. Two decades later in the deserts of Southwest Asia, American airmen were able to avoid the gradualism that cost so many lives and planes in the jungles of Southeast Asia. Readers should come away from this book with a sympathetic understanding of the men who bombed North Vietnam. Those airmen handled tough problems in ways that ultimately reshaped the Air Force into the effective instrument on display in the Gulf War. This book is a sequel to Jacob Van Staaveren's Gradual Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam, 1965-1966, which we have also declassified and are publishing. Wayne Thompson tells how the Air Force used that failure to build a more capable service-a service which got a better opportunity to demonstrate the potential of air power in 1972. Dr. Thompson began to learn about his subject when he was an Army draftee assigned to an Air Force intelligence station in Taiwan during the Vietnam War. He took time out from writing To Hanoi and Back to serve in the Checkmate group that helped plan the Operation Desert Storm air campaign against Iraq. Later he visited Air Force pilots and commanders in Italy immediately after the Operation Deliberate Force air strikes in Bosnia. During Operation Allied Force over Serbia and its Kosovo province, he returned to Checkmate. Consequently, he is keenly aware of how much the Air Force has changed in some respects-how little in others. Although he pays ample attention to context, his book is about the Air Force. He has written a well-informed account that is both lively and thoughtful.

This is the third volume in a planned 10-volume operational and chronological series covering the Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War. This volume details the continued buildup in 1966 of the III Marine Amphibious Force in South Vietnam's northernmost corps area, I Corps, and the accelerated tempo of fighting during the year. The result was an "expanding war."