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Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-2009 - A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response: Letort Paper (Paperback)
Loot Price: R378
Discovery Miles 3 780
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Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-2009 - A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response: Letort Paper (Paperback)
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Loot Price R378
Discovery Miles 3 780
Expected to ship within 10 - 15 working days
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"Surprise" is a familiar term in military writings: the achievement
of tactical surprise has such obvious benefits that it is enshrined
in the military doctrine of most nations. Surprises that emerge in
tactics, however, can also operate at the strategic and operational
levels. These surprises are particularly dangerous, because they
can test the relevance and adaptability of military forces and the
"institutional" defense establishments that create, develop, and
sustain them. A military establishment that is too slow to
recognize and respond to such surprises places its nation's
interests at grave risk. In the bipolar strategic environment of
the Cold War, deep knowledge of a known adversary reduced the
likelihood of such surprises. The same is not true now. This
monograph thus comes at an important time, as Western nations
contemplate major reductions in defense spending with consequent
limitations on force structure. The range of enemy capabilities
that a force will be able to match, qualitatively and
quantitatively, will become smaller; hence the potential for
operational and strategic surprise will increase. In this
monograph, Brigadier Andrew Smith uses the improvised explosive
device threat as it manifested itself in Iraq between 2003 and 2009
as a case study of such a surprise and how defense establishments
responded to it. He argues that, although tactical in itself, this
threat posed an operational and strategic threat in a modern "war
of discretion" that demanded institutional responses from both the
U.S. and Australian institutional militaries, including major
equipment, training, and budgetary changes within iv time frames
that circumvented the normal peacetime force development cycles of
those countries. There are disappointments in the way both
countries met this challenge. A key conclusion from this analysis
is the critical role of strategic leadership in recognizing the
scale of surprise and in forcing the necessary institutional
response. At a time when budgets will not allow surprise to be
addressed by maintaining large and technically diverse forces at
high readiness, the ability to recognize and respond adroitly to
operational and strategic surprise may be a critical requirement
for a modern defense establishment.
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