This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC
BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford
Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and
selected open access locations. The formation of coalitions to
achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we
see all around us. The list is long and varied: production cartels,
political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and
ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. Drawing upon
and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures at the University of
Essex, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective
of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions
will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a
social perspective? Ray brings together developments in both
cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics
of coalition formation and binding agreements. This book
concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential
applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.
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