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Epistemic Luck (Hardcover)
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Epistemic Luck (Hardcover)
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One of the key supposed 'platitudes' of contemporary epistemology
is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the
attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one
can take credit for - it is an achievement of sorts - and yet luck
undermines genuine achievement. The problem, however, is that luck
seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises,
which tempts us to think that either scepticism is true and that we
don't know very much, or else that luck is compatible with
knowledge after all. In this book, Duncan Pritchard argues that we
do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since
a closer examination of what is involved in the notion of epistemic
luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge
possession and varieties that aren't. Moreover, Pritchard shows
that a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between luck
and knowledge can cast light on many of the most central topics in
contemporary epistemology. These topics include: the
externalism/internalism distinction; virtue epistemology; the
problem of scepticism; metaepistemological scepticism; modal
epistemology; and the problem of moral luck. All epistemologists
will need to come to terms with Pritchard's original and incisive
contribution.
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