Singular reference to ourselves and the ordinary objects
surrounding us is a most crucial philosophical topic, for it looms
large in any attempt to understand how language and mind connect to
the world. This book explains in detail why in the past
philosophers such as Frege, Russell and Reichenbach have favoured a
descriptivist approach to this matter and why in more recent times
Donnellan, Kripke, Kaplan and others have rather favoured a
referentialist standpoint. The now dominant referentialist theories
however still have a hard time in addressing propositional
attitudes and empty singular terms. Here a way out of this
difficulty emerges in an approach that incorporates aspects of the
old-fashioned descriptivist views of Frege, Russell and Reichenbach
without succumbing to the anti-descriptivist arguments that back up
the current referentialist trend. The resulting theory features a
novel approach to the semantics and pragmatics of determiner
phrases, definite descriptions, proper names and indexicals, all
treated in uniform fashion in both their anaphoric and
non-anaphoric uses.
This work will be of interest to researchers in philosophy of
language, philosophy of mind and theoretical linguistics. The
wealth of background information and detailed explanations that it
provides makes it also accessible to graduate and upper level
undergraduates and suitable as a reference book.
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