Books > Business & Economics > Business & management
|
Buy Now
Independence in Crisis - The Argentinean Central Bank and their accountability for bureaucratic and political decisions, 1991-2007 (Hardcover, New edition)
Loot Price: R1,280
Discovery Miles 12 800
|
|
Independence in Crisis - The Argentinean Central Bank and their accountability for bureaucratic and political decisions, 1991-2007 (Hardcover, New edition)
Expected to ship within 12 - 19 working days
|
Central bankers like the idea of low inflation, but their actions
have a distribution effect of richness. During the 1990s, the
independence of central banks increased. What have central banks
done with this independence? When we infer that all actors have
interests, whether governments, voters or interest groups, why
would we assume that central banks are technocratic institutions
maximizing the welfare of the state? To answer these questions,
this study looks at the Argentinean Central Bank between 1991 and
2007 and researches the incentives of a central bank to act
strategically. This book uses a model which is an adaptation of
Helmke's model (2002, 2005) for the Supreme Court of Justice. An
inter-temporal conflict of interest explains the Central Bank's
behavior.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!
|
You might also like..
|
Email address subscribed successfully.
A activation email has been sent to you.
Please click the link in that email to activate your subscription.