The formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash's work in
the early 1950s. This book discusses two recent developments in
this theory. The first uses the tool of extensive games to
construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled
explicitly. The second applies the theory of bargaining to the
study of decentralized markets. Rather than surveying the field,
the authors present a select number of models, each of which
illustrates a key point. In addition, they give detailed proofs
throughout the book. It uses a small number of models, rather than
a survey of the field, to illustrate key points, and includes
detailed proofs given as explanations for the models. The text has
been class-tested in a semester-long graduate course.
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