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Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? - Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will (Hardcover)
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Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? - Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will (Hardcover)
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If humans are purely physical, and if it is the brain that does the
work formerly assigned to the mind or soul, then how can it fail to
be the case that all of our thoughts and actions are determined by
the laws of neurobiology? If this is the case, then free will,
moral responsibility, and, indeed, reason itself would appear to be
in jeopardy. Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown here defend a
non-reductive version of physicalism whereby humans are (sometimes)
the authors of their own thoughts and actions.
Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? brings together insights from both
philosophy and the cognitive neurosciences to defeat
neurobiological reductionism. One resource is a "post-Cartesian"
account of mind as essentially embodied and constituted by
action-feedback-evaluation-action loops in the environment, and
"scaffolded" by cultural resources. Another is a non-mysterious
account of downward (mental) causation explained in terms of a
complex, higher-order system exercising constraints on lower-level
causal processes. These resources are intrinsically related: the
embeddedness of brain events in action-feedback loops is the key to
their mentality, and those broader systems have causal effects on
the brain itself.
With these resources Murphy and Brown take on two problems in
philosophy of mind: a response to the charges that physicalists
cannot account for the meaningfulness of language nor the causal
efficacy of the mental qua mental. Solutions to these problems are
a prerequisite to addressing the central problem of the book: how
can biological organisms be free and morally responsible? The
authors argue that the free-will problem is badly framed if it is
put in terms ofneurobiological determinism; the real issue is
neurobiological reductionism. If it is indeed possible to make
sense of the notion of downward causation, then the relevant
question is whether humans exert downward causation over some of
their own parts and processes. If all organisms do this to some
extent, what needs to be added to this animalian flexibility to
constitute free and responsible action? The keys are sophisticated
language and hierarchically ordered cognitive processes allowing
(mature) humans to evaluate their own actions, motives, goals, and
rational and moral principles.
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