In 1960, President Kennedy warned of a dangerous future, rife with
nuclear-armed states and a widespread penchant for conflict by the
end of the century. Thankfully, his prediction failed to pass; in
fact, roughly three times as many countries have since opted to
give up their nuclear pursuit or relinquish existing weapons than
have maintained their arsenals. Nevertheless, clandestine
acquisition of nuclear materials and technology by states such as
Iraq, Syria, and Iran, and a nuclear North Korea, has reaffirmed
the need for United States' commitment to pursuing aggressive
counterproliferation strategies, particularly with rogue states.
This book looks at the experiences of countries that ventured down
the path of nuclear proliferation but were stopped short, and
examines how the international community bargains with
proliferators to encourage nuclear reversal. It asks why so many
states have relented to pressure to abandon their nuclear weapons
programs, and which counterproliferation policies have been
successful. Rupal N. Mehta argues that the international community
can persuade countries to reverse their weapons programs with
rewards and sanctions especially when the threat to use military
force remains "on the table". Specifically, nuclear reversal is
most likely when states are threatened with sanctions and offered
face-saving rewards that help them withstand domestic political
opposition. Historically, the United States has relied on a variety
of policy levers-including economic and civilian nuclear assistance
and, sometimes, security guarantees, as well as economic
sanctions-to achieve nuclear reversal. Underlying these
negotiations is the possibility of military intervention, which
incentivizes states to accept the agreement (often spearheaded by
the United States) and end their nuclear pursuit. The book draws on
interviews with current and former policymakers, as well as
in-depth case studies of India, Iran, and North Korea, to provide
policy recommendations on how best to manage nuclear proliferation
challenges from rogue states. It also outlines the proliferation
horizon, or the set of state and non-state actors that are likely
to have interest in acquiring nuclear technology for civilian,
military, or unknown purposes. The book concludes with implications
and recommendations for U.S. and global nuclear
counterproliferation policy.
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