This survey of more than fifty years of national security policy
juxtaposes declassified U. S. national intelligence estimates with
recently released Soviet documents disclosing the views of Soviet
leaders and their Communist allies on the same events. Matthias
shows that U. S. intelligence estimates were usually correct but
that our political and military leaders generally ignored
them--with sometimes disastrous results. The book begins with a
look back at the role of U. S. intelligence during World War II,
from Pearl Harbor through the plot against Hitler and the D-day
invasion to the "unconditional surrender" of Japan, and reveals how
better use of the intelligence available could have saved many
lives and shortened the war. The following chapters dealing with
the Cold War disclose what information and advice U. S.
intelligence analysts passed on to policy makers, and also what
sometimes bitter policy debates occurred within the Communist camp,
concerning Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, the
turmoil in Eastern Europe, the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars in the
Middle East, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In many
ways, this is a story of missed opportunities the U. S. government
had to conduct a more responsible foreign policy that could have
avoided large losses of life and massive expenditures on arms
buildups.
While not exonerating the CIA for its own mistakes, Matthias
casts new light on the contributions that objective intelligence
analysis did make during the Cold War and speculates on what might
have happened if that analysis and advice had been heeded.
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