The "oligopoly problem"--the question of how prices are formed
when the market contains only a few competitors--is one of the more
persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this
book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to
develop a theory of oligopoly pricing.Vives begins by relating
classic contributions to the field--including those of Cournot,
Bertrand, Edgeworth, Chamberlin, and Robinson--to modern game
theory. In his discussion of basic game-theoretic tools and
equilibrium, he pays particular attention to recent developments in
the theory of supermodular games. The middle section of the book,
an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides
specialized existence results, characterizations of equilibria,
extensions to large markets, and an analysis of comparative statics
with a view toward applied work. The final chapters examine
commitment issues, entry, information transmission, and collusion
using a variety of tools: two-stage games, the modeling of
competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design
theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games, including
Markov perfect equilibrium and differential games.
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