Husserl's phenomenology has often been criticized for its Cartesian, fundamentalistic, idealistic and solipsistic nature. Today, this widespread interpretation must be regarded as being outdated, since it gives but a very partial and limited picture of Husserl's thinking. The continuing publication of Husserl's research manuscripts has disclosed analyses which have made it necessary to revise and modify a number of standard readings. This anthology documents the recent development in Husserl research. It contains contributions from a number of young phenomenologists, who have all defended their dissertation on Husserl in the nineties, and it presents a new type of interpretation which emphasizes the dimensions of facticity, passivity, alterity and ethics in Husserl's thinking.

Generative Worlds. New Phenomenological Perspectives on Space and Time accounts for the phenomenological concept of generativity. In doing so, this book brings together several recent phenomenological studies on space and time. Generative studies in phenomenology propose new ways of conceiving space, time, and the relation between them. Edited by Luz Ascarate and Quentin Gailhac, the collection reveals new dimensions to topics such as the generation of life, birth, historicity, intersubjectivity, narrativity, institution, touching, and places, and in some cases, the contributors invert the classical definitions of space and time. These transformative readings are fruitful for the interdisciplinary exchange between philosophy and fields such as cosmology, psychology, and the social sciences. The contributors ask if phenomenology reaches its own concreteness through the study of generation and whether it manages to redefine certain dimensions of space and time which, in other orientations of the Husserlian method, remain too abstract and detached from the constitutive becoming of experience.

Paul Ricoeur's first book, Freedom and Nature, introduces many themes that resurface in various ways throughout his later work, but its significance has been mostly overlooked in the field of Ricoeur studies. Gathering together an international group of scholars, The Companion to Freedom and Nature is the first book-length study to focus exclusively on Freedom and Nature. It helps readers to understand this complex work by providing careful textual analysis of specific arguments in the book and by situating them in relation to Ricoeur's early influences, including Merleau-Ponty, Nabert, and Ravaisson. But most importantly, this book demonstrates that Freedom and Nature remains a compelling and vital resource for readers today, precisely because it resonates with recent developments in the areas of embodied cognition, philosophical psychology, and philosophy of the will. Freedom and Nature is fundamentally a book about embodiment, and it situates the human body at the crossroads of activity and passivity, motivation and causation, the voluntary and the involuntary. This conception of the body informs Ricoeur's unique treatment of topics such as effort, habit, and attention that are of much interest to scholars today. Together the chapters of this book provide a renewed appreciation of this important and innovative work.

Given its transcendental impulse, Husserl's analysis of the lived body has been considered by many phenomenologists and by most Husserl scholars as unable to account for our everyday intimate relationship with our own embodied self and with other embodied selves. Contrary to such a widespread contention, I want to show that Husserl's phenomenology contains unknown descriptive resources which provide a detailed account of our individual and communitarian lived body at a transcendental level proper.
The purpose of LuciditA(c) du corps, then, is to confront such an analysis with recent accounts in empirical scientific fields (emergent neurobiology, ethology and infant psychology, psychopathology, comprehensive sociology and ethnology) and to engage in a renewed analysis of our lived body as empowered with lucidity and not as burdened by a passive opacity. Unlike Merleau-Ponty, P. Ricoeur and J. Derrida, I maintain the transcendentality of our body, but unlike a Kantian-inspired version of transcendentalism, I claim the possibility of a transcendental empiricism as a theoretical framework for phenomenology.
Du fait de son impulsion transcendantale, l'analyse husserlienne du corps vivant et vA(c)cu entendu comme corps charnel a A(c)tA(c) congA(c)diA(c)e par maints phA(c)nomA(c)nologues et par la plupart des exA(c)gA]tes de Husserl au titre de sa soi-disante incapacitA(c) A rendre compte A partir de lA de la relation intime et quotidienne que nous entretenons avec nous-mAames et avec les autres. A rebours de cette thA]se largement rA(c)pandue, je souhaite montrer combien la phA(c)nomA(c)nologie husserlienne contient en elle des ressources descriptive mA(c)connues, qui libA]rentl'espace d'un compte rendu dA(c)taillA(c) de notre expA(c)rience corporelle et charnelle, tout aussi bien individuelle que communautaire, et ce, A son niveau transcendantal rigoureux.
Le propos de LuciditA(c) du corps rA(c)side dA]s lors dans la confrontation entre une telle analyse et les descriptions rA(c)centes des diffA(c)rentes dimensions du corps telles qu'elles se dA(c)ploient de plus en plus dans les champs empiriques rA(c)cents (neurobiologie A(c)mergente, A(c)thologie, psychologie de l'enfant, psychopathologie, sociologie comprA(c)hensive et ethnologie), ce qui permet d'ouvrir la voie A une analyse renouvelA(c)e de notre chair en tant que dotA(c)e de ludicitA(c) plutAt que comme grevA(c)e d'opacitA(c) passive. A la diffA(c)rence de Merleau-Ponty, de P. Ricoeur et de J. Derrida, je maintiens fermement la contrainte transcendantale de l'expA(c)rience phA(c)nomA(c)nologique de la chair, mais, contrairement A une version de la transcendantalitA(c) formelle inspirA(c)e par l'hA(c)ritage kantien, je revendique la possibilitA(c) d'un empirisme transcendantal A titre de cadre philosophique pour la dA(c)marche phA(c)nomA(c)nologique.

Peut-on, de l'existence d'un Cours consacre partiellement a l'attention, conclure a l'existence chez Husserl d'une phenomenologie de l'attention en bonne et due forme? En montrant comment l'attention entretient une relation complexe a la perception, a la volonte, a l'affect et a la reflexion, le phenomenologue fait ressortir l'originalite d'un vecu qui n'est pas un acte intentionnel au sens precis mais traverse les actes pour les porter a leur accomplissement: ni raison (a savoir volonte et reflexion), ni sentiment (a savoir affect et plaisir), l'attention remplit une fonction modulatrice des actes de la onscience, fonction qui fait a elle seule son originalite dynamique d'amorcage et d'adossage integratif. Par une double reforme de l'intentionnalite (formelle) et de l'intensite (materielle) de la conscience, il renvoie dos-a-dos, non sans y puiser certaines ressources, la problematique du champ de la conscience (Wundt) et celle, longuement discutee, de l'attention comme plaisir pris a remarquer (Stumpf). Husserl joue sur une variation terminologique de l'attention (Zuwendung: conversion attentionnelle; Aufmerksamkeit: activite aperceptive de remarquer; attention: tension vers) qui demantele une identite homogene donnee a priori et permet au langage d'epouser les modifications et mutations experientielles du phenomene attentionnel. A-t-on pour autant affaire a une phenomenologie de l'attention ? Nous laissons le lecteur juger et conclure lui-meme apres lecture.