William E. Nelson's first volume of the four-volume The Common Law of Colonial America (2008) established a new benchmark for study of colonial era legal history. Drawing from both a rich archival base and existing scholarship on the topic, the first volume demonstrated how the legal systems of Britain's thirteen North American colonies-each of which had unique economies, political structures, and religious institutions -slowly converged into a common law order that differed substantially from English common law. The first volume focused on how the legal systems of the Chesapeake colonies-Virginia and Maryland-contrasted with those of the New England colonies and traced these dissimilarities from the initial settlement of America until approximately 1660. In this new volume, Nelson brings the discussion forward, covering the years from 1660, which saw the Restoration of the British monarchy, to 1730. In particular, he analyzes the impact that an increasingly powerful British government had on the evolution of the common law in the New World. As the reach of the Crown extended, Britain imposed far more restrictions than before on the new colonies it had chartered in the Carolinas and the middle Atlantic region. The government's intent was to ensure that colonies' laws would align more tightly with British law. Nelson examines how the newfound coherence in British colonial policy led these new colonies to develop common law systems that corresponded more closely with one another, eliminating much of the variation that socio-economic differences had created in the earliest colonies. As this volume reveals, these trends in governance ultimately resulted in a tension between top-down pressures from Britain for a more uniform system of laws and bottom-up pressures from colonists to develop their own common law norms and preserve their own distinctive societies. Authoritative and deeply researched, the volumes in The Common Law of Colonial America will become the foundational resource for anyone interested the history of American law before the Revolution.

What does it mean when civil lawyers and common lawyers think differently? In Charting the Divide between Common and Civil Law, Thomas Lundmark provides a comprehensive introduction to the uses, purposes, and approaches to studying civil and common law in a comparative legal framework. Superbly organized and exhaustively written, this volume covers the jurisdictions of Germany, Sweden, England and Wales, and the United States, and includes a discussion of each country's legal issues, structure, and their general rules. Professor Lundmark also explores the discipline of comparative legal studies, rectifying many of the misconceptions and prejudices that cloud our understanding of the divide between the common law and civil law traditions.
Students of international law, comparative law, social philosophy, and legal theory will find this volume a valuable introduction to common and civil law. Lawyers, judges, political scientists, historians, and philosophers will also find this book valuable as a source of reference. Charting theDivide between Common and Civil Law equips readers with the background and tools to think critically about different legal systems and evaluate their future direction.

Should judges in United States courts be permitted to cite foreign laws in their rulings? In this book Jeremy Waldron explores some ideas in jurisprudence and legal theory that could underlie the Supreme Court's occasional recourse to foreign law, especially in constitutional cases. He argues that every society is governed not only by its own laws but partly also by laws common to all mankind (ius gentium). But he takes the unique step of arguing that this common law is not natural law but a grounded consensus among all nations. The idea of such a consensus will become increasingly important in jurisprudence and public affairs as the world becomes more globalized.

Hong Kong is one of the very few places in the world where the common law can be practiced in a language other than English. Introduced into the courtroom over a decade ago, Cantonese has significantly altered the everyday working of the common law in China's most Westernized city. In "The Common Law in Two Voices," Ng explores how English and Cantonese respectively reinforce and undermine the practice of legal formalism.
This first-ever ethnographic study of Hong Kong's unique legal system in the midst of social and political transition, this book provides important insights into the social nature of language and the work of institutions. Ng contends that the dilemma of legal bilingualism in Hong Kong is emblematic of the inherent tensions of postcolonial Hong Kong. Through the legal dramas presented in the book, readers will get a fresh look at the former British colony that is now searching for its identity within a powerful China.

Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort contains thirteen original essays on leading tort cases, ranging from the early nineteenth century to the present day. It is the third volume in a series of collected essays on landmark cases (the previous two volumes having dealt with restitution and contract). The cases examined raise a broad range of important issues across the law of tort, including such diverse areas as acts of state and public nuisance, as well as central questions relating to the tort of negligence. Several of the essays place cases in their historical context in ways that change our understanding of the case's significance. Sometimes the focus is on drawing out previously neglected aspects of cases which have been - undeservedly - assigned minor importance. Other essays explore the judicial methodologies and techniques that worked to shape leading principles of tort law. So much of tort law turns on cases, and there are so many cases, that all but the most recent decisions have a tendency to become reduced to terse propositions of law, so as to keep the subject manageable. This collection shows how important it is, despite the constant temptation to compression, not to lose sight of the contexts and nuances which qualify and illuminate so many leading authorities.

Much more than an historical examination of liability, criminal law, torts, bail, possession and ownership, and contracts, "The Common Law" articulates the ideas and judicial theory of one of the greatest justices of the Supreme Court. G. Edward White reminds us why the book remains essential reading not only for law students but also for anyone interested in American history. The text published is, with occasional corrections of typographical errors, identical with that found in the first and all subsequent printings by Little, Brown.

The American system of law has experienced a quiet revolution that has gone largely unnoticed by political scientists and legal scholars. The change that has occurred- the abandonment of the common law foundation on which the American judicial system was built-has important consequences for democratic politics in the United States and abroad. Dismantling American Common Law: Liberty and Justice in Our Transformed Courts tracks the development of the American common law through historical and quantitative analysis and a philosophical inquiry of the founding. Author Kyle Scott seeks to reclaim this lost tradition of common law, which was vital as a legitimizing force and consensus-building mechanism at the American founding and will grow in importance for newly democratizing nations around the world.

In a series of fifteen vivid essays, this book discusses the contributions of great common-law jurists and singular documents--namely the Magna Carta and the Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts--that have shaped common law, from its origins in twelfth-century England to its arrival in the American colonies.
Featured jurists include such widely recognized figures as Glanvill, Francis Bacon, Sir Edward Coke, and John Selden, as well as less known but influential writers like Richard Hooker, Michael Dalton, William Hudson, and Sir Matthew Hale. Across the essays, the jurists' personalities are given voice, the context of time and events made clear, and the continuing impact of the texts emphasized. Taken as a whole, the book offers a simple reverence for the achievements of these men and law books and a deep respect for the role historical events have played in the development of the common law.

In the two related works in this volume, Bentham offers a detailed critique of William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-9). In "Comment on the Commentaries," on which Bentham began work in 1774, he exposes the fallacies which he claims to have detected in Blackstone, and criticizes the theory of the Common Law. He goes on to provide important reflections on the nature of law, and more particularly on the nature of customary and of statute law, and on judicial interpretation.
A Fragment on Government, which was published in 1776, was detached from the "Comment on the Commentaries." Concentrating on a passage of five or six pages in which Blackstone discusses the origin of society and government, Bentham offers three main criticisms. First, he criticizes Blackstone's methodology for failing to distinguish between the role of the expositor and the role of the censor, and thereby confusing the question of what the law is with the question of what the law ought to be. Second, he criticizes Blackstone's assumption that the theory of the social contract represents an adequate justification of the obligation to obey government. Third, he criticizes Blackstone's theory of sovereignty, which claims that in every state there must exist some absolute, undivided power, whose commands are law. Bentham points to the existence of states where sovereign power is both divided and limited.
In these two works, published by OUP for the first time, Bentham outlines a number of themes which he goes on to develop in his later works: the principle of utility; the importance of a "natural arrangement" for a legal system; the point at which resistance to government becomesjustifiable; the exposition of legal terms; and much more.
The volume also contains Bentham's "Preface" intended for, but not published in, the second edition of A Fragment on Government, which appeared in 1823. Having by this committed himself to political radicalism, Bentham uses this occasion to reflect on the text and the circumstances in which it was produced.
The text has been edited by H.L.A. Hart and J.H. Burns, whose reputations in their respective fields of legal theory and history of political thought are unsurpassed. The volume contains an Editorial Introduction which explains the provenance of the text, and the method of presentation. The texts are fully annotated with textual and historical notes, and the volume is completed with a detailed subject index, based on a methodology devised by Hart.

William E. Nelson here proposes a new beginning in the study of colonial legal history. Examining all archival legal material for the period 1607-1776 and synthesizing existing scholarship in a four-volume series, The Common Law in Colonial America shows how the legal systems of Britain's thirteen North American colonies--initially established in response to divergent political, economic, and religious initiatives--slowly converged into a common American legal order that differed substantially from English common law.
Drawing on groundbreaking and overwhelmingly in-depth research into local court records and statutes, the first volume explores how the law of the Chesapeake colonies--Virginia and Maryland--diverged sharply from the New England colonies--Massachusetts Bay, Connecticut, New Haven, Plymouth, and Rhode Island--and traces the roots of these dissimilarities from their initial settlement until approximately 1660. Nelson pointedly examines the disparate motives of the legal systems in the respective colonies as they dealt with religion, price and labor regulations, crimes, public morals, the status of women, and the enforcement of contractual obligations. He reveals how Virginians' zeal for profit led to a harsh legal framework that efficiently squeezed payment out of debtors and labor out of servants; whereas the laws of Massachusetts were primarily concerned with the preservation of local autonomy and the moral values of family-centered farming communities. The law in the other New England colonies, Nelson argues, gravitated towards the Massachusetts model, while Maryland's law, gravitated toward that of Virginia.
Comprehensive, authoritative, and extensivelyresearched, The Common Law in Colonial America, Volume 1: The Chesapeake and New England, 1607-1660 is the definitive resource on the beginnings of the common law and its evolution during this vibrant era in America's history. William E. Nelson here proposes a new beginning in the study of colonial legal history.

The American system of law has experienced a quiet revolution that has gone largely unnoticed by political scientists and legal scholars. The change that has occurred- the abandonment of the common law foundation on which the American judicial system was built-has important consequences for democratic politics in the United States and abroad. Dismantling American Common Law: Liberty and Justice in Our Transformed Courts tracks the development of the American common law through historical and quantitative analysis and a philosophical inquiry of the founding. Author Kyle Scott seeks to reclaim this lost tradition of common law, which was vital as a legitimizing force and consensus-building mechanism at the American founding and will grow in importance for newly democratizing nations around the world.

This book examines the way in which judges in the top courts of nine different common law countries go about developing the law by devising new principles to allow themselves to be innovative and justice-oriented, and to ensure that human rights are universally protected.
The book surveys the decisions of these top courts over the last generation to determine how 'judicially active' they have been. It seeks to compare and contrast the different experiences and to identify the principles in accordance with which the various courts have decided to develop the law. How do they interpret legislation? What use do they make of standards derived from other countries or from international law? How willing are they to make law in areas which are traditionally the preserve of elected politicians?
The contributors are all experts in their own jurisdictions and have already published widely in the field of judicial activism. The jurisdictions covered include Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. The chapter on the judicial work of the House of Lords anticipates the transformation of that institution into the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in 2009 and the book as a whole suggests that there is plenty of scope for that new court to learn from other common law supreme courts about the appropriate limits of judicial creativity.

Foundations of Private Law is a treatise on the Western law of property, contract, tort and unjust enrichment in both common law systems and civil law systems. The thesis of the book is that underlying these fields of law are common principles, and that these principles can be used to explain the history and development of these areas. These underlying common principles are matters of common sense, which were given their archetypal expression by older jurists who wrote in the Aristotelian tradition. These principles shaped the development of Western law but can resolve legal problems which these older writers did not confront.

Water resources were central to England's precocious economic development in the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, and then again in the industrial, transport, and urban revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Each of these periods saw a great deal of legal conflict over water rights, often between domestic, agricultural, and manufacturing interests competing for access to flowing water. From 1750 the common-law courts developed a large but unstable body of legal doctrine, specifying strong property rights in flowing water attached to riparian possession, and also limited rights to surface and underground waters.
The new water doctrines were built from older concepts of common goods and the natural rights of ownership, deriving from Roman and Civilian law, together with the English sources of Bracton and Blackstone. Water law is one of the most Romanesque parts of English law, demonstrating the extent to which Common and Civilian law have commingled. Water law stands as a refutation of the still-common belief that English and European law parted ways irreversibly in the twelfth century. Getzler also describes the economic as well as the legal history of water use from early times, and examines the classical problem of the relationship between law and economic development. He suggests that water law was shaped both by the impact of technological innovations and by economic ideology, but above all by legalism.

Foundations of Private Law is a treatise on the Western law of property, contract, tort and unjust enrichment in both common law systems and civil law systems. The thesis of the book is that underlying these fields of law are common principles, and that these principles can be used to explain the history and development of these areas. These underlying common principles are matters of common sense, which were given their archetypal expression by older jurists who wrote in the Aristotelian tradition. These principles shaped the development of Western law but can resolve legal problems which these older writers did not confront.

This book describes the encounter between the common law legal system and the tribal peoples of North America and Australasia. It is a history of the role of anglophone law in managing relations between the British settlers and indigenous peoples. That history runs from the plantation of Ireland and settlement of the New World to the end of the Twentieth century. The book begins by looking at the nature of British imperialism and the position of non-Christian peoples at large in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries. It then focuses on North America and Australasia from their early national periods in the Nineteenth century to the modern era. The historical basis of relations is described through the key, enduring, but constantly shifting questions of sovereignty, status and, more latterly, self-determination. Throughout the history of engagement with common law legalism, questions surrounding the settler-state's recognition - or otherwise - of the integrity of the tribe have recurred. These issues were addressed in many and varied imperial and colonial contexts, but all jurisdictions have shared remarkable historical parallels which have been accentuated by their common legal heritage. The same questioning continues today in the renewed and controversial claims of the tribal societies to a distinct constitutional position and associated rights of self-determination. Mc Hugh examines the political resurgence of aboriginal peoples in the last quarter of the Twentieth century. A period of 'rights-recognition' was transformed into a second-generation jurisprudence of rights-management and rights-integration. From the 1990s onwards, aboriginal affairs have been driven by an increasingly rampant legalism. Throughout this history, the common law's encounter with tribal peoples not only describes its view of the aboriginal, but also reveals a considerable amount about the common law itself as a language of thought. This is a history of the voyaging common law.

In the eighteenth century, the English common law courts laid the foundation that continues to support present-day Anglo-American law. Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench, 1756-1788, was the dominant judicial force behind these developments. In this abridgment of his two-volume book, "The Mansfield Manuscripts and the Growth of English Law in the Eighteenth Century," James Oldham presents the fundamentals of the English common law during this period, with a detailed description of the operational features of the common law courts. This work includes revised and updated versions of the historical and analytical essays that introduced the case transcriptions in the original volumes, with each chapter focusing on a different aspect of the law.

While considerable scholarship has been devoted to the eighteenth-century English criminal trial, little attention has been given to the civil side. This book helps to fill that gap, providing an understanding of the principal body of substantive law with which America's founding fathers would have been familiar. It is an invaluable reference for practicing lawyers, scholars, and students of Anglo-American legal history.

The leading case of The Mayor, Alderman and Burgesses of the Borough of Bradford v Pickles was the first to establish that it is not unlawful for a property owner to exercise his or her property rights maliciously and to the detriment of others, or the public interest. Though controversial at the time, today it is often invisible and taken for granted. This book explores why the common law, in contrast to civil law systems, developed in this way.

The impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on public and criminal law has been well documented. The common law will be equally revolutionised by the Convention,yet its future is uncharted. This collection of papers, the product of two seminars held jointly with 1 Crown Office Row and the human rights group Justice, offers some navigational aids to those confronted with these deep waters. It contains analyses of current law and predictions for the future from practitioners and experts in a range of common law fields, including clinical negligence, medical law, environmental law, mental health and defamation. In addition to these specific areas, these chapters also explore the relationship between the ECHR principles of proportionality and margin of appreciation and the traditional way of resolving common law disputes. The book also includes a detailed - and controversial - scrutiny of the compatibility of the legal aid and costs proposals with the procedural right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Convention. CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION William Edis 2 THE CONVENTION AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: A NEW WAY OF THINKING Philip Havers QC and Neil Garnham 3 COSTS, CONDITIONAL FEES AND LEGAL AID Guy Mansfield QC 4 HORIZONTALITY: THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS IN PRIVATE DISPUTES Jonathan Cooper 5 REMEDIES Rosalind English 6 GENERAL COMMON LAW CLAIMS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT Richard Booth 7 BRINGING AND DEFENDING A CONVENTION CLAIM IN DOMESTIC LAW: A PRACTICAL EXERCISE Philippa Whipple 8 THE IMPACT OF THE CONVENTION ON MEDICAL LAW Philip Havers QC and Neil Sheldon 9 CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE AND PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION Robert Owen QC, Sarah Lambert and Caroline Neenan 10 ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS David Hart 11 CONFIDENTIALITY AND DEFAMATION Rosalind English 12 MENTAL HEALTH Jeremy Hyam 13 BIBLIOGRAPHY AND GUIDE TO Sources Owain Thomas

The fourth collection of essays in this long-established series brings together some of the leading contributors to the study of the philosophical foundations of common law . Key issues in

contract, tort, and criminal law are subjected to philosophical scrutiny, the aim being to provide an exciting new basis for advanced teaching and further research.

What makes a great book? If the determining factors are the content,authorship and timing of publication then this collection of essays from some of Europe's most eminent judges and jurists satisfies all three criteria. Readers will here find the expanded versions of the speeches given at a one-day conference in London to mark, from a legal point of view, the beginning of the new millennium. In a thoughtful and predominantly comparative manner the distinguished speakers explore the cross fertilisation of ideas that is taking place between the Common and Civil law systems in such important topics as human rights, commercial law, and comparative methodology. The contributors include Lords Irvine, Bingham, Woolf, Steyn, and Goff, the President of the Court of the European Communities, Dr Iglesias, the President of the Court of Human Rights, Dr Wildhaber, the President of the German Constitutional Court, Professor Limbach, Justices Lenoir and Mirabelli, respectively of the French and Italian Constitutional Courts, the Professor Walter van Gerven, former Advocate General of the Court of the European Communities, Professor Klaus Hopt, co-Director of the Max-Planck Institute of Hamburg, Professor Christian von Bar, Director of the Institute of Comparative Law at the University of Osnabruck and the organiser of the conference, Professor Basil Markesinis, Director of the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law. The book commences with a Foreword by Keith Clark, Senior Partner of the multinational law firm, Clifford Chance, who have sponsored the conference. This is a unique book about legal practice in the increasingly integrated world of tomorrow.

This volume is based closely on the lectures delivered by The Hon. Justice W. M. C. Gummow at Oxford University in 1999 as part of the Clarendon law lectures series, sponsored by Oxford University Press. These lectures take up themes of continuity and change in the law, particularly as they appear in the great common law jurisdictions.

One of the greatest of all English common lawyers,Lord Atkin it was who asked the question in Donoghue v. Stevenson 'Who then in law is my neighbour?' which became the foundation of the whole modern law of negligence. His courageous dissent in the wartime detention case of Liversidge v. Anderson is now recognised as a historic stand on principle. This book contains absorbing accounts of the background to these two great cases, as well as an assessment of their significance in the legal history of this century. It is the only legal biography of its kind. Instead of taking the conventional narrative form it treats individually the principal themes of Lord Atkin's decisions and illuminates some less well known aspects of his work including the critical series of Canadian constitutional appeals in 1936. In showing the strong influence on his thinking of Lord Atkin's home life and upbringing in the Welsh countryside, this study confirms Lord Wright's conclusion that it was first and foremost a liberal spirit which animated Atkin's work. This is a reprint of a work first published by Butterworths in 1983.

There have been few studies of the Law Lords, and no study of them by a political scientist for more than ten years. This book concentrates on the arguments the Law Lords use in justifying their decisions, and is concerned as much with the legal methodology as with the substance of their decisions. Very close attention is paid to the different approaches and styles of judicial argument, but the book is not restricted to this traditional analytic approach. One chapter applies the statistical techniques Americans call 'jurimetrics' and have successfully used on the US Supreme Court. The main theme is that the Law Lords enjoy and fully utilise far more discretion in their judgements than is normally admitted, and that much depends on exactly which judges happen to hear a case. the second part of the book shows the impact this extreme discretion has had in shaping both public law and areas of civil law.

The development of an autonomous English public law has been accompanied by persistent problems - a lack of systematic principles, dissatisfaction with judicial procedures, and uncertainty about the judicial role. It has provoked an ongoing debate on the very desirability of the distinction between public and private law. In this debate, a historical and comparative perspective has been lacking. A Continental Distinction in the Common Law introduces such a perspective. It compares the recent emergence of a significant English distinction with the entrenchment of the traditional French distinction. It explains how persistent problems of English public law are related to fundamental differences between the English and French legal and political traditions, differences in their conception of the state administration, their approach to law, their separation of powers, and their judicial procedures in public-law cases. The author argues that a satisfactory distinction between public and private law depends on a particular legal and political context, a context which was evident in late nineteenth-century France and is absent in twentieth-century England. He concludes by identifying the far-reaching theoretical, institutional, and procedural changes required to accommodate English public law.