As an administrative officer in the Egyptian Government, the author compiled a digest of the law and practice of the Bedouin Courts, together with an account of desert life and customs.

This volume is based closely on the lectures delivered by The Hon. Justice W. M. C. Gummow at Oxford University in 1999 as part of the Clarendon law lectures series, sponsored by Oxford University Press. These lectures take up themes of continuity and change in the law, particularly as they appear in the great common law jurisdictions.

This book examines the interface between religion, charity law and human rights. It does so by treating the Church of England and its current circumstances as a timely case study providing an opportunity to examine the tensions that have now become such a characteristic feature of that interface.
Firstly, it suggests that the Church is the primary source of canon law principles that have played a formative role in shaping civic morality throughout the common law jurisdictions: the history of their emergence and enforcement by the State in post-Reformation England is recorded and assessed. Secondly, it reveals that of such principles those of greatest weight were associated with matters of sexuality: in particular, for centuries, family law was formulated and applied with regard for the sanctity of the heterosexual marital family which provided the only legally permissible context for any form of sexual relationship. Thirdly, given that history, it identifies and assesses the particular implications that now arise for the Church as a consequence of recent charity law reform outcomes and human rights case law developments: a comparative analysis of religion related case law is provided. Finally, following an outline of the structure and organizational functions of the Church, a detailed analysis is undertaken of its success in engaging with these issues in the context of the Lambeth Conferences, the wider Anglican Communion and in the ill-fated Covenant initiative.From the perspective of the dilemmas currently challenging the moral authority of the Church of England, this book identifies and explores the contemporary moral imperatives or red line issues that now threaten the coherence of Christian religions in most leading common law nations. Gay marriage and abortion are among the host of morally charged and deeply divisive topics demanding a reasoned response and leadership from religious bodies. Attention is given to the judicial interpretation and evaluation of these and other issues that now undermine the traditional role of the Church of England. As the interface between religion, charity law and human rights becomes steadily more fractious, with religious fundamentalism and discrimination acquiring a higher profile, there is now a pressing need for a more balanced relationship between those with and those without religious beliefs.
This book will be an invaluable aid in starting the process of achieving a triangulated relationship between the principles of canon law, charity law and human rights law.
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Oxford's variorum edition of William Blackstone's seminal treatise on the common law of England and Wales offers the definitive account of the Commentaries' development in a modern format. For the first time it is possible to trace the evolution of English law and Blackstone's thought through the eight editions of Blackstone's lifetime, and the authorial corrections of the posthumous ninth edition. Introductions by the general editor and the volume editors set the Commentaries in their historical context, examining Blackstone's distinctive view of the common law, and editorial notes throughout the four volumes assist the modern reader in understanding this key text in the Anglo-American common law tradition. Book I: Of the Rights of People Volume Editor: David Lemmings Book II: Of the Rights of Things Volume Editor: Simon Stern Book III: Of Private Wrongs Volume Editor: Thomas P. Gallanis Book IV: Of Public Wrongs Volume Editor: Ruth Paley

Common law is explored as the alternative to natural rights as a means of restricting state power. The separation of powers is weighed in the balance and found wanting as a brake on state power. The underlying root of this inability is discovered in the philosophy of natural rights. Natural rights gave birth to the separation of powers, but neither the former nor the latter has been able to restrain government. This failure is highlighted in detail, and the alternative means to the same end, the common law, is brought to the fore.

The mediation of the balance between vigilance and restraint is a fundamental feature of judicial review of administrative action in the Anglo-Commonwealth. This balance is realised through the modulation of the depth of scrutiny when reviewing the decisions of ministers, public bodies and officials. While variability is ubiquitous, it takes different shapes and forms. Dean R. Knight explores the main shapes and forms employed in judicial review in England, Canada, Australia and New Zealand over the last fifty years. Four schemata are drawn from the case law and taken back to conceptual foundations, exposing their commonality and differences, and each approach is evaluated. This detailed methodology provides a sound basis for decisions and debates about how variability should be brought to individual cases and will be of great value to legal scholars, judges and practitioners interested in judicial review.

This volume in the landmark Oxford History of the Laws of England series, spans three centuries that encompassed the tumultuous years of the Norman conquest, and during which the common law as we know it today began to emerge. The first full-length treatment of all aspects of the early development of the English common law in a century, featuring extensive research into the original sources that bring the era to life, and providing an interpretative account, a detailed subject analysis, and fascinating glimpses into medieval disputes. Starting with King Alfred (871-899), this book examines the particular contributions of the Anglo-Saxon period to the development of English law, including the development of a powerful machinery of royal government, significant aspects of a long-lasting court structure, and important elements of law relating to theft and violence. Until the reign of King Stephen (1135-54), these Anglo-Saxon contributions were maintained by the Norman rulers, whilst the Conquest of 1066 led to the development of key aspects of landholding that were to have a continuing effect on the emerging common law. The Angevin period saw the establishment of more routine royal administration of justice, closer links between central government and individuals in the localities, and growing bureaucratization. Finally, the later twelfth and earlier thirteenth century saw influential changes in legal expertise. The book concludes with the rebellion against King John in 1215 and the production of the Magna Carta. Laying out in exhaustive detail the origins of the English common law through the ninth to the early thirteenth centuries, this book will be essential reading for all legal historians and a vital work of reference for academics, students, and practitioners.

The House of Lords served as the highest court in the UK for over 130 years. In 2009 the new UK Supreme Court took over its judicial functions, closing the doors on one of the most influential legal institutions in the world, and a major chapter in the history of the UK legal system. This volume gathers over 40 leading scholars and practitioners from the UK and beyond to provide a comprehensive history of the House of Lords as a judicial institution, charting its role, working practices, reputation and impact on the law and UK legal system. The book examines the origins of the House's judicial work; the different phases in the court's history; the international reputation and influence of the House in the legal profession; the domestic perception of the House outside the law; and the impact of the House on the UK legal tradition and substantive law. The book offers an invaluable overview of the Judicial House of Lords and a major historical record for the UK legal system now that it has passed into the next chapter in its history.

This book studies the U.S. Supreme Court and its current common law approach to judicial decision making from a national and transnational perspective. The Supreme Court's modern approach appears detached from and inconsistent with the underlying fundamental principles that ought to guide it, an approach that often leads to unfair and inefficient results. This book suggests the adoption of a judicial decision-making model that proceeds from principles and rules and treats these principles and rules as premises for developing consistent unitary theories to meet current social conditions. This model requires that judicial opinions be informed by a wide range of considerations, beginning with established legal standards but also including the insights derived from deductive and inductive reasoning, the lessons learned from history and custom and ending with an examination of the social and economic consequences of the decision. Under this model, the considerations taken to reach a specific result should be articulated through a process that considers various hypotheses, arguments, confutations, and confirmations, and they should be shared with the public."

Scotland has a special claim for the attention of comparative lawyers, of legal historians, and of those who seek to identify a common core in European private law or to develop a new ius commune. For Scotland stands at the inter-section of the two great traditions of European law - of the law of Rome, received and developed in Continental Europe, and of the law which originated in England but was exported throughout the British Empire. In Scotland, uniquely in Europe, there is to be found a fusion of the civil law and the common law.

Scotland has a special claim for the attention of comparative lawyers, of legal historians, and of those who seek to identify a common core in European private law or to develop a new jus commune. For Scotland stands at the intersection of the two great traditions of European law-of the law of Rome, received and developed in Continental Europe, and of the law which originated in England but was exported throughout the British Empire. In Scotland, uniquely in Europe, there is to be found a fusion of the civil law and the common law. Law in Scotland has a long history, uninterrupted either by revolution or by codification. It is rich in source material, both printed and archival. Yet hitherto the history of legal doctrine has been relatively neglected. This work is the first detailed and systematic study in the field of private law. Its method is to take key topics from the law of obligations and the law of property and to trace their development from earliest times to the present day. A fascinating picture emerges. The reception of civil law was slow but profound, beginning in the medieval period and continuing until the eighteenth century. Canon law was also influential. This was flanked by two receptions from England, of Anglo-Norman feudalism in the twelfth century and beyond, and, more enduringly, of aspects of English common law in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In addition there was much that was home-grown. Over time this disparate mixture was transformed by legal science into a coherent whole.

Any effort to understand how law works has to take seriously its main players - judges. Like any performance, judging should be evaluated by reference to those who are its best exponents. Not surprisingly, the debate about what makes a 'great judge' is as heated and inconclusive as the debate about the purpose and nature of law itself. History shows that those who are candidates for a judicial hall of fame are game changers who oblige us to rethink what it is to be a good judge. So the best of judges must tread a thin line between modesty and hubris; they must be neither mere umpires nor demigods. The eight judges showcased in this book demonstrate that, if the test of good judging is not about getting it right, but doing it well, then the measure of great judging is about setting new standards for what counts as judging well.

The development of an autonomous English public law has been accompanied by persistent problems - a lack of systematic principles, dissatisfaction with judicial procedures, and uncertainty about the judicial role. It has provoked an ongoing debate on the very desirability of the distinction between public and private law. In this debate, a historical and comparative perspective has been lacking. A Continental Distinction in the Common Law introduces such a perspective. It compares the recent emergence of a significant English distinction with the entrenchment of the traditional French distinction. It explains how persistent problems of English public law are related to fundamental differences between the English and French legal and political traditions, differences in their conception of the state administration, their approach to law, their separation of powers, and their judicial procedures in public-law cases. The author argues that a satisfactory distinction between public and private law depends on a particular legal and political context, a context which was evident in late nineteenth-century France and is absent in twentieth-century England. He concludes by identifying the far-reaching theoretical, institutional, and procedural changes required to accommodate English public law.

Schwartz provides a masterly exposition of administrative law through a comparative study of the French droit administratif, arguably the most sophisticated Continental model. As Vanderbilt points out in his introduction, this is an important field that involves much more than administrative procedure. It deals directly with some of the most crucial issues of modern government regarding the distribution of power between governmental units, the resulting effect on the freedom of the individual and on the strength and stability of the state. Reprint of the sole edition." T]his book represents a significant achievement.... Unlike so many volumes that roll off the press these days, it fills a real need; and, though perhaps not the definitive work in English on the subject, it fills it extremely well." --Frederic S. Burin, Columbia Law Review 54 (1954) 1016Bernard Schwartz 1923-1997] was professor of law and director of the Institute of Comparative Law, New York University. He was the author of over fifty books, including The Code Napoleon and the Common-Law World (1956), the five-volume Commentary on the Constitution of the United States (1963-68), Constitutional Law: A Textbook (2d ed., 1979), Administrative Law: A Casebook (4th ed., 1994) and A History of the Supreme Court (1993).

This book examines the view of women held by medieval common lawyers and legislators, and considers medieval women's treatment by and participation in the processes of the common law. Surveying a wide range of points of contact between women and the common law, from their appearance (or not) in statutes, through their participation (or not) as witnesses, to their treatment as complainants or defendants, it argues for closer consideration of women within the standard narratives of classical legal history, and for re-examination of some previous conclusions on the relationship between women and the common law. It will appeal to scholars and students of medieval history, as well as those interested in legal history, gender studies and the history of women.

When British authorities established 'settler' colonies in North America and the Antipodes (New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, Fiji) from the early seventeenth to the late nineteenth centuries, they introduced law through parliamentary statutes and Colonial Office oversight, and they dispatched governors and judges to the colonies. These jurists set aside some aspects of English Common Law to meet the special conditions of the settler societies, but the 'Responsible Governments' that were eventually created in the colonies and the British immigrants themselves set aside even more of the English law, exercising 'informal law' - popular norms - in its place. Law and popular norms clashed over a range of issues, including ready access to land, the property rights of aboriginal people. the taking of property for public purposes, master-servant relationships and crown/corporate liability for negligent maintenance and operation of roads, bridges and railways. Drawing on extensive archival and library sources in England, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, Karsten explores these collisions and arrives at a number of conclusions that will surprise.

This book argues that Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., helps us see the law through an Emersonian lens by the way in which he wrote his judicial dissents. Holmes's literary style mimics and enacts two characteristics of Ralph Waldo Emerson's thought: "superfluity" and the "poetics of transition," concepts ascribed to Emerson and developed by literary critic Richard Poirier. Using this aesthetic style borrowed from Emerson and carried out by later pragmatists, Holmes not only made it more likely that his dissents would remain alive for future judges or justices (because how they were written was itself memorable, whatever the value of their content), but also shaped our understanding of dissents and, in this, our understanding of law. By opening constitutional precedent to potential change, Holmes's dissents made room for future thought, moving our understanding of legal concepts in a more pragmatic direction and away from formalistic understandings of law. Included in this new understanding is the idea that the "canon" of judicial cases involves oppositional positions that must be sustained if the law is to serve pragmatic purposes. This process of precedent-making in a common-law system resembles the construction of the literary canon as it is conceived by Harold Bloom and Richard Posner.

Patrick Atiyah is one of the most important legal scholars of his generation in the common-law world. His publications cover a wide field: legal theory, legal history, the study of legal institutions, the law of tort (especially compensation for personal injuries) and, most famously perhaps, the law of contract. It is no exaggeration to say that by his work, Atiyah has opened up new ways of thinking about the law of obligations. This volume of essays, written by colleagues, friends, and admirers of Patrick Atiyah from the UK and abroad, reflects the breadth of his interests. As well as discussions of particular aspects of the law of contract and tort, it contains essays on the history and theory of contract and tort and on the role of judges and law teachers. There is also an assessment of the `law in context' movement of which Patrick Atiyah was a founder member and leading practitioner. Contributors: William Twining, Tony Honore, Jan Hellner, Robert S. Summers, John Bell, Paul D. Carrington, Robert Stevens, A. W. B. Simpson, Roy Goode, S. M. Waddams, Jane Stapleton, Donald Harris, John Dwyer, John Fleming, and Peter Cane.

This collection examines critically, and with an eye to reform, conceptions and conditions of corporate blameworthiness in law. It draws on legal, moral, regulatory and psychological theory, as well as historical and comparative perspectives. These insights are applied across the spheres of civil, criminal, and international law. The collection also has a deliberate focus on the 'nuts and bolts' of the law: the legal, equitable and statutory principles and rules that operate to establish corporate states of mind, on which responsibility as a matter of daily legal practice commonly depends.The collection therefore engages strongly with scholarly debates. The book also speaks, clearly and cogently, to the judges, regulators, legislators, law reform commissioners, barristers and practitioners who administer and, through their respective roles, incrementally influence the development of the law at the coalface of legal practice.

Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort contains thirteen original essays on leading tort cases, ranging from the early nineteenth century to the present day. It is the third volume in a series of collected essays on landmark cases (the previous two volumes having dealt with restitution and contract). The cases examined raise a broad range of important issues across the law of tort, including such diverse areas as acts of state and public nuisance, as well as central questions relating to the tort of negligence. Several of the essays place cases in their historical context in ways that change our understanding of the case's significance. Sometimes the focus is on drawing out previously neglected aspects of cases which have been - undeservedly - assigned minor importance. Other essays explore the judicial methodologies and techniques that worked to shape leading principles of tort law. So much of tort law turns on cases, and there are so many cases, that all but the most recent decisions have a tendency to become reduced to terse propositions of law, so as to keep the subject manageable. This collection shows how important it is, despite the constant temptation to compression, not to lose sight of the contexts and nuances which qualify and illuminate so many leading authorities.

The recognition and enforcement of legitimate expectations by courts has been a striking feature of English law since R v North and East Devon Health Authority; ex parte Coughlan [2001] 3 QB 213. Although the substantive form of legitimate expectation adopted in Coughlan was quickly accepted by English courts and received a generally favourable response from public law scholars, the doctrine of that case has largely been rejected in other common law jurisdictions. The central principles of Coughlan have been rejected by courts in common law jurisdictions outside the UK for a range of reasons, such as incompatibility with local constitutional doctrine, or because they mark an undesirable drift towards merits review. The sceptical and critical reception to Coughlan outside England is a striking contrast to the reception the case received within the UK. This book provides a detailed scholarly analysis of these issues and considers the doctrine of legitimate expectations both in England and elsewhere in the common law world.

Sir Rabinder Singh has been one of the leading lights in the recent development of the common law, most notably in the field of human rights and the law of privacy. Here, for the first time, he reflects on the defining themes of his career as advocate and judge. Combining his trademark originality of thought and impeccable scholarship, he selects previously published and unpublished writings to track the evolution of his approach to the common law. A substantial introduction gives context to the book, while opening introductions to each piece reflect on their relevance to contemporary legal thought. The essays explore themes as diverse as judicial review, equality, and privacy and personal autonomy. Insightful, erudite, and thought-provoking, this collection is a must read for all those interested in the law and its role in society.

"The Common Law" is Oliver Wendell Holmes' most sustained work of jurisprudence. In it the careful reader will discern traces of his later thought as found in both his legal opinions and other writings.
At the outset of "The Common Law" Holmes posits that he is concerned with establishing that the common law can meet the changing needs of society while preserving continuity with the past. A common law judge must be creative, both in determining the society's current needs, and in discerning how best to address these needs in a way that is continuous with past judicial decisions. In this way, the law evolves by moving out of its past, adapting to the needs of the present, and establishing a direction for the future. To Holmes' way of thinking, this approach is superior to imposing order in accordance with a philosophical position or theory because the law would thereby lose the flexibility it requires in responding to the needs and demands of disputing parties as well as society as a whole.
According to Holmes, the social environment--the economic, moral, and political milieu--alters over time. Therefore, in order to remain responsive to this social environment, the law must change as well. But the law is also part of this environment and impacts it. There is, then, a continual reciprocity between the law and the social arrangements in which it is contextualized. And, as with the evolution of species, there is no starting over. Rather, in most cases, a judge takes existing legal concepts and principles, as these have been memorialized in legal precedent, and adapts them, often unconsciously, to fit the requirements of a particular case and present social conditions.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1841-1935) served as chief justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court and as an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. He was nicknamed the "Great Dissenter" because of his many dissenting opinions. Holmes is also the author of "Kent's Commentaries on the Law" (1873) and ""The Path of the Law"" (1897).
Tim Griffin has advanced degrees in philosophy and law, and has taught philosophy and legal theory courses at a number of universities. He is currently a seminarian pursuing ordination to the priesthood in the Episcopal Church.

This book examines the view of women held by medieval common lawyers and legislators, and considers medieval women's treatment by and participation in the processes of the common law. Surveying a wide range of points of contact between women and the common law, from their appearance (or not) in statutes, through their participation (or not) as witnesses, to their treatment as complainants or defendants, it argues for closer consideration of women within the standard narratives of classical legal history, and for re-examination of some previous conclusions on the relationship between women and the common law. It will appeal to scholars and students of medieval history, as well as those interested in legal history, gender studies and the history of women.