Looking at key questions of how companies are held accountable under private law, this book presents a succinct and accessible framework for analysing and answering corporate attribution problems in private law. Corporate attribution is the process by which the acts and states of mind of human individuals are treated as those of a company to establish the company's rights, duties, and liabilities. But when and why are acts and states of mind attributed in private law? Drawing on a wide range of material from across the disparate areas of company law, agency law, and the laws of contract, tort, unjust enrichment, and equitable obligations, this book's central argument is that attribution turns on the allocation and delegation of the company's own powers to act. This approach allows for a much greater and clearer understanding of attribution. A further benefit is that it shows attribution to be much more united and coherent than it is commonly thought to be. Looking at corporate attribution across the broad expanse of the common law, this book will be of interest to lawyers across the common law world, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Singapore.

Sir Rabinder Singh has been one of the leading lights in the recent development of the common law, most notably in the field of human rights and the law of privacy. Here, for the first time, he reflects on the defining themes of his career as advocate and judge. Combining his trademark originality of thought and impeccable scholarship, he selects previously published and unpublished writings to track the evolution of his approach to the common law. A substantial introduction gives context to the book, while opening introductions to each piece reflect on their relevance to contemporary legal thought. The essays explore themes as diverse as judicial review, equality, and privacy and personal autonomy. Insightful, erudite, and thought-provoking, this collection is a must read for all those interested in the law and its role in society.

The recognition and enforcement of legitimate expectations by courts has been a striking feature of English law since R v North and East Devon Health Authority; ex parte Coughlan [2001] 3 QB 213. Although the substantive form of legitimate expectation adopted in Coughlan was quickly accepted by English courts and received a generally favourable response from public law scholars, the doctrine of that case has largely been rejected in other common law jurisdictions. The central principles of Coughlan have been rejected by courts in common law jurisdictions outside the UK for a range of reasons, such as incompatibility with local constitutional doctrine, or because they mark an undesirable drift towards merits review. The sceptical and critical reception to Coughlan outside England is a striking contrast to the reception the case received within the UK. This book provides a detailed scholarly analysis of these issues and considers the doctrine of legitimate expectations both in England and elsewhere in the common law world.

Anti-Bribery Laws in Common Law Jurisdictions provides a comprehensive analysis of the foreign bribery laws, related laws, and regulations in all of the major common law jurisdictions. This book extensively addresses the official guidance associated with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the UK Bribery Act, along with the related legal obligations pertaining to record-keeping practices and maintaining adequate internal controls. Foreign bribery legislation in the major common law jurisdictions of Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and South Africa are also addressed. Stuart H. Deming directs careful attention to laws that may expose an individual or entity to private or commercial bribery in foreign settings, as well as to the application of laws relating to money laundering, accounting, and record-keeping practices to situations involving foreign bribery. Throughout, special attention is given to explaining the criteria used in each jurisdiction to establish liability on the part of an entity or organization.

As Kent Greenwalt's second volume on aspects of legal interpretation, this book analyzes statutory and common law interpretation and compares the two. In respect to statutory interpretation, it first asks whether judges are "faithful agents" of the legislature or "independent cooperative partners." It concludes that the obvious answer is that neither simple categorization really fits-that the function of judges involves a combination of roles. The next issue addressed is whether the intent of those in authority matters for interpreting the kinds of instructions contained in statutes. At the general level, the answer is "yes." This answer follows even if one thinks interpretation should concentrate on the understanding of readers, because readers themselves would treat intentions as part of the relevant context of the language of statutes. It would take some special reasons, such as constitutional structure or unreliability, to discount actual intents of legislators and use of legislative history. The book argues that none of these special reasons are convincing. On the question whether judges should focus on the language of specific provision or overall purpose, both are relevant, and purpose should become more important as time passes. In an analysis of various other features of statutory interpretation, the book claims that presidential signing statements should not have weight, that subsequent legislative actions short of new statutes should only occasionally carry importance, that "canons of interpretation," such as the rule of lenity, can provide some, limited, guidance, and that there are special reasons for courts to adhere to precedents in statutory cases, but these should not yield any absolute rule. A chapter on administrative interpretation of statutes claims that the standards agencies apply should differ to a degree from those of courts and that judicial deference to those interpretations is ordinarily warranted. The book's second part, on common law interpretation, considers the force of precedents, resisting any simple dichotomy between holding and dictum. It also defends the use of reasoning by analogy, not only in the initial stages thinking about a problem, but also in respect to some final justifications for decisions. An examination of the place of rules, principles, and policies argues that all three are relevant in common law interpretation; and shows that common law interpretation is not reducible to any formula. A final chapter compares statutory and common law interpretation, similarities and differences, how each can affect the other, and the significance of having a legal system in which they both play prominent roles.

Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort contains thirteen original essays on leading tort cases, ranging from the early nineteenth century to the present day. It is the third volume in a series of collected essays on landmark cases (the previous two volumes having dealt with restitution and contract). The cases examined raise a broad range of important issues across the law of tort, including such diverse areas as acts of state and public nuisance, as well as central questions relating to the tort of negligence. Several of the essays place cases in their historical context in ways that change our understanding of the case's significance. Sometimes the focus is on drawing out previously neglected aspects of cases which have been - undeservedly - assigned minor importance. Other essays explore the judicial methodologies and techniques that worked to shape leading principles of tort law. So much of tort law turns on cases, and there are so many cases, that all but the most recent decisions have a tendency to become reduced to terse propositions of law, so as to keep the subject manageable. This collection shows how important it is, despite the constant temptation to compression, not to lose sight of the contexts and nuances which qualify and illuminate so many leading authorities.

The American system of law has experienced a quiet revolution that has gone largely unnoticed by political scientists and legal scholars. The change that has occurred- the abandonment of the common law foundation on which the American judicial system was built-has important consequences for democratic politics in the United States and abroad. Dismantling American Common Law: Liberty and Justice in Our Transformed Courts tracks the development of the American common law through historical and quantitative analysis and a philosophical inquiry of the founding. Author Kyle Scott seeks to reclaim this lost tradition of common law, which was vital as a legitimizing force and consensus-building mechanism at the American founding and will grow in importance for newly democratizing nations around the world.

Foundations of Private Law is a treatise on the Western law of property, contract, tort and unjust enrichment in both common law systems and civil law systems. The thesis of the book is that underlying these fields of law are common principles, and that these principles can be used to explain the history and development of these areas. These underlying common principles are matters of common sense, which were given their archetypal expression by older jurists who wrote in the Aristotelian tradition. These principles shaped the development of Western law but can resolve legal problems which these older writers did not confront.

The concept of common law has been one of the most important conceptual instruments of the western legal tradition, but it has been neglected by legal theory and legal history for the last two centuries. There were many common laws in Europe, including what is known in English as the common law, yet they have never previously been studied as a general phenomenon. Until the nineteenth century, the common laws of Europe lived in constant interaction with the particular laws which prevailed in their territories, and with one another. Common law was the main instrument of conciliation of laws which were drawn from different sources, though applicable on a given territory. Claims of universality could be, and were, reconciled with claims of particularity. Nineteenth and twentieth century legal theory taught that law was the exclusive product of the state, yet common laws continued to function on a world-wide basis throughout the entire period of legal nationalism. As national legal exclusivity is increasingly challenged by the process of globalization, the concept of common law can be looked to once again as a means of conceptualisation and justification of law beyond the state, while still supporting state and other local forms of normativity.

Voluntary Euthanasia investigates the complex and controversial issue of active voluntary euthanasia, presenting the legal position in a clear, comprehensive fashion. It critically examines the criminal law prohibition of medically administered active voluntary euthanasia in common law jurisdictions and looks at the situation in practice. The evidence of patient demands for active euthanasia and the willingness of some doctors to respond to patients requests is explored, and an argument for reform of the law is made with reference to the position in the Netherlands where active voluntary euthanasia is now openly practised.

The impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on public and criminal law has been well documented. The common law will be equally revolutionised by the Convention,yet its future is uncharted. This collection of papers, the product of two seminars held jointly with 1 Crown Office Row and the human rights group Justice, offers some navigational aids to those confronted with these deep waters. It contains analyses of current law and predictions for the future from practitioners and experts in a range of common law fields, including clinical negligence, medical law, environmental law, mental health and defamation. In addition to these specific areas, these chapters also explore the relationship between the ECHR principles of proportionality and margin of appreciation and the traditional way of resolving common law disputes. The book also includes a detailed - and controversial - scrutiny of the compatibility of the legal aid and costs proposals with the procedural right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Convention. CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION William Edis 2 THE CONVENTION AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: A NEW WAY OF THINKING Philip Havers QC and Neil Garnham 3 COSTS, CONDITIONAL FEES AND LEGAL AID Guy Mansfield QC 4 HORIZONTALITY: THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS IN PRIVATE DISPUTES Jonathan Cooper 5 REMEDIES Rosalind English 6 GENERAL COMMON LAW CLAIMS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT Richard Booth 7 BRINGING AND DEFENDING A CONVENTION CLAIM IN DOMESTIC LAW: A PRACTICAL EXERCISE Philippa Whipple 8 THE IMPACT OF THE CONVENTION ON MEDICAL LAW Philip Havers QC and Neil Sheldon 9 CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE AND PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION Robert Owen QC, Sarah Lambert and Caroline Neenan 10 ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS David Hart 11 CONFIDENTIALITY AND DEFAMATION Rosalind English 12 MENTAL HEALTH Jeremy Hyam 13 BIBLIOGRAPHY AND GUIDE TO Sources Owain Thomas

What makes a great book? If the determining factors are the content,authorship and timing of publication then this collection of essays from some of Europe's most eminent judges and jurists satisfies all three criteria. Readers will here find the expanded versions of the speeches given at a one-day conference in London to mark, from a legal point of view, the beginning of the new millennium. In a thoughtful and predominantly comparative manner the distinguished speakers explore the cross fertilisation of ideas that is taking place between the Common and Civil law systems in such important topics as human rights, commercial law, and comparative methodology. The contributors include Lords Irvine, Bingham, Woolf, Steyn, and Goff, the President of the Court of the European Communities, Dr Iglesias, the President of the Court of Human Rights, Dr Wildhaber, the President of the German Constitutional Court, Professor Limbach, Justices Lenoir and Mirabelli, respectively of the French and Italian Constitutional Courts, the Professor Walter van Gerven, former Advocate General of the Court of the European Communities, Professor Klaus Hopt, co-Director of the Max-Planck Institute of Hamburg, Professor Christian von Bar, Director of the Institute of Comparative Law at the University of Osnabruck and the organiser of the conference, Professor Basil Markesinis, Director of the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law. The book commences with a Foreword by Keith Clark, Senior Partner of the multinational law firm, Clifford Chance, who have sponsored the conference. This is a unique book about legal practice in the increasingly integrated world of tomorrow.

One of the greatest of all English common lawyers,Lord Atkin it was who asked the question in Donoghue v. Stevenson 'Who then in law is my neighbour?' which became the foundation of the whole modern law of negligence. His courageous dissent in the wartime detention case of Liversidge v. Anderson is now recognised as a historic stand on principle. This book contains absorbing accounts of the background to these two great cases, as well as an assessment of their significance in the legal history of this century. It is the only legal biography of its kind. Instead of taking the conventional narrative form it treats individually the principal themes of Lord Atkin's decisions and illuminates some less well known aspects of his work including the critical series of Canadian constitutional appeals in 1936. In showing the strong influence on his thinking of Lord Atkin's home life and upbringing in the Welsh countryside, this study confirms Lord Wright's conclusion that it was first and foremost a liberal spirit which animated Atkin's work. This is a reprint of a work first published by Butterworths in 1983.

This collection of essays brings together the work of many of the world's leading Contract Law scholars. It focuses upon a common central theme---the question of good faith and fair dealing in the Law of Contract. The book is divided into several parts: the first part is an Introduction; Part II examines the requirement of good faith and its role in the formation of contracts; Part III is concerned with contractual obligations; Part IV examines Breach of Contract and Remedial Issues. The work will be of widespread interest to scholars of Private Law in both Common and Civil Law jurisdictions.

"Cannibalism and the Common Law" is an enthralling classic of legal history. It tells the tragic story of the yacht Mignonette, which foundered on its way from England to Australia in 1884. The killing and eating of one of the crew, Richard Parker, led to the leading case in the defence of necessity, R. v. Dudley and Stephens. It resulted in their being convicted and sentenced to death, a sentence subsequently commuted. In this tour de force Brian Simpson sets the legal proceedings in their broadest historical context, providing a detailed account of the events and characters involved and of life at sea in the time of sail. Cannibalism and the Common Law is a demonstration that legal history can be written in human terms and can be compulsive reading. This brilliant and fascinating book, a marvelous example of eareful historical detection, and first-class legal history, written by a master.

England was unique among the medieval kingdoms of Western Europe. In addition to developing a system of national courts with an extensive original jurisdiction and run on quasi-bureaucratic lines by royal justices, it also gave birth to a single national customary law which was applicable throughout the country. This was partly the product of judicial decisions made by the royal courts and partly the product of legislation. The great formative period of the Commom Law began during the reign of King Henry II but continued through to the early fourteenth century. Paul Brand possesses an unrivalled knowledge of the published and unpublished sources for this critical period. The Making of the Common Law brings together his essays, some previously unpublished, on this period. The essays on the making of the English legal system (which complement his book on The Origins of the English Legal Profession) include an important essay on 'Henry II and the Creation of the English Common Law', and 'Courtroom and Schoolroom: The Education of Lawyers in England prior to 1400', the essay which won the 1988 Donald W. Sutherland Prize of the American Society for Legal History.The devlopment of English law is discussed in a number of essays including a critical introduction to the 'Milsom thesis' on the origins of England land law and 'Lordship and Distraint in Thirteenth-Century England', a major reappraisal of the balance of power between lords and tenants in this period. The Common Law was taken by settler from England to North America and to Australasia. Its earliest venture overseas, however, was to Ireland. The Making of the Common Law includes a number of important essays on the transfer of English law and the creation of a legal system modelled on that of England in the medieval English lordship of Ireland.

Mozambique has been hailed as a success story by the international community, which has watched it evolve through a series of violent political upheavals: from colonialism, through socialism, to its current democracy. As Juan Obarrio shows, however, this view neglects a crucial element in Mozambique's transition to the rule of law: the reestablishment of traditional chief-tanship and customs entangled within a history of colonial violence and civil war. Drawing on extensive historical records and ethnographic fieldwork, he examines the role of customary law in Mozambique to ask a larger question: what is the place of law in the neoliberal era, in which the juridical and the economic are deeply intertwined in an ongoing state of structural adjustment? Having made the transition from a people's republic to democratic rule in the 1990s, Mozambique offers a fascinating case of postwar reconstruction, economic opening, and transitional justice, one in which the customary has played a central role. Obarrio shows how its sovereignty has met countless ambiguities within the entanglements of local community, nation-state, and international structures. Ultimately, he looks toward local rituals and relations as producing an emergent kind of citizenship in Africa, which he dubs "customary citizenship," forming not a vestige of the past but a yet ill-defined political future.

In this unique book Lord Woolf recounts his remarkable career and provides a personal and honest perspective on the most important developments in the common law over the last half century. The book opens with a comprehensive description of his family background, which was very influential on his later life, starting with the arrival of his grandparents as Jewish immigrants to England in 1870. His recollections of his early years and family, education and life as a student lead into his early career as a barrister and as a Treasury Devil, moving on to his judicial career and the many roles taken therein. The numerous standout moments examined include his work on access to the judiciary, prison reform, and suggested reforms to the European Court of Human Rights. Fascinating insights into the defining cases of his career, T AG v Jonathan Cape, Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers, Tameside, Hazel v Hammersmith, M v Home Office, remind the reader of how impactful his influence has been. He considers the setting of the mandatory component of the life sentences of Thompson and Venables and the Diane Blood case. Alongside the case law, and the Woolf Reforms, the Constitutional Law Reform Act 2005 is also explored. Considering the ebb and flow of changes over his remarkable judicial life, Lord Woolf identifies those he welcomes, but also expresses regret on what has been lost. A book to remind lawyers, be they students, practitioners or scholars, of the power and importance of law. All author profits from the book will be donated to the Woolf Institute.

In a projected four-volume series, The Common Law in Colonial America, William E. Nelson will show how the legal systems of Britain's thirteen North American colonies, which were initially established in response to divergent political, economic, and religious initiatives, slowly converged until it became possible by the 1770s to imagine that all thirteen participated in a common American legal order, which diverged in its details but differed far more substantially from English common law. Volume three, The Chesapeake and New England, 1660-1750, reveals how Virginia, which was founded to earn profit, and Massachusetts, which was founded for Puritan religious ends, had both adopted the common law by the mid-eighteenth century and begun to converge toward a common American legal model. The law in the other New England colonies, Nelson argues, although it was distinctive in some respects, gravitated toward the Massachusetts model, while Maryland's law gravitated toward that of Virginia.

This volume arises from the inaugural Public Law Conference hosted in September 2014 by the Centre for Public Law at the University of Cambridge, which brought together leading public lawyers from a number of common law jurisdictions. While those from such jurisdictions share background understandings, significant differences within the common law world create opportunities for valuable exchanges of ideas and debate. This collection draws upon one of the principal sub-themes that emerged during the conference - namely, the the way in which relationships and distinctions between the notions of 'process' and 'substance' play out in relation to and inform adjudication in public law cases. The essays contained in this volume address those issues from a variety of perspectives. While the bulk of the chapters consider topical issues in judicial review, either on common law or human rights grounds, or both, other chapters adopt more theoretical, historical, empirical or contextual approaches. Concluding chapters reflect generally on the papers in the collection and the value of facilitating cross-jurisdictional dialogue.

Law is a lasting social institution, but it must also be open to change. How is law made, and what prompts change? How can society influence the law, and how does the law respond to societal change? The first volume of Shaping Tomorrow's Law examined human rights and European law. In this second volume Mary Arden turns her attention to domestic law, providing a judge's viewpoint on the roles of society, government, and the judiciary in the transformation and reform of the law. The first section of Common Law and Modern Society explains what we mean by judge-made law and shows how the law responds to the needs of a changing society. Adaptation may be in response to shifting values, or in response to constitutional change. This is demonstrated in chapters on assisted reproduction and assisted dying, both modern concerns, and a far older example, that of the law on water, which has been evolving over the centuries in response to society's changing demands. The law also needs to reflect constitutional change, as in the case of Welsh devolution. The second section of the book looks at the necessary simplification of the law and systematic legal reform. These tasks lie at the heart of the work of the Law Commission, which celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2015. Drawing on her own experience as former Chairman of the Law Commission, Mary Arden argues that statute law can be made simpler by codification, and that the success of codification may vary depending on the field of law. The final section looks ahead to tomorrow's judiciary. The accountability of judges is a continuing area of discussion, and this includes ensuring that the reasoning behind their decisions is understood by the relevant people. Mary Arden goes on to argue that the vision for the judiciary today and tomorrow should be one of greater diversity in the widest sense. This will help to ensure not only greater fairness and wider opportunity but also better decision-making. The book concludes with advice and encouragement for future legal professionals.