This work was written 1989 and published for the first time in 2002. The author's intention is to inform even-handedly, national and international debates about the misunderstandings surrounding the Sharia and common legal systems in Nigeria. Balewa broadly discusses Western and Islamic philosophical backgrounds of law, relationships between law, politics and religion in society, and concepts of secularism and secularity. He traces the history and schools of Sharia law, and the sources of common law in Nigeria, and its comparative religious and colonial foundations. He further appraises two views of the controversy: namely, whether Sharia law, as a fully-fledged legal system, should be reflected in the Nigerian constitution - or not, given its contentious religious content; and he states the case against Sharia. His conclusion is that in view of the status quo, and the multi-ethnic, mulit-religious nature of Nigerian society, there is a need for understanding of the truths of both systems; and to find appropriate means of ensuring their equality and peaceful co-existence.

Judge Richard A. Posner is internationally regarded as a leading exponent and a founding father of the law and economics movement. This volume draws together a selection of his most important papers on the methodology and the theory of law and economics to create a valuable collection for scholars and practitioners in the field. It includes a coherent and informative introduction by Professor Francesco Parisi containing salient insights into Judge Posner's work.Themes explored in this volume include: the economics of common law the criterion of wealth maximization an economic approach to judicial rulemaking the application of finance theory to law the methodology of law and economics. The Economic Structure of the Law draws together Judge Posner's seminal contributions on the methodological foundations of law and economics and will be a valuable reference source for economists, lawyers and judges alike.

This is a broad history of the western European legal tradition. From the modern age the author looks back to a time when Europe had a common law that transcended national and legal boundaries. This common law, which Bellomo calls the ""ius commune"", had developed in the 12th century from the fusion of Roman, canon and feudal law. Existing within the framework of the ""ius commune"" were the local laws or ""iura propria"" - the myriad laws of everyday life, the laws particular to the various kingdoms, principalities, cities, guilds and secular and ecclesiastical corporations. Bellomo illustrates how for centuries the ""ius commune"" permeated every aspect of the ""iura propria"", marking European law indelibly with its stamp. Because the ""iura propria"" emerged from the unifying norms and principles of the ""ius commune"", one can not properly understand local European systems of law without first understanding the ""ius commune"" and its influence on the legal concepts, institutions, procedures, documents, and doctrines of the ""iura propria"". Linking his history to modern day concerns, Bellomo argues that the codification that occurred in European countries during the 18th and 19th centuries has introduced ambiguity, rigidity and uncertainty into legal systems. A new common law for the whole of Europe, he asserts, would provide a much better vehicle for legal change and development in a time when the economic barriers between European nations are crumbling. Bellomo then describes the beginnings of the ""ius commune"" in the schools of the 12th century, discusses the development of Italian, French and German ""iura propria"", and incorporates into the text sketches of the great jurists who gave common law its intellectual vigour. He concludes with an account of the humanist jurists of the 15th, 16th and early 17th centuries.

The forms of action are a part of the structure upon which rests the whole common law of England and, though we may have buried them, they still, as Maitland says, rule us from their graves. The following extract is taken from the editors' preface: 'The evasion of the burden of archaic procedure and of such barbaric tests of truth as battle, ordeal and wager of law, by the development of new forms and new law out of criminal or quasi criminal procedure and the inquest of neighbour-witnesses has never been described with this truth and clearness. He makes plain a great chapter of legal history which the learners and even the lawyers of today have almost abandoned in despair. The text of the chief writs is given after the lectures ...'

This volume contributes to the codification debate by bringing together research articles which compare and contrast the experience of countries which have a criminal code with those operating a case law system. The articles consider the criticisms that are often made of criminal code systems such as: the implicit restrictions on judicial discretion; the tendency towards inflexibility; the discrepancy that can develop between the theory and the development of the law in practice; and the potential difficulty of a criminal code fitting into a country's domestic socio-legal culture. The advantages of the case law system are also considered such as reliance on the judiciary for the development of the nation's criminal law as well as the ability to legislate on the problems of the day by enacting topical laws for distinct subjects. Whereas wholesale codification is a much more accepted phenomenon in the continental law traditions, simplistic transplants from one legal tradition can result in systemic frictions and other anomalies which may offend domestic culture. This collection is an invaluable reference tool which supports the discussion over codification and promotes better understanding across the common law/civil law divide.

Lord Denning, an influential but controversial English judge, stated that 'Words are the lawyer's tools of trade'. This course book reflects that conviction as it focuses on words, the language of the law - legal terms, expressions, and grammar - introduced systematically with relevant aspects of the law, and examined in context through analytical reading activities based on original legal texts selected for their interest and importance in different branches of the common law system. This book explores constitutional law, criminal law, tort, and contract; yet includes international legal contexts, with a particular focus on human rights and European law. The presentation of legal concepts and terminology in context in each chapter is graded so that the course progresses, building on the vocabulary and law encountered in earlier chapters. Each chapter, organized thematically, includes a series of activities - tasks - to complete, yet the book does not presuppose previous knowledge of legal English or of the common law: full answer keys and reflective commentary on both legal and linguistic aspects are given and sections marked 'Advanced' offer especially challenging materials. Consolidation sections are designed to test students' global comprehension of the legal texts analysed, including precise usage of legal vocabulary in context, with solutions. Common Law Legal English and Grammar is addressed to the non-native speaker of English, and in particular, intermediate to advanced students who are studying law, or academics with a professional interest in Anglo-American law. Practising lawyers will also find that the book offers valuable analysis of the language of legal documents. Please note, this book is not available for purchase in Italy.

This is the story of how disputes of all kinds were managed in England between AD 1154 and the first signs of the Common Law, and 1558 when a new period started in the development of the English legal system. Primary sources, including private papers like the "Paston Letters", show how disputes were managed in practice. Mediation and arbitration were then natural and widespread. Their aim was to produce peace through compromise. Parties turned to the community for help: hundred and shire, magnates, city and borough guilds, university, the Church and the Jews. The king's Council and even Parliament offered mediation and arbitration. The scope included disputes not arbitrable today ownership of freehold land, status, even rape, murder and riot. Arbitration centres in London, York and Bristol offered services to all comers. Foreigners brought disputes with no connection to England. In 1484 a labourer, defended his interests in an arbitration arranged by the York authorities. The Mayor of Bristol kept an office open every day to arrange arbitrations. The Privy Council sat on a Sunday morning in February 1549 for that purpose. And women were parties almost as often as men - and occasionally mediators and arbitrators.

This book presents a clear, carefully-analysed picture of the operation of equity today, across the common law world. Rather than revisit the abstract debate as to whether or not equity has 'fused' with the common law, it focuses on specific equitable principles and doctrines. Expert contributors step back and take a wider view of those doctrines, examining how they can best be understood today, and how they might develop in the future. This will prove invaluable to practitioners and courts (at first instance as well as appellate level), allowing them to navigate the constantly-growing mass of case law. Drawing on expertise from across the worlds of academia, practice and the bench, this seminal collection provides the most illuminating picture available of how equity operates.

This collection examines critically, and with an eye to reform, conceptions and conditions of corporate blameworthiness in law. It draws on legal, moral, regulatory and psychological theory, as well as historical and comparative perspectives. These insights are applied across the spheres of civil, criminal, and international law. The collection also has a deliberate focus on the 'nuts and bolts' of the law: the legal, equitable and statutory principles and rules that operate to establish corporate states of mind, on which responsibility as a matter of daily legal practice commonly depends.The collection therefore engages strongly with scholarly debates. The book also speaks, clearly and cogently, to the judges, regulators, legislators, law reform commissioners, barristers and practitioners who administer and, through their respective roles, incrementally influence the development of the law at the coalface of legal practice.

Sir Rabinder Singh has been one of the leading lights in the recent development of the common law, most notably in the field of human rights and the law of privacy. Here, for the first time, he reflects on the defining themes of his career as advocate and judge. Combining his trademark originality of thought and impeccable scholarship, he selects previously published and unpublished writings to track the evolution of his approach to the common law. A substantial introduction gives context to the book, while opening introductions to each piece reflect on their relevance to contemporary legal thought. The essays explore themes as diverse as judicial review, equality, and privacy and personal autonomy. Insightful, erudite, and thought-provoking, this collection is a must read for all those interested in the law and its role in society.

The author's investigation of early-modern Javanese law reveals that judicial authority does not come from the contents of legal titles or juridical texts, but from legal maxims and variations thereof. A century and a half ago Simon Keyzer, a recognized scholar of Javanese law, noted that understanding of that law is dependent upon a grasp of such pithy expressions, which provide the key to the whole body of suits. (Preface, C.F. Winter, Javaansche Zamenspraken, 1858, which examines hundreds of sloka, the majority of which are directed to prevailing legal practice). Drawing upon the contents of 18th century Javanese legal texts, the present work builds upon Keyzer's and Winter's references to 'sloka-phenomena', namely sloka proper (maxims) and its derivatives sinalokan (that made of sloka), aksara here meaning legal principles, and prakara (matter, case). These are usually conveyed in vignettes illustrating their function and as a group, constitute the essence of traditional Javanese written law.

Duels and bloodfeuds have long been regarded as essentially Continental phenomena, counter to the staid and orderly British ways of settling differences. In this surprising work of social and legal history, Paul R. Hyams reveals a post-Conquest England not all that different from the realms across the Channel. Drawing on a wide range of texts and the long history of argument about these texts, Hyams shatters the myth of English exceptionalism, the notion that while feud and vengeance prevailed in the lands of the Franks, England had advanced beyond such anarchic barbarism by the time of the Conquest and forged a centralized political and legal system. This book provides support for the notion that feud and vengeance flourished in England long beyond the Conquest, and that this fact obliges us to reconsider the genealogies of both common law and the English monarchy.Moving back and forth between a broad overview of 300 years of legal history and the details of specific disputes, Hyams attends to the demands of individuals who believed that they had been aggrieved and sought remedy. He shows how individuals perceived particular acts of violence and responded to them. These reactions, in turn, sparked central efforts to manage disputes and thereby establish law and order. Respectable litigation, however, never eclipsed the danger of direct action, often violent and physical.

For centuries, courts across the common law world have developed systems of law by building bodies of judicial decisions. In deciding individual cases, common law courts settle litigation and move the law in new directions. By virtue of their place at the top of the judicial hierarchy, courts at the apex of common law systems are unique in that their decisions and, in particular, the language used in those decisions, resonate through the legal system. Although both the common law and apex courts have been studied extensively, scholars have paid less attention to the relationship between the two. By analyzing apex courts and the common law from multiple angles, this book offers an entry point for scholars in disciplines related to law - such as political science, history, and sociology - who are seeking a deeper understanding and new insights as to how the common law applies to and is relevant within their own disciplines.

Looking at key questions of how companies are held accountable under private law, this book presents a succinct and accessible framework for analysing and answering corporate attribution problems in private law. Corporate attribution is the process by which the acts and states of mind of human individuals are treated as those of a company to establish the company’s rights, duties, and liabilities. But when and why are acts and states of mind attributed in private law? Drawing on a wide range of material from across the disparate areas of company law, agency law, and the laws of contract, tort, unjust enrichment, and equitable obligations, this book’s central argument is that attribution turns on the allocation and delegation of the company’s own powers to act. This approach allows for a much greater and clearer understanding of attribution. A further benefit is that it shows attribution to be much more united and coherent than it is commonly thought to be. Looking at corporate attribution across the broad expanse of the common law, this book will be of interest to lawyers across the common law world, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Singapore.

The recognition and enforcement of legitimate expectations by courts has been a striking feature of English law since R v North and East Devon Health Authority; ex parte Coughlan [2001] 3 QB 213. Although the substantive form of legitimate expectation adopted in Coughlan was quickly accepted by English courts and received a generally favourable response from public law scholars, the doctrine of that case has largely been rejected in other common law jurisdictions. The central principles of Coughlan have been rejected by courts in common law jurisdictions outside the UK for a range of reasons, such as incompatibility with local constitutional doctrine, or because they mark an undesirable drift towards merits review. The sceptical and critical reception to Coughlan outside England is a striking contrast to the reception the case received within the UK. This book provides a detailed scholarly analysis of these issues and considers the doctrine of legitimate expectations both in England and elsewhere in the common law world.

Law is a strange beast. It is often thought of as moral, yet morality and law do not often coincide. It is supposed to encourage individuals to act in accordance with societal wishes, such as the protection of intellectual property encourages someone to invent new products and thereby increase the level of technology, productivity, and economic activity in our economy. Yet law often provides perverse incentives that cause individuals, or even the State, to act in discordant, and therefore inefficient, ways. More than anything else, law in its various forms creates the working rules of an economy, for better or for worse. The popular refrain 'there ought to be a law' is a desire to alter future outcomes when current or past outcomes seem to the public to be inconsistent with their notions of fairness and justice. Regardless, many, if not most, laws applied to our economic system create severe inefficiencies such as minimum wage legislation and rent control laws; these actually serve to deny individuals work and shelter in a haphazard and capricious manner. Law also dictates property rights, yet eminent domain lets the State take it away with seemingly arbitrary compensation to the owner. It is for this reason that workers, employers, managers and others have a stake in understanding the interplay between law and economics and how to evaluate laws to determine whether and how their business property and equity may be impacted by them. It is also incumbent upon individuals to understand the process of rulemaking as a mechanism that can be designed to reduce the transactions costs that cause us to resort to the legal system to resolve disputes. One unique aspect of this book is that it is written with both economists and non-economists in mind. Another difference is that this text does not concern itself with criminal law, which is left to a separate book in the Business Expert Press economics collection. A final difference is that this text discusses the legal organization of businesses as well as tax law from an economics perspective, two items that are not formally treated in other economics of law textbooks.

Globally, the methodologies of legal education have not changed in any fundamental way, some methods dating back hundreds of years. Law schools have relied, for too long, on passive learning methods such as lectures or cases. Clinical legal education provides an alternative that is more than just another pedagogical method. It provides a way for students to experience their emerging professional selves, while providing services or projects with poor and underrepresented clients. This book documents both the historical origins of clinical experiments in the earliest days of US university legal education, and the now-global reach of clinical pedagogy as a proven tool for effective training of legal professionals.

Mozambique has been hailed as a success story by the international community, which has watched it evolve through a series of violent political upheavals: from colonialism, through socialism, to its current democracy. As Juan Obarrio shows, however, this view neglects a crucial element in Mozambique's transition to the rule of law: the reestablishment of traditional chief-tanship and customs entangled within a history of colonial violence and civil war. Drawing on extensive historical records and ethnographic fieldwork, he examines the role of customary law in Mozambique to ask a larger question: what is the place of law in the neoliberal era, in which the juridical and the economic are deeply intertwined in an ongoing state of structural adjustment? Having made the transition from a people's republic to democratic rule in the 1990s, Mozambique offers a fascinating case of postwar reconstruction, economic opening, and transitional justice, one in which the customary has played a central role. Obarrio shows how its sovereignty has met countless ambiguities within the entanglements of local community, nation-state, and international structures. Ultimately, he looks toward local rituals and relations as producing an emergent kind of citizenship in Africa, which he dubs "customary citizenship," forming not a vestige of the past but a yet ill-defined political future.

Much of our law is based on authoritative texts, such as constitutions and statutes. The common law, in contrast, is that part of the law that is established by the courts. Common law rules predominate in some areas of law, such as torts and contracts, and are extremely important in other areas, such as corporations. Nevertheless, it has been far from clear what principles courts use-or should use-in establishing common law rules. In this lucid yet subtly argued book, Melvin Eisenberg develops the principles that govern this process. The rules established in every common law case, he shows, are a product of the interplay between the rules announced in past precedents, on the one hand, and moral norms, policies, and experience, on the other. However, a court establishing a common law rule is not free, as a legislator would be, to employ those norms and policies it thinks best. Rather, it can properly employ only those that have a requisite degree of social support. More specifically, the common law should seek to satisfy three standards. First, it should correspond to the body of rules that would be arrived at by giving appropriate weight to all moral norms, policies, and experiential propositions that have the requisite support, and by making the best choices where norms, policies, and experience conflict. Second, all the rules that make up the body of the law should be consistent with one another. Third, the rules adopted in past precedents should be applied consistently over time. Often, these three standards point in the same direction. The central problems of legal reasoning arise when they do not. These problems are resolved by the principles of common law adjudication. With the general principles of common law adjudication as a background, the author then examines and explains the specific modes of common law reasoning, such as reasoning from precedent, reasoning by analogy, drawing distinctions, and overruling. Throughout the book, the analysis is fully illustrated by leading cases. This innovative and carefully worked out account of the common law will be of great interest to lawyers, law students, students in undergraduate legal studies programs, scholars interested in legal theory, and all those who want to understand the basic legal institutions of our society.