Much of our law is based on authoritative texts, such as constitutions and statutes. The common law, in contrast, is that part of the law that is established by the courts. Common law rules predominate in some areas of law, such as torts and contracts, and are extremely important in other areas, such as corporations. Nevertheless, it has been far from clear what principles courts use-or should use-in establishing common law rules. In this lucid yet subtly argued book, Melvin Eisenberg develops the principles that govern this process. The rules established in every common law case, he shows, are a product of the interplay between the rules announced in past precedents, on the one hand, and moral norms, policies, and experience, on the other. However, a court establishing a common law rule is not free, as a legislator would be, to employ those norms and policies it thinks best. Rather, it can properly employ only those that have a requisite degree of social support. More specifically, the common law should seek to satisfy three standards. First, it should correspond to the body of rules that would be arrived at by giving appropriate weight to all moral norms, policies, and experiential propositions that have the requisite support, and by making the best choices where norms, policies, and experience conflict. Second, all the rules that make up the body of the law should be consistent with one another. Third, the rules adopted in past precedents should be applied consistently over time. Often, these three standards point in the same direction. The central problems of legal reasoning arise when they do not. These problems are resolved by the principles of common law adjudication. With the general principles of common law adjudication as a background, the author then examines and explains the specific modes of common law reasoning, such as reasoning from precedent, reasoning by analogy, drawing distinctions, and overruling. Throughout the book, the analysis is fully illustrated by leading cases. This innovative and carefully worked out account of the common law will be of great interest to lawyers, law students, students in undergraduate legal studies programs, scholars interested in legal theory, and all those who want to understand the basic legal institutions of our society.

Im Rahmen der Foederalismusreform 2006 fallt ein Reformgegenstand aufgrund seiner Neuartigkeit besonders ins Auge - die in Art. 72 Abs.3 GG statuierte Abweichungsgesetz-gebung. Mit dem in ihr angelegten Nebeneinander von Rechtssetzungen des Bundes und der Lander innerhalb einer Regelungsmaterie strapaziert sie die Funktionsweise des kooperativen Foederalismus ebenso wie den bundesstaatlichen Gedanken in seiner Gesamtheit. Ausgehend hiervon soll die vorliegende Publikation einen Bogen zwischen der Entwicklungsgeschichte der Abweichungsgesetzgebung bis hin zu ihrer konkreten Anwendung am Beispiel der Novellierung des sachsischen Naturschutzrechts schlagen. Der Autor nimmt dabei insbesondere das Sachsische Naturschutzgesetz vom 6. Juni 2013 unter abweichungsrechtlichen Problemstellungen in den Blick.

In a projected four-volume series, The Common Law in Colonial America, William E. Nelson will show how the legal systems of Britain's thirteen North American colonies, which were initially established in response to divergent political, economic, and religious initiatives, slowly converged until it became possible by the 1770s to imagine that all thirteen participated in a common American legal order, which diverged in its details but differed far more substantially from English common law. Volume three, The Chesapeake and New England, 1660-1750, reveals how Virginia, which was founded to earn profit, and Massachusetts, which was founded for Puritan religious ends, had both adopted the common law by the mid-eighteenth century and begun to converge toward a common American legal model. The law in the other New England colonies, Nelson argues, although it was distinctive in some respects, gravitated toward the Massachusetts model, while Maryland's law gravitated toward that of Virginia.

Mozambique has been hailed as a success story by the international community, which has watched it evolve through a series of violent political upheavals: from colonialism, through socialism, to its current democracy. As Juan Obarrio shows, however, this view neglects a crucial element in Mozambique's transition to the rule of law: the reestablishment of traditional chief-tanship and customs entangled within a history of colonial violence and civil war. Drawing on extensive historical records and ethnographic fieldwork, he examines the role of customary law in Mozambique to ask a larger question: what is the place of law in the neoliberal era, in which the juridical and the economic are deeply intertwined in an ongoing state of structural adjustment? Having made the transition from a people's republic to democratic rule in the 1990s, Mozambique offers a fascinating case of postwar reconstruction, economic opening, and transitional justice, one in which the customary has played a central role. Obarrio shows how its sovereignty has met countless ambiguities within the entanglements of local community, nation-state, and international structures. Ultimately, he looks toward local rituals and relations as producing an emergent kind of citizenship in Africa, which he dubs "customary citizenship," forming not a vestige of the past but a yet ill-defined political future.

The history underlying and informing the Australian legal system is a uniquely interesting amalgam of English, American and local developments. It is often poorly understood - not least because there are no modern counterparts to this volume and its companion on commercial law. But, as Holmes long ago pointed out, in order to know what the law is we must first know what it has been. This volume not only discharges that function, informing its readers clearly and lucidly, but it also demonstrates how Australian legal history may be examined from a range of perspectives, leading to a deeper and richer understanding. This first volume of 15 essays, by distinguished judges and practitioners, sets the very highest standards of analysis and scholarship. There are incisive assessments of key figures such as Sir Owen Dixon and Justice Joseph Story (by Justices Hayne and Allsop respectively), and of key developments such as the establishment of an Australian land law, the reception of the common law, the growth to nationhood, the changing role of precedent, and the separation of powers. There are essays on the very early influences on Australian law from the leading early texts (Glanvill and Bracton), from early English statutes and from Roman law. There are essays on the growth of equity, and even a modern dialogue (in accordance with an ancient tradition) on the Judicature legislation. And there are accounts of legal procedure, which is ultimately the source of much substantive law, and of the jurisprudential figures who have sought to analyse law. The introductory essay by Justin Gleeson and James Watson provides an overview of the volume, as well as being a powerful argument for why an understanding of legal history is not optional but essential. Three of the authors have been appointed to judicial office since preparing these essays, and another has been made Solicitor-General of Australia. All have made distinguished contributions, and their essays will bear reading and re-reading, for all Australian lawyers looking for a deep understanding of how the Australian legal system operates.

Pre-trial detention refers to the period when a person, after being arrested, is detained so as to determine the nature of the offences and the characterization of the charges. This notion is part and parcel of the legal proceedings of a criminal investigation and aims at striking a fragile balance between protecting the State and respecting individual freedoms. Lots of examples can be quoted to illustrate the various pre-trial detention modalities in common law and civil law traditions, including the duration of custody; custody rights; right to silence; right to the presence of a lawyer; modalities and control of pre-trial detention; and procedures in case of wrongful detention.This book makes an important contribution to the newly-researched topic of pre-trial detention from a theoretical and empirical point of view. Papers alternatively consider various issues: they analyse the philosophical principles and policies underlying pre-trial detention and look at the different forms it takes according to several countries; on a more technical and pragmatic level, they raise the question of the use of an appropriate terminology and the problem of translation that may arise from the differences between the studied legal systems. Finally, they consider the checks and balances mechanisms put in place to limit the negative effects of the measures restricting liberty.This volume contains a selection of contributions by academics specialized in law and comparative criminal procedure, political science, history, sociology, linguistics, and legal translation, and offers a comparative analysis of countries with differing legal traditions.