At about 11:30 on a Sunday morning in 1815, a few shots rang out as the curtain-raiser to one of Europe's most titanic military clashes. By late afternoon, at the close of the Battle of Waterloo, nearly 40,000 men lay dead or wounded. Until that day, the army of Napoleon Bonaparte seemed almost invincible. Indeed, by mid-afternoon, victory for the French seemed a distinct possibility. But the Allied army, led by the Duke of Wellington and ably assisted by Marshal Blucher, finally delivered a fatal blow that not only defeated the French forces but destroyed for ever Napoleon's dreams of conquest and glory, in which he would stand astride Europe like a colossus. Events that day confirmed the Duke of Wellington as a military genius and Blucher as an eccentric but loyal ally. For the British, the Battle of Waterloo was one of our greatest ever victories and the story of that extraordinary day,.

In this narrative overview, Embser-Herbert explores the history of the policy of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," (DADT) the federal law restricting the military service of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. She traces the policy from its origins in the early 1990s through its evolution and implementation into law in the United States military and evaluates the impact of post-9/11 events on the military, the policy, and the ongoing debate surrounding the existence of the policy itself as lawmakers consider its repeal. Her three-part history of DADT begins with a brief look at earlier policies that preceded it, a discussion of events in 1992-1993 that resulted in the passage and implementation of the new law, and an examination of the law's impact on the military. She also compares the policy to that of other nations, such as Canada, Australia, and Great Britain, that eliminated similar restrictions as they sought ways to avoid a potential manpower shortage in their armed forces. The War on Terror has returned DADT to the public spotlight. Embser-Herbert examines U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and what they can teach about gays and lesbians in the military. She concludes Part I with an analysis of whether the law might be repealed or overturned. Part II of the handbook provides summaries of key legal decisions, and Part III contains key documents, such as the language of the law itself and excerpts from current military regulations and training manuals. The book also includes a chronology of events, glossary of terms, and an annotated bibliography.

Noted Middle East military expert Anthony H. Cordesman details the complex trends that come into play in determining the military balance in a region that has become so critical to world peace. This ready resource provides a wealth of information on military expenditures and major arms systems, as well as qualitative trends, by country and by zone. However, as Cordesman stresses, because the "greater Middle East" is more a matter of rhetoric than military reality, mere data summarizing trends in 23 different countries is no substitute for a substantive explanation. Using tables, graphs, and charts, this study explores every aspect of the regional military balance with attention to sub-regional balances, internal civil conflicts, and low level border tensions. The Middle East is certainly one of the most militarized areas in the world, and changes in technology, access to weapons of mass destruction, and political instability contribute to a situation that has long been in constant flux. Some of the regional flashpoints covered in this study include the Maghreb (North Africa); the Arab-Israeli conflict (dominated by Israel versus Syria); and the Gulf (divided into those states that view Iran as the primary threat and those who lived in fear of Iraq). Internal conflicts, such as those in Mauritania, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Yemen, increasingly dominate regional tensions. In addition, border conflicts within the region and with neighboring countries could further aggravate the delicate balance.

Transformation has become a buzz word in today's military, but what are its historical precursors--those large scale changes that were once called Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA)? Who has gotten it right, and who has not? The Department of Defense must learn from history. Most studies of innovation focus on the actions, choices, and problems faced by individuals in a particular organization. Few place these individuals and organizations within the complex context where they operate. Yet, it is this very context that is a powerful determinant of how actions are conceived, examined, and implemented, and of how errors are identified and corrected. The historical cases that Mandeles examines reveal how different military services organized to learn, accumulate, and retrieve knowledge; and how their particular organization affected everything from the equipment they acquired to the quality of doctrine and concepts used in combat. In cases where more than one community of experts was responsible for weighing in on decisionmaking, the service benefited from enhanced application of evidence, sound inference, and logic. These cases demonstrate that, for senior leadership, participating in such a system should be a strategic and deliberate choice. In each of the cases featured in this book, no such deliberate choice was made. The interwar U.S. Navy (USN) aviation community and the U.S. Marine Corps amphibious operation community were lucky that, in a time of rapid technological advance and strategic risk, their decisions in framing and solving technological and operational problems were made within a functioning multi-organizational system. The Army Air Corps and the Royal Marines wereunfortunate, with corresponding results. It is characteristic of 20th-century military history that no senior civilian or military leader suggested a policy to handle overlapping responsibilities by multiple departments. Today's policymakers have not learned this lesson. In the present time, while a great deal of thought is devoted to proper organizational design and the numbers of persons required to perform necessary functions, there is still no overarching framework guiding these designs.

It has long been acknowledged that the study of war and warfare demands careful consideration of technology, institutions, social organization, and more. But, for some, the so-called "war and society" approach increasingly included everything but explained nothing, because it all too often seemed to ignore the events on the battlefield itself. The military historians in Warfare and Culture in World History return us to the battlefield, but they do so through a deep examination of the role of culture in shaping military institutions and military choices. Collected here are some of the most provocative recent efforts to analyze warfare through a cultural lens, drawing on and aggressively expanding traditional scholarship on war and society through sophisticated cultural analysis. With chapters ranging from an organizational analysis of American Civil War field armies to the soldiers' culture of late Republican Rome and debates within Ming Chinese officialdom over extermination versus pacification, this one volume provides a full range of case studies of how culture, whether societal, strategic, organizational, or military, could shape not only military institutions but also actual battlefield choices.

Based on a decade of research in Indonesia, this book provides an in-depth account of the military's struggle to adapt to the new democratic system after the downfall of Suharto's authoritarian regime in 1998. Unlike other studies of the Indonesian armed forces, which focus exclusively on internal military developments, Mietzner's study emphasizes the importance of conflicts among civilians in determining the extent of military involvement in political affairs. Analysing disputes between Indonesia's main Muslim groups, Mietzner argues that their intense rivalry between 1998 and 2004 allowed the military to extend its engagement in politics and protect its institutional interests. The stabilization of the civilian polity after 2004, in contrast, has led to an increasing marginalization of the armed forces from the power centre. Drawing broader conclusions from these events for Indonesia's ongoing process of democratic consolidation, the book shows that the future role of the armed forces in politics will largely depend on the ability of civilian leaders to maintain functioning democratic institutions and procedures.