The Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) State Safety Oversight Rule (49 CFR Part 659) requires oversight of all rail transitagencies in revenue operation after January 1, 1997. This report summarizes activities performed to implement the State Safety Oversight Program during Calendar Year 2003, analyzes rail fixed guideway system accident statistics using information provided by state oversight agencies, and documents the safety and security performance of the rail transit industry in 2003, including a discussion of the probable causes of accidents and unacceptable hazardous conditions.

The Transit Safety & Security Statistics & Analysis 2002 Annual Report (formerly SAMIS) is a compilation and analysis of mass transit accident, casualty, and crime statistics reported under the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA's) National Transit Database Reporting System by transit systems that were beneficiaries of FTA Urbanized Area Formula funds in the United States during 2002.

In support ofthe Federal Transit Administration (FTA) Electric Drive Strategic Plan (EDSP), this report assesses state-of-art advances inlithium-ion batteries, ultracapacitors, and relatedpower management and controltechnologies for the rechargeable energy storage systems (RESS) on-board existing and emerging electric drive buses. RD&T roadmaps for near-, mid-, and long-term are developed for FTA and potential partners developing next generation electric drive buses, based on a review of technical literature, and inputs from experts and transit stakeholders regarding lessons learned, knowledge gaps, and priority RD&T needs. Illustrative projects up to 2020 are proposed based on the identified priority needs in these roadmaps. They promise to advance RESS technologiesfrom research, development, demonstration, test and evaluationto full integration in more fuel efficient, environmentally sustainable, and cost-effectivecommercial electric drive transit buses.

The John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center was asked by the Office of Security of the Maritime Administration to examine the issue of industrial control systems (ICS) security in the Maritime Transportation System (MTS), and to develop a white paper based upon its findings for circulation amongst MTS stakeholders. In evaluating the issue, this paper first discusses the role of the MTS as part of the domestic and international transportation system and global supply chain, and provides examples of the economic impact of past natural and manmade disruptions to the MTS. It next explores the uses and applications of ICS throughout the MTS, identifies potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities of ICS, and provides examples of possible ICS failures and the potential impact on the MTS. Finally, the paper explores the issue in the context of Federal policy governing critical infrastructure, cybersecurity and supply chain resilience, and makes a number of recommendations that government agencies and the private sector might consider in order to mitigate the ICS security risks.

On October 24, 2004, about 1235 eastern daylight time,1 a Beech King Air 200, N501RH, operated by Hendrick Motorsports, Inc., crashed into mountainous terrain in Stuart, Virginia, during a missed approach to Martinsville/Blue Ridge Airport (MTV), Martinsville, Virginia. The flight was transporting Hendrick Motorsports employees and others to an automobile race in Martinsville, Virginia. The two flight crewmembers and eight passengers were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed at the time of the accident.

On November 28, 2004, about 0958 mountain standard time,1 a Canadair, Ltd., CL-600-2A12, N873G, registered to Hop-a-Jet, Inc., and operated by Air Castle Corporation doing business as Global Aviation Glo-Air flight 73, collided with the ground during takeoff at Montrose Regional Airport (MTJ), Montrose, Colorado. The on-demand charter flight was operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and snow was falling. Of the six occupants on board, the captain, the flight attendant, and one passenger were killed, and the first officer and two passengers were seriously injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The flight was en route to South Bend Regional Airport (SBN), South Bend, Indiana.