The traditional doctrine of Islamic law in regard to international re lations is well known. The Shari'a includes many excellent provisions about declarations of war, treaties of peace, armistices, diplomatic envoys, negotiations and guarantees of safe conduct. But the fact remains that it divides the world, broadly speaking, into the "Abode of Islam" and the "Abode of 'War," and that it envisages the continu ance of intermittent war between them until the latter is absorbed in the former. In the course of such fighting, and in the intervals in be tween, many civilities were to be meticulously observed; but prisoners of war could be killed, sold or enslaved at the discretion of the Muslim authorities, and the women of those who resisted the advance of Islam could be taken as slave-concubines, regardless of whether they were single or married. The "Abode of Islam" did not, indeed, consist ex clusively of Muslims, for those whose religion was based on a book accepted by Islam as originally inspired and in practice, indeed, those other religions too - were not forced to embrace Islam but only to accept Muslim rule. They were granted the status of dhimmis, were protected in their persons and their property, were allowed to follow their own religion in an unobtrusive fashion, and were accorded the position of essentially second-class citizens. They were also of course, perfectly free to embrace Islam; but for a Muslim to be converted to another faith involved the death penalty."

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read on the Oxford Academic platform and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. How can the EU be made legitimate and sustainable through (constitutional) law - and what is the role of constitutional lawyers and their ideas in creating this "sense of legitimacy"? This book seeks to answer these questions through the concept of the "constitutional imaginary": sets of ideas and beliefs that motivate and justify the practice of government and collective self-rule. Constitutional imaginaries are as important as institutions and office- holders, as they provide political action with an overarching sense and purpose recognized as legitimate by those governed. Constitutional imaginaries are 'necessary fictions' that make political rule possible, and at the same time they are ideologies which hide from view various forms of domination. European Constitutional Imaginaries deals with a variety of questions and is split into four parts to address: the first part explores in more detail various meanings of European constitutional imaginary, as seen by different disciplines: legal sociology, political and constitutional theory, and philosophy. The second part revisits the contribution of some key authors to the creation of European constitutional imaginaries, and the third part offers various new ways of thinking about European constitutionalism. The fourth and final part examines political economy behind various constitutional imaginaries. Written by a balanced mix of well-established authors and newer talent, European Constitutional Imaginaries promises to open debates on European constitutionalism that are necessary to understanding Europe's present predicament and its various crises, all navigated through the medium of law.

Das Buch befasst sich mit der Fragestellung nach einer Konstitutionalisierung des Voelkerrechts und beleuchtet diese aus einer systemtheoretischen Sichtweise. Das Werk setzt sich zunachst intensiv mit der Systemtheorie von Niklas Luhmann auseinander und analysiert anschliessend sowohl vorherrschende Konstitutionalisierungs- als auch Fragmentierungstendenzen. Ausfuhrlich wird dabei auf den Ansatz des sog. Societal Constitutionalism eingegangen und die Hauptthese der Vertreter dieses Ansatzes kritisch gewurdigt. Schliesslich beleuchtet das Werk die Konstitutionalisierung des Voelkerrechts unter systemtheoretischen Gesichtspunkten und untersucht, inwieweit ein autonomes oder sogar autopoietisches Rechts- und Politiksystem auf internationaler Ebene existieren und ob diese beiden Systeme analog zur nationalstaatlichen Ebene durch eine Art strukturelle Kopplung verbunden sind. Im Kern bejaht das Werk ein Vorliegen einer strukturellen Kopplung und dadurch auch eine Konstitutionalisierung zumindest in einem abgeschwachten Mass.

This book provides the definitive reference point on all the issues pertaining to dealing with the 'crisis of the rule of law' in the European Union. Both Member State and EU levels are considered. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the concrete legal bases and instruments that the EU may avail itself of for enforcing rule of law, and the volume clearly demonstrates that a number of legally sound ways of rule of law oversight are available. Contributors are leading scholars who assess the potential role to be played by the various bodies in the context of dealing with the EU's rule of law imperfections.

Fresh water is one of man's most vital needs. The distribution of water within river basins has a direct bearing on the organization of water resources development to meet this ever-expanding need. River basins, despite their very great diversity in other respects, have one physical characteristic in common: each is a more or less self-contained unit within whose bounds all the surface and part or all of the ground waters form an interconnected, interdependent system. This inter dependence has such far-reaching implications - for pollution and flood control, apportionment of supply, relations between upstream and downstream riparians, to mention only a few examples - that the river basin has become almost universally accepted (within the past 20 or 30 years at least) as the unit of optimal water resources de velopment. Professor Teclaff's work (which was originally submitted to the New York University School of Law as a doctoral dissertation) is the first fully developed response to the important resolution passed by the International Law Association at its New York meeting in I958 recognizing the legal nature of the international river basin. His study quite properly, therefore, poses the question whether the adoption of the river basin unit is a temporary phenomenon, reflecting the current stage of technology and of administrative, economic, and legal thought on water resources development, or whether the de terminative influence of the river basin's physical unity which has always operated in the past will continue to operate in the future."

Can two-Chinas co-exist in the present world order? In a sense they co-exist now-Free China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Communist China on the mainland. Barring a military showdown, this situation could remain for years to come. However, if we seek to put Free China and Communist China on some permanent basis and give them interna tional juridical status as abiding and separate entities, then we are faced with serious difficulties. Free China and Communist China co exist at present simply because neither can effectively alter the situa tion. Each is backed by a power bloc that recognizes the legal existence of only one of these political regimes. The United States does not re cognize Peiping, even though it has conducted meetings on the ambas sadorial level with the Regime for several years. In a corresponding way, the Soviet bloc of nations refuses to recognize Nationalist China. The situation is very similar to that of two-Germanys, two-Koreas and two-Vietnams. To seek a solution to this political impasse, it is suggested that a "Sino-Formosan State" or some kind of "self-determination" by the Formosans be instituted. This was first expressed by Chester Bowles in his article "The China Problem Reconsidered" (Foreign Affairs, April 1960), and supported by John Carter Vincent in his letter to the editor of the New York Times (December 7,1961). The Conlon Report of 1959 held the same posi. tion. Also, Arnold J.

Mr. Asamoah's book is concerned with an area of growing importance in the evolution of contemporary international law. The traditional division of the sources of International law into custom and treaties has already been supplemented in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice by the "general principles of law re cognized by civilized nations" and-as subsidiary sources, the judicial decisions and the teachings of highly qualified publicists. But in order to cope with the diversity of international law in our time, we have to look to a far greater variety of sources of international law, and we shall have to recognize that, in accordance with the many-sided character of international law, these sources may vary greatly in intensity. In recent years, Declaratory Resolutions of the General Assembly have been much concerned with the general princi ples of international law. Sometimes these Declarations are interpre tations of the Charter and other instruments; sometimes they are evi dence of state practice and a developing customary international law ; sometimes they formulate new principles which, in some cases will eventually lead to international treaties or new custom, or in other cases will be accepted as authorative statements of international legal principles, in circumstances where a formal treaty cannot be attained. There are many reasons--often of an internal character-which prevent the conclusion of a treaty but not the acceptance of the principles contained in it.

The purpose of this book is to present to lawyers outside Sweden an introduction to Private International Law as applied in Sweden. As in the original Swedish version, (Internationell Privatriitt. Metod och Material, Stockholm 1962), emphazis is put on the structure and func tioning of conflict law, and the book does not attempt to present a comprehensive survey of Swedish conflict rules. A resume of these rules has, however, been included in the English edition. The author wants to express his thanks to those who have helped to make possible the publication of this book. Generous support was given by the Swedish State Council for Social Science Research. Dr. Stig Stromholm, Uppsala, prepared the translation into English of the original Swedish text. Some alterations were subsequently made in the, English version, including minor deletions of material which had ap peared in the Swedish original and the addition of some new material, including the whole of present chapter IV. The English text as a whole was finally revised by the author with the help, in the case of chapters I, IV, V and part of chapter II, of Mrs. Helen Moats Eek (Ph. D., University of Chicago) and, in the case of chapter III and part of chapter II, of Mr. Richard Cox (B. Sc. Econ (Hons. ), F. R. Econ. Soc. ). Valua: ble assistance, particularly in the preparation of the bibliography and the index, was given also by Mr. Lars Lindgren (LL."

In dem Band werden die voelkerrechtlichen Konsequenzen untersucht, die sich aus der Grundung der Afrikanischen Union (AU) ergeben. Aufbauend auf einer Analyse der organisationsrechtlichen und programmatischen Neuerungen werden die militarischen Eingriffsbefugnisse der AU uberpruft und ihr Verhaltnis zu den Vereinten Nationen und regionalen Organisationen beleuchtet. So kann der Autor nachweisen, dass die AU innovative strukturelle und programmatische Entwicklungen angestossen und sich im Einklang mit geltendem Voelkerrecht neu positioniert hat.

The first edition of Public Policies for Environmental Protection contributed significantly to the incorporation of economic analysis in the study of environmental policy. Fully revised to account for changes in the institutional, legal, and regulatory framework of environmental policy, the second edition features updated chapters on the EPA and federal regulation, air and water pollution policy, and hazardous and toxic substances. It includes entirely new chapters on market-based environmental policies, global climate change, solid waste, and, for the first time, coverage of the Safe Drinking Water Act. Portney, Stavins, and their contributors provide an invaluable resource for researchers, policymakers, industry professionals, and journalists---anyone who needs up-to-date information on U.S. environmental policy. With their careful explanation of policy alternatives, the authors provide an ideal book for students in courses about environmental economics or environmental politics.

At the UN General Assembly in 1997, an overwhelming majority of States voted for the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses - a global overarching framework governing the rights and duties of States sharing freshwater systems. Globally, there are 263 internationally shared watersheds, which drain the territories of 145 countries and represent more than forty percent of the Earth's land surface. Hence, inter-State cooperation towards the sustainable management of transboundary water supplies, in accordance with applicable international legal instruments, is a topic of crucial importance, especially in the context of the current global water crisis. This volume provides an assessment of the role and relevance of the UN Watercourses Convention and describes and evaluates its entry into force as a key component of transboundary water governance. To date, the Convention still requires further contracting States before it can enter into force. The authors describe the drafting and negotiation of the Convention and its relationship to other multilateral environmental agreements. A series of case studies assess the role of the Convention at various levels: regional (European Union, East Africa, West Africa, Central Asia, Central America and South America), river basin (e.g. the Mekong and Congo) and national (e.g. Ethiopia and Mexico). The book concludes by proposing how future implementation might further strengthen international cooperation in the management of water resources, to promote biodiversity conservation as well as sustainable and equitable use.

International Law Reports is the only publication in the world wholly devoted to the regular and systematic reporting in English of decisions of international courts and arbitrators as well as judgments of national courts. Volume 163 reports on, amongst others, the 2015 judgment of the High Court of India in AWAS 39423 Ireland v. Director-General of Civil Aviation and Spicejet Ltd, the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Jamaa and Others v. Italy, and the English Court of Appeal judgment in Al-Jedda v. Secretary of State for Defence (No. 2).

(i) What is Martial Law? It is difficult to define martial law, especially because of "the haze of uncertainty which envelops it. " 1 The expression is used to denote a variety of forms of government or law, such as military law governing soldiers in the service of the State, military govern ment in occupied areas, any kind of arbitrary government in which the military arm plays a dominant role, and the emergency ad ministration "which obtains in a domestic community when the military authority carries on the government, or at least some of its functions. " 2 It is in the sense indicated last that martial law is discussed in the following pages. In this sense, it is "the extension of military government to domestic areas and civil persons in case of invasion or rebellion. . . it is a suspension of normal civil government in order to restore it and has civilians for its subjects and civil areas for its loci of operation. " 3 Thus martial law has to be clearly distinguished from military law and military government, though 4 all these have common roots in history and logic. The term 'martial law' was originally applied to the law ad ministered by the court of the Marshal and the Constable of England. There are two theories about the source of the word 'martial' in the expression. One theory is that the term 'martial 1 C. Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule, page 19. 2 idem, page 30.

Civil Aviation has become a public utility service. SALVATORE TOMASINO I} Although civil aviation has enjoyed unflagging public interest since its birth in 1919, and even before that date, the factors governing the development of civil aviation are nevertheless not widely known. This applies not so much to technical development as to the political and economic considerations which ultimately determine the pattern of the worldwide network of air routes. Whereas, prior to World War II, civil aviation was regarded mainly as an instrument for political penetration, with perhaps the Netherlands and its K.L.M.2) as a striking exception, since 1945 civil aviation has come to be judged more on its own merits, though it has remained primarily a government matter. The political, strategic, economic, financial and social aspeCts of civil aviation together constitute a field which, particularly since World War II, has come to form the subject-matter of a more or less independent branch of foreign policy, designated 'by the term "international civil aviation policy." In spite of the dominating factors of national prestige and later of economic nationalism, States have nevertheless directly and indirectly taken upon themselves a number of obligations in the international field, thereby giving civil aviation an international legal basis.

When is a norm peremptory? This is a question that has troubled legal scholars throughout the development of modern international law. In this work, Daniel Costelloe suggests - through an examination of State practice and international materials - that it is the legal consequences of a norm which distinguish it as peremptory. This book sheds light on the legal consequences that peremptory norms have, for instance, in the law of treaties, international responsibility and state immunity. Unlike their substance or identification, the consequences of peremptory norms have remained under-studied. This book is the first specifically on this topic and is essential reading for all scholars and practitioners of public international law.

According to democratic theory the state is for man not man for the state. This theory has been implemented by bills of rights in many national constitutions giving the individual a legal opportunity to redress abuses by his state. In Federal Consti tutions, however, difficulties have been faced when central au thority seeks to enforce the standards of the constitution against the legislation and customs of the constituent states. The latter habitually resist, proclaiming the virtues of horne rule and local self-govemment, also supported by democratic theory. Thus the opposition of man versus the state develops into a double op position of man versus the state and the state versus the super state. To what extent should the super-state take the part of man demanding respect for human rights, or of the state demand ing self-govemment, when the two conflict? The failure to solve this problem precipitated the American Civil War and continues to agitate American politics. Should the human right of equal educational opportunities prevail over the "State's Right" of autonomy in the organization of its schools? The same problem appears in more virulent form in the efforts of the United Nations to "promote respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion" without "intervening in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."

In international law the authority of the writers has been great and the Statute of the International Court of Justice still takes cognizance of them as subsidiary sources. Yet it has been widely recognized that on many points writers, even of the most respecta ble authority, have merely repeated the statements of their predecessors, sometimes with the result that error or some indivi dual dogma or predilection has been perpetuated. The three-mile limit of territorial waters, for example, was long identified with the range of cannon and with the famous dictum of Galiani until modern historical research revealed more accurately its historical origin in the practice of states. The very definition of internation al law as a law of which only states were subjects impelled to somewhat far-fetched inclusions of certain political entities as "states," and has had at last to yield at least to the concept that an international organization may also be a subject of inter national law. The long repetition of the essential attributes ot states - sovereignty, independence, equality - has not altered the realities of the very great differences between states in respect of each of these attributes. As Cardozo said of definitions, if our preconceived notions of international law do not accord with the facts of international life, so much the worse for those old no tions; they must be revised to be brought into line with reality.