Two years before the action in Lone Survivor, a Green Berets A Team conducted a very different, successful mission in Afghanistan's notorious Pech Valley. Led by Captain Ronald Fry, the Hammerhead Six mission applied the principles of unconventional warfare to "win hearts and minds" and fight against the terrorist insurgency. In 2003, the Special Forces soldiers entered an area later called "the most dangerous place in Afghanistan." Here, where the line between civilians and armed zealots was indistinct, they illustrated the Afghan proverb: "I destroy my enemy by making him my friend." Fry recounts how they were seen as welcome guests rather than invaders. Soon after their deployment ended, the Pech Valley reverted to turmoil. Their success was never replicated. Hammerhead Six finally reveals how cultural respect, hard work (and the occasional machine-gun burst) were more than a match for the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

On Sunday morning, July 9, 1950, the U.S. 23rd Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Infantry Division received orders to deploy to Korea, where the North Koreans had crossed the 38th Parallel just two weeks earlier. In service in various forms since 1861, the 23rd Infantry Regiment - nicknamed the "Tomahawks" - was, like other army units following the downsizing of the military after World War II, short on radios, weapons, and men. Nevertheless, the regiment amassed volunteers to fill out its ranks and mobilised for the Far East. By the time the 23rd Infantry arrived in South Korea, American forces and their U.N. allies had been driven more than 100 miles down the Korean Penninsula by the communist Chinese. In February 1951, with his Eighth Army understrength and low on morale after weeks of retreat, Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway ordered the 23rd Infantry, under the command of Col. Paul Freeman, to hold the small town of Chipyong-ni, a vital road hub east of Seoul. Faced with several Chinese divisions totaling nearly 25,000 men, the 23rrd Infantry's 4,500 soldiers were outnumbered five to one. Trapped behind enemy lines, the 23rd Infantry's last stand of February 12-15 could have been one of the worst defeats in I.S. military history. Instead, the regiment's victory has been called the "Gettysburg of the Korean War" and altered the course of the remainder of the war. In High Tide in the Korean War, Leo Barron retells the Battle of Chipyong-ni from the point of view of thje commanders faced with a do-or-die defense and the soldiers fighting from the foxholes, outnumbered in unfamiliar territory in winter. Drawn from memoirs, interviews iuntelligence summaries, unit reports and personal research in South Kore, Barron's narrative is a gripping, page-turning history of one of the most important battles of the Korean War.

The US-led coalition which launched an invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003 led to a decade-long military presence in the country. In the run-up to that invasion, many comparisons were made with the 1991 Gulf War. Ahmed Ijaz Malik takes these two instances of military intervention by Republican US governments to highlight how the official discourse of leaders and decision-makers has an impact on foreign policy and its results. By taking these two examples, he examines how discourse affects real events, and the extent to which the legacy of the Cold War has influenced the decisions which are made at the upper echelons of the US government. US Foreign Policy and the Gulf Wars critically analyses the post-Cold War liberal cosmopolitan and realist discourses related to these two instances of US military intervention. Using an approach which Malik labels 'critical realism', this book examines the ways in which discourses often act as ideological covers for material interests, whilst still not holding a deterministic view whereby these interests alone shape policies. From this perspective, this book assesses the themes of 'Just War', humanitarianism and cosmopolitanism. It furthermore uses the approach of 'critical realism' to engage with a variety of arguments on the emerging role of the US - as they were displayed in academic discourses and other intellectual contributions around each of the 1991 and 2003 wars. Malik relates these discussions to an analysis of the official discourses, documents and policies displayed prior to the 1991 and 2003 wars, as well as to an examination of the resulting actual conduct. Since the implications of the US military presence in the Middle East are so central to the study of International Relations and Security Studies, this book will be invaluable for specialists in these disciplines, as well as for those interested in policy formation and the wider Middle East.

Band 8 der Gesamtstudie Vom Raketenschach der Kubakrise zum Krieg gegen den Terrorismus," Resultat eines von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft DFG unterstutzten Forschungsprojektes, stellt den Irakkrieg der Administration von George W. Bush ins Zentrum der Analysen. Bei der Behandlung jenes weiten Themenfeldes setzt die Studie folgende Schwerpunkte: Besonderes Interesse gilt zum einen der Vorbereitungsphase, dem militarischen Planungsprozess (gepragt insbesondere durch administrationsinterne Grabenkampfe und durch die Spannungen zwischen Rumsfeld und den Spitzenmilitars) und der Vernachlassigung der Stabilisierungsoperationen. In diesem Kontext wird nicht zuletzt auch auf zwei bemerkenswerte Konfliktsimulationen eingegangen, auf Desert Crossing" von 1999 und auf Millennium Challenge 2002." Einen weiteren Schwerpunkt markiert die Darstellung der Entscheidungsprozesse in Washington, welche dann 2006/2007 den Weg fur die surge" im Irak bereiteten. Dazwischengeschaltet ist ein Theoriekapitel, welches sich mit den Charakteristika und Paradoxien des asymmetrischen Krieges und mit den Grundzugen von Counterinsurgency-Operationen (COIN) beschaftigt."

Mit Band 7 verlasst die zehnbandige Gesamtstudie Vom Raketenschach der Kubakrise zum Krieg gegen den Terrorismus," Resultat eines von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft DFG unterstutzten Forschungsprojektes, die Ara des Kalten Krieges. Als eine analytische Brucke zwischen den beiden Hemispharen" der Langen Kriege fungiert nun die Darstellung des Golfkrieges von 1990/91. Die Studie prasentiert zum einen die jungsten Erkenntnisse zu den Motiven Saddam Husseins und zur Disposition der irakischen Streitkrafte (etwa betreffend den Einsatz der Scud-Systeme oder von Massenvernichtungswaffen). Zum anderen wirft die Untersuchung einen Blick auf die Entscheidungsprozesse auf amerikanischer Seite, unter Betonung der Unterschiede wie der Parallelen zur Vorgeschichte des Irakkrieges 2003: So werden die Debatten innerhalb des Fuhrungszirkels von George H.W. Bush analysiert, welche gekennzeichnet waren von Spannungen zwischen JCS-Chairman Colin Powell und Verteidigungsminister Dick Cheney. James Bakers Allianzdiplomatie soll ebenso betrachtet werden wie die Anatomie der amerikanisch-israelischen Beziehungen. Und auch das Verhaltnis zwischen der US-Regierung und dem Hause Saud wird sehr eingehend beleuchtet (und dies schlagt den Bogen zuruck zu den Ausfuhrungen uber die amerikanisch-saudischen Beziehungen in den 70er und 80er Jahren in den Banden 4 und 5): Dabei werden etwa neue Forschungsergebnisse verarbeitet, welche die Cheney-Mission nach Djiddah und die Audienz bei Konig Fahd vom 7. August 1990 in ein neues Licht rucken. Aber auch andere Aspekte jenes Golfkrieges wie die Arbeit der US-Nachrichtendienste, die Triumphe, aber auch die Defizite der amerikanischen Aufklarung, werden thematisiert. Dann vollzieht die Studie einen Zeitsprung und blendet uber in die Zeit nach den Terroranschlagen des 11. September 2001: Das nun folgende Kapitel behandelt die erste Phase des Afghanistankrieges 2001/2002 und stellt die von der Bush-Administration begangenen Kardinalfehler heraus - bei der Jagd auf Osama bin Laden wie auch bei der Stabilisierung Afghanistans. Exemplarisch werden die Gefechte um Tora Bora und die Operation Anaconda" im Detail analysiert. Eine Ursache fur jenes Scheitern, fur jene bei der Befriedung Afghanistans von Anfang an begangenen Konstruktionsfehler liegt naturlich in der Konzentration der Administration von George W. Bush auf den Lieblingsfeind" Saddam Hussein begrundet.

The Korean Language Flagship Center (KLFC) aims to produce professionals who can function in Korean in their chosen fields. After two years of intensive Korean language training customized to their fields, graduates of this program are expected to take their place among the next generation of global professionals as Korea specialists, commanding professional-level proficiency in Korean. Successful completion of the program and demonstration of the ability to use Korean at a professional level (ILR 3, ACTFL Superior) lead to the Master of Arts degree in Korean for Professionals. This monograph series is a compilation of the students' research critical and controversial issues in Korea or Korea-US relations. The series is issued every year and includes scholarly papers written by all graduates.

America's second war against Iraq differed notably from its first. Operation Desert Storm was a limited effort by coalition forces to drive out those Iraqi troops who had seized Kuwait six months before. In contrast, the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was a more ambitious undertaking aimed at decisively ending Saddam Hussein's rule.

After several days of intense air strikes against fixed enemy targets, allied air operations began concentrating on Iraqi ground troops. The intended effect was to destroy Iraqi resistance and allow coalition land forces to maneuver without pausing in response to enemy actions. Iraqi tank concentrations were struck with consistently lethal effect, paving the way for an allied entrance into Baghdad that was largely unopposed. Hussein's regime finally collapsed on April 9. Viewed in hindsight, it was the combination of allied air power as an indispensable enabler and the unexpected rapidity of the allied ground advance that allowed coalition forces to overrun Baghdad before Iraq could mount a coherent defense.

In achieving this unprecedented level of performance, allied air power was indispensable in setting the conditions for the campaign's end. Freedom from attack and freedom to attack prevailed for allied ground forces. The intended effect of allied air operations was to facilitate the quickest capture of Baghdad without the occurrence of any major head-to-head battles on the ground.

This impressive short-term achievement, however, was soon overshadowed by the ensuing insurgency that continued for four years thereafter in Iraq. The mounting costs of that turmoil tended, for a time, to render the campaign's initial successes all but forgotten. Only more recently did the war begin showing signs of reaching an agreeable end when the coalition's commander put into effect a new counterinsurgency strategy in 2007 aimed at providing genuine security for Iraqi citizens.

The toppling of Hussein's regime ended the iron rule of an odious dictator who had brutalized his people for more than 30 years. Yet the inadequate resourcing with which that goal was pursued showed that any effective plan for a regime takedown must include due hedging against the campaign's likely aftermath in addition to simply seeing to the needs of major combat. That said, despite the failure of the campaign's planners to underwrite the first need adequately, those who conducted the three-week offensive in pursuit of regime change performed all but flawlessly, thanks in considerable part to the mostly unobserved but crucial enabling contributions of allied air power.

The war in Afghanistan has been a major policy commitment and central undertaking of the Canadian state since 2001: Canada has been a leading force in the war, and has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on aid and reconstruction. After a decade of conflict, however, there is considerable debate about the efficacy of the mission, as well as calls to reassess Canada's role in the conflict. An authoritative and strongly analytical work, Empire's Ally provides a much-needed critical investigation into one of the most polarizing events of our time. This collection draws on new primary evidence - including government documents, think tank and NGO reports, international media files, and interviews in Afghanistan - to provide context for Canadian foreign policy, to offer critical perspectives on the war itself, and to link the conflict to broader issues of political economy, international relations, and Canada's role on the world stage. Spanning academic and public debates, Empire's Ally opens a new line of argument on why the mission has entered a stage of crisis.

The objective of a negotiated peace in Afghanistan has been firmly embraced by most of the potential parties to a treaty. However, arriving at an agreement about the sequencing, timing, and prioritization of peace terms is likely to be difficult, given the divergence in the parties' interests and objectives. The U.S. objective in these negotiations should be a stable and peaceful Afghanistan that neither hosts nor collaborates with terrorists.

Rarely has a foreign policy event spawned such interest in international public opinion as has the Iraq War. What does this war indicate about the extent to which public opinion influences foreign policy leaders? Have leaders decisions about participating in the Iraq Coalition reflected the willingness of their citizens to do so? Are leaders of some countries more responsive to public opinion than others?The editors address these questions using select case studies that explore the extent to which leaders and people in democracies that are capable of participating in the Iraq War Coalition have willingly done so. Each chapter is based on the premise that democracies are most responsive to public opinion and that the wealthiest democracies would be most capable, though not necessarily most willing, to participate in the Iraq War.The editors have assembled contributions that build on the successful model of Richard Sobel s "International Public Opinion and the Bosnia Crisis." In this Iraq volume, leading scholars debate the role of public opinion in particular countries decisions to participate or not in an international conflict, making it an essential text for any foreign policy course.

Here is the firsthand account of a member of one of the United States Army's three-man Tactical Psychological Operations Teams, groups of men tasked with winning the hearts and minds of Iraq's civilian population through leaflets, loudspeakers, conversation, and bribery. Transcribed from and inspired by Russell Snyder's personal wartime journal, it is a story of introspection, relating how the feelings of eagerness and uncertainty in a young man unfamiliar with war were replaced with the dread knowledge that, buried within his soul, beneath a facade of goodwill and morality, lurked the capacity to kill his fellow men. There are scenes of battle retold within the pages of Hearts and Mines, descriptions of the feelings of seeing once-familiar human bodies destroyed beyond recognition. Some days are described as being full of hope and appreciation for the beauty of the world, others with despair for the omnipresent cruelty and destruction which has a habit of consuming men when they feel unaccountable for their actions. It captures the sensory experience of living in a singular environment full of strange plants and animals, friends true and false, and determined enemies, encapsulating the existential fear of mortar and rocket attacks, as well as the ridiculousness of military bureaucracy, such as was demonstrated by a sergeant major's decision to punish graffiti artists by removing the doors of all the camp's toilets.

Security force assistance (SFA) is a central pillar of the counterinsurgency campaign being waged by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. This monograph analyzes SFA efforts in Afghanistan over time, documents U.S. and international approaches to building the Afghan force from 2001 to 2009, and provides observations and recommendations that emerged from extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan in 2009 and their implications for the U.S. Army. This title analyzes security force assistance efforts in Afghanistan, focusing on lessons and themes that emerged from extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan in 2009 and their implications for the U.S. Army.

In a world in which advanced communication technologies have made the reporting of disasters and conflicts (also in the form of breaking news) a familiar and 'normalised' activity, the information we present here about television news reporting of the 2003 war in Iraq has implications that go beyond this particular conflict. Evaluation and Stance in War News functions as a tool kit for the critical evaluation of language in the news, both as raw data in need of interpretation and as carefully packaged products of 'information management' in need of 'unpacking'. The chapters offer an array of theoretical and empirical instruments for revealing, identifying, sifting, weighing and connecting patterns of language use that construct messages. These messages carry with them world views and value systems that can either create an ever wider divide or serve to build bridges between peoples and countries.

"On previous flight ops, when a launch was delayed, we usually passed the time telling jokes or exchanging the latest scuttlebutt. Tonight was different. Each of us sat silently with our own thoughts. All of us, I'm sure, made impossible promises to God, and I was one of them. My gut was wound so tight, it was hard to breathe, no less talk. For the umpteenth time, I tightened the harness of my chute. I remember praying, 'Whatever else happens, don't make me bail out of this thing '"
With little to no recognition from the general public, navy enlisted aircrewmen performed heroically in the Korean War. Manning radios and radar, they were indispensable to the success of missions. Aviation Electronics Technician Second Class Jack Sauter was one such aircrewman. Assigned to the USS "Midway" and the USS "Lake Champlain," he flew twenty-one early warning and antisubmarine missions from the backseat of a Douglas Skyraider with Task Force 77 off Korea in support of our troops.
From the excitement and thrill of being catapulted from the deck of an aircraft carrier to the tedium of service at sea, the author describes in detail his service in the Korean air war.

Front Line Bloggers - Afghanistan and Helmand Blog - Afghanistan (now combined as UK Forces Afghanistan) were established by the MoD to allow UK armed forces personnel to tell the public back home what they were doing there, in their own words. Officers, NCOs and other ranks representing a wide variety of units - infantry, artillery, signals, logistics, aviation, medical - contribute their thoughts and experiences on everything from what it's like to take on the Taliban in a firefight to the difficulties of trying to eat well at a patrol base. These personal accounts give a picture of the conflict at ground level, the details of daily life that usually do not make the news, as well as individuals' perspectives on major events. Some of the bloggers have even been asked to contribute to the Radio 4 Today Programme and Channel 4 News. With the war in Afghanistan in the news almost constantly, this is a timely book which tells the real story of what it's like for our troops on the ground.

No Lack of Courage is the story of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Operation Medusa, the largely Canadian action in Afghanistan from 1 to 17 September 2006, to dislodge a heavily entrenched Taliban force in the Pashmul district of Afghanistans Kandahar Province. At stake, according to senior Afghan politicians and NATO military commanders, was nothing less than the very existence of the reconstituted state of Afghanistan, as well as the NATO alliance itself. In a bitterly fought conflict that lasted more than two weeks, Canadian, Afghan, and Coalition troops defeated the dug-in enemy forces and chased them from the Pashmul area.

In the end, the brunt of the fighting fell on the Canadians, and the operation that saved Afghanistan exacted a great cost. However, the battle also demonstrated that Canada had shed its peacekeeping mythology and was once more ready to commit troops deliberately to combat. Moreover, it revealed yet again that Canadian soldiers have no lack of courage.

Preparation for warfare materially reshapes rural landscapes and environments; this is a comparative history and geography of militarized landscapes. The black smoke billowing from burning oil wells during the Gulf War of 1990-91 directed media and public attention towards war's devastating environmental impact. Yet even before the first bomb is dropped, preparation for warfare materially and imaginatively reshapes rural landscapes and environments. This volume is the first to explore the comparative histories and geographies of militarized landscapes. Moving beyond the narrow definition of militarized landscapes as theatres of war, it treats them as simultaneously material and cultural sites that have been partially or fully mobilized to achieve military aims. Ranging from the Korean DMZ to nuclear testing sites in the American West, and from Gettysburg to Salisbury Plain, "Militarized Landscapes" focuses on these often secretive, hidden, dangerous and invariably controversial sites that occupy huge swathes of national territories.

Known as the graveyard of empires, Afghanistan has now been singled out as Obama's "just war," the destination for an additional thirty thousand US troops in an effort to shore up an increasingly desperate occupation. Nick Turse brings together a range of leading commentators, politicians, and military strategists to analyze America's real motives and likely prospects. Through on-the-spot reporting, clear-headed analysis and historical comparisons with Afghanistan's previous occupiers-Britain and the Soviet Union, who also argued that they were fighting a just and winnable war-The Case for Withdrawal From Afghanistan carefully examines the current US strategy and offers sobering conclusions. This timely and focused collection aims at the heart of Obama's foreign policy and shows why it is so unlikely to succeed.

Given extraordinary access by the U.S. Army, Barry Goldstein spent two years photographing and interviewing more than fifty actively serving members of a veteran battalion, including two month-long trips during which he lived and patrolled with the unit. No one indicts war more powerfully than experienced professional soldiers, and no one enumerates more eloquently the reasons for serving. Gray Land is a collection of photographic portraits of veterans accompanied by excerpts from candid, unsupervised interviews and images documenting the realities of life in a war zone. The nobility and wisdom of these men and women will change the way we see war.

The American engagement in Iraq has been looked at from many perspectives, to include examination of the flawed intelligence that provided the war's rationale, the failed effort to secure an international mandate, the rapid success of the invasion, and the long ensuing counterinsurgency campaign. This compelling new book focuses on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its Administrator, L. Paul Bremer. The book also includes interviews with many of those in Baghdad and Washington responsible for setting and implementing occupation policy, on the memoirs of American and Iraqi officials who have since left office, on journalist accounts of the period, and on tens of thousands of internal and recently unclassified CPA documents, to which the authors were allowed access.

After a series of disastrous missteps in its conduct of the war, the White House in 2006 appointed General David Petraeus as the Commanding General of the coalition forces. "Tell Me How This Ends" is an inside account of his attempt to turn around a failing war.

Linda Robinson conducted extensive interviews with Petraeus and his subordinate commanders and spent weeks with key U.S. and Iraqi divisions. The result is the only book that ties together military operations in Iraq and the internecine political drama that is at the heart of the civil war.

Replete with dramatic battles, behind-doors confrontations, and astute analysis, the book tells the full story of the Iraq War's endgame, and lays out the options that will be facing the next president when he or she takes office in January 2009.

This monograph examines prewar planning efforts for the reconstruction of postwar Iraq. It then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003, through June 2004. Finally, it examines civilian efforts at reconstruction, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services.

Chris Terrill is a man in search of his limit. He's 55 years old. He is not a soldier. He is being trained by the Royal Marines and he is going to Afghanistan. The only difference is that instead of a gun, Chris will be holding a camera and filming the whole ordeal for a major TV series. The Royal Marines Commando training base in Lympstone Devon, has a famous motto: '99.9% need not apply'. Of those who start training, after a very tough selection process, nearly 50% fail to make it through the most gruelling physical tests of any armed forces in the world in an eight month training regime. The elite who do eventually pass out are generally eighteen years old and at the peak of physical condition. But Chris Terrill is the exception: this book will tell of his heroic struggle to become the oldest man to win the coveted Royal Marines Commando Green Beret and enter the record books. And after six months of hell, what next? Chris will follow the raw recruits on a tour to Southern Afghanistan. He will tell the story in book and film of the fears and hopes of the youngsters as they are plunged into one of the planet's most dangerous wars in the outlaw mountain terrain of Helmand Province. He will tell of ferocious battles against the Taliban, of firefights, of jaw-dropping heroism, British sang froid and humour and tragedy as causalities are suffered -- all from the unique perspective of a civilian who has achieved the ultimate accolade: to be accepted as an honorary Royal Marines Commando. Commando is a brilliant account of modern war on the front line.

It was supposed to be quick and easy. The Bush Administration even promised that it wouldn't cost American taxpayers a thing - Iraqi oil revenues would pay for it all. But billions and billions of dollars and thousands of lives later, the Iraqi reconstruction is an undeniable failure. Iraq pumps out less oil now than it did under Saddam. At best, Iraqis average all of twelve hours a day of electricity. American soldiers lack body armour and adequate protection for their motor vehicles. Increasingly worse off, Iraqis turn against us. Increasingly worse off, our troops are killed by a strengthening insurgency. As T. Christian Miller reveals in this searing and timely book, the Bush Administration has fatally undermined the war effort and our soldiers by handing out mountains of cash not to the best companies for the reconstruction effort, but to buddies, cronies, relatives and political hacks - some of whom have simply taken the money and run with it.