The story begins in 2007 when Deborah Campbell travels undercover to Damascus to report on the exodus of Iraqis into Syria following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. There she meets and hires Ahlam, a refugee working as a "fixer" - providing Western media with trustworthy information and contacts. Ahlam has fled her home in Iraq after being kidnapped while running a humanitarian center. Strong and charismatic, she has become an unofficial leader of the refugee community in Damascus, supporting her husband and two children through her work with foreign journalists, and working to set up a makeshift school for displaced girls. Campbell is inspired by Ahlam's determination to create something good amid so much suffering, and the two women become close friends. But one morning Ahlam is seized from her home in front of Campbell's eyes. Haunted by the prospect that their work together has led to her friend's arrest, Campbell spends the months that follow trying to find her - all the while fearing she could be next. The compelling story of two women caught up in the shadowy politics behind today's most searing conflict, A Disappearance in Damascus reminds us of the courage of those who risk their lives to bring us the world's news.

Over the last five years, a cycle of films has emerged addressing the ongoing Iraq conflict. Some became well-known and one of them, " The Hurt Locker," won a string of Oscars. But many others disappeared into obscurity. What is it about these films that led "Variety "to dub them a "toxic genre"?Martin Barker analyses the production and reception of these recent Iraq war films. Among the issues he examines are the borrowing of soldiers' YouTube styles of self-representation to generate an "authentic" Iraq experience, and how they take refuge in "apolitical" post-traumatic stress disorder. Barker also looks afresh at some classic issues in film theory: the problems of accounting for film "failures"; the shaping role of production systems; the significance of genre-naming; and the impact of that "toxic" label. "A 'Toxic Genre'" is fascinating reading for film studies students and anyone with an interest in cinema's portrayal of modern warfare.

"In The Naval Air War in Korea, Dr. Hallion has captured the fact, feel- ing, and fancy of a very important conflict in aviation history, in- cluding the highly significant facets of the transition from piston to jet-propelled combat aircraft."--Norman Polmar, author of Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 18th Edition

Debriefing the President presents an astounding, candid portrait of one of our era's most notorious strongmen. John Nixon, the first man to conduct a prolonged interrogation of Hussein after his capture, offers expert insight into the history and mind of America's most enigmatic enemy. In December 2003, after one of the largest, most aggressive manhunts in history, US military forces captured Iraqi president Saddam Hussein near his hometown of Tikrit. Beset by body-double rumors and false alarms during a nine-month search, the Bush administration needed positive identification of the prisoner before it could make the announcement that would rocket around the world. At the time, John Nixon was a senior CIA leadership analyst who had spent years studying the Iraqi dictator. Called upon to make the official ID, Nixon looked for telltale scars and tribal tattoos and asked Hussein a list of questions only he could answer. The man was indeed Saddam Hussein, but as Nixon learned in the ensuing weeks, both he and America had greatly misunderstood just who Saddam Hussein really was. After years of parsing Hussein's leadership from afar, Nixon faithfully recounts his debriefing sessions and subsequently strips away the mythology surrounding an equally brutal and complex man. His account is not an apology, but a sobering examination of how preconceived ideas led Washington policymakers-and the Bush White House-astray. Unflinching and unprecedented, Debriefing the President exposes a fundamental misreading of one of the modern world's most central figures and presents a new narrative that boldly counters the received account.

In Band 9 der zehnbandigen Gesamtstudie Vom Raketenschach der Kubakrise zum Krieg gegen den Terrorismus," Resultat eines von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft DFG unterstutzten Forschungsprojektes, soll der Fokus wieder zuruckschwenken auf den Kriegsschauplatz Afghanistan, nun wird der Zeitraum von 2004 bis 2010/2011 betrachtet: Analog zu den Kapiteln zum Afghanistankrieg in den 80er Jahren in Band 5 geht es an dieser Stelle nicht um die Beschreibung einzelner Militaroperationen gegen die wiedererstarkten Taliban, sondern vielmehr um die sicherheitspolitischen Determinanten in der Gesamtregion AfPak (plus Indien). Die Studie thematisiert eingehend die Unterstutzung des pakistanischen Geheimdienstes ISI fur die Extremisten und beleuchtet die aktuell vom pakistanischen Nuklearwaffenarsenal ausgehenden Gefahren, inklusive der nuklearen Ambitionen von al-Qaida. Hier werden naturlich Brucken zuruckgeschlagen zu vorhergehenden Episoden; um hier nur wenige Beispiele anzufuhren: Der mit der Aufsicht uber das pakistanische Nuklearwaffenarsenal beauftragte Generaldirektor der Strategic Plans Division der Joint Services Headquarters" der pakistanischen Streitkrafte, Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, war im Dezember 1971 als junger Offizier in indische Gefangenschaft geraten und hatte spater bei einer pakistanischen Schutztruppe gedient, die sich in Saudi-Arabien um die Sicherheit des Herrscherhauses kummern sollte. Und was die nuklearen Optionen und Doktrinen der Atommachte Pakistan und Indien anbetrifft, so werden unerwartete Reminiszenzen wach an die Konfrontation zwischen NATO und Warschauer Pakt im Kalten Krieg (etwa bei der verstorenden pakistanischen Sehjra-Option"). Die indischen Militarstrategen, welche traditionell der Sundarji Doctrine" mit ihren massiven Operationen anhingen, vollzogen gerade im Gefolge der Twin Peaks Crisis" (der Konfrontation mit Pakistan 2001/2002) den Wandel hin zum Cold Start"-Konzept fur begrenzte, selektive Operationen. Im Zuge des US-Schlages gegen die Festung Osama" in Abbottabad sind in Islamabad Befurchtungen laut geworden, Indien konnte analoge Kommandoaktionen gegen Ziele in Pakistan durchfuhren - Kommandoaktionen, wie sie gerade in besagtem Cold Start"-Konzept tatsachlich vorgesehen sind. Und schliesslich analysiert die Studie den Weg der Obama-Administration hin zu surge" in Afghanistan (Ende 2009) und die mit jenem Strategiewandel hin zur COIN verbundenen muhsamen Fortschritte bzw. Ruckschlage. Den ultimativen Schlusspunkt in jener Darstellung bildet dann der Raid der SEALs gegen Osama bin Ladens Anwesen in Abbottabad und die schwere Krise in den amerikanisch-pakistanischen Beziehungen. Bei jener Reise durch die jungsten Dekaden der Militargeschichte hat die Studie immer wieder auch die einzelnen Entwicklungsphasen und Zwischenetappen der Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) bzw. der Militarischen Transformation" beleuchtet, angefangen vom Einsatz der Prototypen der Prazisionsmunition (PGMs) und der ersten Drohnen im Vietnamkrieg bzw. im Jom-Kippur-Krieg (vgl. die Bande 3 und 4) uber die Debatten zum Themenbereich nukleare PGMs" und mini-nukes" in der Nuklearen Planungsgruppe der NATO (vgl. Band 2) bis schliesslich hin zur Entwicklung des AirLand Battle-Konzeptes (vgl. Band 6) und zum Kriegsbild des Golfkrieges 1990/91 (vgl. Band 7). Diesen roten Faden aufgreifend widmet sich die Studie nun der Frage, inwieweit das neue" Kriegsbild (die aus dem Irak und aus Afghanistan bekannten asymmetrischen Konfliktszenarien und die COIN-Gegenrezepte) auch Einfluss nehmen auf die aktuellen bzw. bevorstehenden Phasen der Militarischen Transformation"

Invisible Scars provides the first extended exploration of Commonwealth Division psychiatry during the Korean War and the psychiatric-care systems in place for the thousands of soldiers who fought in that conflict. Fitzpatrick demonstrates that although Commonwealth forces were generally successful in returning psychologically traumatized servicemen to duty, they failed to compensate or support in a meaningful way veterans returning to civilian life. Moreover, ignorance at home contributed to widespread misunderstanding of their condition. This book offers an intimate look into the history of psychological trauma. In addition, it engages with current disability, pensions, and compensation issues that remain hotly contested.

'This is what an SAS career is really like' AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE MAGAZINE Elite SAS Patrol Commander Stuart 'Nev' Bonner takes us inside the extraordinary and dangerous world of secret combat operations in this explosive, behind-the-scenes look at life inside the SAS. A world where capture means torture or death, and every move is trained for with precision detail to bring elite soldiers to the very peak of fighting ability. In a career spanning twenty years, fourteen of them in the SAS, Bonner shares with us the inside story of being out in front - and often behind enemy lines. From patrolling the mountains of East Timor to covert operations in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, from sweeping into the Iraqi desert ahead of invading US forces to cripple Saddam Hussein's communications to patrolling in war-torn Baghdad and being in the middle of the disastrous Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan - this is a no-holds-barred account of what it's like to live, eat and breathe SAS. Now part of the HACHETTE MILITARY COLLECTION.

Canada's six-year military mission in Afghanistan's Kandahar province was one of the most intense and challenging moments in Canadian foreign affairs since the Korean War. A complex war fought in an inhospitable environment, the Afghanistan mission tested the mettle not just of Canada's soldiers but also of its politicians, public servants, and policy makers. In Adapting in the Dust, Stephen M. Saideman considers how well the Canadian government, media, and public managed the challenge. Building on interviews with military officers, civilian officials, and politicians, Saideman shows how key actors in Canada's political system, including the prime minister, the political parties, and parliament, responded to the demands of a costly and controversial mission. Some adapted well; others adapted poorly or - worse yet - in ways that protected careers but harmed the mission itself. Adapting in the Dust is a vital evaluation of how well Canada's institutions, parties, and policy makers responded to the need to oversee and sustain a military intervention overseas, and an important guide to what will have to change in order to do better next time.

Grappling with centuries-old feuds, defeating a shrewd insurgency, and navigating the sometimes paralyzing bureaucracy of the U.S. military are issues that prompt sleepless nights for both policy makers in Washington and soldiers at war, albeit for different reasons. Few, however, have dealt with these issues in the White House situation room and on the front line. Michael G. Waltz has done just that, working as a policy advisor to Vice President Richard B. Cheney and also serving in the mountains of Afghanistan as a Green Beret, directly implementing strategy in the field that he helped devise in Washington. In Warrior Diplomat: A Green Beret's Battles from Washington to Afghanistan, Waltz shares his unique firsthand experiences, revealing the sights, sounds, emotions, and complexities involved in the war in Afghanistan. Waltz also highlights the policy issues that have plagued the war effort throughout the past decade, from the drug trade, to civilian casualties, to a lack of resources in comparison to Iraq, to the overall coalition strategy. At the same time, he points out that stabilizing Afghanistan and the region remains crucial to national security and that a long-term commitment along the lines of South Korea or Germany is imperative if America is to remain secure.

Mit Band 7 verlasst die zehnbandige Gesamtstudie Vom Raketenschach der Kubakrise zum Krieg gegen den Terrorismus," Resultat eines von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft DFG unterstutzten Forschungsprojektes, die Ara des Kalten Krieges. Als eine analytische Brucke zwischen den beiden Hemispharen" der Langen Kriege fungiert nun die Darstellung des Golfkrieges von 1990/91. Die Studie prasentiert zum einen die jungsten Erkenntnisse zu den Motiven Saddam Husseins und zur Disposition der irakischen Streitkrafte (etwa betreffend den Einsatz der Scud-Systeme oder von Massenvernichtungswaffen). Zum anderen wirft die Untersuchung einen Blick auf die Entscheidungsprozesse auf amerikanischer Seite, unter Betonung der Unterschiede wie der Parallelen zur Vorgeschichte des Irakkrieges 2003: So werden die Debatten innerhalb des Fuhrungszirkels von George H.W. Bush analysiert, welche gekennzeichnet waren von Spannungen zwischen JCS-Chairman Colin Powell und Verteidigungsminister Dick Cheney. James Bakers Allianzdiplomatie soll ebenso betrachtet werden wie die Anatomie der amerikanisch-israelischen Beziehungen. Und auch das Verhaltnis zwischen der US-Regierung und dem Hause Saud wird sehr eingehend beleuchtet (und dies schlagt den Bogen zuruck zu den Ausfuhrungen uber die amerikanisch-saudischen Beziehungen in den 70er und 80er Jahren in den Banden 4 und 5): Dabei werden etwa neue Forschungsergebnisse verarbeitet, welche die Cheney-Mission nach Djiddah und die Audienz bei Konig Fahd vom 7. August 1990 in ein neues Licht rucken. Aber auch andere Aspekte jenes Golfkrieges wie die Arbeit der US-Nachrichtendienste, die Triumphe, aber auch die Defizite der amerikanischen Aufklarung, werden thematisiert. Dann vollzieht die Studie einen Zeitsprung und blendet uber in die Zeit nach den Terroranschlagen des 11. September 2001: Das nun folgende Kapitel behandelt die erste Phase des Afghanistankrieges 2001/2002 und stellt die von der Bush-Administration begangenen Kardinalfehler heraus - bei der Jagd auf Osama bin Laden wie auch bei der Stabilisierung Afghanistans. Exemplarisch werden die Gefechte um Tora Bora und die Operation Anaconda" im Detail analysiert. Eine Ursache fur jenes Scheitern, fur jene bei der Befriedung Afghanistans von Anfang an begangenen Konstruktionsfehler liegt naturlich in der Konzentration der Administration von George W. Bush auf den Lieblingsfeind" Saddam Hussein begrundet.

Contemporary Military Strategy and the Global War on Terror offers an in-depth analysis of US/UK military strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2001 to the present day. It explores the development of contemporary military strategy in the West in the modern age before interrogating its application in the Global War on Terror. The book provides detailed insights into the formulation of military plans by political and military elites in the United States and United Kingdom for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Alastair Finlan highlights the challenges posed by each of these unique theatres of operation, the nature of the diverse enemies faced by coalition forces, and the shortcomings in strategic thinking about these campaigns. This fresh perspective on strategy in the West and how it has been applied in recent military campaigns facilitates a deep understanding of how wars have been and will be fought. Including key terms, concepts and discussion questions for each chapter, Contemporary Military Strategy and the Global War on Terror is a crucial text in strategic studies, and required reading for anyone interested in the new realities of transnational terrorism and twenty-first century warfare.

What were the causes of the Iraq War? Who were the main players? How was the war sold to the decision makers? Despite all that has been written on the Iraq war the myriad scholarly, journalistic and polemical works the answers to these questions remain shrouded in an ideological mist. TheRoad to Iraq is an empirical investigation that dispels this fog.
Discover how a small but ideologically coherent and socially cohesive group of determined political agents used the contingency of 9/11 to overwhelm a sceptical foreign policy establishment, military brass and intelligence apparatus.

In February 1989, the CIA's chief in Islamabad famously cabled headquarters a simple message: "We Won." It was an understated coda to the most successful covert intelligence operation in American history. In What We Won , CIA and National Security Council veteran Bruce Riedel tells the story of America's secret war in Afghanistan and the defeat of the Soviet 40th Red Army in the war that proved to be the final battle of the cold war. He seeks to answer one simple question - why did this intelligence operation succeed so brilliantly? Riedel has the vantage point few others can offer: He was ensconced in the CIA's Operations Center when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979. The invasion took the intelligence community by surprise. But the response, initiated by Jimmy Carter and accelerated by Ronald Reagan, was a masterful intelligence enterprise. Many books have been written about intelligence failures - from Pearl Harbor to 9/11. Much less has been written about how and why intelligence operations succeed. The answer is complex. It involves both the weaknesses and mistakes of America's enemies, as well as good judgment and strengths of the United States. Riedel introduces and explores the complex personalities pitted in the war - the Afghan communists, the Russians, the Afghan mujahedin, the Saudis, and the Pakistanis. And then there are the Americans - in this war, no Americans fought on the battlefield. The CIA did not send officers into Afghanistan to fight or even to train. In 1989, victory for the American side of the cold war seemed complete. Now we can see that a new era was also beginning in the Afghan war in the 1980s, the era of the global jihad. This book examines the lessons we can learn from this intelligence operation for the future and makes some observations on what came next in Afghanistan - and what is likely yet to come.

Band 8 der Gesamtstudie Vom Raketenschach der Kubakrise zum Krieg gegen den Terrorismus," Resultat eines von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft DFG unterstutzten Forschungsprojektes, stellt den Irakkrieg der Administration von George W. Bush ins Zentrum der Analysen. Bei der Behandlung jenes weiten Themenfeldes setzt die Studie folgende Schwerpunkte: Besonderes Interesse gilt zum einen der Vorbereitungsphase, dem militarischen Planungsprozess (gepragt insbesondere durch administrationsinterne Grabenkampfe und durch die Spannungen zwischen Rumsfeld und den Spitzenmilitars) und der Vernachlassigung der Stabilisierungsoperationen. In diesem Kontext wird nicht zuletzt auch auf zwei bemerkenswerte Konfliktsimulationen eingegangen, auf Desert Crossing" von 1999 und auf Millennium Challenge 2002." Einen weiteren Schwerpunkt markiert die Darstellung der Entscheidungsprozesse in Washington, welche dann 2006/2007 den Weg fur die surge" im Irak bereiteten. Dazwischengeschaltet ist ein Theoriekapitel, welches sich mit den Charakteristika und Paradoxien des asymmetrischen Krieges und mit den Grundzugen von Counterinsurgency-Operationen (COIN) beschaftigt."

Since the American Revolution, African American women have served in every U.S. military conflict. Despite this dedicated service to their country, very little empirical research has been published regarding African American servicewomen, including those who have served in the Gulf Wars. Seen through the eyes of eleven African American servicewomen, this book explores issues such as health care, child care, sexism/sexual harassment, racism, religion, military promotions/career advancement, and serving in combat zones. Their stories illuminate the types of professional, sociological, and interpersonal experiences black servicewomen have encountered during their time in the Gulf Wars. To learn more about Marching as to War, check out Elizabeth Desnoyers-Colas' blog post at http: //rhetoricraceandreligion.blogspot.com/2014/05/stories-that-must-be-told-sharing.html

Military, social and economic historians have long appreciated the significance of the conflict in Korea in shaping the post-war world. The policy of containment was formed, China was established as an important military power, and the US increased its military expenditure fourfold as a result of a conflict which killed over 33,000 Americans. What has been less appreciated is the role played by the United Nations and the British Commonwealth in influencing US strategy at this time of crisis: the Truman administration invested time and effort into gaining UN approval for the conflict in Korea, and the course of the war was adapted to keep UN allies, often holding crucial strategic positions in other Cold War theatres, in tow. Robert Barnes develops a fresh perspective on these fluctuating relationships, the tensions between Washington and its British Commonwealth allies and their impact on the direction of the conflict in order to challenge the common view that the United States was able to use its dominant position within the UN to pursue its Cold War ambitions with impunity. This important new interpretation is supported by evidence from a wealth of sources, from official government records to private papers and memoirs written by the most important American and Commonwealth personalities directly involved in shaping the UN's response to the conflict. This study presents a thorough deconstruction of the decision-making process behind US handling of the Korean War from the outbreak of conflict in 1950 to the Geneva Conference of 1954. This will be essential reading for students of International Relations, Cold War Studies and modern History.

The war in Afghanistan has been a major policy commitment and central undertaking of the Canadian state since 2001: Canada has been a leading force in the war, and has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on aid and reconstruction. After a decade of conflict, however, there is considerable debate about the efficacy of the mission, as well as calls to reassess Canada's role in the conflict. An authoritative and strongly analytical work, Empire's Ally provides a much-needed critical investigation into one of the most polarizing events of our time. This collection draws on new primary evidence - including government documents, think tank and NGO reports, international media files, and interviews in Afghanistan - to provide context for Canadian foreign policy, to offer critical perspectives on the war itself, and to link the conflict to broader issues of political economy, international relations, and Canada's role on the world stage. Spanning academic and public debates, Empire's Ally opens a new line of argument on why the mission has entered a stage of crisis.

Security force assistance (SFA) is a central pillar of the counterinsurgency campaign being waged by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. This monograph analyzes SFA efforts in Afghanistan over time, documents U.S. and international approaches to building the Afghan force from 2001 to 2009, and provides observations and recommendations that emerged from extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan in 2009 and their implications for the U.S. Army. This title analyzes security force assistance efforts in Afghanistan, focusing on lessons and themes that emerged from extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan in 2009 and their implications for the U.S. Army.

The war in Afghanistan has been a major policy commitment and central undertaking of the Canadian state since 2001: Canada has been a leading force in the war, and has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on aid and reconstruction. After a decade of conflict, however, there is considerable debate about the efficacy of the mission, as well as calls to reassess Canada's role in the conflict. An authoritative and strongly analytical work, Empire's Ally provides a much-needed critical investigation into one of the most polarizing events of our time. This collection draws on new primary evidence - including government documents, think tank and NGO reports, international media files, and interviews in Afghanistan - to provide context for Canadian foreign policy, to offer critical perspectives on the war itself, and to link the conflict to broader issues of political economy, international relations, and Canada's role on the world stage. Spanning academic and public debates, Empire's Ally opens a new line of argument on why the mission has entered a stage of crisis.

A true-life adventure sure to shock as well as inspire.

AK47s, masked thugs, and brutal urgency erupt from Roy Hallums' account of his abduction in Iraq, shredding through those frequently sterile cable news reports revealing that another "American contractor is being held hostage . . ."

Hallums was the everyman behind that report―a 56-year-old retired Naval commander working as a food supply contractor in Baghdad's high-end Mansour District.

His abduction was transacted in a matter of minutes, amidst a hail of gunfire and a handful of casualties. For the first few months of his captivity, Hallums endured beatings and psychological torture while being shuffled from one ramshackle safe house to another.

From the four-foot-tall crawlspace where he carried out the bulk of his nearly year-long abduction, Hallums established a surprising degree of normalcy―a system of routines and timekeeping, along with an attention to the particulars that defined his horrific ordeal. His experience is recreated here, rich with harrowing specifics and surprising observations.

Here is the firsthand account of a member of one of the United States Army's three-man Tactical Psychological Operations Teams, groups of men tasked with winning the hearts and minds of Iraq's civilian population through leaflets, loudspeakers, conversation, and bribery. Transcribed from and inspired by Russell Snyder's personal wartime journal, it is a story of introspection, relating how the feelings of eagerness and uncertainty in a young man unfamiliar with war were replaced with the dread knowledge that, buried within his soul, beneath a facade of goodwill and morality, lurked the capacity to kill his fellow men. There are scenes of battle retold within the pages of Hearts and Mines, descriptions of the feelings of seeing once-familiar human bodies destroyed beyond recognition. Some days are described as being full of hope and appreciation for the beauty of the world, others with despair for the omnipresent cruelty and destruction which has a habit of consuming men when they feel unaccountable for their actions. It captures the sensory experience of living in a singular environment full of strange plants and animals, friends true and false, and determined enemies, encapsulating the existential fear of mortar and rocket attacks, as well as the ridiculousness of military bureaucracy, such as was demonstrated by a sergeant major's decision to punish graffiti artists by removing the doors of all the camp's toilets.

"On previous flight ops, when a launch was delayed, we usually passed the time telling jokes or exchanging the latest scuttlebutt. Tonight was different. Each of us sat silently with our own thoughts. All of us, I'm sure, made impossible promises to God, and I was one of them. My gut was wound so tight, it was hard to breathe, no less talk. For the umpteenth time, I tightened the harness of my chute. I remember praying, 'Whatever else happens, don't make me bail out of this thing '"
With little to no recognition from the general public, navy enlisted aircrewmen performed heroically in the Korean War. Manning radios and radar, they were indispensable to the success of missions. Aviation Electronics Technician Second Class Jack Sauter was one such aircrewman. Assigned to the USS "Midway" and the USS "Lake Champlain," he flew twenty-one early warning and antisubmarine missions from the backseat of a Douglas Skyraider with Task Force 77 off Korea in support of our troops.
From the excitement and thrill of being catapulted from the deck of an aircraft carrier to the tedium of service at sea, the author describes in detail his service in the Korean air war.